collective opinion. The psychological phenomenon of collective opinion in a military team. Aspects of studying collective opinion, collective mood and intra-collective traditions in a military unit

Collective opinion - is a set of value judgments, which expresses the attitude of the mass (majority) of the team to various events in the life of society, to the actions, behavior and activities of both the entire team and each person in it.

Thus, as can be seen from the definition, collective opinion (KM) is a massive socio-psychological phenomenon that develops under the influence of ideology in the process of communication and interaction of people, their constantly live exchange of thoughts, views, beliefs, feelings.

KM is a specific form of reflection of public consciousness. That is, KM affects the education of the personality of a serviceman and a military team, because. KM is a factor of influence on consciousness.

Socio-psychological mechanism of the impact of CM on personality

In interaction with the collective, the individual is a self-regulating system in the social environment. CM in this case can be considered as a feedback channel and as the most important source of socio-psychological information from the social environment for the individual.

The social environment informs a person about the reaction to his actions and deeds from other people, and thus contributes to making adequate decisions.

Social environment includes

system of norms

social sanctions

Praise

condemnation

Thus, CM combines persuasion, suggestion, psychological coercion.

The strength of the collective is in its public opinion, but there is conscious and unconscious in KM. Sometimes the opinion of the collective is perceived by the individual not critically; unconsciously, to think like everyone else.

The peculiarity of the manifestation of KM to the personality

Systematic

Indisputable

Efficiency

Publicity

Also a feature of KM are stamps , that last a long time (first impression, characteristics of a senior leader, etc.).

CM causes a person's conscious self-esteem, through emotions and feelings.

Positive emotions - satisfaction, joy, dignity, duty, honor.

Negative emotions - shame, remorse, etc.

KM dynamics

Public opinion originates initially in the sphere of individual consciousness and in the form of an impression.

Stages of CM formation

Stage I - people directly experience events, evaluate them

Stage II - exchange feelings, assessments. At this stage, the opinion, as it were, crosses the border of the individual to the group assessment.

Stage III - in the process of discussion, public opinion is formed.

Characteristics of the collective mood (KH)

KN is special case joint experiences that for some time took possession of the whole community and every person in it.

KN is predominantly the emotional side of the spiritual life of the team.

The main properties of the Collective / Opinion / Mood

Predominantly due to social factors, the mood of the individual is influenced by physiological (hunger ...), psychological level of emotional state), social factors. Social factors act as the material and spiritual side of people's lives.

Special contagiousness - KN is the most mobile element in psychology. The contagiousness of CI is determined by the fact of contact and direct communication in the conditions of the life of a military team. The contagiousness of CI is based on the socio-psychological law of imitation (fashion, behavior, etc.).

KN has great motivating power. KN is not just a mechanical sum of the moods of the team members, they seem to come into resonance and increase the emotional side of the mood.

The special dynamics of group mood - passes from one form to another - from the unconscious to the clearly conscious, from hidden to open.

Turns into action quickly

It is subject to fluctuations and in the most insignificant time can turn into its opposite.

KN acts as an emotional factor. Thus, under the influence of danger, a feeling of excitement arises in the form of fusion, organic unity or despondency, despair, fear, panic.

A person's reaction to the presence of others manifests itself in the form of a fan of a wide variety of effects.

Group Effects- these are the mechanisms of the functioning of the group, through which group processes are carried out and group states are achieved. They are the means that ensure the integration of individual actions in joint group activities and communication. Here are the main group effects:

The effect of social facilitation (inhibition).

The "belonging to a group" effect.

Ringelmann effect.

"Synergy" effect.

Groupthink effect.

The effect of "conformity".

The effect of "fashion" (imitation).

"halo" effect.

The "group favoritism" effect.

The effect of "group selfishness".

"Pendulum" effect.

Wave effect.

Pulsar effect.

Boomerang effect.

The “we-they” effect.

The effect of social facilitation. The effect is associated with an increase in dominant responses in the presence of others. This effect was discovered by Norman Triplet in 1897. Triplet's experiment was to study the results of the influence of the competition situation on the change in the speed of the cyclist and compare them with the results obtained in a single race. Triplet found that cyclists show the best time when they compete with each other, and not with a stopwatch, and concluded that the presence of others spurs people to more vigorous action.

The effect of the presence of others can either increase or decrease a person's motivation. For example, the presence of others reduces the effectiveness of human activity when memorizing meaningless syllables, when passing through a maze, and when solving complex multiplication examples.

Increased social arousal promotes a dominant response. However, when the solution algorithm is known and the person does not see the correct answer, social arousal, i.e., an unconscious reaction to the presence of others, makes mental operations (analysis, synthesis, establishing cause-and-effect relationships) difficult and leads to an incorrect decision. The attention of a person switches from solving a problem to the people around him. When deciding simple tasks the reaction is innate or well learned. The presence of other people is the strongest stimulant and contributes to the correct decision.

Social psychologist D. Myers believes that the determining factors of such reactions are:

The number of people around. The impact of others increases as their number increases. A person is much more excited when surrounded by a large number of people;

Relationships of sympathy or antipathy within the group;

The importance of the surrounding people for a person;

The degree of proximity between people. Social arousal is the stronger, the closer people are to each other.

The effect of belonging to a group. The English psychologist MacDougall in 1908 in his book "Social Psychology" singled out among other instincts the feeling of belonging to a group of people.

English psychologists G. Tejfel and J. Turner in the late 70s studied the process of an individual's awareness of belonging to a group, designating it with the term "group identification". They created a theory of social identity, the main provisions of which are as follows: a person, identifying himself with any group, seeks to evaluate it positively, thus raising the status of the group and his own self-esteem.

Group identity is an attitude towards belonging to a particular group. Like any attitude, it consists of three components - cognitive, emotional and behavioral - and regulates the behavior of a person in a group.

cognitive the component consists in a person's awareness of belonging to a group and is achieved by comparing his group with other groups according to a number of significant features. Thus, the basis of group identity is the cognitive processes of cognition (categorization) of the surrounding social world.

Emotional component is inextricably linked with the cognitive component. The emotional side of identity consists in experiencing one's belonging to a group in the form of various feelings - love or hate, pride or shame.

Behavioral the component manifests itself when a person begins to react to other people from the positions of his group membership, and not from the positions of an individual, from the moment when the differences between his own and other groups become noticeable and significant for him.

Ringelmann effect. As the number of members increases, the average individual contribution to group work decreases. This effect was discovered by a student of V. Mede, Max Ringelman. He found that the collective performance of a group does not exceed half of the sum of the performance of its members, that is, the members of the group are actually less motivated and make less effort when performing joint actions than when performing individual actions.

M. Ringelman experimented with lifting weights by a group and individuals. It turned out that if the productivity of one person is taken as 100%, then two people together, on average, will lift a weight that is not twice as much, but only 93% of the total weight lifted by two people working separately. The "efficiency factor" of a group of three people will be equal to 85%, and of eight people - only 49%. Ringelman proposed a formula for determining the average individual contribution of participants in groups of different sizes:

C \u003d 100 - 7 * (K-1),

where C is the average individual contribution of the participants; K is the number of group members.

B. Lataine in 1979 described the phenomenon of a non-interfering witness. After conducting a series of various experiments, he proved that the very number of witnesses to a tragic incident prevents any of them from helping. An accident victim is less likely to get help if a large number of people are watching her suffering. The following pattern was found: the probability of receiving help is higher if a person is in small group, and much lower if it is surrounded by a large number of people.

Factors of social laziness are:

The presence of individual responsibility for the results of their work. The higher the responsibility, the lower the social laziness;

Group cohesion and friendships. People in groups goof off less if they are friends rather than strangers;

Group size. How more strength groups, the higher the social laziness;

Cross-cultural differences. Members of collectivistic cultures exhibit less social laziness than members of individualistic cultures;

Gender differences. Women are less socially lazy than men.

"Synergy" effect. This is an additional intellectual energy that arises when people are united into an integral group and is expressed in a group result that exceeds the sum of individual results, i.e. meets the requirement 1+1>2. This group effect was studied by V. M. Bekhterev. In his works and the works of M. V. Lange, it was established that group success in work can indeed exceed the individual success of individuals. This is manifested not only in the intellectual sphere, but also in an increase in the observation of people in a group, the accuracy of their perception and assessments, the amount of memory and attention, the effectiveness of solving relatively simple tasks that do not require complex and coordinated interaction. However, when solving complex problems, when logic and consistency are needed, "especially gifted people", in the terminology of Bekhterev, can exceed the average group achievements.

The effect of "synergy" is most clearly manifested during "brainstorming" - "brainstorming", when the group needs to offer many new ideas without their critical analysis and logical reflection.

groupthink effect. It is a way of thinking acquired by people in a situation where the search for agreement becomes so dominant in a cohesive group that it begins to overpower a realistic assessment of possible alternative actions. The discovery of this phenomenon and the invention of the term "groupthink" (group think), or "group thinking", belongs to the American psychologist Irving Janis. The effect of "groupthink" occurs in a situation where the criterion of truth is the cohesive opinion of the group, which is opposed to the opinion of an individual. When group members are faced with the threat of disagreement, disputes and conflicts, they try to reduce group cognitive dissonance and eliminate the resulting negative feelings, trying to find a solution that suits everyone, even if this solution is not objective and reasonable from the point of view of everyone. individual member of the group.

Usually, for a group involved in such a decision-making strategy, the search for consensus becomes so important that group members voluntarily give up any doubts and opportunities to look at the problem with a new, original, unconventional view. Individual members of the group can even turn into a kind of "guardians of thought", quickly fixing and severely punishing any dissent.

Thus, a person is dependent on the group in his contacts with the outside world, in the vast majority of cases he is inclined to yield to the group. Even a person's sensory information can be distorted by social pressure.

conformity effect. In 1956, Solomon Ash used the term "conformism" and described the results of his experiments with a front group and a naive subject. A group of seven people were asked to participate in an experiment to study the perception of the length of segments. It was necessary to determine which of the three segments drawn on the poster corresponds to the reference one. At the first stage, dummy subjects alone gave, as a rule, the correct answer. At the second stage, the group got together and the members of the group gave a false answer, which was unknown to the naive subject. With their categorical opinion, the members of the group exerted pressure on the opinion of the subject. According to Ash, 37% of his subjects listened to the opinion of the group and showed conformity. The study of the conformity effect is very popular in social psychology. There are several conditions for the emergence of conformity:

personality type: people with low self-esteem are more susceptible to group pressure than people with high self-esteem;

group size: people show the greatest degree of conformity when they are faced with the unanimous opinion of three or more people;

composition of the group: conformity increases if, firstly, the group consists of experts, secondly, the members of the group are significant people for a person, thirdly, the members of the group belong to the same social environment;

groupthink trap among people;

cohesion: the greater the degree of cohesion of the group, the more power it has over its members;

having an ally: if a person who defends his opinion or doubts the unanimous opinion of the group is joined by at least one ally who gave the correct answer, then the tendency to submit to the pressure of the group falls;

public response: more high level people show conformity when they have to speak to others, and not when they write down their answers in their notebooks. Having expressed an opinion publicly, people tend to stick to it.

The degree of conformity increases if the task is difficult or the subject feels incompetent.

D. Myers names three reasons for conformal behavior. First, the persistent and stubborn behavior of other people can convince a person of the fallacy of his original opinion. Secondly, a member of the group consciously or unconsciously seeks to avoid punishment, censure, condemnation, ostracism from the group for disagreement and disobedience. Thirdly, the uncertainty of the situation and the vagueness of information contribute to the orientation of a person to the opinions of other people, they become definite and clear sources of information.

In group interaction, the effect of conformism plays a significant role, since it is one of the mechanisms for making a group decision.

The effect of fashion (imitation). Imitation is one of the main mechanisms of group integration. In the process of group interaction, group members develop common standards, stereotypes of behavior, following which emphasizes and strengthens their membership in the group. In external terms, such stereotyping can even result in a uniform (for example, a military uniform, a business suit for a businessman, a doctor's white coat), which shows others which one social group belongs to this or that person, what norms, rules and stereotypes regulate his behavior. People are more likely to follow the example of someone who is similar to them than someone who is not.

The imitation effect underlies any learning and contributes to the adaptation of people to each other, the consistency of their actions, and their readiness to solve a group problem. It is close to the effect of conformism. However, if in conformism the group somehow puts pressure on its member, then in imitation, following group requirements is voluntary.

"halo" effect. This the influence on the content of knowledge, opinions, personality assessments of a specific attitude that one person has in relation to another. The “halo” effect, or “halo effect”, is a phenomenon that occurs when people perceive and evaluate each other in the process of communication.

The halo effect occurs when:

time deficit. A person does not have time to thoroughly get to know another person and carefully consider his personal qualities or the situation in which he finds himself;

information overload. A person is so overloaded with information about various people that he does not have the opportunity and time to think in detail about each separately;

the insignificance of another person. Accordingly, a vague, indefinite idea of the other, his "halo" arises;

perception stereotype. Arises on the basis of a generalized idea of a large group of people, to which this person belongs to one or another parameter;

brightness, eccentricity of personality. Some kind of personality trait catches the eye of others and pushes into the background all her other qualities. Physical attractiveness is often just such a trait.

In a negative sense, this effect is manifested in an underestimation of the merits of the object of perception, which leads to prejudice in relation to it on the part of perceiving people. Prejudice is a specific setting of subjects based on information about the negative qualities of the object. Such information, as a rule, is not checked for reliability and reliability, but is taken for granted.

effect of group favoritism. This the tendency to favor members of one's own group in some way, as opposed to members of another group. The effect of group favoritism is based on the “us and them” effect and, as it were, establishes a “demarcation line” between those people who, according to some criteria, are perceived as “ours”, and those who, according to the same criteria, are perceived as “strangers”.

Here are some patterns of the mechanism of group favoritism:

The effect of group favoritism is more pronounced in cases where the comparison criteria are very significant for the group based on the results of activities and the specifics of relationships with other groups, i.e. when the groups are in a situation of competition with each other;

Group favoritism is more pronounced in relation to those groups whose criteria for comparison with the activities of which are not only significant for the group, but also correspond to its own criteria, that is, in this case, the possibility of a clear unambiguous comparability of groups appears;

Membership in a group turns out to be more important than interpersonal similarity: people more often prefer “their own”, although they are not similar to themselves in personal qualities, and refuse to prefer “strangers”, although they are similar in their views, interests, personal characteristics;

Group members tend to explain the possible success of their group by intra-group factors, and its possible failure by external factors, that is, if the group achieves success, then it attributes this result to itself (its professionalism, favorable socio-psychological climate, business qualities of leaders and etc.), but if the group fails, then people look for the guilty outside the group, try to shift the blame to other groups.

The effect of group egoism. This is the orientation of group interests, goals and norms of behavior against the interests, goals and norms of behavior of individual members of the group or the whole society. The goals of the group are achieved by infringing on the interests of its individual members, to the detriment of the interests of society. Group egoism manifests itself when the goals, values of the group, the stability of its existence become more important than an individual, more significant than the goals of society. Then the person is usually sacrificed to the integrity of the group, completely submits to its requirements and standards of behavior. The effect of group egoism can play a very negative role in the further life of the group and the fate of its individual members.

"Pendulum" effect. This cyclic alternation of group emotional states sthenic and asthenic character. The intensity of manifestation and the temporal duration of emotional states are determined by the conditions and events of their joint activity that are significant for the members of the group.

The experimental emotional potentials of the group were studied by the Russian psychologist A. N. Lutoshkin. The mood depends on several factors:

time of day and day of the week: at the end of the working day and week, the mood of workers deteriorates as fatigue accumulates;

features psychological structure groups, leadership processes;

the level of labor discipline in the group: the higher the discipline of work, the better the mood and emotional state of the members of the group;

established system of relationships in a group, the level of conflict or cohesion: the higher the level of conflict, the worse the mood.

Wave effect. This distribution in the group of ideas, goals, norms and values. A new idea is born in the head of one person, he shares it with his inner circle, which discusses, corrects, supplements and develops the proposed idea. Then the idea is distributed among other members of the group, its group scene and discussion is carried out. Like a pebble thrown into water, the idea is spreading to more and more people. True, the wave effect is possible only when new idea meets the needs and interests of people, and does not contradict them. In the first case, it is understood and developed by people, serves as a stimulus for their activity, and in the second case, the wave effect fades.

Pulsar effect. This change in group activity depending on various stimuli. Group activity goes through a cycle of "optimal activity necessary for the normal functioning of the group - an increase in activity - a decrease in activity - a return to the optimal level of activity." This cycle can depend both on external stimuli (for example, the group receiving an urgent task), and on internal subjective stimuli for activity (for example, the desire of group members to solve a problem that has arisen). The “pulsar” effect, as a manifestation of group activity, consists in a sharp increase in activity at the beginning of the activity process, then, when the task is solved, in a decrease in activity, i.e. people need rest. Then group activity returns to the optimal level necessary for normal, well-coordinated, uninterrupted work of the group.

Boomerang effect. The "boomerang" effect was first recorded in the activities of the mass media. It consists in the following: a person who perceives information does not recognize its content or conclusion as true and continues to adhere to a pre-existing setting or develops a new value judgment in relation to the event being covered, but this judgment or setting, as a rule, turns out to be the opposite of the setting that was tried. to inspire him through the mass media. The “boomerang” effect can arise in case of inconsistency of information, distrust of its source, methods of persuasion, etc.

This effect is also manifested in the direct communication and interaction of people. Often the aggressive actions or words of one person directed against another, as a result, turn around against the one who performed these actions or uttered these words. For example, in a situation of conflict, it is more likely that group members will be psychologically on the side of a calm, balanced person than on the side of his aggressive opponent.

The “us and them” effect. This is a feeling of belonging to a certain group of people (the “we” effect) and, accordingly, a feeling of detachment from others, delimitation from other groups (the “they” effect).

The effect of belonging to a group includes two more particular effects - ownership effect and emotional support effect. The first is expressed in the fact that a member of the group feels himself involved in the problems, deeds, successes and failures of the group to which he really belongs or subjectively classifies himself. On the basis of the effect of ownership, a sense of responsibility for the results of the group's activities is formed. The effect of emotional support is manifested in the fact that a member of the group expects emotional support, sympathy, empathy, help from other members of the group. It also implies not only emotional, but also real support by the actions of other members of the group. If such support is not provided to a member of the group, then his sense of “we” is destroyed - belonging to the group, involvement in its affairs - and a feeling of “they” arises, that is, a member of the group who has not received emotional support is able to perceive his group as a group strangers who do not share his interests and concerns.

The “we” effect turns out to be an effective psychological mechanism for the functioning of the group. Exaggeration of the sense of "we" can lead a group to overestimate its capabilities and merits, to break away from other groups, to "group egoism". At the same time, insufficient development of the sense of "we" leads to the loss of the value-oriented unity of the group.

Depending on the degree of unity and agreement in the dynamics of the public opinion of a military collective, three of its main stages are distinguished: diffuse, polarized, and unified collective opinion.

Diffuse opinion is a disparity in views and in judgments. Warriors have conflicting, inconsistent positions; some of them find it difficult to determine their point of view, cannot objectively evaluate the judgments of their comrades and consciously adhere to any position.

A polarized opinion takes place if the leading points of view have already been determined, as a result of which the personnel are divided into two or three groups, each of which has its own position and defends it. This state can have negative consequences, conflict.

A single collective opinion is characterized by maximum agreement and the presence of one, common, consciously and sincerely shared by all positions.

The process of forming a collective opinion can be observed in various forms of communication between soldiers: during a meeting, in a comradely conversation during a rest, when discussing films, books, and printed materials. Participating in these forms of communication, observing how agreement is reached on positions and views on issues of concern to personnel, how differences are overcome, commanders draw conclusions about the essential moral and psychological characteristics of the team.

In interaction with the collective, the individual appears as a self-regulating system in the social environment. From this point of view, collective opinion can be viewed as a feedback channel, as the most important source of socio-psychological information about the immediate environment for the individual. It informs a person about the reaction to his actions and deeds from other people and, thus, contributes to the adoption of adequate decisions. Moreover, the group itself carries out certain social sanctions in relation to the individual. It continuously compares the behavior of each of its members with the system of norms that exists within this group, and the results are expressed in the characteristics of the attitude towards this person in the team, which can reflect approval and praise or, conversely, condemnation.

It should be noted that the collective opinion is not only a multifaceted phenomenon, but also a very dynamic one. In the dynamics of the formation and development of public opinion, a number of degrees are distinguished.

The positive traditions and moods that exist in the military collective contribute to the formation of the correct public opinion.

Family education: content, types, methods.

The family is obliged to form a physically and mentally healthy, moral, intellectually developed personality, ready for the upcoming work, social and family life. The constituent components of the content of family education are well-known areas: physical, moral, intellectual, aesthetic, labor. The methods of raising children in the family have their own specifics: the influence on the child is individual, based on specific actions and adapted to the personality; the choice of methods depends on the pedagogical culture of the parents: understanding the purpose of education, parental role, ideas about values, style of relationships in the family, etc. Consequently, family education methods bear a bright imprint of the parents' personality and are inseparable from them. How many parents, so many varieties of methods. There are various means of solving educational problems in the family. Among these means are the word, folklore, parental authority, work, teaching, nature, home life, national customs, traditions, public opinion, spiritual and moral climate of the family, press, radio, television, daily routine, literature, museums and exhibitions, games and toys, demonstrations, physical education, sports, holidays, symbols, attributes, relics, etc. e. Methods of family education Carefully read the list of methods and techniques of family education: showing a sample (how to do it?, how to behave?); creating a positive attitude towards the form of behavior that should be pursued; demonstrating the benefits of this form of behavior; prevention of violations of the child's behavior or practices; control over the actions of the child; stimulation of his self-control. All parents use common methods family education: - a method of persuasion that provides for the pedagogical interaction of parents in order to form a child's internal agreement with the requirements placed on him. Explanation, suggestion and advice are predominantly used as its means; ? encouragement method, which involves the use of a system of pedagogically appropriate means to encourage the child to form the desired personality traits and qualities or behavioral habits (praise, gifts, perspective); ? the method of joint practical activity implies the joint participation of parents and children in the same educational activities (visiting museums, theaters; family field trips; charitable actions and deeds, etc.); ? the method of coercion (punishment) involves the use of a system of special means that do not degrade his personal dignity in relation to the child, in order to form in him a refusal from undesirable actions, actions, judgments, etc. As a rule, deprivation of a certain list of significant for his pleasures - watching TV, walking with friends, using a computer, etc. How many families, so many features of education. But, despite all their diversity, one can single out typical models of relations between adults and children in families. 1. Families that respect children. Children in such families are loved. Parents know what they are interested in, what worries them, respect their opinions, experiences, try to tactfully help. These are the most prosperous for raising a family. 2. Responsive families. Relations between adults and children are normal, but there is a certain distance that neither parents nor children try to break. Children know their place in the family, obey their parents. 3. Financially oriented families. The main attention in the family is given to material well-being. Children from an early age are taught to look at life pragmatically, to see their own benefit in everything. They are forced to study well for the sole purpose of enrolling in a university. 4. Hostile families. Children are shown disrespect, distrust, surveillance, corporal punishment. They grow secretive. Unfriendly, treat parents badly, do not get along with peers, do not like school, may leave the family. Behavior, life aspirations of children cause conflicts in the family, and at the same time, parents are more likely to be right. 5. Antisocial families. Rather, these are not families, but temporary shelters for children who were not expected here, they are not loved, they are not accepted. Parents lead an immoral lifestyle: they drink, steal, fight, threaten each other and children. Parents take a conflicting position, not wanting to suppress their shortcomings. This is manifested in nervousness, irascibility, intolerance to a different opinion.

Collective opinion is a set of value judgments that expresses the attitude of the majority of members of the team to various events in the life of society, to the actions, behavior and activities of both the entire team and each of its members.

The opinion of the collective is a socio-psychological phenomenon that arises and develops in the process of communication and interaction of people, a constant lively exchange of their thoughts, views, beliefs, feelings. Thus, collective opinion is a kind of fusion of personal opinions that have undergone certain changes as a result of interaction.

By its nature, collective opinion is a specific form of social consciousness, and therefore often acts as a criterion for the actions and actions of individual members of the team. It has a special impact on the personality of a serviceman, since through it such educational functions of the team as presenting a system of requirements to the individual and constant monitoring and evaluation of his actions and behavior are carried out. In turn, it should be noted that by directing people's behavior in accordance with the requirements of the surrounding social environment, collective opinion actively contributes to the formation in them of the qualities necessary for military professional activity.

At the first stage, people directly experience the event, talk about it and evaluate it.

At the second stage, they exchange their feelings and ideas, views and assessments. It is here that opinion crosses the boundaries of individual consciousness and captures the sphere, first of all, of group, collective, and then of public consciousness. From the moment of exchange of views, discussions and discussions, the process of formation of public opinion begins. In the future, different opinions are united around the main points of view on the subject of discussion, and in the process of discussion a common opinion is formed.

Complete unity of collective opinion is rare. There is only a more or less pronounced tendency in the formation of an assessment of a particular situation. At the same time, the degree of maturity of opinion varies, and this is not accidental, because its carriers are specific people with certain psychological characteristics, which largely determine the emergence of both positive and negative collective opinion. Therefore, the subunit commander must always take care of the formation of a single point of view of the team on certain social phenomena. It is quite possible to achieve this, since the collective opinion is a controlled, organized phenomenon.

The main condition for the formation of a collective opinion is the ability of an officer to influence the opinions and views of specific servicemen. At the same time, in order to successfully influence the collective opinion, it is necessary to take into account the dynamics of its development: it is important not to miss the moment when people directly experience this or that event and try to evaluate it. It is at this moment that some have the right, while others have false views. The misconceptions that have arisen are initially weak, but can quickly gain a foothold, so preventive measures are needed. It is also important to take into account that every single judgment, especially if it suits the general opinion, the mental state of people in a given situation, can quickly become group or collective, sometimes even if it contradicts own opinion many members of the team.

One of the prerequisites for the formation of public opinion on a particular issue is the knowledge of the main trend in views and all opinions that contradict this direction. In this regard, when forming public opinion, special attention should be paid to the fight against false views, for which it is necessary to debunk the authority of persons with strong negative influence. Effective way To achieve this, the restructuring of the attitude of their inner circle towards them serves - when the opinion of the closest of the comrades who previously supported the violator changes dramatically and coincides with the opinion of the entire team, it becomes able to rebuild the relations of soldiers in this group and change the behavior of an undisciplined colleague.

The positive traditions and moods that exist in the military collective contribute to the formation of the correct public opinion.

collective opinion

Intensive consultations with heads of other socialist countries with regard to Czechoslovakia, they developed from the beginning of 1968. The first tangible result was the agreement on a meeting in Dresden. At this meeting, in addition to delegations from the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, representatives of the communist parties of the GDR and Poland were to be present. Hungary and Bulgaria.

The meeting of representatives of the communist parties of the six socialist countries in Dresden on March 23 began with the fact that the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were told that "the concept of their activities is incomprehensible to the fraternal communist parties." The Prague delegation was criticized for the fact that "the press, radio and television were out of control"; that as a result of attacks by the media, “well-tested, battle-hardened cadres of the party and the state” are removed from their posts; that 80% of those fired are people who studied in Moscow; that mass resignations of secretaries of district committees and regional committees began. It was pointed to the beginning decomposition of the army, "drawn into rallies instead of service." However, complete unity, not in words, but in deeds, in condemning the Czechoslovak leadership in Dresden was not achieved. Some of the participants in the meeting, primarily the Hungarian leader J. Kadar, had a dissenting opinion. Moreover, on April 18, Kadar cautiously, but expressed his approval of a number of actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

The results of the Dresden meeting were discussed and approved by the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, held in Moscow on April 9-10. The main refrain of the speeches was: "We will not give up socialist Czechoslovakia."

After the Dresden meeting, there was a temporary lull in the relations between the conflicting parties. TASS, without any comments, reprinted fragments of A. Dubcek's speech at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The election of General L. Svoboda to the post of President of the country was generally received with approval. Thus, the high probability of the election of Smrkovsky, a figure completely unacceptable to Moscow, was eliminated.

The "truce", however, was short-lived.

In the second half of April in the Czech press, for the first time, there were demands to purge the HRC of the "stained" - those who were involved in the repressions of past years. The demands found support among a significant part of the public, primarily among young people and students. An attempt at this campaign could have had far-reaching consequences. In some cases, those who collaborated with the Soviet underground during the Second World War were also considered “stained”.

The implementation of calls for a purge could blow up the entire political system country, directly threatening almost all representatives of the party-state elite.

Indicative in this sense was the speech of the writers E. Goldstücker, chairman of the Union of Writers of Czechoslovakia, and J. Prochazka, held on April 26, 1968 in Prague, in the House of the Czechoslovak Army.

They sharply criticized the entire path of development of Czechoslovakia after February 1948, pointing out that as a result of the events of 1968, prerequisites appeared in the country for the creation of a new social system democratic socialism. The Soviet Union, according to Goldstucker, was "a classic country of dictatorship."

Goldstücker's theses were developed by Prochaska. Commenting on the recent suicide of General Janko, one of those responsible for political repression early 50s, the writer stated that he “acted as fair man", adding: "But I do not recommend that the entire General Staff exchange fire."

The Czechoslovak leadership was invited to Moscow for an explanation.

On May 4, A. Dubcek, O. Chernik, I. Smrkovsky and V. Bilyak arrived in Moscow. From the Soviet side, L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, N.V. Podgorny, K.F. Katushev and K.V. Rusakov. The conversation went on for a long time - more than nine hours - and caused undisguised irritation in the Kremlin.

At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on May 6, Brezhnev, commenting on the results of the meeting, said: “When you recall all the stages of relations after the first conversation with Comrade Dubcek, in particular, my conversation in Prague, and subsequent conversations, you get the impression that he deliberately says one thing, but does something completely different, although he speaks wobbly, vaguely. As an example, Brezhnev cited Dubcek's assurances to keep the personnel. However, according to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia changed all the cadres from top to bottom. Dubcek effectively "decapitated the party". Brezhnev spoke extremely sharply about the “Program of Action”: “I think we are unanimous that this is a bad program that opens up opportunities for the restoration of capitalism in Czechoslovakia, though veiled by different phraseology. This is an expression of the petty-bourgeois element. Smrkovsky at a meeting with the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU, according to Brezhnev, did not speak much. The main thing in his speech was the condemnation of the previous repressions. In the disputes that arose between the Czech and Soviet sides, Smrkovsky made on Brezhnev, who saw him for the first time, the impression of a strong man and a whole personality. However, according to Brezhnev, he did not see any concern and anxiety, no positive proposals in Smrkovsky's speech.

low score General Secretary The Central Committee of the CPSU gave the speech to Chernik - in his words, confused, containing unsupported promises. Above all, Brezhnev assessed Bilyak's position. In it, “one could really feel anxiety for the state of affairs, for the development of events. For example, he said that events were developing in such a direction that it threatened the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the socialist gains that all non-communist parties raised their heads.

Brezhnev's conclusion was as follows: “Today at the Military Council we considered issues, we have already discussed specific plans for our practical measures in connection with the current situation. Our first step was: we informed them of a proposal to send 20-25 of our marshals and generals, led by Marshal Konev and Moskalenko, to celebrate Victory Day ... We also discussed whole line other measures, which I will talk about a little later.

Kosygin brought a new, even tougher tone to the discussion. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, he said, is preparing a rehabilitation, “they are thinking of playing with this, believing that Gottwald and Zapototsky have blood on their hands and that they acted together with Soviet Union. Against this background, they are thinking of organizing a new party, in fact, a bourgeois party and the bourgeois order. According to Kosygin, the request of the Czechoslovak side for a loan of 500 million rubles. gold are inherently provocative: “They know that we will refuse this, that we will not give this loan under such conditions as they propose, and they also want to play on this.”

The May 1968 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which Moscow counted on, did not bring any changes in the alignment of political forces and did not ensure the defeat of the reformers.

On June 4, a message was received through diplomatic channels in Moscow about a meeting between the Soviet ambassador and Bilyak. This time, he gave a detailed description of the situation in the leadership of the HRC, paying special attention to the so-called “Prague center”, which, according to him, included Szyk, the first secretary of the South Moravian Regional Committee of the HRC J. Spacek, Cisarzh, Kriegel and the Minister of the Interior J. Pavel. They were joined by the head of the organizational and political department of the Central Committee F. Kolář and the head of the department of administrative and state bodies V. Prhlik. These people, Bilyak claimed, hold meetings in the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in the office of Tsisarzh. The Prague Center is trying to operate in the Prague districts, discrediting Dubcek. Bilyak also noted that Dubcek has up to 10 thousand of the most dedicated soldiers and officers as an "operational force", who, if necessary, will be immediately alerted.

Relations between the CPSU and the CPC continued to deteriorate in the meantime and gradually reached a critical point. The situation became comparable to the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture of 1948. However, Moscow still hoped that the next multilateral negotiations could still rectify the situation.

But in what followed between L.I. During a telephone conversation between Brezhnev and A. Dubcek, it became clear that the Czechs were refusing a joint meeting of representatives of the six communist parties in Warsaw. It was a blatant demarche.

Brezhnev attacked Dubcek with accusations, saying that the refusal to meet opens a new confrontational stage in relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Dubcek languidly justified himself, admitting that the press did make some mistakes, in particular anti-Soviet attacks.

The "Letter of Five", as it was called in Prague, to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, containing an invitation to Czechoslovak leaders in Warsaw, was still regarded in Czechoslovakia as unacceptable interference in internal affairs.

During the Warsaw Conference (in the absence of the Czechoslovak delegation) a message was drafted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The document stated that “in view of the counter-revolution offensive unfolding in Czechoslovakia, the fraternal parties urgently demand that the Czechoslovak leadership urgently take energetic measures to repel the onslaught of the enemy, given that the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not a private affair of this country only, but the sacred duty of the entire socialist community ".

The news from Prague was less and less encouraging. One of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia informed that the Soviet embassy and the villas where Soviet diplomats live were monitored, all their meetings were controlled.

In mid-July, a secret letter addressed to L.I. Brezhnev from a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia A. Kapek. It reported: “In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a group of the leadership of the party in the person of Smrkovsky, Kriegel, Shpachek, Shimon, Tsisarzh, Slavik has mastered all the media and is conducting anti-Soviet and anti-socialist work.” At the end of the letter, A. Kapek directly called: “I appeal to you, Comrade Brezhnev, with an appeal and request to provide fraternal assistance to our Party and all our people in rebuffing those forces that pose a serious danger to the very fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia. Socialist Republic» .

The letter was read out at a meeting of the Politburo, but it was considered insufficient for making an important military-political decision. A few days later, Brezhnev received another letter through the same channels, signed by now five Czechoslovak leaders. The letter spoke of the emergence in Czechoslovakia of the possibility of a "counter-revolutionary coup" and contained a call for intervention in Czechoslovak events. “In such a difficult situation, we appeal to you, Soviet Communists, leading representatives of the CPSU and the USSR, with a request to provide us with effective support and assistance with all the means that you have. Only with your help can Czechoslovakia be pulled out of the threatening danger of counter-revolution. We are aware that for the CPSU and the USSR this last step in the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia would not be easy.

Due to the complexity and danger of the development of the situation in our country, we ask you for the maximum secrecy of this statement of ours, for this reason we will send it directly to you personally in Russian.

On July 19, at a regular meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev declared that a new stage had begun in relations with Czechoslovakia. Time, according to him, “does not work in our favor, against us. Now in Prague they are waiting for the arrival of Ceausescu and Tito, there is talk of some kind of Danube conspiracy, a Danube meeting. Brezhnev stressed that the HRC received support in the European communist movement, and the Italian and French Communist Parties called for a European meeting, where the actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia can be approved. From this followed the conclusion: “Not only a new moment has arisen, but also new requirements for our actions. One question arises: have we exhausted everything from the arsenal of political influence, have we done everything before taking extreme measures? We declared at the plenum that we would take all measures of political influence depending on us. If this does not give the appropriate effect, only then will we take extreme measures.”

With this cautious, restrained statement, Brezhnev made it clear that at this stage he still remains a supporter of political pressure on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Kosygin agreed with him, who believed that a bilateral meeting could become an effective form of exerting political pressure.

This position, however, did not find support among the majority of the members of the Politburo. The object of criticism, of course, was not Brezhnev, but Kosygin. Andropov, Ustinov, Mazurov, Kapitonov - they all believed that the time had come for tough measures. Ultimately, the Politburo came to a compromise solution: to consider the meeting with the Czechoslovak leaders as the last political measure of influence.

The policy of pressure on Prague was greatly facilitated by the relatively neutral attitude of international public opinion towards what was happening in Czechoslovakia.

The meeting with US Secretary of State D. Rusk on July 22 showed that the Americans do not want to interfere in the conflict. Rusk stated: “The US government tends to be very restrained in its comments in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia. We definitely do not want to be somehow involved or involved in these events. It was a signal for Moscow. It became clear to the political leadership of the USSR that the implementation of "extreme measures" would not lead to active opposition from the United States.

According to the decisions of the Politburo of July 19 and 22, a hasty practical study of these "extreme measures" began. On July 20, the first, and on July 26, the second version of the Declaration was prepared on behalf of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Revolutionary Government of Czechoslovakia on internal and foreign policy, as well as "Appeal to the citizens of Czechoslovakia, to the Czechoslovak army." These documents were to be made public after the troops of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries entered Czechoslovakia. On July 26-27, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, all the necessary documents were fully worked out, including the statement “To the Soviet people". The hour of decision was inexorably approaching.

The last Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations on July 29 - August 1, 1968 were held with the participation of almost the entire composition of both the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. They took place in Cierna nad Tisou. The absence of the heads of the most important Soviet departments at the talks: Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman Yu.V. Andropov - clearly indicated the desire of the participants to present the discussion as a purely party affair.

The meeting, however, could hardly be called negotiations in the exact sense of the word. In Moscow, it was conceived rather as a form of massive pressure; the bet was made on finally forcing Prague to make concessions and change its position.

On the eve of the negotiations, the Politburo received almost simultaneously messages from N. Ceausescu, I. Tito and 18 European Communist Parties, which contained a request (a veiled warning) not to put too much pressure on the leadership of Czechoslovakia. The delegations settled down in a marching way - in two railway trains in the middle of tobacco plantations near the border strip, which was supposed to indicate the urgency of what was happening and put psychological pressure on the Prague leaders.

The talks opened with a four-hour speech by Brezhnev, in which he mixed quotations from the Czechoslovak press with accusations of pandering to Western imperialism and trying to "slip through the counter-revolution." If the goal was to achieve mutual understanding, this performance could not be considered successful.

It caused dissatisfaction from the very beginning. opposite side. The event was in jeopardy.

The Kremlin leaders did not take into account the mentality of the Czechs and Slovaks. They did not expect that by unceremonious pressure they would only revive a sense of cohesion in the Prague leadership. In such a situation, even Bilyak and Indra with their supporters considered it prudent to join the common camp.

During the negotiations, P.E. behaved most aggressively. Rustle. He raised the issue of the status and position of the Ukrainian national minority in Slovakia. Engaged in finding out who was "right" in the Czechoslovak leadership, Shelest insulted Kriegel, calling him a "Galician Jew." The attack escalated the situation to the limit. Kosygin was forced to go to the train of the Czechoslovak delegation and apologize for Shelest, "who had gone too far."

After the break, the parties agreed to continue the exchange of views in groups.

In the end, the Czechoslovak leadership made a commitment to curb the press, reaffirmed the commitment to socialism and the loyalty of their country to the obligations under the Warsaw Treaty Organization. However, the Prague leadership, headed by Dubcek, was asked to once again express their position at a multilateral forum in Bratislava. The delegation of the HRC did not hide its surprise: why meet again? But she was forced to agree on the condition that the meeting would take place on the territory of Czechoslovakia and would not interfere in internal affairs.

In fact, the meeting left a deeply negative impression on both sides.

V.A. Aleksandrov believed that two Czechoslovak leaders, Chairman of the National Assembly I. Smrkovsky and head of the National Front F. Kriegel, were constant “sources of inflating distrust” in the course of a frank discussion, “the first - due to his ambitions, claims to be the main tribune, the second - in force of breathtaking political infantilism. As soon as Dubcek or Chernik said some phrase friendly towards the USSR, both of them "enfant terrible" hurried in their circle to refute what was said: they say, do not believe it, in fact, "Sasha" thought differently. In other cases, such disagreement would mean nothing, but it was about relations that were called “fraternal”, and here trust or its absence acquired a decisive significance.

In turn, after returning from Cierna nad Tisou, F. Kriegel said: “After Cierna I cannot sleep. I discovered the incredibly low level of these people who have not read a single book by Marx or Lenin in their lives. When I think that the fate of the world depends on them, I can't sleep."

After negotiations, Prime Minister O. Czernik called C. Cisarzh - the only member of the top party leadership remaining in Prague - and conjured him to try to avoid the appearance in the press immediately before the new meeting of the leaders of the bloc of harsh publications that could irritate Moscow.

However, the Czechoslovak press was already beyond the reach of party control. One of the issues of the mass publication Literary Lists came out with a caricature of W. Ulbricht. The agreements reached were not respected.

The Bratislava meeting remained the last, more and more illusory hope. At the meeting in Bratislava, there were many handshakes, kisses and flowers. It was reminiscent of a meeting of old friends, not burdened by disagreements and disputes, delighted at the opportunity to see each other after parting. The delegations in full force were seated in the large hall. A lively discussion ensued that threatened to drag on forever.

Brezhnev soon stopped the collective discussion. He suggested that only the first secretaries stay, adding: "Here, Kosygin will also be with me." The party leaders locked themselves in a separate room and began to read the text of the draft joint statement, which was prepared by the Soviet working group in a saloon car on the way from Cierna to Bratislava. None of the assistants and persons who were not part of the leadership were admitted to this work. Corrections to the project were made directly by Brezhnev, who gave the text sheet by sheet to his assistant G.E. Tsukanov - the only person who received the right to enter the negotiation room.

Everyone else was waiting in the adjoining hall – lower-ranking leaders, experts, accompanying persons.

The statement of the six fraternal Communist Parties, adopted in Bratislava, did not contain any statement about the offensive of the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. In the most general terms, the socialist achievements of the past were spoken of; on compliance general patterns socialist construction in accordance with the documents of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, including the leading role of the party, the principle of democratic centralism, and the uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology; about close ties within CMEA and the Warsaw Pact; about fraternal mutual assistance and solidarity.

But in phrases that at first glance seemed to be formulaic statements in newspaper editorials, there was a far from harmless meaning hidden.

The main point of the Bratislava statement was the provision on defending the gains of socialism as a common international duty of all socialist countries. It was a rather vague thesis that allowed for various interpretations. Among other things, he assumed the use, if necessary, of collective (including military) measures against the offending country. Each side, leaving the meeting, considered itself a winner. Dubcek viewed the results of the meeting in Bratislava as "the legalization of the Czechoslovak path to socialism."

But he was wrong. Recognizing the defense of socialism as a matter of the entire socialist community and thus the right of "fraternal" parties to discuss and, on occasion, intervene in the internal problems of a sovereign country, Dubcek thereby admitted the possibility of replacing interstate relations with interparty ones.

Western journalists who watched the meeting noted an incomprehensible timidity in Brezhnev's behavior and the angry look of Ulbricht and Gomulka.

Immediately after the Bratislava meeting, a somewhat reassured Brezhnev went on vacation. He was replaced in the Central Committee of the CPSU by A.P. Kirilenko, who was instructed to transmit to the Crimea, where the Secretary General was located, generalized information and assessments of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

In fact, the information that came to the Crimea from Moscow was of secondary importance to Brezhnev. The main channel of information, which he completely trusted, was the Yalta-Prague telephone cable, conversations with the Soviet embassy that went on continuously, several times a day. Representatives of the “healthy forces” in the Czechoslovak leadership contacted Brezhnev through this channel. Their live speech, apparently, was more convincing than the corresponding written presentation in the reports of Ambassador Chervonenko.

The main leitmotif of the conversations was one: the Dubcek team interprets the results of the Bratislava meeting in a completely different way than the leaders of the other communist parties.

Shortly after the Bratislava meeting, Brezhnev received encrypted messages about meetings of party activists in the Prague districts, at which F. Kriegel and I. Smrkovsky shared their impressions of how they “deceived the Russians” and noted that “everyone will do it their own way.”

Brezhnev was finally convinced that further negotiations with the Czechoslovak reformers were useless, in the near future they would inevitably be swept away by a second, more radical wave, which would lead to the restoration of the bourgeois order in Czechoslovakia.

The dissonance and clash of ambitions in the ranks of the Czechoslovak reformers allowed Moscow to actively search for a replacement for Dubcek - either offering the post of first secretary to E. Erban, who was not in the front positions, which he prudently refused, or hatching plans to create a puppet "workers' and peasants' government". According to Mlynarzh, the Kremlin’s search for a 100% reliable candidate was affected by “the Russian tradition of betting on someone alone, invested with absolute trust,” the inability to take into account, and even more so, cooperate with various political forces or silent factions of one party.

On August 9, in a telephone conversation with Dubcek, Brezhnev expressed his claims about the actual refusal of the Czechoslovak side to fulfill the previous agreements.

“One gets the impression,” Brezhnev said, “that no conclusions have been drawn from the meetings. The commitments that we made in Cierne nad Tisou are not being fulfilled.” He then spoke of measures to take over the media and to shut down the activities of the Social Democratic Party and clubs.

On August 13, a new telephone conversation took place with Dubcek. Brezhnev demanded an explanation for the anti-Soviet attacks in the Czechoslovak press. Brezhnev also raised two other problems: the promised changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the party leadership. In this difficult emotional conversation with a lot of mutual reproaches from Brezhnev, accusations of deceit and refusal of obligations were made. In turn, Dubcek constantly referred to the changed circumstances, to the impossibility of resolving the issues raised at the Presidium. It is still unclear, however, what Dubcek meant by "changed circumstances." Apparently, control over the situation really slipped out of his not very firm hands.

The conclusions drawn in Moscow after Brezhnev's conversation with Dubcek on August 13 became decisive. No one doubted or dared to doubt the need for a military invasion of Czechoslovakia.

On August 16, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU approved the text of Brezhnev's message to Dubcek. In it, on two pages, point by point, the obligations violated by the Czechoslovak leadership were listed.

The next day, August 17, the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee was chaired by Brezhnev himself. From this meeting began the final stage of preparations for the invasion. It was decided to convene on August 18 a meeting of the leaders of the countries - members of the Warsaw Pact, whose troops were involved in military operation in Czechoslovakia.

Children and education - Information portal

collective opinion. The psychological phenomenon of collective opinion in a military team. Aspects of studying collective opinion, collective mood and intra-collective traditions in a military unit

More on the topic The importance of collective opinion in life and work:

Family education: content, types, methods.