- [Page 4] -

Combat training programs formed military units and the training of reserves in reserve rifle and special units were approved by the People's Commissar of Defense. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0429 of October 14, 1943, in order to improve the manning and the most expedient use of trained reserves, the Glavupraform of the Red Army focused on all issues of manning and creating trained reserves for all branches of the armed forces. With the beginning of the war, the leadership of combat training, the organization and material support of spare and training units of a kind of troops was entrusted to the commanders and chiefs of the branches of the Red Army and military districts.

In the conditions of the outbreak of war, attempts by the party and Komsomol bodies of Siberia to organize military training in the Komsomol organizations and primary organizations of the Osoaviakhim could not solve the problem of a full-fledged military training reserves for the army. The quality of military training of draft youth in the Vsevobuch subdivisions did not fully meet the requirements of the front due to insufficient training and material support. Under these conditions, only the military method of training military-trained reserves ensured the continuous replenishment of the active army with trained manpower.

The dissertation examines the process of the formation of a system for preparing reserves for the front, the organizational structure of spare and training units and formations, the procedure for the formation and composition of marching units, the activities of the command of units and formations to fulfill the established orders for the preparation and dispatch of prepared reserves.

The dissertation candidate identified and analyzed the sources of staffing for combat, spare and training units. During the formation in August - September 1941 of reserve formations of the second stage, serious difficulties arose with their staffing with command and control personnel. Reserve officers recruited to the posts of company platoon commanders comprised from 72% to 82% of the staff, most of them had no military education and service experience. The appointment of rank-and-file fighters to the positions of junior commanders had a negative impact on the quality of training.

For the staffing of combat and rear military units and formations were sent senior military personnel (up to 50 years old and above) and regular conscription ages, servicemen after recovery in hospitals, military personnel, previously booked for the national economy, a variable composition of the military educational institutions and spare parts, women. For the staffing of spare rifle units and formations, military-liable reserves under the age of 46 and front-line soldiers from hospitals with education up to 3 classes were sent, to artillery spare parts from 4 to 6 classes. To staff the special units, along with those liable for military service, were sent servicemen from spare and training units, military transit points and women.

Mostly conscripts born in 1924 - 1927 were sent to staff the educational formations for the training of junior commanders. and those liable for military service under the age of 35 with an education of at least 3-4 classes - for training riflemen; with education of at least 5 classes - training tank; in educational automobile - up to 45 years old and educational communication parts - up to 47 years. In the second half of 1942, senior military servicemen (up to 50 years old) with a training period of 2 months began to be sent to staff the reserve artillery brigades.

One of the sources of completing spare parts were conscripts from among the special contingent and repressed citizens. In the structure of replenishment, the number of such persons liable for military service was 15 - 20% and remained unchanged throughout the war. Since 1943, spare and training rifle and artillery units and formations were staffed mainly with conscripts, while senior military personnel were sent to separate units and subunits. The tendency to staff these units mainly with resources from the Siberian regions continued throughout the war.

In 1943 - 1944. in the Siberian Military District and Zabfront, in connection with the significant withdrawal of manpower (up to 70% of the total mobilized) in the first period of the war, problems arose with the staffing of spare and training units. The main source of replenishment was the re-examination and re-booking of conscripts and conscripts. The main task local authorities military management was the implementation of monthly plans to find human resources for the staffing of units and formations.

The problem of preparing reserves in reserve formations was aggravated by the large proportion of untrained in the structure of the military reserve. As in other military districts, by the beginning of the war their share in the regions of the Siberian Military District was about 30% and had a tendency to increase until 1943. The preparation of reserves by military commissariats to staff spare and training units for military service and conscripts unfit for service significantly hampered the preparation of reserves. inconsistency in the actions of various departments and services and a continuing shortage of training and material resources.

The terms of training of servicemen in spare parts and formations changed during the war and ranged from 2 to 6 months. At the final stage of preparation, they were included in the march units for military registration specialties, were provided with uniforms, food and, as part of the march replenishment, were sent to active army.

Upon arrival at the front, the marching reinforcements were distributed in parts and put into battle. In 1941, inadequate training, ill-conceived order of entry into battle, combined with a shortage of weapons and ammunition, led to heavy and unjustified losses, devaluing the value of such reinforcements. Since January 1942, the procedure for receiving marching replenishment by the active army has been changed. Marching reinforcements began to be sent to the formed reserve army and front-line spare parts, where they underwent additional training.

The second section "Organization of combat training in reserve and training rifle, artillery, cavalry formations and signal units" examines the organization and features of combat training of soldiers of various military registration specialties, summarizes the experience of preparing reserves for the active army. The combat training of Siberian warriors in the formed combat, spare and training units was carried out in a differentiated manner, in several stages, and began already in the process of their staffing. It was distinguished by: high intensity, the maximum approximation to the requirements of the front.

In order to form the practical skills and knowledge of soldiers in units and formations, they were equipped training grounds, camps, special defensive areas, assault lines, anti-tank areas. Subdivisions and units were withdrawn for 7-10 days to the areas of training fields and shooting ranges. The main emphasis was placed on tactical, special and fire training. In order to create a real situation and consolidate the acquired skills, it was practiced to conduct joint exercises for soldiers of various specialties. The personnel learned to overcome steep slopes, to lower the material part. All marching units were required to be trained in overcoming water obstacles and shooting in the mountains and the city. The marching endurance and physical conditioning of the soldiers was developed in the course of long marches of subunits and units with full combat gear and standard weapons. In winter, marches were made on skis, and the soldiers spent a significant part of their time in mobile winter camps.

In order to study the experience of the war and improve methodological skills, mainly front-line soldiers were appointed to the positions of command and command personnel, in units and formations it was practiced to conduct training and methodological gatherings, instructor-methodological classes and briefings for officers and sergeants. 50% of the time in the command training system was devoted to improving military knowledge and 50% to mastering the teaching methodology.

The combat competition, in which both individual soldiers and subunits and military units, took part, contributed to the improvement in the quality of the exercises. The main indicators of the competition were: the results of combat training, the level of military discipline and physical training, the state of training fields, shooting ranges, the savings and condition of weapons, the internal routine, the quality of the marching companies handed over. The winners of the competition were awarded cash prizes, badges "For excellent shooting", were awarded military ranks and gratitude were announced, the divisions were awarded the challenge Red Banners, cultural and educational property.

The dissertation also analyzes the system of training junior commanders in the reserve and training units of the Siberian Military District and the Zabfront. For the preparation of junior commanders, training formations, regimental schools and schools for foremen were created in spare parts, formations and military schools. They were staffed with the best trained fighters of variable composition and participants in the war. Since August 16, 1942, 2 separate educational rifle brigades... The terms of training for junior command personnel for the emerging combat units were 3 months and 4 months for cadets of training units and units. In 1943, the training period for junior commanders was increased to 6 months.

The training process for junior commanders was consistent and thoughtful. Instructor-methodological and practical skills of squad command in all types of combined arms combat, fire control in combat, study of the materiel of weapons and their preparation for firing were acquired and improved in the course of single training, which was allotted for 1 month. The skills of a marching combat life were formed in the course of tactical exercises and exercises. The condition for the assignment of military ranks was the successful passing of final tests.

The detachment of servicemen of variable composition for various construction, defensive and economic work negatively affected the preparation of reserves. In 1941, there were cases of sending servicemen to the front who had not completed the training program.

In the third section "Preparing reserves for armored and mechanized troops" the specifics of training tank crew specialists in reserve and training tank regiments of the Siberian Military District and Zabfront are considered.

With the beginning of the war, the 7th reserve auto-armored and 4th separate training tank regiments were training tank reserves in the ZabVO. The increase in the production of T-34 tanks in Omsk and tank diesel engines in Barnaul in 1942 contributed to the creation in the Siberian Military District of a single center for the production of combat vehicles and the training of crew members. In June 1942, the 30th separate training tank battalion was formed at the Omsk plant No. 174. On August 2, 1942, the 4th separate training tank regiment was redeployed to Omsk. The regiment consisted of 4 tank training battalions, which trained driver mechanics, tower gunners and radiotelegraph operators. The 4th battalion carried out the tasks of ensuring the educational process. In the 30th separate tank training battalion, the training of formed tank crews was being completed. In September 1944, the 9th reserve tank regiment was formed on the basis of the battalion. The training of commanders of tanks and tank platoons was carried out by the Kamyshin Tank School, which arrived in Omsk in August 1943.

For the staffing of spare and training tank units, military-liable reserves came from among the former tankers. From November 1, 1942, to staff the Kamyshinsky tank school, and from February 1943 - training tank units, the rank and file and junior command personnel of the active army who distinguished themselves in battles were sent at the age of no older than 35 years with an education of at least 7 classes for the school and 3 classes - for educational parts. The terms of training tankers depended on the level of military training of a variable composition and ranged from 4 to 6 months. With the beginning of the war, the training period for tank officers was 6 months, in 1942 - 8 months, from the second half of 1943 - 1 year.

Much attention in the training of tank crews was paid to fire and special training, which took up to 50% of the training time. In the course of performing tactical tasks, 35% of the study time was devoted to night classes. After completing training and putting together tank crews during tactical exercises with live fire, marching companies were sent to the active army or to tank military camps in the Volga Military District.

V initial period During the war, the level of training of tank reserves was negatively affected by poor training and material support, large differences in age and theoretical and practical training of trainees. Improving the quality of training tankers contributed to: practical training on the device of tanks directly in the factory, the participation of soldiers in the assembly of combat vehicles, consistent and differentiated learning, conducting joint tactical exercises and exercises with rifle divisions, increasing the number of motor resources and shells, front-line internships and increasing the proportion of front-line soldiers in the structure of the permanent staff and trainees.

Fourth section "Training of sniper personnel in training units and sniper schools" is devoted to the analysis of the sniper training system deployed in Siberia since the beginning of the war.

The training of soldiers in the art of sniper shooting was widely deployed in the units and formations that were forming on the territory of the Siberian Military District and the ZabVO. It was carried out both in the process of daily combat training and in the course of special events. In all regiments, sniper teams were created from the number of trained snipers, and a competition was organized among the masters of well-aimed fire. Sniper companies of units took part in the district sniper competitions. Warriors were awarded with the badges “For excellent shooting” and “Sniper” for high examples of excellent weapon skills.

In August 1942, the 3rd and 5th separate training rifle brigades were formed in the Siberian Military District to train commanders of sniper squads, excellent riflemen, tank destroyers, machine gunners, machine gunners and mortarmen. In December 1942, the formation of the 15th, 16th and 17th district began in the Siberian Military District, in the Zabfront - the 25th and 26th district schools of sniper training. The dissertation student analyzed the organizational structure of the formed formations and sniper schools. Their high material support is noted - the staff of schools and regiments had combat and training rifles, carbines, anti-tank rifles, light and heavy machine guns, etc. sniper training in the special forces of Vsevobuch and passed the tests for "good" and "excellent". The duration of training in sniper schools was 6 months.

The command of the Siberian Military District and the Zabfront paid great attention to the selection and improvement of the educational and methodological skills of commanders of all degrees. The posts of command and commanding staff of schools were mainly appointed by regular officers, mainly front-line soldiers. The special and methodological knowledge of the commanding staff was improved in the course of educational and methodological gatherings and classes.

In order to form high moral and combat qualities of cadets in sniper schools in Siberia, up to 80% of the study time was allocated to field studies, front-line experience, including school graduates, was introduced into the training process. Army newspapers have repeatedly come out with the initiative to organize a movement of well-aimed firemen. Graduates of sniper schools and training units were appointed to the positions of unit commanders in the field army, as well as in training and reserve rifle units and formations.

Fifth section "Training of flight technical personnel of the Air Force" dedicated to the preparation of aviation reserves. In the second half of July 1941, the formation of the 5th and 20th reserve fighter aviation regiments began in the Siberian Military District, in the ZabVO - the 23rd bomber and 24th fighter reserve aviation regiments.

The spare aviation regiments were manned by flight technical personnel from combat units, reserve aviation schools of the Air Force, graduates of aviation schools and courses, and reserve specialists. In 1942, the 5th Fighter and 9th Reserve Aviation Brigades were formed in the Siberian Military District. Spare aviation units of the Siberian Military District and Zabfront trained marching aviation regiments, single pilots and technical personnel for Pe-2, LAGG-3, Yak-7 aircraft and its modifications. The main task of the 9th Reserve Aviation Brigade was to receive and send to the front aircraft supplied under Lend-Lease.

The training of flight personnel was complicated by the simultaneous development of new types of aircraft with a constant and variable composition, tight retraining periods, slow arrival of new materiel, difficult weather conditions, frequent fuel interruptions, maintenance of operational flights of the Air Force and assistance to aviation plants in fine-tuning and sending aircraft to the front. The timing of the training of aviation regiments was different and was determined by the presence of combat experience among the pilots who arrived, knowledge of new types of aircraft before arriving in the regiment, and the coordination of the work of the flight technical personnel. With the completion of the retraining program, the aviation regiments received new materiel and departed to the front.

Military innovators and inventors made a great contribution to the successful solution of the tasks facing the regiments. Thanks to their tireless work, visual tutorials out of service units, equipped training classes, motor resources and fuel were saved, training aircraft were improved.

In order to quickly master the new aviation technology used various forms and methods of educational work: exchange of combat experience with pilots arriving from the front of regiments; technical conferences with the participation of aircraft designers. The improvement of the quality of training of aviation personnel was facilitated by the front-line training of command and instructors, etc.

In the second chapter "Training of officers in military schools and colleges" analyzes the structure and effectiveness of the system of training command personnel in the Siberian Military District and the Zabfront on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War, the main problems and difficulties faced by the command of military districts, military units and institutions in solving the problems of training and retraining of command personnel are shown.

The first section of this chapter "Organization of the system of training command personnel on the eve and in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War" examines the main features of the activities of military educational institutions on the eve and with the outbreak of war.

Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. includes the following aspects: the degree of provision of the army with clothing, the transformation of the structure of supply institutions in the period from 1935 to 1941 and the organization of their activities for this period. The changes in the structure made following the results of the local military conflicts of 1938-1940 seem to be significant. The relevance of the study of the organization of clothing supply for the Red Army in the period 1935-1941. determined by the increasing attention to the pre-war situation in the Soviet Union. According to the definition proposed by the author of the article, the organization of clothing supply implies an orientation towards positive result, within the framework of the adopted structure and supply scheme. In 1935, the supply system was reformed.

In pursuance of the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR No. 0145 of August 8, 1935, the Office of the baggage and clothing supply was formed. According to the regulation, the Department of baggage and clothing supply was central authority People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR for providing the Red Army with all types of transport and clothing items. The department was headed by the chief and the military commissar. They were entrusted with: the responsibility for drawing up estimates for items of transport and clothing supplies for the Red Army; procurement and provision of the army with a wagon train, including a special one; objects of mechanization of the military-economic rear; harness, saddles, packs; clothing, household items

course; sanitary, household and sports equipment, as well as appropriate repair materials. According to the regulations, the Department of Conveyance and Apparel Supply was also responsible for the management of mobilization work on the Conveyance and Apparel Supply of the Red Army, the accumulation of inviolable stocks of baggage and clothing items, storage, maintenance and refreshment of these stocks, the development of new samples, technical conditions and designs for the items of the designation. -stuff supply.

The mentioned order also approved the troop supply scheme: center - district - front ( war time) - army (wartime) - division - regiment (battalion) - company - Red Army soldier. In the structural units, up to the regiment, inclusive, military-economic supply bodies were created, which had a baggage-clothing supply as part of the department. The management of these bodies was to be carried out from top to bottom, applications for property were presented by the lower echelon of the highest echelon.

It should be noted that the guidelines regarding the change in the structure of supply agencies and the fundamental directions of movement of property were carried out by the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, that is, the Department of Baggage and Clothing Supply had very limited leadership functions. At the same time, it should be noted that there was an overlap of the functions of the Office of Equipment Supply and the General Staff. The General Staff concentrated data on the size of the army, so supply planning had to be carried out jointly. The activities of the Department of Conveyance and Clothing Supply were also dependent on the activities of the Department of Military Communications. In the period 1935-1939. the structure of the supplies and clothing supply agencies has undergone some changes associated with the need to adapt the supply process to existing conditions, as well as with the centralization of certain types of supply. In October 1939, the Office of the Chief of Supplies was formed. By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 0167 of October 23, 1939, a temporary regulation was announced on the Directorate of the Chief of Supply of the Red Army, according to which it was the central body of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, uniting the activities of the relevant directorates for the management of clothing and food supplies, housing

contentment and trade in the Red Army. The management functions of the Office were still limited. However, by the beginning of local military conflicts in 1938-1940. the organization of clothing supply has not yet been established properly. The low staffing level with qualified workers in the baggage and clothing departments of various levels, the lack of continuity of personnel in the governing bodies had a negative effect. The development of the organization of clothing supply was negatively influenced by the unclear distribution of responsibilities for supply planning between the General Staff and the Office of the supply of goods and clothing, which was directly subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Defense.

This circumstance contributed to the actual lack of a mobilization plan and an emergency reserve. In addition, the General Staff was in charge of the Office of Military Communications, which was entrusted with organizing the delivery of property. This circumstance created decentralization in the organization of supply. The implementation process of the adopted clothing supply scheme was slowed down due to poor record keeping. The transition to a new military-administrative division also affected. The lack of storage space, which was observed in 1935, remained until 1938. In addition, the conditions for storing property in warehouses continued to be unsatisfactory. It should be borne in mind that a number of organizational shortcomings also depended on the internal organization of the servicemen themselves, on issues of frivolity of attitude towards accounting and saving property. We must not forget about the positive trends in the development of clothing supply in the period from 1935 to 1938. - on the introduction of new norms and samples of property, the development of documentation necessary for the full implementation of the supply scheme, on the improvement of the training of military representatives at industrial enterprises. Thus, by 1938, the model for organizing clothing supply, adopted in 1935, was at the initial stage of development. In a number of cases, organizational deficiencies were eliminated by issuing appropriate guidance documents based on the results of the audits carried out.

At the beginning of the military conflict on the lake. Hasan revealed a weak preparation of the rear structures, or rather, their complete unpreparedness to support the troops. The military-economic apparatus of the 39th Rifle Corps was represented by the chief of the logistics department and the chief of military-economic supplies. It must be said here that the corps apparatus of the military-economic service did not presuppose the presence of departments: transport and clothing and food, with a large number of staff units. This circumstance made it difficult to organize clothing supplies at a time when one corps was involved in the battle, and the entire burden of organizing supplies fell on the corps apparatus. The supply confusion could not last long. It was necessary to urgently resolve the issue of organizing the rear. On August 5, a meeting was held at which a management scheme was developed. Originality the decision consisted in the fact that the head of the rear department and the head of the military-economic supply of the corps were to work in the army supply department, thereby strengthening its staff7. Thus, information about the security of the formations bypassed the corps link and was transmitted immediately to the army supply department. The decision to unite the leadership of the corps and army rear services was supposed to contribute to the flexibility of the organization of supply.

However, the provision of units remained difficult due to the lack of the necessary amount of transport, as well as poor communications. On August 10, 1939, the corps apparatus changed its place of deployment, which was caused by the need to find out the actual need on the spot due to the distortion of the incoming data. Thus, the merger of the army and corps supply apparatus did not bring the desired results. Having briefly touched upon the issue of organizing the rear during the operation, one should dwell on the problem of providing parts with clothing. At the beginning of the operation, the units were 100% provided with uniforms, while the overcoats of 40% of the Red Army men and commanders were worn out. There was a severe shortage of shoes. In addition, due to a lack of understanding of the scale of the operation, the units left stocks of property in winter apartments.

At first, they were replenished from military warehouses. Starting from August 5-6, applications for replenishing the missing property began to arrive at the army field supply department and the head warehouse of the Posiet pier. There were cases when applications for property expanded in comparison with the actual need, which created additional difficulties and led to an excess of property in some parts at the expense of the needs of others, and interfered with the correct setting of accounting. The head warehouse created in Posiet was united, that is, it provided storage different types property and weapons, the warehouse staff is only 8 people, the workers did not even know the names of some items of uniform and equipment8. At the very least, the part's need for clothing was satisfied before the onset of the rainy season, which further disorganized the rear. The worn-out uniforms began to fail quickly. The command staff was in the worst position compared to the Red Army because the raincoats got wet, and they had to use either the Red Army raincoat-tent or stay wet all the time. G.M. Stern, by telegram to the military council of the 1st Army, requested that the troops be given tarpaulins to cover cargo, boilers, raincoats, uniforms and boots. However, there was no property in the head warehouse, except for sheets. The requests of the units for providing them with clothing began to be satisfied only in September9. The repair of footwear in the troops was carried out manually.

The army's mobile shoe workshop was formed only in mid-August, the repair shops of the formations were not staffed before the conflict, for this reason they were not taken on the campaign. They arrived at the troops only in September. The reason for the late deployment of the workshop in the 40th Infantry Division was the search for units that were found at a field bakery10. At the end of the operation, the leadership of the supply department of the army drew conclusions regarding the organization of the rear. It is said that the front-line strip must have reliable ports prepared in all respects. The planning of work should be centralized, therefore it is necessary to resolve organizational issues between the military communications department of the army and the naval headquarters by appointing a port commandant. It is also said that during the operation, the supply was controlled by the chief of staff of the army through the chief of military communications, in the complete absence of any activity of the head of the logistics department, which contributed to the inadequacy of planning and management of the supply11. It was noted that the home front workers did not know the main statutory provisions12. Military conflict on the river. Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 and the campaign of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Belarus in 1939 did not bring anything fundamentally new to the issues of organizing clothing supply. However, an attempt was made to centralize food, clothing, transport and apartment supplies. In October 1939, as mentioned earlier, the Office of the Chief of Supplies was formed13. During the military conflict on the river. Khalkhin-Gol in 1939, such shortcomings in the equipment supply of the troops were revealed, such as the discrepancy of some samples of uniforms and equipment for the conduct of combat in specific natural conditions, difficulties in washing clothes due to the remoteness of the laundry detachments, the impracticality of the united head warehouses, the difficulty of transportation due to the large stretch rear. There was a proposal to create warehouses for individual or related types of property.

The problem of lack of transportation and communication means remained unresolved. In the initial period of the operation, the rear of the combat area, as well as during the battles on the lake. Hasan 1938, was not prepared. As then, the main means of collecting information on the provision of property remained personal communication between the rear services of the army group and units. "There was not a day when the rear workers of the units were not at the head of the rear department, there was also not a day when any of the workers of the rear department did not visit any part14 ..." It is worth noting the positive moments associated with the establishment of interaction between the rear services. The delivery took place according to a plan developed by the rear services department of the headquarters of the army group together with the head of the military communications department15. We can say that the experience of the operation on the lake was taken into account. Hasan 1938, and the organization of the delivery was, if not established, then at least regulated. In general, the organization of clothing supply during the battles on the river. Khalkhin-Gol in 1939 had a relatively stable character, in the sense that it was not necessary to replenish property damaged by bad weather. In the initial period of the campaign of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Belarus in 1939, there was a shortage of clothing in some parts, while in others there was a surplus. The property was redistributed by orders of the command of the armies in the field. The supply was difficult due to the rapid advance of the troops and the large stretch of the rear. On the positive side, it should be noted the introduction of the head warehouses of convoy and clothing property, one per army. In general, there was a well-developed road network in the conflict area, in contrast to the area of ​​the battles on the lake. Hasan 1938 and b. Hal-

khin-Gol 1939 16. Based on the experience of this military conflict, it was impossible to make serious conclusions about the organization of clothing supply. The soldiers themselves called this campaign a "military walk". However, a general analysis of the work of the rear at the district level was carried out, but did not receive an assessment of the high leadership at the proper level - the outbreak of war with Finland in 1939-1940 prevented. By the beginning of the "winter war" the clothing supply of the Red Army had been established. Its implementation was affected by: a shortage of qualified personnel in the military-economic apparatus, insufficient staffing of supply and clothing departments at all levels, lack of continuity in the staff of governing bodies, excessive bureaucracy, unclear distribution of functions and unclear interaction between the Office of equipment supply and the General Staff. Often complications arose due to the supply of troops not according to the standard, but according to the payroll number - applications for the provision of troops were delayed by the General Staff.

The industry was working to the limit, there was a defect in the products, in addition, it was necessary to work on requests that were received with a great delay. As a result, the industry delayed the implementation of the supply plan. The process of clothing supply was difficult because of the cumbersome forms of accounting, the lack of forms for them. As a result of this circumstance, the accounting documentation was kept carelessly, and sometimes not at all. The transition to a new military-administrative division also affected - the emerging system was not able to provide timely supplies on a different territorial principle for the reasons stated above. There was a lack of storage space. In addition, the organization of storage and accounting of property in warehouses was unsatisfactory. However, the situation in the field of clothing supply could not seriously affect the provision of active armies in the initial period of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. According to the author, the lack of an adequate understanding of the timing of the military campaign, as well as the climatic and relief features of the Karelian-Finnish theater of military operations, affected the command. To fully provide the Red Army for the winter of 1939-1940. as of October 1, 1939, overcoats were missing - 1,120,000, woolen trousers - 419,000, winter helmets - 1,200,000, warm shirts - 717,000, woolen shirts - 383,000, summer shirts - 680,000.

The release of winter uniforms to units according to the plan for 1939 dragged on until January 1940.17 From the above figures it can be seen that the shortage of uniforms in the Red Army as a whole was not catastrophic, but, in the presence of a small amount of emergency supplies, to the Leningrad Military District the necessary reserves of warm clothes from other military districts were not drawn in time. December 1939 was the most difficult month in the supply of troops. Due to the lack of reserves of property, due to the fact that the command did not adequately assess the huge problems associated with the above circumstance, big number frostbite. Compared with the December period from January 1940, the organization of the baggage and clothing supply of all the armies that took part in the military campaign has improved. After reports of frostbite, insulated tents, winter uniforms, felt boots began to be sent to the troops. Camouflage - camouflage coats18 began to be used (Fig. 1, 2).

Based on the documents preserved in the Russian State Archives, it can be concluded that, starting from January 1940, the 7th Army was supplied more efficiently than the 13th Army, due to the better organization of its rear. However, the 13th Army was better provided than the armies of the northern directions, since the stretch of the rear of the latter was enormous. At the same time, there were such units that did not have shoes at all in March, for example, the 60th working company - the boots were worn out, and the boots were not delivered on time19. By January 17, 1940, the 122nd Infantry Division of the 9th Army had practically not received felt boots, gloves, and greatcoats20. Often the sizes for shoes were not followed, and small felt boots were received by the troops, the same can be said about overcoats. The armies of the northern directions until the end of winter remained unsecured with earflaps, there was not enough wadded uniforms. During the hostilities, the percentage of provision of sanitary and economic equipment was very low - robes, aprons, hospital shoes, tents and stretchers. It should be noted that the military units repeatedly requested property according to the norms of peacetime, but it was released according to the norms of wartime and had to be operated until it was completely worn out, in addition, the units were extremely poorly registered.

What was undertaken by the governing bodies to improve the provision of fighters with clothing during the period of hostilities? By directive of the Main Military Council No. 001 of December 9, 1939, the direct command of the troops was entrusted to the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Red Army, headed by I.V. Stalin. In order to unite the actions of the 7th and 13th armies, on the basis of the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR No. 0977 / op dated January 7, 1940, the North-Western Front was created under the command of the 1st rank commander S.K. Timoshenko, whose management was formed on the basis of the management staff of the Leningrad Military District. By order of the Main Military Council No. 1 of January 10, 1940, the post of deputy chief of staff for the rear of the front and a temporary staffing table of the front's baggage and clothing department were introduced.

The deputy chief of staff of the front for rear services was called upon to organize the work of the rear and the supply of property, overseeing its delivery and evacuation. Similar positions were introduced in all active armies in December 1939. By order of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 0897 of January 3, 1940, in order to organize material support and sanitary evacuation of the 8th, 9th, 14th armies, the Office of the Deputy Commander of the Leningrad of the military district for material support and sanitary evacuation of the northern armies under the leadership of the corps commander M.V. Zakharova, directly subordinate to the Headquarters, under the management created a designation and clothing department. Nevertheless, until January 21, that is, until the completion of the formation of the Office of the Deputy Commander of the Forces, the provision of all active armies was entrusted to the Directorate of the North-Western Front.

For the period of hostilities, the following structure of the baggage and clothing service was adopted: the baggage and clothing department of the front; transport and clothing departments of the armies; military-economic supply services for military formations and units; district convoy and clothing warehouse No. 161; head carriage and clothing warehouses; corps and divisional exchange offices; field mechanical workshops for the repair of shoes, harness and saddlery, kitchens, wagon train; brigades of tinkers of field kitchens; laundry squads. V rifle divisions During wartime, a field mobile warehouse for food and baggage-clothing property was introduced - a combined one.

Its functionality was studied, namely, whether warehouse employees can organize work at exchange offices23. In order to provide for the armies of the northern directions, in January 1940 in the city of Vologda, a supply warehouse No. 869 and a base No. 865 at the Volkhovstroy station were created.24 The delivery of property, as a rule, was carried out according to the following scheme. The property was delivered from the district supply warehouse by railroad at the supply station, where it was supposed to be taken into account and transferred to the head warehouses located at the stations. Further, by army transport, it was delivered to corps and divisional exchange points, and from there, by divisional transport, to formations and units. The property entered the warehouses in the absence of invoices, in bulk.

Especially clearly noted problems made themselves felt in the northern directions25. The transport and clothing department of the Leningrad Military District, which for a long time was the organizer of the supply of all active armies, at the beginning of hostilities remained in the states of peacetime. In order to provide the troops as quickly as possible from the personnel of the department, an operational squad was allocated, consisting of four people, which was exclusively engaged in supporting the active armies. Only from February 1, 1940, temporary staffs of the baggage and clothing department of the district (front) were introduced, consisting of 51 people.

During the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. measures were taken to lighten the wearable stocks of the soldier, instructions were given on methods of repair and the number of repair shops for clothing property. At the end of hostilities, a number of proposals were made on the need to change the structures and norms for the supply of clothing. A decision was made to increase the staff of the economic and transport services of military units and army formations, and additional units of vehicles were introduced. Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 provoked a number of changes in the leadership of the rear at the level of central directorates. Beginning on March 1, 1940, the Office of the baggage and clothing supply was divided into two independent departments: the Office of the clothing supply and the Office of the baggage and economic supply28. In July 1940, the Main Quartermaster Directorate was created, replacing the Directorate of the Chief of Supplies.

It is not possible to draw any conclusions about the organization of clothing supplies during the campaign to Bessarabia in 1940, which lasted almost a week. But it is worth noting that in the period from April to August 1941, a reform of the organization of the rear was carried out, largely based on the experience of previous local conflicts... This reform completed the process of centralizing all types of supply. On August 1, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense issued an order, according to which the Main Directorate of Logistics was formed, to which central offices supplies, including the Main Quartermaster Directorate and the Directorate of Military Communications.

Similar structural changes have taken place at the front and army levels. This structure of the organization of the rear, with minor adjustments, remained until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Based on the foregoing, it should be concluded that the pre-war experience of organizing the rear, in particular of clothing supply, was carefully analyzed, which was largely facilitated by the war with Finland in 1939-1940.

M.A. Konevskaya (St. Petersburg)

Larich 29-07-2011 14:11

Question
Many people know that at the beginning of the war, junior officers were trained at an accelerated rate - 3-6 months courses and that's it.
But in my opinion, from 43-44 years old, the previous training was restored for 2-3 years. Although I have heard a lot of stories on this topic.
One of them (according to my fellow traveler, a frontline artillery officer)
He was drafted as a soldier, then immediately sent to a school, where he studied for about a year, graduated, and then the war soon ended, and he was not allowed to demobilize - he was called up as a soldier and serve the same amount. He served until the age of 53 or 54. It seems that senior officers were demobilized at that time, but the younger ones were not released.
And immediately the second question - if at that time during the service a soldier became an officer, how long did he serve as a soldier or as an officer?

petrp 29-07-2011 17:27

From July 1942 to April 1943, my father served and fought as a private. In August 1944 he graduated from the "Courses for junior lieutenants of the 2nd Ukrainian Front".
This means that at least in 1944 there was parallel training in schools and courses.
After the war, in July 1945, he was certified in a separate officer reserve regiment. The conclusion of the command: "It is advisable to leave in the personnel of the Red Army. Use as a platoon commander."
It follows that not all officers were left in the army. And besides, it seems that in 1954 there was a reduction of the army by 1.5-2 million people.

petrp 29-07-2011 17:54

Service life in the Great Patriotic War is another story. Someone served urgently even before the war, plus the war and after the war, demobilization did not immediately begin. So, there were privates and sergeants who generally had to serve up to 7 - 8 years.

datchanin 29-07-2011 18:59

I have heard more than once about those who were drafted in 1939, fought in Finland and then throughout the Great Patriotic War. Perhaps there were those who also fought as private soldiers in Mongolia, and then throughout the Second World War.

spy der 29-07-2011 19:51

quote: Originally posted by petrp:

Service life in the Great Patriotic War is another story. Someone served urgently even before the war, plus the war and after the war, demobilization did not immediately begin. So, there were privates and sergeants who generally had to serve up to 7 - 8 years.

Precisely, the grandfather of the 40th year of conscription, was demobilized in the 49th petty officer.

SanSanish 29-07-2011 21:02

quote: Originally posted by petrp:

So, there were privates and sergeants who generally had to serve up to 7 - 8 years.

And not only the pre-war draft. My grandfather left to partisan at the age of 16, at the 44th after the liberation of Belarus he was drafted into the fleet, sent to Leningrad. He served on the cruiser Kirov for another 8 years. Why didn't they demobilize before, I don't know, I didn't ask because of my childhood. I remember from my grandmother's stories that they did not let me go home for a very long time.

VladiT 30-07-2011 12:07

quote: And immediately the second question - if at that time during the service a soldier became an officer, then how long did he serve, as a soldier or as an officer?

Good answers to these questions are in the recordings of conversations with veterans on this site-
http://www.iremember.ru/
Unlike the propaganda campaigns of the early perestroika - in general, there is no impression that everyone was sent unprepared and not taught.

Which is logical. No matter how you say "halva" in the sense that "the regime is bloody and merciless" - nevertheless, then both the regime and the performers needed a RESULT, not a party (as it is today).

And for the result, untrained meat gives nothing. Anyone who loves to "fight with meat" simply will not complete the task and will be shot for it by Mehlis or other "smersh" - that's all.

Once Isaev seems to have successfully asked a good question, "How much meat should you put on a tank to make it stop?"

Rosencrantz 30-07-2011 12:08

quote: Perhaps there were those who also fought as private soldiers in Mongolia, and then throughout the Second World War.

Yes they were.
My grandfather Vasily Semyonovich served in Mongolia, cavalry.
In the 41st he was sent for retraining, after which in the 42nd he fell under Stalingrad as a junior lieutenant of artillery. The war ended in the town of Wittstock in the Brandenburg land as the commander of a 45-mm anti-tank gunnery battery. Demobilized in October 1945

The second grandfather, Ivan Vasilievich, served as an aviation mechanic. He said that due to a lack of specialists, the service life was constantly added - and it lasted from 1937 to the beginning of the Second World War. Demobilized, or rather went into exile in August 1945. Staff Sergeant.

datchanin 30-07-2011 01:16

quote: Originally posted by Rosencrantz:
The second grandfather, Ivan Vasilievich, served as an aviation mechanic. He said that due to the lack of specialists, the service life was constantly being added - and it lasted from 1937 to the beginning of the Second World War. Demobilized, or rather went into exile in August 1945. Staff Sergeant.

And what kind of "interesting" demobilization is this ??? Nationality did not please ????

nicols 30-07-2011 02:24

much depends on VUS.

political officers were prepared quickly (he closed his mouth - workplace removed), not very specialists (infantry is a separate topic). political officers reclined quickly, specialists - not very much.

the war did not go to the length of service, even without taking into account the ranks. remember how many more urgent orders served on the tsar's battleships

By the way, for example: ordinary soldiers of the assault battalions (after the 42nd) were trained for at least 3 months.

Rosencrantz 30-07-2011 06:11

quote: And what kind of "interesting" demobilization is this ??? Nationality did not please ????

The origin is class alien))
Popovich.
They made jokes in the arrangement, he, apparently alone, did not report, or rather did not report about it - a fairly common story, as knowledgeable people explained to me right there on the Hansa.
The punishment, however, was also nonsense - he lived for two years in the city of Osh in the Tajik SSR, his grandmother followed him there as the wife of a Decembrist, two children were born during this time, including my father.
The link went for the future, I must say. It is characteristic that the grandfather considered snitching disgusting, but he constantly, literally every day, drummed into his children, and then to his grandchildren, not to talk too much, to watch your language and not to mess with balabolians.

VladiT 30-07-2011 11:27

Discussion Isaev-Buntmann radio Echo of Moscow on the preparation of the armies of the USSR-Germany and losses-

"... A. ISAEV - As for military training. Naturally, training in the Red Army was quite long. If we talk about, for example, how the reserve armies that entered the battle at Stalingrad, they had training, duration: they say, not yesterday they pulled out from behind a school desk or were torn off from the machine and thrown into battle. The average training time was about three months. And three months people were taught. But at the same time it was necessary to give some elementary , there, the simplest "subordination", "to the right", "to the left", etc., at least some general cohesiveness of the unit, and this was not enough. Because the army could not give a person in three months: from four grades of education to give ten grades of education. This is objectively impossible. The Germans could pass, there, the same three-month course and act better.

S. BUNTMAN - Ie. based on completely different.

A. ISAEV - Yes, again, we take 1945. Germans: I am quoting history German division"Frunsberg", I am not a Soviet document. People on the way out of the cinema were caught and after a few days they were going to advance into Operation Solstice. This is February 1945. Well, of course, the people who were caught at the cinema, they had a different level of education, and it was easier for them to give some algorithms. Although what the Germans had in 1945 was a real nightmare, this is what they usually tell about us in 1941, about one rifle in five. Here is one rifle for five: I have not yet found a single unit of the Red Army - there, a division - in which there would be one rifle for five. And I can name such a German division right off the bat.

S. BUNTMAN - Well, maybe:

A. ISAEV - Yes, but nevertheless, it is a fact. Those. there is documentary evidence that "Friedrich Ludwig Young", a division named such, in April 1945 had one rifle for three ... "
http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/netak/514463-echo/

petrp 30-07-2011 13:24

quote: Unlike the propaganda campaigns of the early perestroika times, in general, there is no impression that everyone was sent unprepared and not taught.

Father fought in the Airborne Forces. Preparation before sending to the front was about 5 months. Including parachute jumping.

quote: And for the result, untrained meat gives nothing. Anyone who loves to "fight with meat" simply will not complete the task and will be shot for it by Mehlis or other "smersh" - that's all.

There have been such things. My father recalled that they had one regiment commander was arrested and then shot for heavy losses.

spy der 30-07-2011 14:12

VladiT, not for the sake of self-interest ... but please do not quote Isaev anymore ...

VladiT 30-07-2011 15:03

quote: Originally posted by spy der:
VladiT, not for self-interest ... but please don't quote Isaev anymore ...

Why on earth and why?

1

World wars, involving many countries in their orbit, occupy a special place in the history of mankind. In such historical periods, the military-political leadership of the belligerent states, along with others, was faced with an extremely acute problem of increasing the scale of recruiting professionally trained personnel in various officer positions. This was due to the need to strengthen the combat power of the armed forces by significantly increasing their the total, as well as the need to compensate for large casualties as a result of hostilities. The Great Patriotic War was also a comprehensive test of the Soviet state and top military leadership for the ability to organize the training and rational placement of command personnel in extreme conditions. The results of the war showed that this harsh examination was passed with flying colors. The relevance of the article is due to the need to generalize historical experience, which can be used, knowing how the training of officers in the Soviet Union was carried out in different periods and in different conditions.

accelerated preparation

field practical training

way of replenishing troops

young officers

military educational institution

1. Military personnel Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Moscow: 1963 .-- 96 p.

2. Sviridov V.A. Pedagogy. Training of officers in wartime conditions. Voronezh: VAIU, 2011 .-- 62 p.

3. Kamenev A. I. History of officer training in the USSR / A. I. Kamenev - Novosibirsk: NVVPU, 1991.

4. Zharsky A. P., Khokhlov V. S. State policy on the training of officers and manning them signal troops during the Great Patriotic War / Zharsky A. P., Khokhlov V. S. // Power. - 2010 - February.

5. Memory of the bygone century / Collection dedicated to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War Soviet people against fascist Germany(1941-1945): Sat. articles in two editions. Issue I. 1st ed., - M .: VNO KC VS RF im. M. V. Frunze, 2002.

6. Soviet military encyclopedia. M., 1980.T.8. - 627 p.

After October revolution 1917 the old system of the Russian military school was broken, and a new one was created in difficult post-war conditions, characterized by a huge shortage of trained command and teaching staff, elementary illiteracy of the majority of the country's population. At the same time, the leadership of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic(from 12/30/1922 - the Soviet Union), surrounded for the most part by hostile states, clearly understood the need to train new command cadres from among the working class and the peasantry.

Taking into account the country's capabilities in the interwar period, a new fairly stable structure of the military school of the Soviet Union, which differs from the old Russian by a more pragmatic approach to military education, took shape by the end of the 1930s. It included secondary military schools (with training for 2 years) and military academies (3-4 years of training). For example, what was training in secondary military schools (basic military schools, directly carrying out the training of command personnel), shows an approximate list of subjects studied by future officers in military armor tank schools The Red Army before the Great Patriotic War (Table 1).

Table 1

Calculation of hours in subjects of study in the schools of the Red Army on the eve of the war

Name of items	Number of hours
1. Combined arms training
Socio-economic cycle
Tactical training
Fire training
Military topography
Military engineering
Military chemistry
Drill
Physical training
The statutes of the Red Army
Military jurisprudence
Military sanitary training
Foreign language
2. Special training
Material part
Parks and Operations Service
Driving
Combat Education Service
Radio engineering and other means of communication
Electrical engineering
Technical drawing
Technical mechanics
Total for the training period

With the outbreak of World War II, military schools were transferred to accelerated learning officer cadres. For example, armored schools trained officers in two main programs: 6 months - training for commanders; 8 months - training of military technicians.

Table 2 shows the calculation of hours in subjects of study in wartime schools in the period from June 1941 to May 1942.

table 2

Calculation of hours in subjects of study in military schools

	Name of items	Quantity
	Political literacy
	Tactical training
	Fire training
	Military topography
	Military chemical training
	Military engineering training
	Charters and war economy
	Drill
	Physical training
	Communication training
	Technical training
	Driving
Total for the training period

An analysis of reports from tank units of the active army during the first year of the war showed that officers who graduated from schools with 6 and 8 months of training did not meet the requirements of the troops, and the military educational institutions themselves had a number of significant shortcomings:

1) the commanders who came from the district military commissariats to staff the schools had absolutely no military training;

2) in 6- and 8-month training programs, a lot of time was devoted to theoretical issues;

3) teaching was carried out by methods of peacetime, where most of the lessons were carried out in classrooms, and field practical training was not the main method of teaching;

4) the command and political staff did not understand the main tasks of training personnel in the shortened training period in wartime and perceived it as a simple postponement of training and a reduction in hours in subjects;

5) the deployment of schools required an increase teaching staff... In addition, part of the teaching staff was sent to teach in the army, and young officers who had just graduated from schools and did not have experience in training cadets entered the school, which affected the quality of training of future officers.

The main reason for these shortcomings, it was noted in the reports, “... is a weak and far from meeting the requirements of today combat training, military discipline and educational work among the cadets. Instead of practical training in action with a material part and weapons, lecture, story, conversation prevail in schools.

The senior staff of the schools have not yet understood the basic requirements for training command personnel in a shorter period of study and do not teach cadets with practical skills and techniques.

Moreover, some of the bosses and teaching staff, possessing good theoretical knowledge, themselves have weak practical skills, so they cannot properly teach cadets. "

The noted training shortcomings led to the fact that the commanders released from the school, having received theoretical knowledge, had weak practical skills in working on equipment, did not have enough skills in managing units, acted in a field situation without initiative, ineptly, uncertainly and extremely slowly. This caused completely unnecessary heavy losses in tanks and men in battle. In this regard, in May 1942, the programs of military schools were revised taking into account the requirements of the front. Instructions were given to switch to practical methods training and increasing the training period to 8 months for commanders and up to 9 months for tank troops. The list of subjects of instruction in armored schools of wartime since May 1942 is presented in Table 3.

Table 3

Calculation of hours in subjects of study in tank schools that train military technicians in 1942

Name of items	Number of hours
		August 1942
Political preparation
Combined arms training
Tactical training
Military topography
Military engineering training
Military chemical training
Drill
Physical training
The statutes of the Red Army
Military sanitary training
Fire training
Radio communication
Technical training
The material part of combat and vehicles
Maintenance service
Recovery and repair service
Driving
Fuels and lubricants
Electrical engineering

At the same time, the report on the results of the work of military educational institutions of armored and motorcycle infantry troops For the Red Army in 1942, it was noted: “... in many of our units there is a situation where the losses of tanks in battles were insignificant. At the same time, a significant number of tanks did not take part in battles due to the low technical training... For example, the Kharkov School sent graduates to 19 training tank regiments, and during the inspection it turned out that the graduates did not know how to prepare a tank for battle (refuel, oil, water, adjust the chassis, etc.), drive a tank; as it turned out, the lieutenants drove the tank for only 10-15 minutes, the military technicians for 1-2 hours. "

At the same time, it should be noted that the system of training officers in the Red Army began to take shape long before the Great Patriotic War. The most active measures in this area began to be carried out since 1932. The Red Army completely goes over to personnel system picking. By 1939, the strength of the Armed Forces had quadrupled. The creation of combined arms armies began. However, their intensive deployment was not provided with officer cadres. The capacity of the schools remained the same. The main way of replenishing the troops was conscription from the reserve. For six years (from 1932 to 1938) 49 113 people were called up from the reserve. But this was clearly not enough. As of January 1, 1938, the shortage was 100 thousand people.

Heightened attention in the pre-war period was given to increasing specific gravity aviation, armored forces, as well as special forces (chemical, engineering, communications, etc.). Naturally, the main effort was spent on training officers for these troops.

Meanwhile, the rifle troops experienced a particularly acute shortage of officer cadres. The number of infantry schools did not increase, but decreased. This led to a deficit in the reserve of the command personnel of the rifle troops. Taking this into account, the People's Commissariat of Defense took measures to cover the shortage. The issue was resolved by reducing officer posts in the army, promoting junior commanders to them (after completing accelerated courses), increasing the release of officers from regular schools and schools, conscription after retraining of reserve commanders.

Since January 1941, it has been installed new system training and retraining of reserve officers. She was guided not by the network of courses and training camps at military educational institutions, but by commanding classes directly in the units. The previously existing courses (65 in total) were mostly disbanded, and the remaining (13) were reorganized. The latter were entrusted with the task of training battalion commanders and assistants to the chief of staff of the regiment.

We believe that it was clearly impossible to train command personnel in such a short time, therefore the quality of training of command personnel remained low. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, almost 70% of the commanding officers had 1 to 6 months of experience in their positions. About 50% of battalion commanders and 68% of company and platoon commanders were graduates of 6-month courses. And only a few regimental echelon commanders had practical experience in the conduct of hostilities (Spain, Khalkhin Gol, Lake Khasan, the Soviet-Finnish war).

The first days of the war required further improvement of the officer replenishment system. This is explained by irrecoverable losses officers, especially in the initial period, were very significant. They numbered over 2 million people, including 5806 regiment commanders and chiefs of staff, 21 thousand battalion commanders, almost 125 thousand company (battery) commanders, 434 510 platoon commanders. Not only great losses on the fronts, but also the need to staff the newly created formations and formations required numerous personnel. So, in the first six months of the war, 286 divisions were formed, a large number individual brigades, regiments and battalions (ski only - about 250). And the reserves of officers trained in peacetime were practically exhausted. In total, 750,336 people were drafted during this period. The reserve remained 165,615 officers, of which 60 thousand worked in national economy(reservation), and 43,777 were women from the medical staff with young children. Thus, in fact, only 61,838 reserve officers could be drafted into the army. In addition, due to the aggravation of the situation, the large losses of officer cadres in battles, the need for command personnel was not limited to the needs of the front. Officers were also needed to organize the training of combat reserves, train cadets in military educational institutions (their network then expanded significantly), and organize general military training for pre-conscription youth.

At the same time, one cannot but emphasize the positive sides the officer training system that operated in wartime. Each military educational institution trained narrow-profile officers, taking into account the combat experience accumulated by troops at the front. First of all, soldiers and sergeants who had distinguished themselves in combat were sent to courses in schools.

Since 1943 the number of the officer corps ground forces becomes more stable. The difficulties of the initial and first periods of the war were overcome. At the same time, the officer training system required further improvement in accordance with new tasks. The growth of combat skill significantly contributed to the reduction of losses among officers. Losses in 1943 were: killed - 175.6 thousand people, missing - 43.4 thousand, wounded - 360 thousand (of which 200 thousand - officers of the ground forces). The loss of command personnel in 1943 decreased in comparison with 1942 by almost 1.5 times. In 1944-1945. there was a further decrease in losses by a factor of two or more. Of course, these losses were considerable, but compared to the first period of the war, they were much smaller.

Despite the fact that during the war the problem of replenishing the losses of the active army and creating a certain reserve as a whole was successfully solved, it was fraught with certain difficulties. They might not have been if the Soviet command had succeeded in foreseeing the nature of the war in advance and in peacetime taking measures to accumulate a proper mobilization reserve of officer cadres.

Reviewers:

Lazukin VF, Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Professor, Professor of the Department of Engineering and Aerodrome Support of the Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Air Force "Air Force Academy named after Professor N.Ye. Zhukovsky and Yu.A. Gagarin ", Voronezh;

Beloshitskiy A.V., Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Center for Organization of Scientific Work and Training of Scientific and Pedagogical Personnel, Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Air Force "Air Force Academy named after Professor N.Ye. Zhukovsky and Yu.A. Gagarin ", Voronezh.

Bibliographic reference

Sviridov V.A., Popov A.V. IMPROVING THE TRAINING OF OFFICERS IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR // Contemporary problems science and education. - 2015. - No. 3 .;
URL: http://science-education.ru/ru/article/view?id=19763 (date of access: 21.04.2019). We bring to your attention the journals published by the "Academy of Natural Sciences"

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, in general, the existing system of training aviation personnel was preserved. At the same time, due to the occupation of a part of the country's territory by the enemy, the Air Force universities were relocated from the western regions to the eastern regions, some of them were merged with other universities. In addition, some of the schools were disbanded and transferred to the formation of reserve air regiments and air regiments armed with Po-2 aircraft (fighter pilot schools - 2, bomber pilots - 3, primary education schools - 15). In total, 6 schools for fighter pilots, 11 schools for bomber pilots, 15 schools for initial training, 3 schools for shooters-bombers were disbanded, transferred to manning reserve aviation regiments and merged with other schools.
With the outbreak of the war, advanced training courses for technical officers were also disbanded, officers were assigned to combat units. Technical universities were completely transferred to the training of aircraft mechanics. In addition, after 1.5 months of the war, by the directive of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of 08/05/1941, it was decided to expand the staff of the existing schools of aircraft mechanics by 10,000 people and additionally form 15 new schools of aircraft mechanics by 01/01/1942 with a staffing of 25,000 human.
Expansion of the staff of the existing schools was carried out, the number of variable composition in technical universities increased to 33,450 people
and the need for new schools disappeared, so 15 new schools of aircraft mechanics, without completing the formation process, were disbanded by the decision of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR by the end of December 1941.
Changes took place in the training of personnel and in the academies. In VA KShS VVS KA (now VUNTS VVS "VVA named after prof. NE Zhukovsky and YA Gagarin") with the beginning of the war, senior students were released ahead of schedule and sent to the active army. Some of the permanent officers were also sent to the front. On the basis of the academic training aviation regiment, two bomber and two fighter squadrons were formed. Within one month, more than 750 people were sent to the front, of which 620 were listeners.
By August 1941, the academy was relocated to the city of Chkalov (Orenburg) and began training students for reduced programs. The term of study at the main faculties was set up to 1 year, for advanced courses - up to 4 months.
The training regiment of the VA KShS of the Air Force KA has become one of the centers for retraining the flight personnel. Only for the period from July 1 to December 30, 1941 did it retrain
525 pilots of all types of aviation.
In order to ensure the accelerated training of engineers for aviation units, the Air Force Engineering Academy began to be staffed with senior students of civilian higher educational institutions. All educational work the academy was rebuilt in accordance with the tasks of wartime. Already in July 1941, the academy produced two graduates of students, giving the front more than 500 engineers.
In total, during the second half of 1941, as the enemy advanced into the depths of our territory, 38 aviation schools were relocated from the western front-line areas, including 12 fighter schools; bomber - 10; initial training - 10; shooters-bombardiers - 6. A total of 800 days were spent on this relocation.