Theoretical components of the concept of rational choice. Rational economic choice. "Social psychology of groups"

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Rational economic choice

In conditions of limited resources, a large role is played by the consumer's choice between the options for using resources. The optimality of the economic choice depends on the costs and the results obtained.

There are three main actors in the economy: consumer, producer and society. In conditions of limited resources, the consumer must measure his income with expenses. The manufacturer decides what to produce, in what quantity, also weighing all costs and revenues. This is how a rational economic choice is formed. That is, with a minimum of costs, the maximum result is provided.

At the cost of the good, which is very different, the consumer decides what will be profitable for him to purchase. And if he chooses this or that product at a favorable price, knowing what it will bring good result, then we can talk about a rational (optimal) economic choice. Therefore, it is associated with the assessment of the opportunity cost of the good.

Information support decision-making in the management of the Federal Property Management Agency

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Valuation of the company OJSC "Gazprom" gas distribution Chelyabinsk

The comparative approach uses two types of information: information of the stock market on the sales prices of shares (Russian trading system, MICEX, etc.) ...

Consumer behavior

Consumers make rational (optimal) choices in the market, i.e. choose products so as to achieve maximum satisfaction of their needs for a given limited budget ...

The subject of economic theory

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The entrepreneur as a subject of the economic process

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Development of a business plan for an enterprise for the production of soft toys

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Calculation of technical and economic indicators of the "Optics" enterprise

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Consumer choice theory

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Pricing policy of the organization

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Utility maximization rule

Critics of the marginal utility theory have articulated the water-diamond paradox. They believed that water should have maximum usefulness, since it is vital, and diamonds - minimum, because without them you can live peacefully. Therefore, the price of water should be higher than that of diamonds.

This contradiction was resolved as follows. In nature, water reserves are not limited, and diamonds are rare. Consequently, the total utility of water is large, but the marginal utility is small, while for diamonds, on the contrary, the total utility is small, and the marginal utility is large. The price is determined not by the total, but by the marginal utility. The relationship between marginal utility and price can be illustrated by the following formula:

where MU x , MU y , MU z- marginal utility of goods; P x , R y , R z- the price of these benefits.

This ratio demonstrates utility maximization rule: the consumer's income should be distributed in such a way that the last ruble spent on the acquisition of each type of goods would bring the same marginal utility. For example, a consumer is going to purchase three goods A, V, WITH to meet your needs. Let us assume that the marginal utility of the good A is 100 yutile, good B- 80 yutils, benefits WITH- 45 yutils. Moreover, the price of the good A is equal to 100 rubles, benefits B- 40 rubles, benefits WITH- 30 rubles. We present these data in table. 4.2.

Table 4.2

Marginal utility and price of goods

As can be seen from the table, the distribution of the consumer's money does not bring him maximum utility, since the rule of utility maximization is not observed. Since the good V brings the maximum weighted utility (i.e. marginal utility per 1 ruble of costs), then the money must be distributed in such a way as to increase the amount of consumption of the good B and reduce the consumption of the good A... In this case, the rule of maximizing utility must be fulfilled.

The consumer should refuse the last copy of the good A, and purchase for the saved 100 rubles. 2.5 parts of the good V... As a result, we get the following ratio (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3

Consumer Equilibrium in Cardinalist Theory

Having thus distributed the monetary income among the goods A, V and WITH, the consumer will be able to extract maximum satisfaction of his needs.

The main peak of the crisis of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and other main methodological directions fell on the 60-70s. These years were full of attempts to find a new methodological basis for further research. Scientists have tried to do this in different ways:

    to update the "classical" methodological approaches (the emergence of post-behavioral methodological directions, neo-institutionalism, etc.);

    to create a system of theories of the "middle level" and try to use these theories as a methodological basis;

    try to create the equivalent of a general theory by recourse to classical political theories;

    turn to Marxism and create on the basis of this various kinds of technocratic theories.

These years are characterized by the emergence of a number of methodological theories claiming the place of the “big theory”. One of such theories, one of such methodological directions is the theory of rational choice.

The theory of rational choice was designed to overcome the shortcomings of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and institutionalism, creating a theory of political behavior in which a person would act as an independent, active political actor, a theory that would allow looking at human behavior "from the inside", taking into account the nature of his attitudes, selection of optimal behavior, etc.

The theory of rational choice came to political science from economics. The "founding fathers" of the theory of rational choice are considered E. Downs (formulated the main provisions of the theory in his work "The Economic Theory of Democracy"), D. Black (introduced the concept of preferences into political science, described the mechanism of their translation into the results of activity), G. Simon (substantiated the concept of bounded rationality and demonstrated the applicability of the rational choice paradigm), as well as L. Chapley, M. Shubik, V. Riker, M. Olson, J. Buchanan, G. Tullock (developed "game theory"). It took about ten years before rational choice theory became widespread in political science.

The supporters of the theory of rational choice proceed from the following methodological premises:

First, methodological individualism, that is, the recognition that social and political structures, politics and society as a whole are secondary to the individual. It is the individual who produces institutions and relations through his activities. Therefore, the interests of the individual are determined by him, as well as the order of preferences.

Secondly, the egoism of the individual, that is, his desire to maximize his own benefit. This does not mean that a person will necessarily behave like an egoist, but even if he behaves like an altruist, then this method is most likely more beneficial for him than others. This applies not only to the behavior of an individual, but also to his behavior in a group when he is not bound by special personal attachments.

Supporters of the theory of rational choice believe that the voter decides whether to come to the polls or not, depending on how he evaluates the benefits of his vote, also votes on the basis of rational considerations of benefits. He can manipulate his political attitudes if he sees that he may not receive a gain. Political parties in elections also try to maximize their benefits by enlisting the support of as many voters as possible. Deputies form committees, guided by the need to pass this or that bill, their people to the government, etc. The bureaucracy in its activities is guided by the desire to increase its organization and its budget, etc.

Third, the rationality of individuals, that is, their ability to arrange their preferences in accordance with their maximum benefit. As E. Downes wrote, “every time we talk about rational behavior, we mean rational behavior initially directed towards selfish goals ”12. In this case, the individual correlates the expected results and costs and, in an effort to maximize the result, tries to simultaneously minimize costs. Since the rationalization of behavior and the assessment of the ratio of benefits and costs requires the possession of significant information, and its receipt is associated with an increase in overall costs, then they speak of the "bounded rationality" of the individual. This limited rationality has more to do with the decision-making procedure itself than with the essence of the decision itself.

Fourth, the exchange of activities. Individuals in society do not act alone; there is an interdependence of people's choices. The behavior of each individual is carried out under certain institutional conditions, that is, under the influence of the actions of institutions. These institutional conditions themselves are created by people, but the starting point is the consent of people to exchange activities. In the process of activity, individuals rather do not adapt to institutions, but try to change them in accordance with their interests. Institutions, in turn, can change the order of preferences, but this only means that the changed order turned out to be beneficial for political actors under the given conditions.

Most often, the political process within the framework of the rational choice paradigm is described in the form of public choice theory, or in the form of game theory.

Proponents of the theory of public choice proceed from the fact that in a group, the individual behaves selfishly and rationally. He will not volunteer to make special efforts to achieve common goals, but will try to use public goods for free (the phenomenon of a "hare" in public transport). This happens because the nature of collective goods includes such characteristics as non-exclusion (that is, no one can be excluded from the use of public goods) and non-competitiveness (consumption of this good by a large number of people does not lead to a decrease in its usefulness).

Game theorists assume that the political struggle to win, as well as the assumptions of rational choice theory about the universality of such qualities of political actors as selfishness and rationality, make the political process similar to a game with zero or non-zero sum. As is known from the course of general political science, game theory describes the interaction of actors through a certain set of game scenarios. The purpose of such an analysis is to find such conditions of the game under which the participants choose certain strategies of behavior, for example, beneficial to all participants at once 13.

This methodological approach is not free from some disadvantages... One of these shortcomings is insufficient consideration of social and cultural-historical factors that influence the behavior of an individual. Authors of this study guide are far from agreeing with researchers who believe that the political behavior of an individual is largely a function of the social structure, or with those who argue that the political behavior of actors is incomparable in principle, because it occurs within the framework of unique national conditions, etc. However, it is obvious that the model of rational choice does not take into account the influence of the socio-cultural environment on the preferences, motivation and strategy of behavior of political actors, and does not take into account the influence of the specifics of political discourse.

Another flaw is associated with the admission of rational choice theorists about the rationality of behavior. The point is not only that individuals can behave like altruists, and not only that they can have limited information, imperfect qualities. These nuances, as shown above, are explained by the theory of rational choice itself. The point is, first of all, that people often act irrationally under the influence of short-term factors, under the influence of affect, guided, for example, by momentary impulses.

As D. Easton rightly notes, the broad interpretation of rationality proposed by the supporters of the theory under consideration leads to the erosion of this concept. It would be more fruitful for solving the problems posed by representatives of the theory of rational choice, it would be to highlight the types of political behavior depending on its motivation. In particular, “socially oriented” in the interests of “social solidarity” 14 differs significantly from rational and egoistic behavior.

In addition, the theory of rational choice is often criticized for some technical contradictions arising from the main provisions, as well as for the limited explanatory possibilities (for example, the applicability of the model of party competition proposed by its supporters only to countries with a two-party system). However, a significant part of such criticism either stems from the incorrect presentation of the works of representatives of this theory, or is refuted by the representatives of the theory of rational choice (for example, using the concept of "bounded" rationality).

Despite the noted shortcomings, the theory of rational choice has a number of merits, which determine its great popularity. The first undoubted advantage is that it uses standard scientific research methods. The analyst formulates hypotheses or theorems based on general theory. The analytical method used by supporters of rational choice theory proposes the construction of theorems that include alternative hypotheses about the intentions of political actors. The researcher then subjects these hypotheses or theorems to empirical testing. If reality does not refute the theorem, that theorem or hypothesis is considered relevant. If the test results are unsuccessful, the investigator draws appropriate conclusions and repeats the procedure again. The use of this technique allows the researcher to conclude which human actions, institutional structures and the results of the exchange of activities will be most likely under certain conditions. Thus, the theory of rational choice solves the problem of verification of theoretical positions by testing the assumptions of scientists about the intentions of political actors.

As the well-known political scientist K. von Boume rightly notes, the success of the theory of rational choice in political science can be generally explained by the following reasons:

    “Neo-positivist requirements for the use of deductive methods in political science are most easily met with the help of formal models on which this methodological approach is based

    the approach from the standpoint of the theory of rational choice can be applied in the analysis of any type of behavior - from the actions of the most selfish rationalist to the infinitely altruistic activities of Mother Teresa, who maximized the strategy of helping the disadvantaged

    areas of political science, which are at the middle level between micro- and macrotheories, are forced to recognize the possibility of an approach based on the analysis of activities ( political actors- E.M., O.T.) actors. The actor in the concept of rational choice is a construction that avoids the question of the real unity of the individual

    rational choice theory promotes the use of qualitative and compulsive ( mixed - E.M., O.T.) approaches in political science

    the rational choice approach acted as a kind of counterbalance to the dominance of behavioral research in previous decades. It is easy to combine it with multilevel analysis (especially when studying the realities of the European Union countries) and with ... neoinstitutionalism, which became widespread in the 80s ”15.

Rational choice theory has a fairly wide range of applications. It is used to analyze voter behavior, parliamentary activity and coalition formation, international relations, etc., and is widely used in modeling political processes.

G.I. Ruzavin

We choose, we are chosen. How often this does not coincide! Economics is not only an arena for the struggle of opposing interests, an endless chain of ups and downs, stabilization and stagnation, but also a fertile field of research for a philosopher-methodologist. Can the choice in the power fields of the economy be rational? To what extent are the concepts of rational choice in economics applicable to other areas of social research? These topical issues for a multipolar world are in the center of attention of Professor G.I. Ruzavin.

Rational choice contradictions

The concept of rational choice, developed within the framework of modern economic theory, is currently being put forward as a universal research paradigm for all social sciences and humanities. For example, R. Schweri states that economics has developed “a special approach that can be applied to the analysis of both the market and non-market sectors of public life. This is, in fact, the main mission of rational choice theory. " However, this theory is entirely focused on the rational behavior of the subject in a market economy and does not take into account his irrational and even irrational actions and motivations. In practical terms, such a choice is primarily oriented towards individualism and therefore opposes itself to collectivism, completely oblivious to the contradictions that arise between individual and public interests.

Without denying the need for a rational choice of the individual and his active position in the development of society, in this article we tried to draw attention to the contradictions that arise between individual and public interests when the role of the individual in such a choice is excessively exaggerated.

What constitutes a rational choice?

Any human activity has a purposeful character, and this presupposes a clear awareness of the goal, its setting and the choice of ways to achieve it. In everyday and practical life, such a choice is made on the basis of everyday experience, in which a choice based on common sense and intuition will be considered rational or reasonable. but common sense and intuition is enough only to solve a relatively simple tasks... In more complex cases of solving scientific problems and complex problems arising in industrial and socio-economic activities, one has to turn to the construction of rational choice models. When building such a model, the scheme of activity includes, firstly, the exact formulation and justification of the goal or, as they say, the target function; secondly, a complete listing of all possible alternatives or ways to achieve the goal; third, the assessment of each alternative in terms of its value or usefulness, as well as the likelihood of its implementation in reality. Ultimately, of all the available alternatives, the one that best suits the goal in terms of both its usefulness and the likelihood of its implementation is selected. In mathematical terms, a rational choice is a choice that corresponds to the maximum or minimum value of the objective function. For example, in a market economy, the maximum value of such a function will correspond to the receipt of the greatest profit, and the minimum value will correspond to the lowest production costs.

Already when building a model of rational choice, we are faced with a discrepancy between the model of reality or a contradiction in the mental image of a specific reality. Therefore, building a model is a process of resolving such a contradiction, bringing the model in line with the real state of affairs, and bringing it closer to reality. But we encounter such contradictions in any process of cognition, and especially in

theoretical modeling. In the case under consideration, we are faced not simply with the cognition and modeling of certain objects, but with choice from a variety of possible alternatives to action, behavior or problem solving.

Such a choice should not be arbitrary, but justified, reasonable or rational. The validity of such a choice is primarily related to its purpose, and rationality or rationality depends on the methods and means used to achieve the final goal. Therefore, the contradictions that arise in the selection process are primarily associated with the identification of rational and irrational approaches, both to the selection process itself and the assessment of possible alternatives for its implementation.

Focusing on the individual rational choice of the subject, the existing economic concept of choice does not take into account the irrational and even irrational decisions and actions of the business entity, which can lead not only to undesirable, but clearly negative consequences. Indeed, the achievement of maximum benefit or utility by an individual often contradicts the interests of society. Therefore, the study of the rational and irrational actions of individuals and individual groups, which are always observed in society, constitute an important problem of socio-economic research.

Other controversy arises in assessing the utility and likelihood of various choice alternatives. They essentially determine the extent to which the choice as a whole is rational. To get a more concrete idea of ​​this, let us first turn to the emergence of the very idea of ​​rational choice, and then to economics, where it found, in essence, the greatest application.

The concept of rational choice in economics

The ideas of rational choice first appeared in the 18th century, but not in economics, but in the teachings of the Scottish school of morality, on the one hand, and the principles of the school of utilitarianism, on the other. Both of these schools rejected the traditional demands to establish moral norms according to religious beliefs and preconceived a priori principles. The behavior of people and their actions, they argued, must be judged by the results to which they lead. Therefore, they cannot be judged in advance as good or bad until these results are known. But for this, people must have freedom of choice in their actions and be responsible for them.

The founder of the school of utilitarianism, Jeremiah Bentham, was guided by the principle that ethics should be based on the achievement of happiness for the largest number people. He even believed that this happiness can be mathematically calculated as a balance of pleasure and pain. Therefore, each person is given the opportunity to make a reasonable choice of their behavior. This fundamentally individualistic concept of morality was later used by Scottish Adam Smith to create classical political economy.

“Each individual person,” he wrote, “... has in mind only his own interest, pursues only his own benefit, and in this case he invisible hand goes to a goal that was not part of his intentions. In pursuit of his own interests, he often more effectively serves the interests of society than when he deliberately seeks to serve them "(italics mine. - G.R.) .

The metaphor of the invisible hand that controls the behavior of people in the market is designed to show that a rational choice based on taking into account people's own interests, under all conditions, turns out to be the most effective means of rational management. However, Smith himself does not disclose the mechanism for achieving such a goal. Therefore, some modern authors believe that he discovered the principle of negative feedback long before the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener. It is this principle, as is known, ensures the preservation of stability dynamic systems, in particular order in a competitive market. But most likely Smith revealed the influence free choice market participants on the mechanism of price formation on it. Indeed, if the demand for goods increases, then prices rise and vice versa, if demand decreases, then prices fall.

There is no doubt that the idea of ​​rational choice plays important role when analyzing not only economic, but also any form of human activity. Such activity always has an expedient character, and this presupposes a clear awareness and setting of a goal and, most importantly, the possibility of choice. a definite decision or alternatives to achieve the goal. But the practical implementation of such a goal is carried out in society not without struggle and contradictions. However, supporters of the concept of rational choice in economics, from A. Smith himself to F. Hayek, do not want to notice this. Notice that in the above quote, Smith argues that self-interest is more effective in promoting the public interest.

than a conscious service to society. True, in the era of free competition, the real contradictions of the economy were not so clearly expressed as to draw attention to them. Therefore, the idea of ​​the self-sufficiency of market regulation prevailed in classical political economy until the Great Depression of the 1930s. last century. The depression and crisis have shown firsthand that market regulation is not self-sufficient and therefore cannot remove the contradictions between the interests of different sectors of society. Meanwhile, advocates of rational choice continued to insist that individual choice always leads to an increase in social wealth and therefore is rational.

At present, representatives of the modern economic elite are beginning to talk about the illusory nature of such ideas. “Life would be much easier,” states the famous financier George Soros, “if Friedrich Hayek were right and the common interest would be obtained as an unintended result of people's actions in their own interests. However, the accumulation of narrow self-interests using the market mechanism entails unintentional negative consequences» .

The contradictions that arise in the theory of economic choice are associated with the very interpretation of the concept of rationality. Since economic theory is based on the principle of methodological individualism, so the concept of rationality becomes subjective in it. If the subject sets as his goal the achievement of maximum benefits and he considers its implementation rational, then such a goal may conflict with the interests of other subjects and society as a whole. Is it possible in this case to consider his choice rational? For example, if an entrepreneur, hoping to take advantage of the existing infrastructure, decides to build a chemical plant near settlement, then from his individual point of view, he will consider his choice to be quite rational. But from the point of view of residents, such rationality is subjective and therefore conflicts with broader public interests. Almost every subject is forced to reckon with the interests of other subjects and interact with them in one way or another. Therefore, the contradictions that arise between them can be resolved by creating appropriate rules of conduct for market participants, not to mention compliance with the general requirements of state regulation and antimonopoly legislation. It follows that the very concept of rational choice in economics needs further

refinement and development. As you know, this concept is based on a more fundamental principle of rationality, which causes a lot of controversy and criticism.

In classical economic theory, rationality was viewed as objective characteristics of the processes under study, in which it was assumed that the decision-maker was considered as an ideal "economic person" (Homo economicus), which possesses complete information about the state of affairs in the market, is not prone to errors and always accepts correct decisions about maximizing your benefits. Such a person chooses the optimal, best course of action in any situation. Noticing the abstract and unrealistic nature of this approach, supporters of neoclassical theory in economics began to interpret it in subjective terms. Even M. Weber considered such an interpretation necessary to reveal the subjective motives of business entities, although he did not deny the possibility of an objective interpretation of rationality. On the contrary, one of the founders of mathematical economics V. Pareto considered rationality as an objective criterion economic knowledge and actions. In his opinion, the achievement of the goal depends not only on the information possessed by the individual subject, but also on those who have much more information.

Although the opposition of the objective interpretation of rationality to the subjective as a whole is illegal, it indicates the need for their distinction, which plays an essential role in characterizing the purposeful objective human activity. M. Weber turns to subjective interpretation precisely for analysis, as he puts it, goal-rational activities, i.e. clarification of the motives, intentions and intentions of the actors. V. Pareto, on the contrary, emphasizes that such activity should also be based on objective existing knowledge and information to be successful.

In modern philosophical discussions on rationality, it is usually associated only with the processes of acquisition and justification. scientific knowledge... The criteria of rationality in these cases are the requirements for the correspondence of knowledge to the laws of logic and the style of thinking that has become established in science. Simply put, knowledge is considered reasonable if it meets the requirements of laws and standards of thought. However, at present, the concept of rationality is also used to analyze the expedient actions of people in various fields of activity. This application of the concept

rationality is even more consistent with the nature of practical than theoretical activity. Let us not forget, however, that in all such cases we are talking about rational choice, which differs from arbitrary and deliberate choice in its practical and theoretical validity.

The effectiveness of economic, like any form of social activity, depends, firstly, on the subjective rationality of the choice of individuals, and secondly, on an objective rational assessment of the objective function, which consists of a cumulative assessment of the utility and the likelihood of possible alternatives for achieving the goal. The cumulative weighted estimate of the usefulness and probability of each alternative makes it possible to choose, if not the optimal, then the more satisfactory solution to the problem. In this regard, the position nobel laureate Herbert Simon, who believes that rational choice should not always be associated with obtaining maximum benefit or utility. “An entrepreneur,” he writes, “may not care about maximization at all, he may just want to get the income that he considers sufficient for himself.” He confirms this conclusion not only with concrete economic evidence, but also with considerations related to psychology. “Man,” he says, “ satisfied a living being that solves a problem by searching ... and not maximizing a being who, when solving a problem, tries to find the best (based on a certain criterion) alternative. " Such restrictions on maximizing rational choice have to be reckoned with, especially in social management and politics.

Rational choice in social management

The idea of ​​an optimally acting "economic person" who always makes the right decisions turned out to be clearly not suitable for social management, since it does not take into account the fact that in the behavior and actions of people, along with undoubtedly rational components, there are irrational and even irrational components. That is why G. Saimon, instead of the ideal model of an "economic person", put forward a model of "administrative person" for social management, in which, on the basis of all available information and a probabilistic assessment of random and unforeseen circumstances,

the goal is to find a satisfactory solution to the assigned management problem. The restrictions imposed here on rational choice are due to many circumstances that arise in real life:

Unforeseen events of a random nature, which can be estimated only with varying degrees of probability;

The cognitive capabilities and intellectual abilities of the administrator himself and his assistants;

The political and organizational conditions for making managerial decisions, which in a democratic society are determined by the interaction of various groups, collectives and associations pursuing different goals and protecting different interests;

Finally, the ability to make the right decisions comes over time and depends on experience and improves with practice.

As far as sociology is concerned, many scholars are aware that individual choices can lead to undesirable and even clearly negative consequences. Advocates of the concept of rational action, although they emphasize the need for a normative and rational approach in sociological analysis, nevertheless object to their interpretation in terms of benefits and disadvantages, as is done in economics. The most important condition such an analysis is the disclosure of contradictions in the interaction of rational and irrational aspects in the development of social processes, the identification and assessment of the role of traditions and innovations in them.

The study of such contradictions should not be limited, however, to a simple statement of the interaction between the rational and the irrational in social processes: it is necessary to analyze the moments of transition and transformation of the rational into the irrational in order to prevent undesirable developments. The study of such transformations, according to A.G. Zdravomyslov, consists, firstly, in the study of the motivation of the behavior of the subject, the identification of rational and irrational moments in it; secondly, in establishing rational measure emerging social institutions; thirdly, in revealing the degree of rationality of the conducted practical policy.

Rational choice in politics

Although individual choices in politics are made at the micro level, in particular during election campaigns, referendums, polls, etc., the very rules of choice are established at the macro level. The contradiction arising here, according to Nobel laureate James Buchanan, can be resolved by creating a "constitution of politics" in civil society, representing a kind of replica of the social contract of the ideologues of the Enlightenment of the 18th century. But unlike the latter, this constitution is based not on the ideas of goodness and justice, but on the principles of market exchange. Buchanan explicitly states that the application of the idea of ​​market exchange in politics undermines the widespread misconception that people participate in politics because they seek to seek justice and goodness in society.

“Politics,” he argues, “is a complex system of exchange between individuals, in which the latter collectively strive to achieve their particular goals, since they cannot realize them through ordinary market exchange. In the market, people trade apples for oranges, and in politics, they agree to pay taxes in exchange for goods that everyone needs: from the local fire department to the court. "

In other words, politics is based on making collective decisions that are beneficial to many. Thus, the contradiction between the state and the individuals that make up society is resolved by concluding a social contract between them, primarily related to taxation. However, the success of a choice in politics is achieved by maximizing it. The voter will vote for the party that promises to reduce taxes. The maximization of benefits in party politics is achieved by obtaining the largest number of votes in parliament, parties unite in coalitions to get the maximum number of votes for the adoption of the desired bill, etc. Since parties act as defenders of the interests of certain social groups, strata and classes of society, it is impossible to achieve any social harmony and justice in society. D. Buchanan understands this very well and therefore his "constitution of politics" is aimed at protecting society from extreme forms of arbitrariness on the part of the state. For this, he considers it necessary to adopt the relevant constitutional laws by universal suffrage.

The principles of rational choice can, to a certain extent, explain some of the features political activities, such as voting results in elections, building coalitions in parliaments, division of power between winning parties in elections, etc. All this constitutes only the external, superficial side of the complex internal political life in modern society, do not reveal its internal mechanisms and driving forces... Therefore, they greatly simplify political life and the events and processes occurring in it, and therefore, can neither explain, let alone predict trends political development society.

Can rational choice theory become universal?

a paradigm for social sciences and humanities?

Having discussed the attempts to apply the economic theory of rational choice in sociology and political science, as the disciplines closest to economic science, we can unequivocally state that it cannot claim the role of a universal research paradigm in the social sciences. It is true, of course, that this theory was able to satisfactorily explain how the disordered actions of individuals in society ultimately give rise to an ordered order, for example, spontaneous order in a competitive market, consisting in the balance between supply and demand. And this makes it possible to regulate the exchange of goods. But already in such a market, at the present time, contradictions constantly arise, when monopolies penetrate into it, violating such an order. Therefore, the idea of ​​rational choice does not work here.

The situation of choice has to be encountered not only in the economy, but also in various spheres of social activity and even in everyday life. However, the difference in the spheres of such activity imposes its own specifics on the nature of the choice in them. Therefore, one cannot agree with the opinion of R. Schweri that the economic theory of choice was able to “celebrate the success of its crusade aimed at conquering all other sciences”. He believes that this theory "formalizes the logic that guides people who make choices in a variety of situations in everyday life."

were developed in the well-known work of J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern "Game theory and economic behavior." Truth, mathematical models created by specialists in these disciplines were first used by economists. This is quite understandable, since economics turned out to be the most suitable science for applying these models. But this does not give economists the right to organize "crusades to conquer all other sciences", as R. Schweri states.

First, specialists in other sciences, when faced with situations of choice, use the principles and models of general decision-making theory, and not the private models of economists.

Second, Schweri himself admits that rational choice theory "cannot handle various social variables that are difficult to define in economic terms."

Third, the possibility of applying some ideas and even models of economic science does not turn specific social sciences and humanities into a part or section of the economy. Each of these sciences has its own special subject and specific research methods that are not covered by the theory of rational choice. Therefore, attempts to conquer them by the economy using the paradigm of rational choice would mean a desire, if not to eliminate the social sciences and humanities, then at least to reduce them, or to reduce them to economics.

Ventcel E.S. Operations research. M., 1980.

Schweri R. Decree. op. P. 51.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about the theory of economics. For rational choice theory applied to forensic science, see rational choice theory (criminology).

Rational choice theory, also known as choice theory or rational action theory, is the basis for understanding and often formally modeling socio-economic behavior. The basic premise of rational choice theory is that the aggregate social behavior is the result of the behavior of individual subjects, each of which makes its own customized solutions... The theory also focuses on the determinants of individual choice (methodological individualism).

Rational Choice Theory then assumes that a person has preferences among the available choices that allow them to indicate which one they prefer. These preferences are not considered complete (a person can always say which of the two alternatives, they consider preferable or which is not preferable to the other) and transitional (if option A is preferable to option B and option B is preferable to option C, then A is more preferable than C ). The rational agent is supposed to take into account the available information, the probabilities of events, and the potential costs and benefits in determining preferences, and to act consistently in choosing the self-determined best choice of action.

Rationality is widely used as an assumption about human behavior in microeconomic models and analysis, and appears in almost all economics textbooks on the procedure for human decision making. It is also used in political science, sociology, and philosophy. A specific version of the rationality of instrumental rationality, which involves the search for the most cost-effective means to achieve a specific goal, without thinking about the dignity of this goal. Gary Becker was an early proponent of applying rational actor models more broadly. Becker won the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics for his research on discrimination, crime and human capital.

Definition and scope

The concept of rationality used in rational choice theory differs from the colloquial and most philosophical use of the word. Colloquially, "rational" behavior usually means "reasonable," "predictable," or "in a thoughtful, sober manner." Rational choice theory uses a narrower definition of rationality. At its most basic level, behavior is rational if it is purposeful, reflective (evaluative), and consistent (during and across different situations of choice). This contrasts with behavior that is random, impulsive, conditioned, or adopted (unevaluative) imitation.

The preference between the two alternatives could be:

  • Strict preference occurs when a person prefers more 1 s on the 2 and not not treat them as equally preferred.
  • Weak preference it follows that the individual either strictly prefers 1 over 2 or is indifferent between them.
  • Indifference occurs when a person does not prefer on the 1 to v 2, nor 2 to 1 ... Since (in fullness) a person does notrefusescomparisons, they must, therefore, be indifferent in this case.

Research that has been filmed in the 1980s has sought to develop models that fall short of these assumptions and argue that such behavior may still be rational, Anand (1993). This work, often carried out by theoretical economists and analytical philosophers, assumes, in the final analysis, that the assumptions or axioms above are not entirely general and, perhaps, can at best be regarded as approximate.

Additional assumptions

  • Perfect information The simple rational choice model above assumes that the person has complete or perfect information about the alternatives, that is, the ranking between the two options does not entail uncertainty.
  • Choice in the face of uncertainty In the richer model, which includes uncertainty about how choices (actions) lead to possible outcomes, a person actually chooses between lotteries, where each lottery causes a different probability distribution over the outcomes. The additional assumption of the independence of extraneous alternatives then leads to expected utility theory.
  • Intertemporal choice When decisions affect choices (eg consumption) at different points in time, the standard method for evaluating alternatives over time is to discount the future benefit.
  • Limited cognitive ability Defining and weighing each alternative against any other can take time, effort, and mental capacity. Recognizing that these costs impose or cognitive constraints on individuals leads to a theory of bounded rationality.

Alternative theories of human action include components such as Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's perspective theory, which reflects the empirical finding that, in contrast to the standard preferences adopted by neoclassical economics, people add value to the objects they already have. is compared to similar items owned by others. In accordance with standard preferences, the amount that a person is willing to pay for a product (for example, as a drinking mug) is considered equal amount that he or she is willing to pay to part with him. In experiments, the latter price is sometimes significantly higher than the former (but see Plott and Zeiler 2005, Plott and Zeiler 2007 and Klass and Zeiler, 2013). Tversky and Kahneman do not characterize loss of disgust as irrational. Behavioral economics includes a large number of other changes in his picture of human behavior that go against neoclassical assumptions.

utility maximization

Often preferences are described by their usefulness to a function or payoff functions... This is a sequential number that a person assigns to more accessible actions, such as:

U (a i)> U (a j). (\ Displaystyle U \ left (a_ (i) \ right)> U \ left (a_ (j) \ right).)

the individual's preferences are then expressed as the relationship between these ordinal tasks. For example, if a person prefers candidate Sarah over Roger for abstinence, their preferences will be relevant:

U (Sara)> U (Roger)> U (abstain). (\ Displaystyle U \ left ((\ text (Sara)) \ right)> U \ left ((\ text (Roger)) \ right)> U \ left ((\ text (abstain)) \ right).)

A preference relationship that, as indicated above, satisfies completeness, transitivity, and furthermore, continuity, can be equivalently represented by a utility function.

criticism

Both assumptions and behavioral predictions of rational choice theory have drawn criticism from various camps. As mentioned above, some economists have developed a model of bounded rationality that hopes to be more psychologically plausible without completely abandoning the idea that reason is at the core of decision-making processes. Other economists have developed several theories of human decision making that allow for the role of uncertainty as well as the determination of individual tastes according to their socioeconomic conditions (see Fernandez-Huerga, 2008).

Other social scientists, inspired in part by Bourdieu's thinking, have expressed concern about the misuse of economic metaphors in other contexts, suggesting that this may have political implications... The argument they do is that by viewing everything as a kind of "economy", they make a particular vision of the way the economy works, it seems more natural. Thus, they assume rational choice is as much ideological as it is scientific that it does not in itself deny its scientific usefulness.

Evolutionary psychology perspective is that many of the seeming contradictions and preconceptions about rational choice can be explained by rational in the context of maximizing bioavailability in ancestral environment, but not necessarily in the current one. Thus, when living at the subsistence level, where a reduction in resources may have meant death, it may have been rational to place more value on losses than on profits. Proponents argue that this may also explain the differences between the groups.

Benefits

The choice of approach allows rationally preferences to be represented as real utility functions. The economic decision-making process becomes a problem of maximizing this