Axis Berlin-Rome

Axis Berlin-Rome

“Axis Berlin ≈ Rome", Military-political union fascist Germany and Italy, formalized by the Berlin Agreement of October 25, 1936. The creation of the "axis" testified to the open preparation of the fascist states for the outbreak of World War II (1939–45). Continuation of the agreement “O. B.-R. " appeared signed on November 25, 1936 by Germany and Japan « Anti-Comintern Pact» , joined on November 6, 1937 Italy.

Munich agreement

In the spring of 1938, the Nazis launched a campaign of unheard-of blackmail and provocations against Czechoslovakia, demanding the transfer of the original Czech lands to Germany. In the government spheres, Western countries were deeply indifferent to the fate of the Slavic country. The Ambassador of Czechoslovakia in London said at the time: “Once, during a conversation with several prominent figures, when I showed them a map of Czechoslovakia, I had the impression that they were seeing it for the first time. Indeed, looking thoughtfully at the map, they said: “Oh! This is curious! What a funny shape! You might think that there is a big sausage in front of you! " In Berlin, Goering instilled in the French ambassador: “Do you see the contours of Czechoslovakia on this map? Isn't this a challenge common sense? It is the appendix, the vestigial organ of Europe. It will need to be removed. " The ruling circles of the West “spoke out with the Nazis, they decided to betray Czechoslovakia in the interests of unleashing a war between Germany and the USSR. Under these conditions, Czechoslovakia could only be saved by aid from the East. But the Czech bourgeoisie went for an unheard-of national betrayal: on December 16, 1937, President Beneš assured the German envoy in Prague that the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR was "a product of a bygone era, but it cannot be simply thrown into the basket."

Meanwhile, the Soviet government in this critical period for Czechoslovakia firmly declared its readiness to come to her aid. Since March 1938, this has been repeatedly brought to the attention of Prague, as well as Paris. And the British and French governments persistently recommended that Czechoslovakia surrender. All international reaction did not want a war in defense of Czechoslovakia, in which the Soviet Union would inevitably take part. According to N. Chamberlain's trusted advisor, G. Wilson, “only Bolshevism would profit from this. This should be prevented. It is necessary to recognize the right of the Germans to expand to the South-East. " The American ambassador in Paris, W. Bullitt, intimidated: in the event of a "general conflagration" Russia would be reborn "like a phoenix from our ashes" in order to carry out a "world revolution". Daladier explained to the German chargé d'affaires: "At the end of the war, regardless of who is victorious and who is defeated, a revolution will inevitably begin in France, as well as in Germany and Italy." In other words, the rulers of the capitalist world understood that the war in defense of Czechoslovakia would lead to the collapse of fascism, the inevitable growth democratic forces... The Francoists in Spain followed the events related to Czechoslovakia with the deepest concern: they understood that if an anti-Hitler front emerged, Franco's defeat was inevitable.

The high command of the German armed forces presented to Hitler an assessment of Germany's military capabilities: the war against Czechoslovakia would last at least three months. The conflict cannot be expected to remain localized. Only by 1943 will Germany be able, with reasonable chances of success, to wage a war against Western powers... Some generals were even ready to take drastic measures: arrest the Nazi leaders and create a military government. At the Nuremberg Trials, Keitel was asked: "Would Germany have attacked Czechoslovakia in 1938 if the Western powers had supported Prague?"

The answer was: “Of course not. We weren't strong enough militarily. The aim of Munich (ie, reaching an agreement in Munich) was to oust Russia from Europe, gain time and complete the armament of Germany. "

On September 29-30, 1938, a meeting of the heads of government of England, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich, convened with the active support of the United States. The representatives of Czechoslovakia and the USSR were excluded from participation in the meeting. It decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was transferred to Germany within ten days; in the near future, some areas were captured by the Polish priests and Horthy Hungary. An area of ​​41 thousand square meters was rejected from Czechoslovakia. km with a population of 4.9 million people, the rest of Czechoslovakia was a country with a territory of 99 thousand square meters. km and a population of about 10 million people. Most of the heavy and mining industries of Czechoslovakia were located on the lands seized from Czechoslovakia. There were also extensive, expensive fortifications built to defend against Germany. The Nazis were celebrating a new victory. At the same time, the Anglo-German Declaration was signed in Munich on September 30: the parties declared that from now on they would never fight each other. On December 6, 1938, France signed an agreement of a similar spirit with Hitler. These documents were essentially non-aggression pacts between Britain and France, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other. Summing up, the ardent Munich Ambassador to Berlin, Henderson, wrote to the British Foreign Secretary Halifax: "Having kept the peace, we saved Hitler and his regime."

In the spring of 1939, the balance of power on the European continent in the event of a war took shape. Two Western European countries, Great Britain and France, and their allies represented by the small states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe opposed two totalitarian dictatorships that made up the Rome-Berlin axis. Of the great powers, only the Soviet Union lacked clear political and military commitments. The opposing coalitions naturally tried to enlist the help of the USSR. In addition, Eastern Europe turned out to be a zone of collision of interests: by that time Poland had become the object of Germany's aggressive claims; Romania also felt threatened. Hitler, who during the summer of 1939 sought to put Poland in a position of international isolation, had to secure at least the neutrality of the Soviet Union in order to carry out the planned Weiss plan - aggression against Poland. The help of the Soviet state was also important for Western countries to strengthen the anti-German front. In this regard, the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in August 1939 seems to be an indisputable diplomatic success for Germany. Leaving aside the reasons for the Soviet "appeasement" Hitlerite Germany"Stalinist style", consider the position of Great Britain during the trilateral Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of a tripartite defensive alliance. An analysis of the foreign policy of the British government in this dramatic period of pre-war history is important for understanding the reasons for the failure of the attempt to create a united anti-Hitler front in 1939.

The policy of Great Britain during this period was determined almost entirely by the government committee on foreign policy(Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy) composed of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary Lord Edward Halifax, Secretary of State for Security Coordination Lord Chatfield, Secretary of the Interior Samuel Hoare and Treasury Secretary John Simon. The papers of the British cabinet now published, together with a number of private letters from N. Chamberlain, show that he was not at all eager to win over to the side of the Western powers. Soviet Russia, thereby contributing to the split of Europe into two opposing blocs. It is quite clear that he did not trust the Russians, did not believe in their military value, wanted to drag out the negotiations and not conclude agreements with the country, which he would have to help. In a letter to his sister dated March 26, 1939, N. Chamberlain wrote, explaining his attitude to a possible alliance with the USSR: “I must confess that I have a deep distrust of Russia. I in no way believe in her ability to carry out an effective offensive, even if she wants to take such a step. And I do not trust her motives, which, it seems to me, have little in common with our ideas about freedom ... Moreover, Russia is hated and suspected by most of the small states, especially Poland, Romania and Finland. " In July, he again wrote that the cabinet was very nervous about the failure of the negotiations, which had to be conducted very carefully. The prime minister remained highly skeptical about the value of Soviet aid to Western countries. So, on July 15, when it seemed that the negotiations were about to be crowned with success, N. Chamberlain noted that he would not "regard this as a triumph" due to Russia's small military power. Instead of an agreement with her, he would like to have "much more time left" while the negotiations last.

E. Halifax, S. Hoore and other members of the British government had a different point of view, and, despite the negative attitude of the prime minister, the government committee on foreign policy as a whole took the negotiations seriously. These conservative politicians, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom N. Chamberlain has always recognized as the "brain of the cabinet" and who used huge influence, were ready to go right up to the conclusion of an agreement, not forgetting for a minute that Great Britain is in a rather difficult situation, having provided guarantees of independence to Poland. Under the influence of their argumentation, as well as experiencing increasing pressure from the press and parliamentary opposition, demanding retaliation for Hitler's aggressive actions in Europe, N. Chamberlain was forced to officially recognize the collapse of the “appeasement” policy and proclaimed a radical turn in the British foreign policy. “We are not going to sit back and watch the independence of one country after another being destroyed with impunity,” the British Prime Minister said on May 11, 1939 in his speech at the Albert Hall.

According to W. Strang, head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office in 1937-1939, who played a prominent role in the Moscow negotiations in 1939, “N. Chamberlain, having survived one Munich, could not put the English public in front of another. Having left Czechoslovakia, he could not leave Poland ... ". The Prime Minister himself assessed in his parliamentary speech the agreement to provide guarantees to Poland as "a new moment ... a new era in the conduct of our foreign policy" write them. " The British Conservatives, for whom since Munich "the strongest impression was the urgent need for a massive armaments program", finding themselves in time trouble, were forced to overcome their distrust and dislike of the Soviet state and try to come to an agreement with him on the creation of a front of peace-loving states opposing aggression.

Joint Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations began in April 1939 following the Soviet proposal to convene a conference of the six powers and the British counter-proposal to sign a declaration of the four powers, which implied consultations between Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Poland in the event of aggression against them. These proposals were not implemented due to Poland's refusal to take part in them. The objectives of British foreign policy at that time were formulated as follows in the Foreign Office memorandum: “Our goal since the guarantee of Polish independence has been to form a peace front with the participation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: Romania, Poland, Greece and Turkey. In this combination, Poland occupies a key position and its position becomes risky in the event of a hostile or even neutral position of the Soviet Union. In the event of war, the only way of communication with Poland will remain - through Russian territory. Thus, we need to secure at least the friendly neutrality of the Soviet Union, and better - the possible assistance to Poland and Romania in the event of an attack against them. "

April 17 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov made a proposal to conclude a trilateral pact on mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the USSR, which was to be supported by a military convention. It was also envisaged to provide assistance to states located between the Baltic and Black Seas in the event of aggression against them. This proposal was sent to both governments and went far beyond their original plans. British Ambassador to Moscow W. Seeds, according to the instructions received on April 14, was to make a much more modest proposal: the Soviet government was expected to publish a declaration promising assistance to the European neighbors of the USSR if they agreed. In other words, Britain sought from the Soviet Union to provide guarantees to Poland and Romania, similar to the obligations undertaken by it and France. The French, for their part, went further, proposing to revive the Soviet-French treaty of 1935, adding guarantees of mutual assistance to it.

Considering Soviet initiatives, the government committee on foreign policy and the British cabinet as a whole decided to adhere to their demand for the adoption of the Soviet declaration and rejected the proposals of M.M. Litvinov and a compromise plan presented by the French government, which agreed to limit Soviet obligations under the pact. The French did not find it possible to insist on its acceptance, knowing that both N. Chamberlain and E. Halifax were seriously afraid of the difficulties that might arise on the question of Poland. N. Chamberlain even declared in the circle of conservative leaders especially close to him that "he would rather resign than sign an agreement with the Soviets."

Before the British government confirmed its decision, a request was sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (TSNTTT) about the state of the Soviet armed forces. In the TSNTTT memorandum, although the negative consequences of the purges were noted, the ineffectiveness of the Soviet war economy and the deplorable state of communications, nevertheless, it was concluded that the participation of the Soviet Union in the war on the side of the Western countries would bring them certain benefits. On the whole, Soviet military power was rated at an average level. In addition, it was emphasized that the Soviet Union would not be able to provide Poland and Romania with significant military aid... In the event of the defeat of these countries, the Soviet armed forces will be able to bind a certain number of German troops.

In early May 1939, M.M. Litvinov, known for his desire to achieve a significant result in negotiations with Western democracies, was replaced at the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, whose unyielding and firm manner of negotiating reminded E. Halifax of "smiling granite." The British response was handed to him. The response contained a definite concession to the Soviet side, which did not want to bind itself with obligations towards Poland and Romania without the reciprocal obligations of England and France in relation to the Soviet borders with Baltic countries and Finland: Russia now had to take no action until its Western allies entered the war in accordance with their common obligations. When determining the foreign policy steps of their government, conservative leaders did not attach of great importance rumors about a possible Soviet-German rapprochement. E. Halifax and Forinoffis generally relied on the assurances of V.M. Molotov on the invariability of the Soviet foreign policy line, taking as an encouraging sign his promise to consider the proposal for a Soviet declaration, as well as the energetic statement of Marshal K.E. Voroshilov to the British military attaché on the need for close cooperation against German aggression.

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

About the source

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is the name of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, rooted in socio-political and historical literature, especially its secret annex signed by VM Molotov and I. Ribbentrop on behalf of their governments and states. The existence of a secret protocol has long been denied the Soviet side, and only in the late 1980s. this fact was recognized and became the property of the world community.

By the time the pact was signed, Germany annexed the Sudetenland, incorporated Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Ensuring international security and combating German aggression Moscow negotiations between the USSR, England and France were supposed to serve, which ended with the adoption of a draft agreement on mutual assistance on August 2, 1939, but the draft never became a real agreement, since neither side showed interest, often putting forward deliberately unacceptable conditions. So, at the negotiations of the military missions of these powers on organizing joint defense against aggression in Europe, the Soviet side set the main condition for ensuring the passage of the Red Army through the territory of Poland or Romania in case they were attacked by an aggressor, knowing in advance that neither Poland nor Romania would ever would not agree at that time to "deal with the Soviets" (J. Beck), especially since this issue was not discussed at all with either the Polish or the Romanian governments.

The decision to end negotiations with Britain and France and conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany was taken by Stalin and Molotov. Both sides had different goals in concluding this agreement. Hitler was feverishly preparing an attack on Poland and believed that this treaty would eliminate the threat of war on two fronts in Europe for Germany, since Stalin, according to his calculations, was interested in seizing the territories of the former Russian Empire and will strive to obtain such an opportunity thanks to the treaty with Germany. Stalin viewed the treaty as a chance to carry out his aggressive intentions, avoiding an armed conflict, and an opportunity to prepare for military actions that would inevitably come.

On August 20, 1939, Hitler, who had already scheduled an attack on Poland for September 1, sent a telegram to Stalin, in which he insisted on the early conclusion of a treaty and asked to accept the Reich Foreign Minister no later than August 23 to sign both a non-aggression pact and an additional protocol. According to the agreement signed on August 23, 1939, the parties pledged to "resolve all disputes and conflicts between themselves exclusively in a peaceful way through a friendly exchange of views." The second article of the treaty stated that "in the event that one of the contracting parties becomes the object of hostilities by a third power, the other contracting party will not support this power in any form." In other words, the USSR will not help the possible victims of the aggression of the fascist Reich.

The treaty had a "secret additional protocol" on the delimitation of "spheres of influence" in the Eastern and South East Europe... It was envisaged that in the event of a war between Germany and Poland, German troops could advance to the so-called "Curzon line", the rest of Poland, as well as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia were recognized as the "sphere of influence" of the USSR. The fate of Poland will be decided "by way of friendly mutual consent." The treaty was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR a week after its signing, and the presence of a "secret additional protocol" was hidden from the deputies. The day after the ratification of the treaty on September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. The USSR was supposed to also send its troops to Poland in accordance with the agreements, but Molotov asked for a short delay, telling the German Ambassador to the USSR V. Schulenburg that due to the fact that Poland was falling apart, the Soviet Union should come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Belarusians, who "Threatened" by Germany, which allowed The Soviet Union do not look like an aggressor.

On September 17, 1939, Red Army units crossed the Polish border, and thus the USSR essentially entered the Second world war in 1939, and not in 1941, as Stalin always emphasized. Poland ceased to exist as a state. Contrary to norms international law the results of its defeat were enshrined in a new treaty "on friendship and frontier" signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop on September 28, 1939. The treaty isolated the USSR from the forces fighting against fascism. Any anti-fascist propaganda was banned on the territory of the USSR. Germany and the USSR have common border, and the question of an attack by one of the contract partners on the other became a matter of time. Since the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR on June 22, 1941, the treaty has lost all force.

BRT: Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact on 11/25/1936; 6/11/1937 accession. Italy - an aggressive block "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis" appeared.

1) Axis B-Rome (10/25/1936) military-polit. the alliance of Germany and Italy, formalized by the Berlin agreement. 10/25/1936. 5 points: the parties stated the coincidence of positions in the area of ​​ext. politicians; agreed to delimit the spheres of expansion in the Balkans and in the basin of the river. Danube; consolidated the recognition of the gene. Franco as Ch. isp. pr-va; outlined measures to strengthen the military. help from G. and I. fasc. rebels in Spain. G. recognized the capture of I. Ethiopia. Creation of "O.B. -R." important milestone on the way of unleashing 2 MV by the aggressors.

2) November 25, 1936 the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by Georgia and Japan(in Berlin: I. von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador K. Musyakoji). Consisted of 3 tbsp. and add. protocol: pledged to inform each other about the activities of the Comm. Jn. and in close sotr. to fight against him; take the necessary measures to combat and “against those who are inside or outside the country, directly or indirectly acting in favor of Com. In. " (the point made it possible for the parties to intervene in the affairs of other states under the pretext of fighting against Kom.); in the event of a war of one of the parties with the USSR, the other side is obliged not to take any measures that could alleviate the situation of the USSR. The duration of the pact was established. at 5 years old, at 25.11.41 it was extended for 5 years.

3) 11/06/1937 to the A. pact joined. Italy. There was a union of 3 aggressive states, called the "triangle Berlin - Rome - Tokyo". Officially, this bloc was directed against the USSR and the left-wing forces within the participating countries, in fact G. and J. under the guise of "fighting K." used the pact to prepare for a war for world domination (Japan was preparing for an attack on China, Germany was gathering its forces for a clash with Britain and France). 2/24/1939 Hungary and Manchukuo joined the pact, 3/27/1939 - Spain. 11/25/1941 the pact was extended for 5 years. On 11/25/1941 Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, Denmark, Slovakia, Croatia and the "Nanking government" in China joined. After the defeat of the bloc of aggressors in 2 MV, the pact was eliminated.

For reference:

Comintern in the 1920s - 1930s (Communist International, Third International) - an international association of communist parties from different countries.

14. Munich Pact (lm) and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (rm)

MP: 09/29/1938 heads of Great Britain (Chamberlain), France (Daladier), nat. Germany (Hitler) and f. Italy (Mussolini) signed in Munich an agreement on the division of Czechoslovakia, which went down in history as the "Munich Agreement" (which became the prologue of WW2). The agreement concerned the transfer to Cech. Germany Sudetenland. Bottom line: Georgia acquired territory favorable for an attack on Poland from several directions, which provided the best foothold for an attack on the USSR.

MR: 08/23/1939(Moscow) non-aggression pact between the USSR and Georgia. The parties pledged not to attack and refrain from other aggressive actions against each other, both separately and together with other states, not to support the third state if it attacks one of the parties , not to participate in coalitions hostile to each other; to consult on issues affecting their common interests, and to resolve disputes and conflicts only by peaceful means. The treaty was accompanied by a secret protocol, the existence of which the USSR denied until the summer of 1989: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, the eastern regions of the Polish state, as well as Bessarabia, which was part of Romania since 1918, were recognized by Georgia as belonging to the sphere of interests of the USSR. The USSR pledged to respect Georgia's interests in the western lands of Poland and Lithuania, which was supposed to include the Vilnius region.

Outcome: USSR the opportunity to gain some time (2 years) to strengthen its economy. and military capabilities; G. wanted to secure the eastern flank, prevent a war on two fronts, and tear the USSR away from the planned alliance with France and Great Britain.