December 20 is the Day of Security Bodies Russian Federation... The holiday is based on the Decree of the Soviet government on the formation of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VChK) of December 20, 1917. The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) also traces its history from the Foreign Department (INO) of the Cheka under the NKVD of the RSFSR. The Main Directorate of the General Staff (formerly the GRU) celebrates its holiday on November 5, since it was on this day in 1918, by order of the RVS of the RSFSR, which was then led by Leon Trotsky (Bronstein), the Field Headquarters of the RVSR was approved. Thus, the history of our intelligence and counterintelligence is artificially limited to a hundred-year period. It turns out that until 1917 we had no special services at all to protect the state security of Russia.

Of course, this is not so, and it is surprising why our state does not remember the heroic pages of intelligence and counterintelligence of the Russian Empire. Let us try, at least to a small extent, to correct this injustice.

The first military intelligence organization was created under Emperor Alexander I on the initiative of the Minister of War, General of Infantry, M.B. Barclay de Tolly. Even then, both Alexander I and his Minister of War understood that the war with Napoleon was only a matter of time. Gathering information about the potential enemy and his plans became an urgent need.

In 1810 Barclay de Tolly reported to the Emperor Alexander Pavlovich his views on the need to create a special organization to carry out these tasks. The sovereign fully agreed with the minister and in 1810 a Secret Expedition (Chancellery) was created under the Minister of War. At the beginning of 1812, the expedition became known as the "Special Chancellery of the Minister of War." She reported directly to the minister, the results of her activities were not included in the annual ministerial report, and the terms of reference of employees were determined by special rules. The intelligence activities of the military department were carried out in the field of strategic intelligence (obtaining secret political and military information abroad), tactical intelligence (collecting information about enemy troops on the territory of neighboring states), counterintelligence (identifying and neutralizing agents of the French special services and its allies) and military intelligence.

Special office became the first central body of the War Ministry of the Russian Empire, which was engaged in the organization of intelligence for the armed forces of foreign states.

M.B. Barclay de Tolly. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Already in August-September 1810, Barclay de Tolly sent instructions to the Russian ambassadors in Europe for obtaining intelligence information. Later, military agents were appointed to European capitals, who were tasked with collecting information about the progress of Napoleon's preparations for war. In Paris, these functions were assigned to Colonel Count A.I. Chernyshev, who was a military agent (attaché) at the court of Napoleon Bonaparte, who sympathized with the Russian colonel, planning to use him to establish a direct dialogue with Alexander I. In Paris, Chernyshev and Count K.V. Nesselrode organized a powerful intelligence network. Among their paid informers were the Minister of Police J. Fouche and the employee of the Ministry of War M. Michel, who compiled the daily summary of the French headquarters. As the historian O. Sokolov writes:

This was information about the size, composition and movement of the Napoleonic army, which even the French marshals did not have at their disposal. As a result, there were no secrets for the tsar regarding the deployment and state of the French army.

Chernyshev obtained valuable information about the preparation of France for a war against Russia, revealed the size of the French army, weapons, and the rate of its movement to the borders of Russia. Finally, he obtained secret documents of important strategic importance: the combat schedule of the French army and its deployment.

In 1810, Chernyshev received instructions from Emperor Alexander I on the way back after completing his next order to call in Stockholm to the Crown Prince Zh.B. Bernadotte to clarify the political views of the leader of Sweden and the then Napoleonic Marshal. Chernyshev established friendly relations with Bernadotte. Napoleon saw Bernadotte as his protege, but he understood that together with the final victory of the French, Bonaparte would deprive him of all independence. In addition, Bonaparte captured Swedish Pomerania, which finally turned the Swedes away from him.

Already in 1811, Bernadotte, through Chernyshev, gave his word to Emperor Alexander I that he would not fight Russia and was ready to provide her with any assistance in the fight against Napoleon. The Swedish crown prince during 1811 - early 1812 transferred to Alexander through the Russian ambassador in Stockholm P.K. Sukhtelena the most important information about the plans of the French emperor. On March 29 (April 10), 1812, Bernadotte reported:

They write to me that Napoleon expects to end the war with Russia in two months, then go to Constantinople, where he will transfer the capital to rule Russia and Austria and all of Europe.

Bernadotte also notified that Napoleon plans, after the victory over the Russian army, to oblige Alexander I to go to the Turks and expel them from Europe, and then proclaim himself an Eastern and Western emperor.

Alexander I. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

One of the interesting episodes in the activities of Russian intelligence is associated with the "Savan case". Retired captain Russian service David Sawan lived with his family in the Duchy of Warsaw. French intelligence, aware of his financial difficulties, offered him cooperation. Sawan was forced to accept the offer. Equipped with instructions and money, he crossed the border at the beginning of 1811, but, having arrived in Vilno, he voluntarily appeared at the command of the Russian army and told about the assignment he had received. Savan returned to the Grand Duchy as an agent of Russian intelligence. He delivered the information of interest to the French, specially prepared at the headquarters of Barclay de Tolly. While in Warsaw, Sawan was able to obtain a number of valuable military information, and according to the previously agreed communication conditions, his encrypted correspondence ended up on the table of the command of the Russian army.

With Savan's assistance, in the spring of 1812, Russian counterintelligence carried out successful operations to identify French agents.

Thus, Lieutenant Drozhnevsky, who was sent by the French to Belarus, was arrested; in cooperation with the French special services, a group of Baltic bankers, led by Menzelman, who supplied Napoleon's agents in Russia with money, was exposed.

In the 30s. XIX century. Count Chernyshev became Minister of War and, of course, paid great attention to intelligence, including economic. In November 1830, Emperor Nicholas I ordered to constantly and purposefully collect information about all discoveries, inventions, improvements and technologies, "both in terms of the military, and in general in terms of manufactories and industry" and immediately deliver detailed information about them.

A.S. Griboyedov. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

An outstanding Russian intelligence officer was the great playwright A.S. Griboyedov, appointed in 1828. Ambassador to Tehran.

Griboyedov was tasked with collecting statistical and political information about Persia, its history, geography, the state of its economy, trade; collection of information about Persia's neighbors, about its relations with them, about the way of life, customs, trade of their population, about "friendly and hostile" relations between Persia and other countries.

Particular attention was paid to collecting "in the true light of the stated" information about Bukhara, its trade, relations with Khiva, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey.

However, Griboyedov only started his intelligence activities when he was killed on January 30, 1829 by Iranian fanatics.

Under Nicholas I, Russian intelligence operated thousands of miles from Russia. So, in Brazil, the first consul in Rio de Janeiro G.I. von Langsdorff collected data for the successful trade between Russia and Brazil, i.e. collected intelligence information of an economic nature. Langsdorf obtained a wealth of information about a country practically unknown to Russia.

The work of military intelligence took place in close cooperation with the Foreign Ministry. May 8, 1852 A.I. Chernyshev told the Foreign Ministry:

The Sovereign Emperor, wishing that the Ministry of War always had as complete and correct information as possible about the military forces of foreign states, the timely receipt of which is necessary for the considerations of the ministry, He deigned to command: special war correspondents, to deliver time-based, at certain times, information about the state of the military forces of these states according to a short and easy-to-follow program.

Russian military intelligence played an important role during the 1877-1878 War of Independence. Just before the start of the Russian-Turkish war, the general leadership of the intelligence service in Turkey and the Balkans was entrusted to Colonel of the General Staff P.D. Parensov, an officer on special assignments, a recognized specialist in intelligence affairs. In mid-December 1876, Parensov, under the name of Paul Paulson, arrived in Bucharest under the legend of a relative of the Russian consul, Baron Stuart. V short term he made the necessary connections, created an active agent network and gathered around him loyal people from among local residents who monitored the movements of ships along the Danube. The Bulgarian patriot banker and grain merchant Evlogiy Georgiev, who had sales agents and warehouses in many cities of Bulgaria that were of interest to the Russian command, provided Parensov with a great free help, which gave Parensov the opportunity to use ready-made and fairly reliable agents. Thanks to Eulogius, he acquired a valuable assistant to Grigory Nachovich.

An educated person who spoke French, German, Romanian and a decent understanding of Russian, he had great connections on both sides of the Danube, was unusually inventive in the methods of obtaining information. Nachovich helped Russian intelligence as a true patriot of his fatherland - for all the time he worked, he never once received a monetary reward from the Russian command.

Emperor Nicholas II. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

Russian military counterintelligence was formed into an organized structure in 1903 by Emperor Nicholas II. January 20, 1903 Minister of War A.N. Kuropatkin sent a memorandum to the sovereign justifying the creation of a new secret division of the military department. The Minister of War considered it expedient to create a special structure within the General Staff of the Ministry of War, which would specifically deal with the search for foreign spies and traitors in two directions: leadership and executive. The leading direction assumed the opening of the probable intelligence routes of foreign states, and the executive one - direct observation of these routes.

The activities of this body should be to establish covert supervision over the usual secret military intelligence routes, which have the starting point of foreign military agents, the end points - the persons who are on our public service and those involved in criminal activities, and the links between them - sometimes whole line agents, intermediaries in the transmission of information ...

In the composition of such a body, according to Kuropatkin, there should be military specialists who are well aware of the organization of military institutions in Russia, as well as specialists in secret search, simply agents-detectives.

In accordance with this, he proposed to establish a special Intelligence Department at the General Staff, putting at the head of it the head of the department with the rank of staff officer, a clerk with the rank of chief officer and clerk. "For the direct detective work of this department, it would be necessary to use the services of private individuals - detectives for free hiring, the constant number of whom, pending clarification by his experience, would seem possible to be limited to six people."

The official establishment of such a body seemed impossible, since the main chance of its success was lost: the secret of its existence.

Therefore, it would be desirable to create a projected department without resorting to the official establishment of it ...

It seemed desirable to enforce the foregoing measures as promptly as possible. The very next day, January 21, the resolution of the Emperor appeared on the document: "I agree." Thus, January 21, 1903 was the birthday of the Russian counterintelligence service. The "Intelligence Department of the General Staff" was created under the leadership of the gendarme captain V.N. Lavrov.

In the same 1903, the Tsar increased the punishment for espionage. The reason for this was the case of the senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District, Lieutenant Colonel A.N. Grimm, who in the period from 1896 to 1902 transferred the most important secret documents to the German and Austro-Hungarian intelligence services. Having been fully exposed of the crime by the gendarmerie and police forces, Grimm was sentenced by the Warsaw Military District Court to 12 years in hard labor, since the death penalty for espionage was not provided for by Russian criminal law.

On February 11, 1903, Emperor Nicholas II, by imperial command of the Military Department, approved amendments to the criminal code. According to its new rule, anyone guilty of issuing secret documents to a foreign state, which entailed or could entail consequences harmful to Russia's external security, was sentenced to deprivation of all rights of state and the death penalty.

It is noteworthy that the death penalty for this form of espionage was envisaged as an "absolute sanction", that is, the only possible one.

In addition to military counterintelligence, Security Departments and the Separate Corps of Gendarmes were engaged in counterintelligence activities in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The Warsaw counterintelligence department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel N.S. Batyushin, who was distinguished by exceptional efficiency, initiative, and systematic operational thinking, had a rich specialist outlook, which allowed him to make unconventional decisions. In the district, literally entangled by Austrian and German agents, the security department and counterintelligence, from 1900 to 1910, revealed almost one and a half hundred foreign spies (from small smugglers to headquarters officers). Counterintelligence developed rapidly, but on the eve of the First World War, it still experienced difficulties with personnel.

The fact is that the chiefs of counterintelligence departments (KRO) were appointed gendarme officers specially sent to the army, and army officers were their assistants. The gendarmes sent out did not always have the practice of counterintelligence work. The situation with army officers was even worse - they had no such experience at all. The military used the professionalism of the gendarme officers not only for counterintelligence purposes, but also to direct military intelligence abroad.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian intelligence managed to recruit Colonel of the Austro-Hungarian army Alfred Redl, who, as one of the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence, became an important source from which extremely valuable military and political information was received for ten years.

Military agents played a huge role in obtaining intelligence information under Emperor Nicholas II, as military attaches were called in Russia: Colonel V.P. Lazarev (Paris), Lieutenant Colonel E.K. Miller (Brussels), Major General V.N. Shebeko (Berlin), Colonel M.K. Marchenko (Vienna), Lieutenant General N.S. Ermolov (London), Colonel V.K. Samoilov (Tokyo) and others.

On the eve of the First World War, significant transformations were carried out in Russian military intelligence. The Main Directorate (GU) of the General Staff (GS) was allocated from the General Staff, the highest body of the military command of Russia, in which the leadership of military intelligence was concentrated.

Emperor Nicholas II and Tsarevich Alexei. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

With the outbreak of the First World War, the Russian special services faced high activity of foreign intelligence officers. For example, already at the end of August 1914, officers of the Police Department in the immediate vicinity of Arkhangelsk detained a German steamer, which had a radiotelegraph station on board. In the same month, the GUGSH revealed the espionage activities of the German agent K. Berghard, who worked under the guise of a traveling salesman in Petrograd and Saratov.

The Austrian agents were not idle either: intelligence schools in Vienna, Krakow and Kosice forcefully trained professional spies to be sent to Russia. And in October 1914, the Ministry of War detected the facts of the participation of Turkish diplomats in the conduct of intelligence activities and the deployment of pan-Islamist propaganda in different parts of the country.

German intelligence used the activities of large European firms as its agents. In particular, the American corporation of sewing machines "Singer".

At the beginning of the twentieth century, "Singer" successfully established itself on the Russian market. Since the beginning of World War I, the corporation has been involved in spying for Germany.

According to the information received from the Police Department, the main office of the Singer factory instructed its agents for the sale of sewing machines to collect secretly in the areas they serve, information on the number and names of villages, indicating the number of farmsteads and inhabitants, as well as attractions of the area. attention that the above circumstances are one of the ways to serve the purposes of military espionage, the Police Department considers it necessary to notify about the above.

In Poland, the gendarmes intercepted another letter to the employees of the Singer firm from the American J. Howard from Bremen. He offered to look for him "persons from the military environment who, for an appropriate monetary reward, would deliver all the latest information about new orders, incidents, changes, etc. in the troops."
In the very first days of the February coup of 1917, counterintelligence, gendarmes and security squads took on the blow of militants led by German agents. The rebels destroyed the archives and files of the capital's police and counterintelligence. Head of the Directorate, Lieutenant General I.D. Volkov was captured, mutilated and shot in the back of the head. The Gendarme Office was burned down. By order of the Provisional Government, all gendarme officers and persons who had previously worked in security departments and the detective police were dismissed from the counterintelligence bodies. The collapse of the Russian special services was gaining momentum, to the undisguised joy of an external enemy.

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• AMBASSADOR ORDER - the first independent state body in Russia, in charge of all issues international relations... It was created by Ivan IV in 1549. Before the creation of the Ambassadorial Prikaz, diplomatic documents were kept together with the royal treasury. During that period, there were practically no differences between diplomatic and intelligence activities. The diplomat, as a rule, also performed the functions of an intelligence officer.


• ORDER OF SECRET CASES - a special chancellery, created in 1654 by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. This special service began to work in parallel with the Ambassadorial order. She took over all intelligence functions. Thus, for the first time, a structural separation of diplomacy and intelligence was undertaken. Secret ciphers are introduced into the regular practice of secret correspondence. Abolished in 1676.


• TRANSFORMATION ORDER - an organization created by Peter I to fight the internal enemies of the state (counterintelligence). In the period between the liquidation of the oprichnina in 1572 and the creation of the Preobrazhensky order in 1697, there was no centralized "secret police" service in Russia. The order existed for thirty years, and was abolished in 1699.


• SECRET OFFICE - created in 1718. In system government controlled she performed the functions of a political investigation (investigation). Created to conduct an investigation in the case of Tsarevich Alexei by Peter I, it was under the personal control of the Tsar, who himself often took part in its work. The office was located in St. Petersburg in the Peter and Paul Fortress. Its branch also worked in Moscow. In 1826 the Secret Chancellery was liquidated. In its place, the Office of Secret Investigative Affairs was created.


• SECRET EXPEDITION - was created under the Senate in 1762. All counterintelligence functions were transferred to it. To combat foreign agents, the expedition introduced and began to effectively use the institution of informants abroad. Through them, "confidential", the Russian special services received data on both spies sent to Russia and on the employees they recruited from among Russian citizens.


• SPECIAL COMMITTEE. The secret expedition ceased to exist with the accession to the throne of Alexander I. Its functions were transferred to the First and Fifth Departments of the Senate. But the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars demanded a revision of the entire system of intelligence and counterintelligence work. In January 1807, a Special Committee was created to consider cases on crimes “tending to disturb the general peace” (the documents also contain another name for this body: “Committee for the Protection general security"). The committee lasted until 1829.


• SPECIAL OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF POLICE ... This office acted in parallel with the Special Committee as a body of political investigation. She was ordered to be in charge of "affairs of the department of foreigners and foreign passports", "censorship audit" and "special affairs" - the fight against espionage. It ceased to exist as an independent body in 1819 (transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs).


• COLLEGE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - one of the government bodies. It was created along with others that replaced the orders in 1717-1721 by Peter I. According to a Senate decree of August 31, 1719, the collegium was charged with registering all foreigners arriving in the Russian Empire, as well as issuing passports to Russian citizens traveling abroad for diplomatic purposes, trade work, study. The collegium constantly collected all information about foreigners. In June 1718, she was charged with the duty of secret reading (perlustration) of all letters received from abroad.


• III DEPARTMENT OF ITS OWN IMPERIAL MAJESTY OF THE OFFICE ... It was created in July 1826 on the basis of the Special Chancellery by Nicholas I. It was headed by A. Kh. Benkendorf. It was conceived as the "highest police" and, unlike the former search bodies, had a widely ramified network of territorial bodies in the form of gendarme units. The III Division was entrusted with various tasks - organizing the political search, conducting an investigation into cases of state crimes; monitoring anti-government organizations and individual public figures; deportation and exile of "suspicious people", supervision over them; the fight against the anti-church activities of schismatics and sectarians, with peasant demonstrations; fake fraud; official and other major criminal offenses. The department was supposed to supervise foreigners, collect information about improvements and inventions, censor periodicals and the press. The department had five expeditions (departments) and two secret archives. Counterintelligence affairs were partly dealt with by the first and third expeditions, the latter supervising foreigners. Discontinued August 1880.


• CASE OF GEANDARMS. This structure (special forces) was created in April 1827 by imperial decree. (Subsequently, it was called the Separate Corps of Gendarmes.) Over time, the gendarme units became the executive bodies of the III Section. According to the regulation adopted in 1836, the whole country was divided into gendarme districts (later provincial gendarme departments were created there), which were headed by gendarme generals.


• DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE. The division of the reorganized Ministry of Internal Affairs, which included the past III Division, began to be called the State Police Department in 1883. He dealt with all the same issues, with the exception of counterintelligence, which entered one of the main divisions of the General Staff of the Russian army.


• "SECURITY" - the Russian secret police of the times of imperial Russia. Founded in the era of Peter I. The term "secret police" itself became widespread in the early 80s of the XIX century. Gendarmes trained appropriately to investigate political crimes were called employees of the "secret police" (political police). The secret police practically did not engage in external intelligence. She only kept track of the political emigration. The "secret police" operated for thirty-six years.


• MILITARY AGENT. The Institute of Military Agents was established in 1810. Then, on the instructions of the Minister of War of Russia, Mikhail B. Barclay-de-Tolly, the first permanent military representatives were sent abroad to the Russian embassies. Their main task was to conduct intelligence, intelligence work. The extraction of important classified information was put on a professional basis. Foreign intelligence is structured in the military department. At the same time, foreign intelligence issues also remain the prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


• MILITARY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE. Formed in 1812 at the General Staff of the Russian Army, he was directly responsible for the fight against espionage. It existed until the beginning of the 20th century. This committee was not engaged in direct search work. His role was mainly in collecting and recording information. For the first time, the Committee began to actively use the institution of "military agents" (attachés) to conduct intelligence at the embassies of the Russian Empire in European countries. It officially existed until 1864.


• GENERAL-APARTMENT SERVICE. For the first time in Russia, the Quartermaster ranks are mentioned in the Charter of 1698. Then the regimental quartermasters (employees of the special service) were introduced to them. In 1701, Peter I approved the post of Quartermaster General. This position was occupied by Prince A. F. Shakhovskoy. But it was only in 1716 that intelligence work acquired a legal basis. In the new Petrine military regulations, intelligence is subordinated to the general-quartermaster service. With the establishment of the General Staff by Catherine II in 1763, the Quartermaster General Service became one of its important units. Quartermaster General - the person in charge of the officers of the General Staff and the special service. In 1810, Minister of War M. B. Barclay de Tolly first introduced the institution of military agents in the embassies of the Russian Empire in a number of European countries... The duties of military agents included the conduct of undercover and intelligence work. Thus, the collection of classified military-political information abroad is put on a professional basis. At the same time, foreign intelligence continues to be carried out, albeit at the level of one-time responsible assignments, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1856, Alexander II approved the first in the history of Russian intelligence Instruction on the work of military agents. The functions of foreign intelligence are increasingly becoming fundamental in the work of the military department. The main role here was played by the defeat of Russia in Crimean war... In 1865, the post of Quartermaster General was abolished. The corps of officers of the special services of the General Staff was at that time directly subordinate to the chief of the General Staff. Since 1892, the post of Quartermaster General was reintroduced, but only in a number of military districts, and since 1890 in the General Staff. Its functions included preparatory work for the conduct of hostilities and the defense of the state. In 1905, the military situation repeated itself (Crimean War - Russo-Japanese war). This led to a new reorganization of the entire intelligence and counterintelligence work of the Russian special services. In the future, all training of professional intelligence officers is entrusted to the General Staff, which introduces a special course on secret intelligence into its program. On the eve of the First World War of 1914-1917, significant transformations were carried out in Russian intelligence. The Main Directorate (GU) of the General Staff (GS) was separated from the General Staff. It was there that the leadership of military intelligence was concentrated. Specifically, since 1910, he was in charge of intelligence department of the Quartermaster General (OGENKVAR) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. With the beginning of the war, a significant part of the officers of OGENKVAR was transferred to the active army. In the course of hostilities, the organization of intelligence was improved taking into account the experience gained. By the beginning of 1917, the military intelligence network was clearly divided according to the tasks performed. Having formed as an effective instrument of the state and military mechanism, Russian intelligence at the end of the summer of the same year was unable to fully realize its capabilities. The approaching new era required a change in the entire intelligence and counterintelligence system. The old government could no longer do anything, the new one still had to be born.
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• CHK - Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage. Soviet organization responsible for state security from 1917 to 1922, then it was renamed the VChK (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission), and since 1923 - the GPU. Founded by decree of V.I. Lenin, it performed police and intelligence functions. It was headed by F.E.Dzerzhinsky. At first, it employed twenty-three people, and by the middle of 1921 it numbered thirty-one thousand people, about one hundred and forty thousand soldiers internal troops and more than ninety thousand border guards. Under the Cheka-VChK, a Foreign Department (foreign intelligence) was created, as well as a Special Department for conducting counterintelligence work and ensuring party-political control in the ranks of the Soviet armed forces.


• OGPU - United Main Political Directorate. It was created in 1922 and worked until 1934 under the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR. Intended for the protection of state security. Supervised the work of the GPU union republics... Included in the NKVD and renamed the General Directorate of State Security. It created the Counterintelligence Department (separated from the Special Department). The system of measures developed by the KRO to prevent and suppress subversive activities of foreign intelligence services on the territory and outside the borders of the USSR retained its significance for many decades. In the 1930s, the OGPU increasingly began to be involved in solving internal and most often political tasks that were completely uncharacteristic of intelligence and counterintelligence. It, in fact, has turned into a punitive body, carrying out, as a result, the expansion of the extrajudicial powers of the security agencies.


• INO - Foreign department (foreign intelligence) ChK-VChK-GPU-OGPU. Formed on December 20, 1920. At first, his duties included work against counterrevolutionary leaders who had emigrated from Soviet Russia... Among the first major operations there were "Trust" and "Syndicate". Later, the department began to train and send its agents abroad for the purpose of conducting political, military, scientific, technical and economic intelligence.


• NKVD- People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (included state security agencies in 1922-1923 and 1934-1943). He was responsible for ensuring the internal security of the state and conducting foreign intelligence.


• GUGB- The Main Directorate of State Security - a security service that was part of the NKVD in 1934-1943.


• PSU- The first main directorate (foreign intelligence) of the KGB of the USSR.


• The KGB - State Security Committee. One of the most powerful public security organizations in the world. The KGB was created in March 1954 on the basis of the existing Ministry of State Security. It worked until October 1991. Its structure looked as follows: First Main Directorate - foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, "active measures", analysis of information coming from the residencies; The second main directorate - internal counterintelligence, the fight against espionage and subversive activities, industrial security; The third main directorate is counterintelligence in the Soviet armed forces (military counterintelligence), OO (special departments); The fourth department - the political search, carried out work on the search for political criminals and traitors to the motherland, later was engaged in the protection and internal security of embassies and consulates, carried out counterintelligence in transport; The fifth department is the fight against anti-Soviet activities (work in all ideological organizations, with dissidents); The sixth department - counterintelligence on all types of transport (engaged in anti-sabotage activities, prevention of dangerous situations, etc., later was engaged in the protection of state secrets in the economy); Seventh department - outdoor surveillance service (operational search); The eighth main department - encryption and decryption, worked for its intended purpose; Ninth Directorate - ensuring the protection of the country's leadership and secret facilities, the Kremlin regiment; The tenth department - accounting and archival; Main Directorate of Border Troops; Government Communications Department; Inspection Department - carried out an audit of the activities of the KGB units in the center and in the field; Investigative part on especially important cases (on the rights of management); Office of the economic service. In addition to the above-mentioned central administrations and directorates, the committee had ten independent departments, then two more were added. The KGB ceased to exist on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union (December 1991). Its functions were subsequently performed by the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Federal Security Service.


• "SMERSH" - "Death to Spies" (Soviet military counterintelligence, operated from 1943 to 1946). Smersh had five departments. The first department is the "Smersh" representation for the trial of suspects in all units and formations of the Red Army, right down to battalions and companies. They monitored the personnel, led the informants. The second directorate - operations, communication with the NKVD, NKGB, special units for the protection of headquarters and senior command personnel (for a company - for the army, a battalion - for the front). The third department is the receipt, storage and dissemination of intelligence data. The fourth department is an inquiry and investigation into servicemen suspected of treason and other anti-state actions. The fifth department consists of military troikas from Smersh employees.


• GRU - The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army (military intelligence), since 1992 - the Russian Army, known as the Fourth Directorate of the General Staff and "VCh No. 44388". Formed in 1918, it was originally called the Registration Department of the Headquarters of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (GRU began to be called from 1942). Currently, according to the "Encyclopedia of Espionage" (Moscow: Kron-Press, 1999), there are eighteen directorates working in the GRU.


• KI- Committee of Information under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It existed for a short time (October 1947 - July 1948). Has incorporated the functions of foreign intelligence, military intelligence. The Information Committee was headed by VM Molotov (Scriabin). Carried out military and political intelligence abroad; operations against all foreign anti-Soviet organizations; counterintelligence in Soviet embassies, trade missions; intelligence operations in the countries of the People's Democracies. A year after its creation, he was only engaged in the collection of foreign policy information. In 1951 it ceased to exist.


• FSB- Russian Federal Security Service. It is designed to oversee the observance of internal state laws and order and counterintelligence. It was originally called Federal Service counterintelligence (FSK). It was created in October 1991. In April 1995 it was renamed FSB. The functions of combating organized crime, banditry, terrorism, smuggling of goods and valuables, and corruption were simultaneously transferred to the service. In accordance with the adopted new law, the FSB obtained the right to its own prison system, the introduction of its agents into foreign organizations and criminal groups, the creation of its own commercial structures in the interests of its main work. The FSB also has the right to demand the receipt of the necessary information from private companies and firms. The FSB is, among other things, responsible for protecting classified government materials and ensuring security in the armed forces and other government agencies. "

It is believed that intelligence is one of the oldest professions on earth. Quotations from the Old Testament or from the Sumerian epic about Gilgamesh are often cited to prove this. In many ways, this statement is legitimate. Indeed, the word "intelligence" in its original sense presupposes the conduct of some kind of secret survey for a specific purpose. But something else is much more important: that intelligence is a necessary mechanism for solving the most important state tasks. This has been proven by history, it is also confirmed by the present.

Speaking about Russia, it should be noted that since the formation of Kievan Rus, intelligence was a state matter and was conducted at two levels - by foreign policy and military departments. For the collection of intelligence information, Russian subjects were used: ambassadors and employees of embassies sent for negotiations, from the 17th century - members of permanent missions abroad, messengers, merchants, representatives of the clergy, residents of border regions, large and small military detachments, as well as individual military personnel. Foreigners, including those living on the territory of the Russian state (merchants, clergymen, employees of foreign missions, defectors and prisoners of war), were also attracted to conduct intelligence.

The first organs appear in Russia in the 16th century central administration, organizing and conducting reconnaissance, due to which the awareness of the state leadership about the plans and intentions of the enemy has increased. As Russia's influence on international affairs grew, so did the role of intelligence. In 1654, by decree of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the Order of Secret Affairs was founded, where intelligence management is concentrated. The leaders of the Order - the ducks - were D. M. Bashmakov, F. M. Rtishchev, D. L. Polyansky and F. Mikhailov. The Preobrazhensky order (1686-1729), which carried out the functions of the secret police, including intelligence, was led by the father and son of the Romodanovsky princes - Fedor Yuryevich (1686-1717) and Ivan Fedorovich (1717-1729).

Peter I in the military charter of 1716 for the first time provides a legislative and legal basis for intelligence work.

Intensification of hostilities in late XVIII- at the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, it sets new tasks for intelligence, and more and more forces and means are attracted to its conduct. This required the creation of a special central intelligence agency, especially a military one, which would combine both the mining and processing functions of the agent's strategic and military intelligence. The decisive impetus to the organization of a permanent central body of Russian military intelligence was the bloody wars that Russia waged with Napoleonic France since 1805. We will dwell on this period in the history of Russian military intelligence in more detail.

The defeat of the Russian troops in the companies of 1805 and 1806-1807. ended with the conclusion on June 25, 1807 of the Peace of Tilsit with France. But the signing of a peace treaty, which in many ways infringes on Russian interests, did not at all mean for Russia that there would never be a war with the French emperor again. Emperor Alexander I and all Russians understood this perfectly well. statesmen... In this regard, the timely receipt of information about the political and military plans of Napoleon acquired paramount importance. Therefore, when General M. Barclay de Tolly in 1810 became Minister of War and began to strengthen the army, he began to pay great attention to the organization of military strategic intelligence.

An important role in the creation of military intelligence in Russia was played by Adjutant General Prince P. M. Volkonsky, the future head of the quartermaster unit of the General Staff of the Russian Army. In 1807-1810. he was on a business trip abroad, on his return from which he presented a report "On the internal structure of the French army of the General Staff."

Influenced by this report, Barclay de Tolly put before Alexander I the question of organizing a permanent organ of strategic military intelligence.

And the first such body was the Expedition of Secret Affairs under the Ministry of War, created on the initiative of Barclay de Tolly in January 1810. In January 1812, it was renamed the Special Chancellery under the Minister of War. In his opinion, the Expedition of Secret Affairs had to solve the following tasks: conducting strategic intelligence (collecting strategically important secret information abroad), operational-tactical reconnaissance (collecting data on enemy troops on the borders of Russia) and counterintelligence (identifying and neutralizing enemy agents). Three people close to the Minister of War became the first leaders of the Russian military intelligence in turn: from September 29, 1810 - aide-de-camp Colonel A.V. Voeikov, from March 19, 1812 - Colonel A.A.Zakrevsky, from January 10, 1813 - Colonel P. A. Chuykevich.

In the same January 1810, Barclay de Tolly talks with Alexander I about the need to organize strategic military intelligence abroad and asked for permission to send special military agents to the Russian embassies in order to collect information “about the number of troops, about the structure, weapons and their spirit, about the state of fortresses and reserves, the abilities and merits of the best generals, as well as about the welfare, character and spirit of the people, about the location and products of the land, about the internal sources of powers or the means to continue the war and about the various conclusions provided for defensive and offensive actions ". These military agents were supposed to be on diplomatic missions under the guise of adjutants to ambassadors-generals or civilian officials and employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Alexander I agreed with the proposals of Barclay de Tolly, and the following officers were sent on foreign missions to carry out secret assignments:

Colonel A. I. Chernyshev (Paris);

Colonel F. W. Teil von Seraskeren (Vienna);

Colonel R. E. Rennie (Berlin);

Lieutenant M. F. Orlov (Berlin);

Major V.A.Prendel (Dresden);

Lieutenant P. H. Grabbe (Munich);

Lieutenant P.I.Brozin (Kassel, then Madrid).

They were to carry out their reconnaissance tasks in secret. For example, the instructions to Major Prendel stated:

“... your real assignment should be subject to impenetrable secrecy, therefore, in all your actions, you should be modest and careful. The main goal of your secret assignment should be to ... acquire accurate statistical and physical knowledge of the state of the Kingdom of Saxony and the Duchy of Warsaw, paying particular attention to war state... and also inform about the merits and properties of military generals. "

Colonel A.I. In a short time he managed to create a network of informants in the government and military spheres in France and receive from them, often for a large reward, information of interest to Moscow. So, on December 23, 1810, he wrote that "Napoleon had already made a decision about war against Russia, but so far he is gaining time because of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Spain and Portugal."

Here is another report from Chernyshev to St. Petersburg, where he, giving a characterization to Marshal of France Davout, shows himself to be an attentive and intelligent observer:

“Davout, Duke of Auerstadt, Prince of Eckmühl. Marshal of the Empire, commander-in-chief of the troops in northern Germany. A rude and cruel man, hated by everyone who surrounds the Emperor Napoleon; zealous supporter of Poles, he big enemy Russia. Currently, this is the marshal who has the greatest influence over the Emperor. Napoleon trusts him more than all others and which he uses most willingly, being sure that, whatever his orders, they will always be executed accurately and literally.

Not showing particularly brilliant courage under fire, he is very persistent and stubborn and, moreover, knows how to force everyone to obey him. This marshal has the misfortune of being extremely short-sighted. "

One of Chernyshev's informants was M. Michel, an employee of the French Ministry of War. He was part of a group of employees who, once every two weeks, compiled a single copy of a summary of the number and deployment of the French armed forces personally for Napoleon. Michel gave a copy of this summary to Chernyshev, who sent it to Petersburg. Unfortunately, Chernyshev's activities in Paris ended in 1811. While he was in St. Petersburg, the French police discovered a note by M. Michel during an unofficial search of his Paris house. As a result, Chernyshev was accused of espionage, and he could not return to France, and Michel was sentenced to death.

Another valuable Russian agent in France was, surprisingly enough, Prince Charles-Maurice Talleyrand, Napoleon's former foreign minister. In September 1808, during the Erfurt meeting between Alexander I and Napoleon, he himself offered his services to the Russian emperor. Initially, Alexander was distrustful of Talleyrand's words, but after a confidential meeting, his suspicions were dispelled. For a huge reward at that time, Talleyrand reported on the state of the French army, gave advice on strengthening the Russian financial system, etc. And in December 1810 he wrote to Alexander I that Napoleon was preparing to attack Russia and even named a specific date - April 1812 g.

But despite the fact that Talleyrand's correspondence with Alexander was carried out in compliance with all the rules of conspiracy, by the beginning of 1809 Napoleon had suspicions of Talleyrand's double game. In January, Napoleon unexpectedly transferred command of the Spanish armies to the marshals, and he himself returned to Paris. On January 28, 1809, a famous scene took place, which has been cited many times in the memoir literature. The emperor literally attacked Talleyrand with the words:

“You are a thief, a scoundrel, a dishonest man! You do not believe in God, you have violated all your obligations all your life, you have deceived everyone, betrayed everyone, there is nothing sacred for you, you would have sold your own father! .. Why have I not hung you on the lattice of the Carousel Square yet? But there is, there is still enough time for this! You are mud in silk stockings! Dirt! Dirt!..".

However, Napoleon did not have concrete evidence of Talleyrand's betrayal, the storm passed by, and Talleyrand transmitted important information to Russia until the very beginning of the war.

Much attention was paid to Barclay de Tolly and agent intelligence, which was carried out on their own by the commanders of the field armies and corps commanders. On January 27, 1812, Alexander I signed three secret additions to the "Institution for the administration of the Big active army":" Education of the Higher Military Police "," Instruction to the Director of the Higher Military Police "and" Instruction to the Chief of the General Staff for the Management of the Higher Military Police ". These documents incorporated the views of Barclay de Tolly and his entourage on approaches to organizing and conducting military intelligence and counterintelligence on the eve and during hostilities. They pay special attention to the conduct of intelligence intelligence. So, in the addendum on "Education of the highest military police" it was said about the constant use of agents (clause 13 "On scouts"):

"1. Scouts on a permanent salary. They ... are sent out on occasions, under different guises and in different garments. They must be quick, cunning and experienced people. Their duty is to bring the information for which they are sent, and to recruit scouts of the second kind and peddlers of correspondence.

2. Scouts of the second kind should preferably be inhabitants of neutral and enemy lands of different states, including deserters. They bring information on demand and are mostly local. They receive a special payment for each piece of news, according to its importance. "

There was also given a classification of agents whose task was “to collect information about the enemy army and the land it occupied:

1st in allied land;

2nd in neutral ground;

3rd in the land of the enemy. "

At the same time, the following clarifications were made:

“- Agents in the land of the allied can be civilian and military officials of that land or sent from the army.

Agents in neutral land can be neutral subjects who have acquaintances and connections, and by them, or for money supplied with certificates, passports and routes necessary for moving. They can be burgomasters, customs inspectors, etc.

Agents in the enemy's land can be spies, sent to it and permanently staying there, or monks, salesmen, public girls, doctors and scribes, or petty officials who are in the enemy's service. "

And in addition to the "Instruction to the Chief of the General Staff for managing the highest military police" there was the following provision:

“In the case of complete impossibility to have news of the enemy in important and decisive circumstances, one must have refuge in forced espionage. It consists in persuading local residents by promises of rewards and even threats to pass through the places occupied by the enemy. "

This situation did not appear by chance. An explanation for this can be found in a letter from de Leser, who was organizing intelligence on the western border, to Barclay de Tolly on December 6, 1811:

"The extreme prudence," writes de Leser, "which is shown by the inhabitants of the Duchy (of the Principality of Warsaw. - Author's note) in relation to travelers, creates great difficulties for us to establish agents and spies that can be useful."

But despite all the difficulties, agent intelligence in the troops before the start of the war was quite active and brought a lot of information. This is evidenced by the memorandum of the commander of the 2nd Western Army, Prince Bagration, to Barclay de Tolly. Here is an excerpt from it:

“And as I intend to send packages to dubious places for secret intelligence under some other pretext of trustworthy and reliable people, then, for free travel abroad, would not Your Excellency please send me several blanks of pashports signed by the Chancellor, in order to ... remove the mighty suspicion will fall. "

With regard to military intelligence, its conduct has practically not been changed. Basically, it was carried out in the old fashioned way - horse rides. "Instruction to the Chief of the General Staff for managing the highest military police" ordered military reconnaissance to be conducted as follows:

“Armed espionage is carried out as follows. The commander dispatches different parties of Cossacks ... he assigns these commands to the most courageous officers and gives each an efficient spy who would know the local situation ... ".

A few words should be said about the counterintelligence operations carried out in Russia on the eve of the war of 1812. The archival documents contain information that in the period from 1810 to 1812, 39 military and civilians who worked for foreign special services were detained and rendered harmless on the territory of the Russian Empire ...

As a result of the measures taken by the Russian command by the summer of 1812, despite the difficult operational conditions, intelligence was able to achieve good results. So, she managed to find out exact time the proposed offensive of the French troops, their number, the location of the main units, as well as to establish the commanders of the army units and give them characteristics. In addition, she established intelligence contacts in territories controlled by the enemy. But, what should be specially noted, the data obtained by intelligence, unfortunately, did not have a significant impact on the development of a plan for the conduct of military operations. Ful's defensive plan, according to which the strategic initiative was ceded to the enemy, not only did not correspond to the real situation, but also completely ignored the intelligence data.

Of course, this was reflected in the first stage of hostilities and led to the fact that for the Russian command the start of hostilities in the operational and tactical terms became sudden. So, in Vilna, where Alexander I was, they learned about Napoleon's crossing of the Neman only a day later from General V.V. Orlov-Denisov, whose regiment was located on the very border. The suddenness of the French offensive introduced some disorganization in the work of the Russian command and affected the management of intelligence. In the diary of N. D. Durnovo, who was at the beginning of 1812 in the retinue of the head of the quartermaster of the General Staff of P. M. Volkonsky, there are the following entries dated June 27 and 28:

“27 ... The main apartment of His Majesty remained in Yanchiny, Barclay de Tolly - in Dvorchany, two versts from ours. There was no news of the enemy's movement. Some suggest that he went to Riga, others - that to Minsk; I am of the latter opinion ...

28. I spent the whole day at work. There is no information about the French. Our outposts traveled twenty miles from their positions without encountering a single enemy. Jews assume that Minsk is occupied by Napoleon himself. "

But soon the confusion passed, and the command of the Russian army began to receive information from intelligence on a regular basis. Throughout the war, the command paid great attention to reconnaissance, realizing the importance of obtaining timely and accurate information about the enemy. Evidence of this, for example, is the prescription of Kutuzov to General Platov of October 19, 1812:

"Under the current circumstances, I absolutely need your Excellency to deliver information about the enemy as often as possible, for, not having quick and reliable news, the army made one march in a completely wrong direction, as it should, which can lead to very harmful consequences." ...

Of all types of intelligence, the most difficult was the collection of information with the help of agents, especially in the area of ​​operations of the 3rd Western Army of General A. Tormasov. This was due to the hostile attitude of the local population towards the Russians and the lack of sufficient funds. Here is what General V.V. Vyazemsky, who commanded a division in the 3rd Western Army, writes about this in his "Journal":

“On the 30th (August). To this day, we still do not know where the enemy corps are located and what their intention is - little money, no faithful spies. The inhabitants are devoted to them, the Jews are afraid of the gallows. "

However, on the primordial Russian lands, especially after the French occupied Moscow, intelligence agents acted fruitfully and obtained important information. Here's one example. The merchant Zhdanov did not manage to leave Moscow and was taken prisoner by the French. At the headquarters of Marshal Davout, he was asked to penetrate the location of the main Russian army and collect the information the French needed, for which he was promised a large reward. Zhdanov "agreed." Having received from the French a list with questions of interest to them and finding himself in the disposition of the Russian troops, he immediately demanded to deliver him to General Miloradovich and told him in detail about the mission received from the enemy and his position in Moscow. Kutuzov, assessing his patriotic act, accepted Zhdanov and awarded him a medal, and General Konovnitsyn on September 2 gave him the following certificate:

“The Moscow third guild merchant Pyotr Zhdanov, we live up to being jealous and zeal for our Fatherland, despite any flattering offers from the French, who inclined him to spy, left his house, wife and children, came to the main apartment and delivered very important information about the state and the position of the enemy army. This patriotic act of his deserves the gratitude and respect of all the true sons of Russia. "

Intelligence intelligence did not lose its significance during the period of the transition of the Russian army to the counteroffensive. Here is what A. Ermolov, who was chief of staff of the 1st and then the main army during the war of 1812, writes about this:

“I reported to the Field Marshal that from the testimony collected from the surrounding villagers, confirmed by the residents leaving Smolensk, Count Osterman informs him that it has been more than a day since Napoleon set out with his guard on Krasny. There could not have been more pleasant news to the Field Marshal ... ”.

Along with agent intelligence, interrogation of prisoners and interception of enemy correspondence were used and played a large role. These reconnaissance methods were used constantly. So, during the period of the retreat of the Russian army before the battle of Smolensk, important data were obtained in this way. General Ermolov describes this case as follows:

“Ataman Platov, reinforced by the vanguard of Count Palen, met a strong detachment of French cavalry at the village of Leshne, defeated it and pursued it to Rudnya. Captured: one wounded colonel, several officers and 500 lower ranks. The colonel reported that they had no news of our approach and that no special orders had been made for that, that no movement was taking place in other corps evenly. From the papers taken in the apartment of the commander, General Sebastiani, one could see the order for the forward posts and instructions to the generals, which of them, for which units of the troops and with what forces should serve as reinforcements to maintain a common connection. "

Another example of obtaining valuable information when interviewing prisoners is Kutuzov's report to Alexander I of August 29, written after the Battle of Borodino. In it, Kutuzov, on the basis of the information reported by the prisoners, draws conclusions about the losses of the French army:

“... The prisoners show, however, that the enemy's loss is extremely great. In addition to divisional general Bonami, who was taken prisoner, there are other killed, among other things Davust is wounded ...

P. S. Some prisoners claim that the general opinion in the French army is that they lost forty thousand wounded and killed. "

Interception of enemy correspondence and documents was also very useful. So, a detachment of Colonel Kudashev, on the day of the Tarutino battle on October 5, captured Marshal Berthier's order to one French general to send all the weights to the Mozhaisk road. This allowed Kutuzov to take correct solution on the refusal to pursue the defeated vanguard of the enemy under the command of Murat and to concentrate the main forces on the Kaluga road, thereby closing the way for the French to the south. Another illustration of the importance of intercepting enemy correspondence for the Russian command important decisions serves a letter from Kutuzov to the commander of the 3rd Army, Admiral P. Chichagov dated October 30:

“Mr. Admiral!

For greater confidence, I am sending once again to Your Excellency the reliable details, gleaned from the correspondence, right down to the letters of Napoleon himself, copies of which I have already sent you. From these extracts you will see, Mr. Admiral, how insignificant are the means that the enemy has in his rear in terms of food and uniforms ... ".

As before, the most important role in the course of hostilities was played by military reconnaissance, carried out with the help of patrols and parties of Cossacks. There is no need to dwell on this type of reconnaissance. It seems that its importance will be seen from Kutuzov's report to Alexander I of August 23:

“... Regarding the enemy, it has been about several days that he has become extremely careful, and when he moves forward, this is, so to speak, by groping. Yesterday, Colonel Prince Kudashev, sent from me, forced from 200 Cossacks all the cavalry of the Davustov corps and the king of Neapolitan to sit motionless on horseback for several hours. Yesterday the enemy did not make a single step forward. Today our Cossack outposts from me in 30 versts of the road are watching very zealously ... ".

Every opportunity was used to conduct reconnaissance and gather information about the enemy. For example, envoys were sent to the French army. One of them - Lieutenant Mikhail Fedorovich Orlov (later Major General, future Decembrist) - returning back, described in detail everything he had seen. Based on his report, Kutuzov drew up the following report dated August 19 to Alexander I about the size of the French army:

“Lieutenant Orlov of the Cavalier Guards Regiment, sent by the envoy before my arrival to the armies by the commander-in-chief of the 1st Western Army to find out about the captured Major General Tuchkov, after 9 days of keeping him at the enemy gave me quite detailed information on his return yesterday. When he met an enemy outpost on the Smolensk road near the village of Korovino, he found the king of Naples with all his cavalry, which he believes to be about 20,000. Not far from him, Field Marshal Davust's corps, consisting of 5 divisions, named from the Moran division, Friant division, Gaudin division , who was wounded and died during the battle at Zabolot'e, divisions Dessek and divisions Kompans, whose corps forces he believes to be about 50,000 , divisions of Razu and divisions of the Wiertemberg troops, commanded by the Wiertemberg Crown Prince. He believes this body to be about 20,000.

Then, in Smolensk, he found the Emperor Napoleon with his guards, in strength about 30,000 and the 5th corps, made up of Poles, about 15,000, which corps is made up of divisions of General Zaionchek and General Knyazevich, following the road where the 2nd Western army, according to which he, Orlov, being returned, did not find anyone else, but he only heard from the French officers that on the left enemy flank in the direction of Sychevka were the corps of Field Marshal Junot and Mortier under the command of the Viceroy of Italy, no more than both as in 30,000, which would be 165,000.

But according to inquiries made by our officers in the quartermaster's unit from the prisoners, I believe Orlov's report is somewhat enlarged.

(General of Infantry, Prince G (deenishchev) Kutuzov. ")

However, the story about the reconnaissance operations of the Russian army in 1812 would not be complete without mentioning the collection of information about the enemy with the help of partisan detachments, the main task of which was formulated by Kutuzov as follows:

“Since the autumn time is now approaching, through which the movements of a large army are made completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, for the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to destroy him, and for this, being now in 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving away important units in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk. "

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from Cossack troops and were unequal in their numbers: from 50 to 500 people. They were assigned the following tasks: to destroy the enemy's manpower in the rear, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transports, deprive the enemy of food and fodder, monitor the movement of enemy troops and report this to the Main Headquarters of the Russian army. The famous poet and commander of partisan detachments Denis Vasilyevich Davydov writes about the last direction of the partisans' activity as follows:

“Guerrilla warfare has an impact on the main operations of the enemy army. Moving it during the campaign according to strategic types must meet irreparable difficulties, when the first and every step of it can be immediately known to the opposite commander by means of parties (partisan - Ed. Auth.). "

The first army partisan detachment was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, sent to the rear of the French army immediately after the Battle of Borodino. And after the French occupied Moscow, this practice became permanent. General A. Ermolov speaks about this quite specifically in his memoirs:

“Soon after leaving Moscow, I reported to Prince Kutuzov that Captain Figner had proposed to the artillery to deliver information about the state of the French army in Moscow and if there were any extraordinary preparations in the troops; the prince gave full permission ...

Prince Kutuzov was very pleased with the first successes of his partisan actions, found it useful to multiply the number of partisans, and Captain Seslavin was appointed second after Figner to the Guards Horse Artillery, and soon after him, the Guards Colonel Prince Kudashev.

Indeed, the commanders of the partisan detachments regularly informed the main headquarters of the Russian army about the movement of French troops and their numbers. So, in one of the reports Figner reported to the duty general of the headquarters of the main army Konovnitsyn:

“Yesterday I learned that you are worried about the strength and movement of the enemy. Why did I have one with the French yesterday, and today I visited them with an armed hand, after which I again had negotiations with them. Captain Alekseev, whom I sent to you, will tell you better about everything that happened, for I am afraid to brag. "

The importance and necessity of military guerrilla intelligence was most fully manifested at the beginning of the retreat of the French army from Moscow, when Napoleon decided to attack the southern provinces of Russia that were not affected by the war. The episode when on October 11 Kutuzov received from Seslavin accurate data on the movement of the main forces of the French to Maloyaroslavets is given in every work dedicated to the war of 1812. There is no point in retelling it. It will be enough to cite an excerpt from Kutuzov's report to Alexander I about the battle at Maloyaroslavets:

“... Partisan Colonel Seslavin really opened the movement of Napoleon, striving with all his forces along this road (Kaluga. - Author's note) to Borovsk. This prompted me, without wasting time, on the 11th of October in the afternoon to march with the whole army and make a forced flank march to Maloyaroslavets ...

This day is one of the most famous in this bloody war, for the lost battle at Maloyaroslavets would entail a most disastrous consequence and would open the way for the enemy through our grain-growing provinces. "

Another type of activity of the partisan detachments was the capture of French couriers. At the same time, not only important intelligence information was obtained, but most importantly, control was disrupted in the enemy troops. True, some French participants in the war of 1812, including Napoleon himself, argued that "not a single relay race was intercepted." This was convincingly refuted by D.V. Davydov, citing a large number of concrete evidence to the contrary. Here are just a few of them:

“In the report of the field marshal to the emperor, dated September 22 (October 4), it is said:“ On September 11/23, Major General Dorokhov, continuing operations with his detachment, delivered the mail he had intercepted from the enemy in two sealed boxes, and the third box - with robbed church things; On September 12/24, two couriers with dispatches were caught by his detachment on the Mozhaisk road, “and so on.

In the report of General Vincengerode to the Emperor from the city of Klin, dated October 3/15, it is said: "To this day, this last colonel (Chernozubov) has taken two French couriers who were traveling from Moscow with dispatches."

The field marshal also informs the emperor, from 1/13 October, about the capture of the courier near Vereya by Lieutenant Colonel Vadbolsky on September 24 (October 6).

Therefore, we will not exaggerate if we say that the reconnaissance operations of the partisan detachments substantially supplemented the usual military reconnaissance operations: undercover reconnaissance, reconnaissance conducted by patrols and parties of Cossacks, interrogating prisoners and intercepting couriers. And in some cases, the information obtained by the partisans had a decisive influence on the adoption of operational decisions (Seslavin's report on October 11).

Concluding the conversation about the activities of the young Russian military intelligence in the Patriotic War of 1812, we note that the Russian command took into account the experience of conducting reconnaissance operations and successfully applied it in the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813–1814. And the experience of doing guerrilla warfare, including intelligence, was collected by D. V. Davydov in his book "1812". As for the influence of the data obtained by intelligence on the course of hostilities in the war of 1812, it is quite large. If we set aside the initial period when they were ignored when drawing up a defense plan, all subsequent time intelligence information played extremely important role in the adoption by the Russian command of all important operational and strategic decisions.

After the end of the Napoleonic wars and the transition of the Russian army to the states of peacetime, another reorganization of the War Ministry took place. In particular, the General Staff was created, which included the Ministry of War.

As for military intelligence, the Special Chancellery under the Minister of War was dissolved in 1815, and its functions were transferred to the first department of the Office of the Quartermaster General of the General Staff. However, in fact, it was the processing body of military intelligence, which received information mainly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the leadership of the first section made attempts to send their officers abroad as well. Thus, Colonel MP Buturlin was sent to the Russian embassy in Paris, Lieutenant Vilboa was sent to the embassy in Bavaria, several officers were sent under the cover of various diplomatic missions to Khiva and Bukhara.

In 1836, after another reorganization, a department of the General Staff was formed within the War Ministry, consisting of three divisions. At the same time, reconnaissance functions were assigned to the Second (military-scientific) branch of the department of the general staff. However, this department was still concerned only with the processing of information coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War forced the leadership of the War Ministry to pay close attention to intelligence. And already on July 10, 1856, Alexander II approved the first instruction on the work of military agents. It stated that “each agent is charged with the obligation to acquire the most accurate and positive information about the following subjects:

1) On the number, composition, structure and location of both land and sea forces.

2) On the methods of the government to replenish and multiply its armed forces and to supply the troops and navy with weapons and other military needs.

3) On the various movements of the troops, both already carried out and anticipated, trying, as far as possible, to penetrate into the true purpose of these movements.

4) About the current state of the fortresses, new fortification work being undertaken to strengthen the banks and other points.

5) On the government's experiments with inventions and improvements in weapons and other military needs that have an impact on the art of war.

6) About camp gathering of troops and about maneuvers.

7) About the spirit of the troops and the way of thinking of officers and higher ranks.

8) About condition different parts military administration, such as: artillery, engineering, commissariat, provisions with all their branches.

9) About all the remarkable transformations in the troops and changes in military regulations, weapons and uniforms.

10) About the latest works related to military sciences, as well as about maps-plans published, especially those areas about which information can be useful to us.

11) About the state military schools, with regard to their device, methods of teaching sciences and the dominant spirit in these institutions.

12) About the structure of the general staff and the degree of knowledge of the officers, the aforementioned components.

(This article for an agent sent to Turkey, where the general headquarters has not yet been established, is replaced by the following paragraph: military administration Turkey, the degree of their knowledge, the ability of each and the power of attorney to him by the government and subordinates. ")

13) On the methods for the movement of troops on the railways, with possible details about the number of troops and the time when they ended their movement between these points.

14) On improvements to the military administration in general for the speedy execution of written matters and reducing the time in the transmission of orders.

15) Collect all the indicated information with the utmost caution and discretion and carefully avoid anything that could incur the slightest suspicion of the local government on the agent.

16) Each agent is completely dependent and subordinate to the head of the mission, with whom he is. Without his permission, do nothing special, ask for instructions and be guided by them exactly. The collected information, especially which may be in connection with political relations, before sending it to the Minister of War, first report it to the head of the mission and, in the event of urgently necessary expenses, ask for benefits from him. "

Conventionally, military intelligence officers at that time can be divided into the following categories: Quartermaster Generals and officers of the Quartermaster General (General Staff) of the War Ministry, Quartermaster Generals and officers of the military districts at their disposal, public and secret military agents abroad, confidential , agent walkers. The latter should include officers of the General Staff sent abroad on a secret mission, and spies sent to the rear of the enemy during the war. More specifically, in 1856 they were sent abroad: to Paris - the adjutant wing, Colonel P.P. Albedinsky, to London - the adjutant wing, Colonel N.P. Ignatiev, to Vienna - Colonel Baron F.F von Thornau, to Constantinople - Staff Captain Franchini. Simultaneously with them in Italy, the plenipotentiary of Russia in Turin, Major-General Count Stackelberg (before that was in Vienna) and the representative of Russia in Naples, Colonel V.G. Gasfort, were engaged in collecting military information.

However, full-fledged centralized military intelligence agencies appeared in Russia only in September 1863, when Emperor Alexander II, in the form of an experiment for two years, approved the Statute and States of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH). The intelligence functions in the GUGSH were assigned to the 2nd (Asian) and 3rd (military-scientist) departments, which were subordinate to the vice-director for the General Staff. At the same time, the military-scientific department was engaged in the collection of military and military-technical information about foreign states, the leadership of military agents abroad and military-scientific expeditions sent to collect information in the border regions of Russia and adjacent countries, etc. Asian branch, it performed the same tasks, but in the Asian countries bordering on Russia. According to the states, 14 employees were envisaged in the military-scientific department, and in the Asian department - 8. Thus, for the first time since 1815, an attempt was made to restore military intelligence.

Introduced for two years as an experiment new structure military intelligence as a whole has paid off. Therefore, in 1865, during the next reorganization of the Ministry of War, it was preserved. The 3rd department was renamed the 7th military-scientific department of the General Staff, and Colonel F.A.Feldman was appointed its head. The 2nd Asian branch, which received the name "Asian part", has also survived. Foreign military agents of the military-scientific department continued their work, moreover, their number increased. So, in Paris there was the adjutant wing Colonel Wittgenstein, in Vienna - Major General Baron Thornau, in Berlin - Adjutant General Count N.V. Adlerberg 3rd, in Florence - Major General Gasfort, in London - Colonel Novitsky, in Constantinople - Colonel Franchini.

In January 1867, the 7th military-scientific department of the General Staff was transferred to the Advisory Committee, which was formed to guide "scientific" and topographic activities. And on March 30, 1867, the Advisory Committee was transformed into the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff, in which an office was created on the basis of the 7th department. It was the office of the Military Scientific Committee that until 1903 was the central body of Russian military intelligence. Its first leader was General N. Obruchev, the right hand of Minister of War Milyutin, and after him - Generals F.A.Feldman (from 1881 to 1896), V.U. Sollogub (from 1896 to 1900) and V. P. Celebrovsky (from 1900 to 1903). As for the Asian part, it remained an independent subdivision of the General Staff, although in 1869 it was renamed the Asian office work. The Asian production consisted of the head, Colonel A.P. Protsenko, and his assistant.

A serious test for Russian military intelligence was Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 On the eve and during hostilities, reconnaissance was still under the jurisdiction of the commanders of formations and units, starting with the commander of the army. It was conducted by specially trained employees. Just before the start of the Russian-Turkish war, the general leadership of intelligence in Turkey and the Balkans was entrusted to Colonel of the General Staff P. D. Parensov, an officer on special assignments, a recognized specialist in intelligence affairs.

Since the main brunt of the upcoming hostilities was to fall on a powerful grouping concentrated in Bessarabia Russian army under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, its headquarters needed fresh operational data on the Turkish troops located in Bulgaria and Romania. Therefore, the commander-in-chief personally set the task for Parensov: to go to Bucharest and organize the collection of information about the Turks.

In mid-December 1876, Parensov, under the name of Paul Paulson, left Chisinau for Bucharest, where he appeared as a relative of the Russian consul Baron Stuart. In a short time, he established the necessary contacts, created an active agent network and gathered around him loyal people from among the local residents. So, the observation of the movements of ships along the Danube was taken under their control by the skopsky headman Matyushev and the voivode Velk.

The Bulgarian patriot banker and grain merchant Evlogiy Georgiev, who had sales agents and warehouses in many cities of Bulgaria interested in the Russian command, provided Parensov with great help (and free), which gave Parensov the opportunity to use ready-made and fairly reliable agents. Thanks to Eulogius, he acquired a valuable assistant to Grigory Nachovich. An educated person who spoke French, German, Romanian and a decent understanding of Russian, he had great connections on both sides of the Danube, was unusually inventive in the methods of obtaining information. Nachovich helped Russian intelligence as a true patriot of his fatherland - for all the time he worked, he never once received a monetary reward from the Russian command.

Throughout the winter of 1876-1877. Colonel Parensov's residency provided comprehensive information about the number of Turkish troops, their movements in the Danube Bulgaria, ships and minefields on the Danube, the state of fortifications, and food supplies. For example, the Russian command was notified in advance of the arrival of reinforcements from Egypt.

With the outbreak of hostilities, new, accurate operational information about the enemy was required. Therefore, Parensov and his closest assistants, in particular Colonel ND Artamonov, began to actively use walking agents. One of them was Konstantin Nikolaevich Favrikodorov, a Greek by birth, who was not a novice in military affairs. Favrikadov participated in the Crimean War of 1853-1856, fighting bravely on the bastions of Sevastopol as a volunteer of the Greek Legion, and received awards - St. George cross 4th grade and a silver medal. Outwardly similar to a Turk, besides speaking Turkish, he was ideally suited for the role of a scout.

On June 26, 1877, Colonel of the General Staff Artamonov sent Favrikodorov under the name of a Turkish citizen Hasan Demershioglu from the city of Sistov to a deep reconnaissance raid on the rear of the Turkish army - the cities of Vidin and Plevna. From there he should have gone to the southeast to find out the number of Turkish troops concentrated in Rumelia, as well as in the fortresses of Shumla and Varna.

Favrikodorov did an excellent job with the task assigned to him. He visited Plevna, the Shumla fortress, Varna, Andrianopol, Filippopol (Plovdiv), collected a large amount of valuable information about the Turkish army and, returning to the main apartment of the Russian army, gave it to Artamonov. And this was not the only raid of the brave scout. Subsequently, he repeatedly went to the rear of the Turkish army and each time obtained extremely valuable intelligence information.

The results of the work of Parensov, Artamonov, Favrikodorov and many other officers of Russian intelligence during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. are generally reflected in the assessment given in 1880 by the head of the Military Scientific Committee, the future chief of the General Staff, Adjutant General N. Obruchev: battalion, each squadron, each battery ... ".

However, despite such a laudatory statement by Obruchev, the Russian-Turkish war also revealed a number of shortcomings in Russian military intelligence, which caused another reorganization of its central apparatus. In December 1879, a new staff of the Office of the Military Scientific Committee was approved, consisting of a business manager, five senior and nine junior clerks, with a clear delineation of the functions of each of them. In 1886, the staff of the Asian office was increased from two to five people. And in the mid-1890s, it already consisted of three office work. The first two were responsible for the work of the Asian military districts, and the third was directly involved in intelligence abroad. In total, by the end of the 19th century, Russia had military agents in 18 world capitals, as well as naval agents in ten countries.

In July 1900, another reorganization of military intelligence began. As part of the General Staff, a quartermaster general was established, which included the operational and statistical offices. At the same time, the statistical department was entrusted with the functions of Asian office work, namely, conducting intelligence in China, Korea, Japan and other Asian countries. And six months later, in December 1900, the office of the Military Scientific Committee was transferred to the Quartermaster General.

In April 1903, the new states of the General Staff were announced. According to them, instead of the office of the Military Scientific Committee, intelligence was assigned to the 7th (military statistics of foreign states) department of the 1st (Military-statistical) department of the Office of the 2nd Quartermaster General of the General Staff. The 7th department consisted of the chief, 8 clerks and the same number of their assistants. Almost immediately, behind the scenes, within the 7th department, a mining unit was allocated, called the Special Office Work, in which two officers worked. However, in the 7th department, the mining and processing functions of intelligence were still not separated and work was not carried out to direct the intelligence of the military districts. In 1903, General Tselebrovsky, who had previously headed the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff, was appointed head of the 7th department. He headed military intelligence until 1905, when he was replaced by General N. S. Ermolov, who held this post until 1906.

The defeat of Russia in the war with Japan revealed significant shortcomings in the organization of military intelligence. War of 1904-1905 clearly showed the need not only for continuous military reconnaissance during the period of hostilities, but also for constant undercover surveillance of potential adversaries, which, in the opinion of most intelligence officers, was not given due attention.

Therefore, the military reforms, which began to be carried out in 1906, forced the intelligence officers to begin a radical reorganization of their service. In the fall of 1906, the GUGSH received memoranda from several officers of the intelligence department with specific proposals for restructuring the activities of intelligence agencies. In their opinion, intelligence should be dealt with by the headquarters of the border districts under the leadership of the GUGSH, which created an agent network in the most important centers of the alleged adversaries, while the headquarters of the districts - in the border areas of adjacent states. Another important link in identifying the forces of Russia's probable adversaries, they considered secret missions of officers of the General Staff for reconnaissance of communication lines and fortified areas in the border zone.

As a result, in April 1906 a new structure of the GUGSH was approved. For the first time, it officially formalized the separation of the mining and processing functions of military intelligence. Mining functions were now concentrated in the 5th (intelligence) office work of the 1st quartermaster general of the General Quartermaster General of the GUGSH. It consisted of one clerk and two assistants, one of whom was responsible for the eastern and the other for the western direction of intelligence. Colonel M. A. Adabash was appointed as the first clerk, and young officers O. K. Enkel and P. F. Ryabikov were appointed his assistants. And in March 1908, Adabash was replaced by Colonel N. A. Monkevitz, who was in charge of military intelligence before the start of the First World War.

The processing functions were assigned to the parts of the 2nd and 3rd Chief Quartermasters: for the 2nd, for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th office work, and for the 3rd, for 1st, 2nd and 4th office work. Employees of the former 7th department became the employees of these processing office work.

However, the reorganization did not stop there, and on September 11, 1910, the new staff of the Main Directorate of the General Staff were approved. The 5th office work was transformed into the Special office work (intelligence and counterintelligence) as part of the Quartermaster General's Department. Special office work was subordinated directly to the Quartermaster General, which indicated an increase in the status of the intelligence service and the strengthening of the role of intelligence. In its structure, a journal part was formed for conducting secret correspondence. And the entire staff of the Special Office Work included a clerk, his three assistants and a journalist.

The processing office work was included in the parts of the 1st and 2nd Chief Quartermasters. Parts of the 1st Oberkquartiermeister were engaged in the western direction: 4th office work - Germany, 5th - Austria-Hungary, 6th - Balkan states, 7th - Scandinavian countries, 8th - other countries Western Europe... The office work of the part of the 2nd Chief Quartermaster was engaged in the eastern direction: 1st office work - Turkestan, 2nd - Turkish-Persian, 4th - Far East.

If we talk about the intelligence personnel, then as a result of the reconnaissance office work in 1909-1910. there have been no major changes in it. And although the heads of the GUGSH, as before, changed too often - 5 people in 6 years: F.F. Palitsyn (1906-1908), V. A. Sukhomlinov (1908-1909), E. A. Gerngros (1910), Ya.G. Zhilinsky (1911–1914), N.N. Yakushkevich (from 1914), however staff departments and office work practically remained the same until the beginning of the First World War. So, in October 1910, Colonel Monkewitz was appointed assistant to the 1st Chief Quartermaster of the GUGSH, and his task was to manage the Special Office Work and the military-statistical production of the 1st Chief Quartermaster, that is, the mining and processing intelligence agencies in Western countries ... As for the heads of the Special Office Work, they were Colonel O. K. Enkel (in 1913–1914) and Colonel N. K. Rasha (in 1914–1916).

Talking about the specific operations of Russian military intelligence before the First World War, one cannot ignore the story associated with the name of the colonel of the Austro-Hungarian army Alfred Redl. And since those events remain largely unclear to this day, it is worth dwelling on them in more detail.

On May 26, 1913, all newspapers published in the Austro-Hungarian Empire placed on their pages a message from the Vienna Telegraph Agency announcing the unexpected suicide of Colonel Alfred Redl, chief of staff of the 8th corps of the Austro-Hungarian army. "A highly talented officer," said the message, "who had a brilliant career ahead of him, while on duty in Vienna, committed suicide in a fit of madness." Further, it was reported about the upcoming ceremonial funeral of Redl, who fell victim to nervous exhaustion caused by prolonged insomnia. But the very next day, a note appeared in the Prague Tageblatt newspaper with the following content:

“One dignitary asks us to refute the rumors, spread mainly in military circles, about the chief of staff of the Prague corps, Colonel Redl, who, as already reported, committed suicide in Vienna on Sunday morning. According to these rumors, the colonel is allegedly accused of having transferred military secrets to one state, namely Russia. In fact, the commission of senior officers that came to Prague to search the house of the late colonel pursued a completely different goal.

Under the strictest censorship in Austria-Hungary at the time, this was the only way for the editor of Praga Tageblatt to inform his readers that Colonel Redl had in fact shot himself after being exposed as a Russian agent. Before the publication in the Prague newspaper, only 10 senior Austrian officers knew about the betrayal of Colonel Redl. Even Emperor Franz Joseph was not informed. But after May 27, this secret became known to the whole world.

Alfred Redl, undoubtedly one of the most capable scouts, was born in Lemberg (Lvov) in the family of an auditor of the garrison court. Having chosen a military career for himself, at the age of 15 he entered cadet corps, and then to the officer's school, which he graduated brilliantly. Excellent knowledge of them foreign languages attracted the attention of the personnel officers of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army to the young lieutenant, and Redl, instead of serving in the provincial units, was enlisted in the staff of this highest military body of the country. Once in such a prestigious place, Redl did his best to get noticed. And he succeeded, despite the caste prejudices that reigned in the Austrian army, when only nobles were preferred in promotion. In 1900, already with the rank of captain, he was sent to Russia to study the Russian language and familiarize himself with the situation in this country, which was considered one of the likely opponents. For several months Redl underwent an internship at a military school in Kazan, leading a carefree lifestyle in his free time and attending numerous parties. It goes without saying that all this time he was under secret surveillance by agents of the Russian counterintelligence in order to study his strengths and weaknesses, hobbies and character traits. Later, these conclusions formed the basis for the following characteristics of Redl, dated 1907:

“Alfred Redl, Major of the General Staff, 2nd Assistant to the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff ... Medium height, grayish blond, with a grayish short mustache, somewhat prominent cheekbones, smiling, ingratiating eyes. The person is crafty, reserved, focused, efficient. The mind is petty. The whole appearance is sugary. The speech is sweet, soft, obsequious. The movements are calculated, slow. Likes to have fun. "

Back in Vienna, Redl was appointed Assistant Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff to General Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. Gisl appointed Redl as head of the bureau's intelligence department (Kundschaftsstelle, abbreviated as KS), in charge of counterintelligence operations. In this post, Redl proved to be an excellent organizer, completely reorganizing the counterintelligence department and turning it into one of the strongest special services of the Austro-Hungarian army. First of all, this was due to the introduction of new technology and new methods of work. So, on his instructions, the room for receiving visitors was equipped with a newly invented phonograph, which made it possible to record on a gramophone record located in the next room, every word of a person invited for a conversation. In addition, two hidden cameras were installed in the room, with the help of which the visitor was secretly photographed. Sometimes during a conversation with a visitor, the phone suddenly rang. But it was a false call - the fact is that the duty officer himself "called" himself to the telephone, pressing the electric bell button located under the table with his foot. “Talking” on the phone, the officer gestured to the guest at the cigarette case lying on the table, inviting him to take a cigarette. The lid of the cigarette case was treated with a special compound, with the help of which the smoker's fingerprints were preserved. If the guest did not smoke, the officer called himself out of the room by phone, taking his briefcase with him from the table. Under it was a folder labeled "Confidential, not subject to publicity." And few of the visitors could deny themselves the pleasure of looking into a folder with a similar inscription. Needless to say, the folder has also been properly handled to store fingerprints. If this trick did not succeed, then another technique was applied, and so on until success was achieved.

Redl also owned the development new methodology interrogation, which made it possible to achieve the desired result without the use of additional "efforts". Among other things, on his instructions, counterintelligence began to keep a dossier on every resident of Vienna, who at least once visited the main centers of espionage at that time, such as Zurich, Stockholm, Brussels. But Redl's main merit was that he obtained unique secret documents of the Russian army. These successes were so impressive that his chief, General Gisl von Gieslingen, appointed commander of the 8th Prague corps, took Redl, by then a colonel, with him as chief of staff. Thus, Redl's career went up sharply, and many began to talk that he might take the post of chief of the general staff in the future.

Heading to his new duty station, Redl left his successor, Captain Maximilian Ronge, a single-copy handwritten document entitled "Tips for Uncovering Espionage." It was a small 40-page bound booklet where Redl summed up his work as head of KS and gave some practical advice. Captain Ronge and new boss The intelligence bureau of the Austrian General Staff August Urbansky von Ostromitz took full advantage of Redl's advice. At the suggestion of Ronge in 1908, the so-called black office was created, here the postage was transcribed. At the same time, special attention was paid to letters received from the border regions of Holland, France, Belgium and Russia, as well as letters sent on demand. Only three people knew that counterintelligence was the real purpose of the perlustration - Ronge, Urbansky and the head of the "black office". Everyone else was told that such strict censorship was introduced to combat smuggling. The department of the main Vienna post office, where the letters of demand were issued, was connected by an electric bell to the police station, which was located in the next building. And when a suspicious person came for a letter, the postal clerk would press the bell button and in a couple of minutes two surveillance officers would appear.

It was the work of the "black cabinet" that marked the beginning of the espionage story, which is associated with the name of Colonel Redl. Colonel Walter Nicolai, who served as chief of the intelligence department of the German General Staff on the eve of World War I, was the first to speak more or less in detail about the Redl case. Although indirect, but a participant in the events that took place in Vienna at that time, he describes them in his book "Secret Forces", published in Leipzig in 1923. His version is clarified by Ronge in the book "War and the Espionage Industry" (in Russian translation - "Intelligence and counterintelligence ", M. 1937) and Urbansky in the article" Redl's failure ". And although all three stories do not coincide in small details, they can be used to reconstruct the course of events.

At the beginning of March 1913, a letter was returned to Berlin, addressed on demand in Vienna to Herr Nikon Nizetas. In Berlin it was opened by the German "black cabinet". The letter contained 6000 crowns and a note, which announced the dispatch of money and gave the address of a certain M. Largier in Geneva, who should have been writing in the future, and another address in Paris. The fact that a letter with such a large sum was not declared valuable aroused certain suspicions, which were reinforced by the fact that it was sent from the German town of Eidkunen, bordering Russia, and the stamp was pasted on it in an unusual way. Having familiarized himself with the contents of the letter, Colonel Nikolai decided to forward it to his Austrian colleague Urbansky, rightly believing that it was connected with espionage activities on the territory of Austria-Hungary. Having received a message from Nicholas, Urbansky gave the order to return the letter to the Vienna post office and to establish the identity of the addressee - Mr. Nizetas. But time passed, and the mysterious Mr. Nicetas did not come for a letter. Moreover, soon two more letters came to his name, one of them contained 7 thousand crowns and a note with the following content:

“Dear Mr. Nicetas. Of course, you have already received my letter from / May, in which I apologize for the delay in deportation. Unfortunately, I could not send you money earlier. I now have the honor, dear Mr. Nicetas, to send you 7000 crowns, which I will venture to send in this simple letter. As for your suggestions, they are all acceptable. Respectfully yours, I. Dietrich.

P. S. Once again I ask you to write to the following address: Christiania (Norway), Rosenborggate, no. 1, Else Kjörnli. "

Meanwhile, Austrian intelligence was checking the addresses contained in the first letter. At the same time, it was decided not to check the Paris address, so that, in the words of Ronge, "not to fall into the clutches of the French counterintelligence." As for the Swiss address, it turned out that Largier was a retired French captain who worked in 1904-1905. to the Austrian intelligence. As a result, the Austrian counterintelligence has a suspicion that Largier "works" for different owners. Therefore, incriminating materials were collected on him, which were anonymously transferred to the Swiss authorities, after which Largier was expelled from the country.

The denouement of this protracted case came on Saturday, May 24, in the evening. The counterintelligence officers on duty at the police station near the post office received a long-awaited signal that Mr. Nitsetas had come for letters. Despite the fact that two surveillance officers came to the post office three minutes later, the recipient of the letter had already left. Running out into the street, they saw a taxi driving away. There was no other taxi or cabman nearby, and it seemed that Mr. Nitsetas had managed to escape surveillance. But this time the counterintelligence officers were lucky - the taxi on which the recipient of the letter left returned to the parking lot near the post office. The driver said that his client, a well-dressed gentleman, drove to the Kaiserhof cafe, where he got out. The counterintelligence officers went there, and on the way carefully examined the interior of the car. They found a suede pocketknife case left behind by the last passenger.

There was no mysterious passenger at the Kaiserhof cafe, but after interviewing taxi drivers in the parking lot near the cafe, it was established that a tall and well-dressed gentleman had recently hired a taxi and went to the Klomser Hotel. At the hotel, the detectives learned that within an hour, four visitors returned to the hotel, including Colonel Redl from Prague, who lives in suite No. 1. Then they handed the porter a knife case and asked him to ask his guests if they had lost it ? After a while the porter asked this Colonel Redl, who was leaving the hotel. "Oh, yes," Redl replied, "this is my case, thank you." But after a minute he remembered that he had dropped it in the taxi when he opened the envelopes. His suspicions intensified after he noticed that he was being followed. Trying to tear himself away, he took out some pieces of paper from his pocket and, tearing them finely, threw them out into the street. But that didn't help either. Despite the late evening, one of the detectives managed to collect the scraps and hand them over to Ronge with the message that Colonel Alfred Redl was the mysterious Mr. Nizetas.

Comparison of handwriting on torn pieces of paper that turned out to be receipts for sending money and receipts for sending registered foreign letters to Brussels, Lausanne and Warsaw at addresses known to counterintelligence as the headquarters of foreign intelligence services, with handwriting on a form that must be filled out at the post office upon receipt of the registered correspondence, and the handwriting of the "Tips on Uncovering Espionage" document, compiled by Redl, established that they were all written by the same person. Thus, Ronge learned to his horror that his predecessor, Colonel Redl, had turned out to be a spy.

Ronge immediately reported his discovery to his superior, Urbansky, who, in turn, informed the Chief of the General Staff, General Konrad von Goetzendorff, about this. On his instructions, a group of four officers headed by Ronge went to the Klomser Hotel with a proposal to Redl to shoot himself in order to wash off the shameful stain on his uniform. At midnight they went up to Redl's suite. He was already waiting for them, finishing writing something.

I know why you came, ”he said. - I ruined my life. I am writing farewell letters.

Those who came asked if he had any accomplices.

I didn't have them.

We need to know the extent and duration of your activity.

You will find all the evidence you need in my house in Prague, - replied Redl and asked for a revolver.

But none of the officers had weapons with them. Then one of them went out for half an hour, after which he returned and put the Browning in front of Redl. Then, after a little hesitation, the officers left the room. After spending the whole night in the cafe opposite, they returned to the hotel at about five in the morning and asked the doorman to call Redl to the phone. Literally a minute later, the doorman returned and said: "Gentlemen, Colonel Redl is dead." When examining the room, two letters were found on the table: one addressed to Redl's brother, and the second to Baron Giesl von Gieslengen, Redl's chief in Prague. There was also a suicide note:

“Frivolity and passions have ruined me. Pray for me. I pay with my life for my sins. Alfred.

1 hour 15 pm Now I am going to die. Please do not do an autopsy on my body. Pray for me. "

After the chief of the General Staff was informed of Colonel Redl's suicide, he ordered a commission to be sent to Prague to examine his apartment and establish the amount of damage he had inflicted. The survey results were stunning. A large number of documents were found confirming that Redl had worked for Russian intelligence for many years (since 1902, it was later claimed). Redl's services were very well paid. His apartment turned out to be luxuriously furnished, 195 outer shirts, 10 military greatcoats with fur, 400 kid gloves, 10 pairs of patent leather boots were described in it, and 160 dozen bottles of champagne of the highest brands were found in the wine cellar. In addition, it was established that in 1910 he bought an expensive estate, and in the last five years has acquired at least four cars and three first-class trotters.

As already mentioned, they decided to keep secret the true reasons for Colonel Redl's suicide. But, according to Ronge, there was an unexpected information leak. The fact is that the best locksmith in Prague, a certain Wagner, was invited to open the safe and the locks of the cabinets located in Redl's apartment. He not only attended the search, but also saw a large number of papers, some of which were in Russian. But unfortunately for the Austrian counterintelligence, Wagner turned out to be the leading player of the Prague football team Storm 1, and because of a search in Redl's apartment he had to miss the match, which his team lost. When the next day the team captain, who is also the editor of the Prague Tageblatt newspaper in Prague, became interested in the reasons for Wagner's absence from the game, he replied that he could not come due to extraordinary circumstances. At the same time, he told in detail about everything he saw at Redl's apartment, mentioning that the officers who carried out the search were very embarrassed and constantly exclaimed: "Who would have thought!", "Is it really possible!" The editor, comparing the report of the Vienna Telegraph Agency about Redl's suicide and the facts communicated to him by Wagner, realized that he had opened a sensational secret. And, using the Aesopian language, the next day he placed a refutation note in the newspaper, from which it followed that Redl was a Russian spy.

This is the generally accepted version of the "Redl case" presented by the main participants in the events. But on closer examination, it does not look convincing at all. First of all, this concerns evidence of Redl's espionage activities found in his Prague apartment. Describing the results of the search, Ronge reports that Urbansky discovered "extensive material" in Redl's apartment that occupied an entire room. Urbansky himself writes that Redl has preserved numerous unsuccessful photographs from secret documents, testifying to his inexperience in photography. In addition, both report that the things of the late Redl were sold at an auction and a student of a real school bought a camera, where there was an undeveloped film on which secret documents were filmed. And it's all.

If we take what has been said on faith, then it seems that the search was carried out by amateurs who did not understand anything about the case entrusted to them. Otherwise, the incident with photographic film cannot be explained. Moreover, no one has ever named a single specific document found in Redl's apartment, which is also rather strange.

It is also strange that neither Urbansky nor Ronge provide a photocopy of a letter that arrived at the Vienna post office addressed to Nizetas, with the Swiss address of the French captain Largier, who was actually arrested in Geneva on suspicion of espionage. Therefore, a legitimate suspicion creeps in - did this letter exist at all? And if it did exist, it is not clear why the professional counterintelligence agent Redl delayed receiving the remuneration for such a long time, thereby increasing the risk of being exposed.

No less strange is the fact that Redl kept receipts for sending registered letters abroad and, which is completely incomprehensible, why he took them with him to Vienna. And the fact that he threw them out on the street when he was being watched, and not destroyed elsewhere, does not fit into my head at all. Even more surprising is the dexterity of the surveillance staff, who managed to collect torn and specially scattered scraps of paper in complete darkness in the evening.

But what is most striking is the description of Redl's interrogation at the Klomser Hotel. The speed and superficiality of the interrogation is amazing. It is completely incomprehensible why such a professional as Ronge was satisfied with the meaningless words of Redl that he worked alone, and did not try to establish important details: who recruited, when, how the reports were transmitted, etc. whom Redl was asked to commit suicide immediately. True, later, apparently realizing that the evidence of Redl's guilt was clearly not enough, Ronge told about the spy's voluntary confession. “Redl was completely shattered, but he agreed to give his testimony to me alone,” writes Ronge. - He said that during 1910-1911. widely served some foreign countries. Recently, he had to confine himself to only the material available to the Prague corps command ... The most serious crime was the issuance of our deployment plan against Russia in the form in which it existed in the years mentioned and which, in general terms, remained in force ... ". And Urbansky, trying to explain the reasons that pushed Redl to betrayal, emphasizes his homosexual inclinations. They, having become known to foreign intelligence, allowed it to recruit the colonel under the threat of exposure.

Another oddity is connected with the locksmith Wagner, who turned out to be closely acquainted with the editor of the newspaper Praga Tageblatt. Didn't the Prague counterintelligence department have an absolutely reliable locksmith who knew how to keep his mouth shut? And even if this was the case, nothing prevented him from doing to Wagner the way Vienna's police chief Gayer did with Redl's lackey I. Sladek. When the latter drew the police chief's attention to the fact that the Browning, from which Redl had shot himself, did not belong to his owner, and at night four officers came to the room, Guyer had such an impressive conversation with him that the next day the reporters could not get a word out of Sladek ...

From the above, we can conclude that in the case of Colonel Redl there is no serious evidence proving his treason. And the question immediately arises: was Redl an agent of Russian intelligence? To try to answer it, you should familiarize yourself with the organization of Russian military intelligence and its employees who worked against Austria-Hungary before the First World War.

Reconnaissance against Austria-Hungary was conducted both by the GUGSH and by the intelligence divisions of the headquarters of the Warsaw and Kiev military districts. Colonel Vladimir Khristoforovich Roop was a military agent in Vienna until 1903. It was he who recruited a certain officer holding a responsible position in the Austrian General Staff, who later supplied valuable information to Russian intelligence.

In 1903, having been recalled from Vienna and appointed commander of a regiment of the Kiev Military District, Roop handed over all his Viennese connections to Captain Alexander Alekseevich Samoilo, who was at that time a senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Kiev Military District and was responsible for collecting intelligence information about the Austro-Hungarian army. Taking advantage of Roop's information, Samoilo illegally visited Vienna and, through an intermediary, established contact with his source in the General Staff. He agreed to continue cooperation with Russian intelligence for a substantial reward, and for several years the headquarters of the Kiev district received important information from his unknown agent. For example, here is an excerpt from the report of the quartermaster general of the district to the GUGSH dated November 1908:

"Per Last year The following documents and information were acquired from the Vienna agent mentioned above: new data on the mobilization of Austrian fortified points, some detailed information about the structure of the armed forces of Austria-Hungary, information about P. Grigoriev, seconded to the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District, who offered his services to Vienna and Berlin as a spy, the full schedule of the Austrian army in case of war with Russia ... ".

In 1911, Samoilo was transferred to the Special Office of the GUGSH, and a valuable Austrian agent was also transferred there. In the "Memorandum on the activities of the headquarters of the Warsaw and Kiev military districts and undercover agents in Austria-Hungary in collecting intelligence information in 1913", compiled by Samoilo, this agent is listed under the heading "Undercover agents" under No. 25. Secret documents are also listed there, received from this agent in 1913:

“Krieg ordre Bataille” (combat deployment plan in case of war) by March 1, 1913 with a special “Ordre de Bataille” (combat deployment plan) for the war with the Balkans, roads during mobilization, new states of wartime ... ". In the same Memorandum, Samoilo, summing up the activities of agent No. 25, writes: “The Redl case indicates that this agent was Redl, but this is denied by General Roop, who originally recruited the agent.”

From this it follows that in Vienna a person outside the Russian intelligence service was accused of espionage and committed suicide. This is confirmed by the fact that just before the war in 1914, Samoilo again went to visit agent No. 25 in Bern and received information from him of interest to Russian intelligence, although he did not find out the name of his informant. Therefore, it can be argued that Redl was not a Russian agent, since information from a source in Vienna continued to flow even after the colonel's suicide.

Accordingly, the question arises: why was Redl accused of betrayal? This can be offered the following explanation. At the beginning of 1913, the Austrian counterintelligence received information about the presence of a secret agent in the General Staff who was transferring secret materials to the Russians. However, the search for the spy did not yield any results, which threatened with great trouble for the leadership of the special services of the Austrian army. In the end, Urbansky and Ronge decided to make Redl the "scapegoat", especially since the counterintelligence leadership was aware of his homosexual inclinations. This circumstance made him vulnerable to blackmail and could serve as an explanation for the reasons for the "betrayal." Counterintelligence quickly organized the "evidence" and thus forced Redl to commit suicide. (It is also possible that he was simply killed at all.) This was a necessary condition for "exposing" the spy, since there could be no question of any trial or investigation. After Redl's death, information about his "espionage activities" was quickly and accurately slipped to journalists through the locksmith-football player Wagner. In the future, the myth of Redl's betrayal was diligently kept afloat by the efforts of Urbansky and Ronge, who were not at all interested in the truth about this case becoming known.

But, as you know, ostentatious processes are never useful. This also happened in the case of Redl. By killing him, Austrian counterintelligence did not deprive Russia of a true source of information, thereby losing the secret war.

Begun in August 1914, the first World War became a serious test for Russian military intelligence. Its main task was to reveal the enemy's military plans, to identify the groupings of his troops and the directions of the main attack. Thus, the intelligence operations during the Russian offensive in East Prussia in August 1914 can be judged by the following report from the Quartermaster General of the 1st Army:

“By the beginning of the reporting year, the area was served by an agent network of 15 people undercover agents, of whom three were in Konigsberg, the rest were in Tilsit, Gumbinen, Eydkunen, Insterburg, Danzig, Stettin, Allenstein, Goldap, and Kybarth. The plan was to plant three more agents in Schneidemühl, Deutsch-Eylau and Thorn. For the maintenance of the network and its strengthening, the GUGSH approved a vacation for expenses of 30,000 rubles per year.

During the reporting year, the agent network underwent major changes, the main reason for which was a change in deployment. Currently, there are 53 agents in the service, of which 41 are in the field, the rest are sent out with new tasks. "

And the senior adjutant of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 2nd Army, Colonel of the General Staff, Lebedev, in a report dated August 22, 1914, indicated that since the beginning of the war, 60 agents had been sent to the enemy's rear to perform various tasks.

However, during the offensive of the 1st and 2nd armies, the reconnaissance reports were not taken into account. Moreover, at the headquarters of the North-Western Front, intelligence about the possibility of a flank strike by three German corps was considered the fruit of the overdeveloped imagination of the scouts. As a result, the advanced units of the 2nd Army of General Samsonov were surrounded and destroyed on 28-30 August.

In 1915, when a solid front line was established between the Russian and German troops, the capabilities of undercover intelligence were reduced. And the lack of a centralized control of intelligence operations made it even more difficult to obtain objective and accurate information. In this regard, in April 1915, the General-Quartermaster of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General M.S.

“From the very beginning, the headquarters of the armies and fronts have been conducting secret reconnaissance abroad completely independently, sending their agents to different cities of neutral countries, without notifying either the top headquarters or each other mutually. As a result, a large number of agents working independently and without any connection were concentrated in Bucharest, Stockholm and Copenhagen. These agents try to discredit each other in the eyes of the respective superiors, sometimes serving in several headquarters at once, which often leads to undesirable consequences. In view of the above, I appeal to Your Excellency with a request: would you consider it possible and useful to inform me in complete confidence about all the covert agents of the front (army) headquarters who are abroad both from the beginning of the war and those who are newly commanded. "

However, as a rule, the quartermaster generals of the fronts and armies refused to transfer their agents to the GUGSH, and until the end of the war, a unified leadership of the agent intelligence was not established. Nevertheless, Russian military intelligence continued active work, sometimes achieving significant success.

The head of the Russian section of the Inter-Allied Bureau (IRB) under the French Ministry of War, Colonel Count Pavel Alekseevich Ignatiev (1878–1931), brother of the famous Alexei Ignatiev, military attaché in Paris, author of the memoirs "50 years in the ranks", worked successfully in Paris. Pavel Ignatiev graduated from the Kiev Lyceum and St. Petersburg University, served in the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, then graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, from the beginning of the war with Germany he fought in East Prussia at the head of the squadron of the Guards Hussar Regiment, from December 1915 he served in Paris in the Russian Military Bureau (in the office of the military attaché) under the name of Captain Istomin. P. A. Ignatiev headed the Russian section of the SME from January 1917 to January 1918, when it was liquidated by the French military authorities. He was engaged in the creation of an agent apparatus, despite the lack of support in the General Staff. He also assisted the soldiers of the Russian Expeditionary Force in France after its dissolution in 1918. P. A. Ignatiev died in exile in Paris. In 1933, his memoirs were published in Paris, the Russian translation of which was republished in 1999 in Moscow under the title "My Mission in Paris".

Many military agents in neutral countries carried out their duties until the spring of 1918 - until the majority of Russian diplomatic missions ran out of funds for the maintenance of employees.

Subsequently, N.F. Ryabikov gave the following assessment to the Russian military intelligence of this period: departmental work, often pursuing its own narrow goals and objectives, sometimes opposite in different departments. "

In October 1917, the Russian intelligence officers were faced with the question: with whom to go next? Each of them made their choice. And for the Russian military intelligence began new period, which lasted more than 70 years and brought her both the glory of victories and the bitterness of defeat.