1921, end of bloody civil war... The armies of the White Guards and interventionists are almost completely defeated, the young Soviet state workers and peasants are gradually strengthening and recovering from the agrarian legacy of the tsarist power and military devastation. But the country is not abandoned by the internal contradictions kindled by counter-revolutionary forces. And one of the most often remembered results of such contradictions that occurred during the period of the establishment of Soviet power throughout Russia is the counter-revolutionary Kronstadt mutiny in March 1921.

To begin with, consider the main reasons and nature of the rebellion that occurred. In the bourgeois milieu of the Kronstadt, it is customary to present it as a kind of hero of the struggle against the "dictatorship of the Bolsheviks," and from the handouts of the bourgeoisie, this heroic halo of sailors of the Baltic Fleet is also picked up by all sorts of "left" anti-Soviet movements, in particular, anarchists, presenting it as almost a new revolution carrying anti-state character. But what was the reality?

With the outbreak of the civil war, the workers 'and peasants' government was forced to switch to an emergency policy of the so-called "war communism", part of which was the surplus appropriation system that took place in the villages. Initially, the peasantry tolerated this, accepting it as a temporary evil, but as the Civil War dragged on for three long years, the contradictions between the city and the petty-bourgeois village, the contradictions between (in this case) the consumer-workers and the producers-peasants grew more and more, which led to the emergence of all kinds of peasant bandit formations of a counter-revolutionary nature: the Makhnovist gangs, "green rebels" and others. This was not a struggle "for", but a struggle exclusively "against" the proletarian dictatorship. Enraged petty possessiveness, dissatisfied with the expropriation of its property for the needs of wartime, attacked the Workers 'and Peasants' government as the source of all ills in their minds, disguising its openly counter-revolutionary essence under beautiful slogans. And one could still justify the uprising by the famine that followed the surplus appropriation, but breaking these unfounded speculations, we will quote L.D. Trotsky, who left a note on this issue:

Demoralization based on hunger and speculation in general increased terribly towards the end of the civil war. The so-called "bagging" took on the character of a social calamity that threatened to stifle the revolution. It was in Kronstadt, whose garrison did nothing and lived on everything ready, that demoralization reached especially large proportions. When the hungry Peter had a particularly difficult time, the Politburo repeatedly discussed the question of whether to make an "internal loan" from Kronstadt, where there were still old stocks of all kinds of goods. But the delegates of the St. Petersburg workers replied: "You will not get anything good from them. They speculate in cloth, coal, bread. In Kronstadt now every bastard has raised his head."

Such was the real situation, without the corny idealisations in hindsight.

It should be added that in the Baltic Fleet, as "volunteers", those of the Latvian and Estonian sailors who were afraid to go to the front and were going to move to their new bourgeois homelands, Latvia and Estonia, were employed. These elements were fundamentally hostile to the Soviet regime and fully manifested their counter-revolutionary essence during the days of the Kronstadt revolt. Along with this, many thousands of Latvian workers, mainly former farm laborers, displayed unparalleled heroism on all fronts of the civil war. Therefore, neither Latvians nor "Kronstadters" can be painted in the same color. You need to be able to make social and political distinctions.

Thus, During the years of famine, the rebels themselves did not provide assistance to the hungry Peter, and when the accumulated funds seemed to be small, they bristled, demanding that the workers 'and peasants' authorities “disarm and disband the political departments,” thereby generally openly showing their counter-revolutionary essence. And the very slogan of the rebels "power to the Soviets, not to the parties" cannot leave doubts about the true, hostile dictatorship of the proletariat, the essence of the rebellion, since it was difficult not to understand that the elimination of the Bolshevik leadership over the Soviets would very quickly destroy the Soviets themselves. Like the demand for free trade by the rebels, this threatened the basic principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, as a result, the rebellion itself threatened to strangle it in the bud.

So, the reasons and the counter-revolutionary character of the rebellion became clear to us. Not the romantic spirit of the anarchist struggle with the state and not hunger were the reasons for the insurgents' dissatisfaction with the policy of War Communism, but only the threat that the accumulated from them would "flow away."

At the end of February, a wave of strikes and rebellious sentiments swept across Kronstadt, which put the work of factories and factories. Taking decisive action, according to the report of the deputy chairman of the Petrograd provincial Chek Ozolin, mentioned in the negotiations with Petrograd, the Cheka managed to arrest "the entire head of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks." Also, Ozolin informs Yagoda: “In total, up to 300 people were arrested, the remaining 200 are active workers and from the intelligentsia. According to the investigation, the Mensheviks play a prominent role in the events. "... The role of the latter in inciting protest sentiments, in principle, raises no doubts. It is worth emphasizing that during the Civil War, the Mensheviks almost openly advocated the restoration of capitalism, which is why their participation in the Kronstadt rebellion even more gives the latter a pronounced counter-revolutionary shade, regardless of any slogans of the rebels.

Dreadnought "Petropavlovsk"

In the days that followed, the situation grew more and more heated. Fermentation and confusion began in some of the spare shelves, which were still able to calm down. February 28, 1921 A meeting of the battleship commands Sevastopol and Petropavlovsk was held at which the rebels adopted a resolution with demands worthy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks: to hold re-elections of the Soviets without communists, abolish commissars and political departments, grant freedom of activity to all socialist parties and allow free trade. And already on March 1, on the Anchor Square of Kronstadt, a 15,000th rally took place under the slogan "Power to the Soviets, not the parties!" Everyone was expecting the arrival of the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, who arrived across the melted ice of the bay. Dolutsky in "Materials for the Study of the History of the USSR (1921 - 1941)" writes: “The gang greeted Mikhail Ivanovich with applause - I was not afraid, I came. The All-Russian headman knew where he had arrived - yesterday, at a general meeting, the teams of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" adopted a resolution for re-election to the Soviets, but without the Communists, for freedom of trade. The resolution was supported by the command of the second battleship - "Sevastopol" - and the entire garrison of the fortress. And here is Kalinin in the seething Kronstadt. One - without guards, guides, took only his wife! "

But the sailors (who quite recently demanded freedom of speech) did not allow Mikhail Ivanovich to finish, just as they did not give an opportunity to speak out to the Baltic Fleet Commissar Kuzmin, who arrived with a speech at the meeting. "Stop the old songs, give bread!" - shouted the rebels, not allowing Kalinin to continue. Here, however, it should be noted that there was just enough bread for the Kronstadters, the Red Navy ration for the winter of 1921 (the data is given in the same source by Dolutsky) was in a day: 1.5 - 2 pounds of bread (1 pound = 400 g), a quarter pound of meat, a quarter pound of fish, a quarter of cereals, 60 - 80 gr. Sahara. The St. Petersburg worker was content with half the ration, and in Moscow, for the most difficult physical labor, workers received 225 grams per day. bread, 7 gr. meat or fish and 10 gr. sugar, which once again confirms the thesis of the exclusively anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary nature of the rebellion.

Kalinin tried to reason with the crowd: "Your sons will be ashamed of you! They will never forgive you today, this hour when you of your own free will betrayed the working class!"... But the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was no longer listened to. Kalinin left, and on the night of March 1–2, the rebels arrested the leaders of the Kronstadt Soviet and about 600 communists, including the Baltic Fleet Commissioner Kuzmin. The first-class fortress, covering the approaches to Petrograd, was in the hands of the rebels. On March 2, the rebels attempted to start negotiations with the authorities, but the latter's position on what was happening was simple: before any negotiations begin, the rebels must lay down their arms. Without fulfilling these requirements, all parliamentarians sent to the Bolsheviks from the rebels were arrested. On March 3, a defense headquarters was created in the Kronstadt fortress, headed by the former captain Solovyanin. Former General of the Red Army Kozlovsky, Rear Admiral Dmitriev and officer of the General Staff of the tsarist army Arkannikov were appointed military specialists of the headquarters.

The Bolsheviks did not drag on further, and on March 4 the rebels were given an ultimatum demanding that they immediately lay down their arms. On the same day, a meeting of the delegate meeting was held in the fortress, which was attended by 202 people, at which this issue was raised. The decision was made to defend himself. At the suggestion of Petrichenko, the leader of the rebellion (not Kozlovsky at all, as the Bolsheviks believed then and as some sources now mention), the composition of the VRK - the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, created by the rebels on March 2, was increased from 5 to 15 people. The total number of the garrison of the Kronstadt fortress was 26 thousand people, however, not all personnel took part in the counter-revolutionary uprising, in particular, 450 people who refused to join the mutiny were arrested and locked in the hold of the battleship "Petropavlovsk". In addition to them, the party school and part of the communist sailors went ashore in full force with weapons in their hands, there were also defectors (in total, before the start of the assault, more than 400 people left the fortress).

Semanov writes: "At the very first news of the beginning of the Kronstadt armed rebellion, the Party Central Committee and the Soviet government took the most decisive measures to liquidate it as soon as possible."

VI Lenin took an active part in their development and implementation. On March 2, 1921, the Labor and Defense Council of the RSFSR adopted a special resolution in connection with the rebellion. The next day, signed by Lenin, it was published. The decree prescribed:

“1) Outlaw the former General Kozlovsky and his associates.

2) Declare the city of Petrograd and the Petrograd province in a state of siege.

3) Transfer all power in the Petrograd fortified area to the Petrograd Defense Committee.

But it is clear that military operations against the rebels could not be limited to the forces of the Petrograd garrison alone, requiring the transfer of military units from other parts of the country.

“Foreseeing the possibility of inconsistency of actions between the local Petrograd leadership and the army command,” Semanov writes further, “The STO of the RSFSR under the chairmanship of Lenin decided on March 3:“ The Petrograd Defense Committee in the field of all measures and actions related to the elimination of the Socialist-Revolutionary-White Guard armed insurrection is entirely subordinate to The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which exercises its leadership in the prescribed manner. "

So, throughout the entire struggle against the insurgents, the government provided support to the St. Petersburg workers, the Bolsheviks and the Defense Committee of Petrograd. The available military and material forces were thrown to the aid of the defenders of the city from the rebels.

The party also had to make considerable efforts for counter-propaganda measures. The matter was also complicated by the fact that Kronstadt was traditionally considered the “capital” of the Baltic Fleet. And especially the authority of the oldest naval fortress in Russia increased after October, when the bulk of the Baltic Fleet sailors became the vanguard. socialist revolution... And of course, in its propaganda, the rebellious self-styled revolutionary committee tried in every possible way to use this fact, posing as the successor of the revolutionary Baltic sailors, therefore, even before the start of the armed suppression of the rebellion, the party organizations began a large explanatory campaign among the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. Meetings and rallies were held on ships and in military units, veterans of the fleet made appeals to ordinary sailors and soldiers, urging them to change their minds and go over to the side of the workers 'and peasants' Soviet power.

Also, counter-propaganda measures were taken against the sailors involved in the mutiny by accident by the Kronstadt leaders. Semanov writes: “The propaganda materials underscored in every possible way the counter-revolutionary essence of the“ revolutionary committee ”, it was proved that its actual leaders were former officers, camouflaged White Guards. On March 4, the appeal of the Committee of Defense of Petrograd was published “We got through. To the deceived Kronstadters "... It said:

“Now you see where the rascals were leading us. Knocked out. From behind the backs of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks the bared teeth of the former tsarist generals... All these generals Kozlovsky, Burskers, all these scoundrels Petrichenkas and Tukins at the last minute, of course, will run away to the White Guards in Finland. And you, deceived ordinary sailors and Red Army men, where are you going to go? If you are promised that they will feed you in Finland, you are being deceived. Haven't you heard how the former Wrangelites were taken to Constantinople and how they died there in thousands like flies from hunger and disease? The same fate awaits you, if you do not come to your senses immediately ... Whoever surrenders immediately will be forgiven of his guilt. Give up immediately! "

According to the testimony of the same Semanov, in the first days of March, a general mobilization of universal education was carried out. By March 4, there were 1,376 Communists and 572 Komsomol members in units of this kind. The trade unions also did not stand aside, having formed their own detachment of 400 people. So far, these forces were used only for the internal defense of the city, but at the same time they became the reserve of the regular Red Army units surrounding the rebellious Kronstadt. Party, trade union, Komsomol mobilizations, as well as the call for universal education were carried out in an orderly and quick manner, demonstrating the full readiness of the Petrograd communists to repulse the insurgents.

The trade unions also played an important role in mobilizing the working masses of Petrograd. The trade unions, as Pukhov testifies, were a great force: in their ranks there were 269 thousand members in the city and about 37 thousand in the province.

March 4, The Council of Trade Unions made an appeal to the population of the city. "Gold shoulder straps have appeared again at the approaches to Red Petrograd." This is how the council's appeal began, implying General Kozlovsky and other leaders of the rebellion with a "tsarist" past. Further, the appeal reminded of the troubling days of 1919, when the White Guards stood literally under the walls of the city. “What saved Krasny Petrograd from Yudenich? The close unity of the St. Petersburg workers and all honest working people. " The appeal reminded of the decisive events of the civil war, to respond with close rallying to the provocations of anti-Soviet forces.

Armed detachments of Komsomol members were formed in all districts of Petrograd. And the slogan of the Revolutionary Troops: "Not a single communist should stay at home" was fulfilled one hundred percent.

On March 5, 1921, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council No. 28, the 7th Army was restored under the command of Tukhachevsky, who was ordered to prepare an operational plan for the assault and "in shortest time suppress the uprising in Kronstadt. " The assault on the fortress was scheduled for March 8th. It was on this day, after several postponements, that the X Congress of the RCP (b) was to open. But this was not a mere coincidence, but a thoughtful step taken with a certain political calculation.

The tight timeframe for preparing the operation was also due to the fact that the opening of the Gulf of Finland could greatly complicate the assault and capture of the fortress. On March 7, the forces of the 7th Army numbered almost 18 thousand Red Army men: almost 4 thousand fighters in the Northern group, about ten in the South and another 4 thousand in the reserve. The main striking force was the combined division under the command of Dybenko, which included the 32nd, 167th and 187th brigades of the Red Army. At the same time, the advance began to Kronstadt and the 27th Omsk rifle division.

At 18:00 on March 7 the shelling of the Kronstadt forts began with course batteries. At dawn on the 8th, on the opening day of the X Congress of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the soldiers of the Red Army went to the assault on Kronstadt across the ice of the Gulf of Finland. However, it was not possible to take the fortress: the assault was repulsed and the troops returned to their original positions with losses.

An unsuccessful battle, as Voroshilov later recalled, undermined the morale of some parts of the army: "the political and moral state of certain units caused alarm," as a result of which two regiments of the 27th Omsk rifle division (235th Minsk and 237th Nevelsky) refused to participate in battle and were disarmed.

According to the Soviet military encyclopedia, as of March 12, the forces of the rebels numbered 18 thousand soldiers and sailors, more than a hundred guns and over a hundred machine guns, as a result of which the number of troops preparing for the second assault on the fortress was also increased to 24 thousand bayonets. , 159 guns and 433 machine guns, and the units themselves were divided into two operational formations: the southern group, under the command of Sidyakin, advancing from the south, from the Oranienbaum area and the northern, under the leadership of Kazan, advancing on Kronstadt from the north along the ice of the bay, from the coast from Sestroretsk to Cape Lisiy Nos.

The preparation was carried out carefully: a detachment of employees of the Petrograd provincial militia was sent to the active units for reinforcement (of which 182 fighters took part in the assault - employees of the Leningrad Criminal Investigation Department), about 300 delegates of the X Congress of the Party, 1,114 communists and three regiments of cadets from several military schools. Reconnaissance was carried out, white camouflage coats, boards and lattice walkways were prepared to overcome unreliable areas of the ice surface.

Storming the fortress was launched on the night of March 16, 1921, before the start of the battle, the forces of the Red Army managed to quietly occupy Fort No. 7, which turned out to be empty, but Fort No. 6 put up long and fierce resistance. Fort No. 5 surrendered immediately after the start of the artillery shelling, but before the assault group approached it. The garrison itself, it should be noted, did not put up any resistance, the cadets from the assault group were greeted with exclamations "Comrades, do not shoot, we are also for Soviet power", from which we can conclude that not all participants in the mutiny were eager to continue to participate in it.

But the neighboring fort number 4 held out for several hours and during the assault the attackers suffered heavy losses. In the course of heavy fighting, it was also possible to seize forts No. 1 and No. 2, "Milyutin" and "Pavel", however, as Voroshilov later recalled, the "Rif" battery and the "Shanets" battery were abandoned by the defenders before the start of the assault and went to Finland across the ice of the bay. who willingly accepted them.

After capturing all the forts, the Red Army broke into the fortress, where fierce street battles with the rebels began, but by 5 a.m. on March 18, the resistance of the Kronstadters was broken, after which the headquarters of the rebels, located in one of the gun towers of Petropavlovsk, decided to destroy the battleships together with the prisoners who were in the holds and break through to Finland. They ordered to lay several pounds of explosives under the gun turrets, but this order caused outrage. On the Sevastopol, the old sailors disarmed and arrested the rebels, after which they released the communists from the hold and radioed that Soviet power had been restored on the ship. Some time later, after the start of the artillery shelling, Petropavlovsk surrendered, which had already been abandoned by most of the rebels.

On the deck of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" after the suppression of the mutiny. In the foreground is a hole from a large-caliber projectile.

According to the Soviet military encyclopedia, the attackers lost 527 killed and 3285 wounded. During the assault, over a thousand rebels were killed, over 2 thousand were "wounded and captured with weapons in their hands", more than two thousand surrendered, and about eight thousand went to Finland.

The counter-revolutionary revolt in Kronstadt was suppressed. Life in the city was gradually improving, but the casualties were considerable.

The Kronstadt forts, the port and structures of the fortress city, the battleships Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol were damaged. Large material resources were spent. Such is the price for a senseless mutiny, raised by a handful of counter-revolutionaries, who, through demagogy and lies, managed to drag sailors and soldiers, half-starved and tired, along with them. Among the captured rebels were three members of the so-called temporary revolutionary committee. Some of the immediate leaders of the rebellion, who did not have time to escape to Finland, were brought to trial and executed by his verdict.

Life in Petrograd returned to normal rather quickly. Already on March 21, V.I.Lenin sent a telephone message to the Petrograd Soviet about the immediate cancellation of the state of siege in the city, and even earlier Tukhachevsky was recalled to Moscow, and D.N. Avrov again became the commander of the troops of the Petrograd military district. By his order, the Northern and Southern groups of forces were disbanded. On April 10, 1921, the 27th Omsk Rifle Division, which did so much to defeat the rebellion, was transferred to the Zavolzhsky Military District by the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. March 22 in Moscow? Vladimir Ilyich received the delegates of the X Congress, who had returned after the battles near Kronstadt. He told them about the results of the work of the congress, talked with them about the battles with the rebels, and then, at the request of the delegates, took pictures with them.

As for the fate of the rebels who fled to Finland, they were greeted rather coldly. Correspondent " Latest news"In the March 20, 1921 issue, he dispassionately described the following expressive scene:" The Finnish Border Guard disarms sailors and soldiers, first forcing them to return and pick up abandoned machine guns and rifles on the ice. More than 10 thousand guns were picked up. " The leaders of the rebellion were placed in the former Russian fortress Ino, and the rest were assigned to camps near Vyborg and in Terioki. At first, around the leaders of the rebellion, a stir broke out, they were interviewed, they were interested in and, albeit secondary, but figures of the Russian emigration. However, they were soon forgotten, and the responsibility for their existence was placed on the Red Cross.

All this, as precisely as possible, emphasizes the idea of ​​V.I.Lenin that during the period of bitter class struggle there is no and cannot be a third force, it either merges with one of the opposing factions fighting with each other, or it dissipates and perishes.

Lenin himself returned to the lessons of Kronstadt more than once in his notes, and in a letter to the Petrograd workers formulated one of the most important conclusions of the "Kronstadt lesson":

“After the Kronstadt events, the workers and peasants began to understand better than before that any transfer of power in Russia [from the Bolsheviks to the“ non-party ”] would benefit the White Guards; it was not without reason that Miliukov and all the clever leaders of the bourgeoisie welcomed the Kronstadt slogan "Soviets without Bolsheviks."

And he put the final point under this sad story a month later, writing the following:

“The masses of workers and peasants need an immediate improvement in their situation. By putting new forces, including non-party ones, on useful work, we will achieve this. The tax in kind and a number of related measures will help this. We will cut the economic root of the inevitable fluctuations of the small producer by this. And we will fight mercilessly against political vacillations useful only to Milyukov. There are many who hesitate. We're few. The oscillators are disconnected. We are united. The hesitant is economically dependent. The proletariat is economically independent. Those who hesitate do not know what they want: they both want to, and inject, and Milyukov does not order. And we know what we want.

And therefore we will win. "

Literature:

1) Voroshilov KE: From the history of the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, "Military historical journal. 1961. No. 3. S. 15-35.

2) Pukhov A.S .: Kronstadt mutiny in 1921. Civil war in sketches. [L.], 1931, p. 93.

3) Semanov S.N .: Elimination of the anti-Soviet Kronstadt rebellion.

4) Trotsky LD: "The hype around Kronstadt"

95 years ago, Trotsky and Tukhachevsky drowned in blood the uprising of the Baltic sailors who stood up for the St. Petersburg workers

March 18, 1921 has forever entered the history of Russia as a black date. Three and a half years after the proletarian revolution, which proclaimed the main values ​​of the new state of Freedom, Labor, Equality, Brotherhood, the Bolsheviks with cruelty unprecedented under the tsarist regime dealt with one of the first protests of workers for their social rights.

Kronstadt, who dared to demand re-election of the soviets - "in view of the fact that the real soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants" - was drenched in blood. As a result of a punitive expedition led Trotsky and Tukhachevsky, more than a thousand sailors were killed, and 2,103 people were shot without trial by special tribunals. What was the fault of the Kronstadters before their "native Soviet power"?

Hatred of the bored bureaucracy

Not so long ago, all archival materials related to the "case of the Kronstadt mutiny" were declassified. And although most of them were collected by the victorious side, an unbiased researcher will easily understand that protest moods in Kronstadt have exacerbated to a large extent due to the outright lordship and rudeness of the snickering party bureaucracy.

In 1921, the economic situation in the country was dire. The difficulties are understandable - the national economy has been destroyed by the civil war and Western intervention. But the way the Bolsheviks began to fight them, angered most of the workers and peasants, who gave so much for the dream of a welfare state. Instead of "partnership relations", the authorities began to create the so-called Labor armies, which became a new form of militarization and enslavement.

The transfer of workers and employees to the mobilized position was supplemented by the use of the Red Army in the economy, which was forced to participate in the restoration of transport, the extraction of fuel, loading and unloading operations and other activities. The policy of war communism reached its climax in agriculture, when surplus appropriation discouraged the peasant from the minimum desire to grow crops, which will still be taken away completely. Villages died out, cities were emptied.

For example, the population of Petrograd declined from 2.4 million at the end of 1917 to 500 thousand by 1921. The number of workers in industrial enterprises during the same period decreased from 300 thousand to 80 thousand. The phenomenon of labor desertion took on a gigantic scale. The IX Congress of the RCP (b) in April 1920 was even forced to call for the creation of penalty workers' teams from captured deserters or to confine them in concentration camps. But this practice only exacerbated social contradictions. The workers and peasants more and more often had a reason for dissatisfaction: what were they fighting for ?! If in 1917 the worker received 18 rubles a month from the "accursed" tsarist regime, then in 1921 - only 21 kopecks. At the same time, the cost of bread increased several thousand times - up to 2625 rubles per 400 grams by 1921. True, the workers received rations: 400 grams of bread per day for a worker and 50 grams for a representative of the intelligentsia. But in 1921, the number of such lucky ones dropped sharply: in St. Petersburg alone, 93 enterprises were closed, 30 thousand of the 80 thousand available by that time were unemployed, which means that they were doomed to starvation together with their families.

And nearby the new "red bureaucracy" lived well and cheerfully, having come up with special rations and special reports, as modern bureaucrats call it now, bonuses for effective management. The sailors were especially outraged by the behavior of their "proletarian" Commander of the Baltic Fleet Fyodor Raskolnikov(real name Ilyin) and his young wife Larisa Reisner, who became the head of the Baltic Fleet's cultural enlightenment. “We are building a new state. People need us, - she frankly declared. "Our activity is constructive, and therefore it would be hypocrisy to deny ourselves what always goes to people in power."

Poet Vsevolod Rozhdestvensky recalled that when he came to Larisa Reisner at the apartment of the former naval minister Grigorovich, which she occupied, he was amazed at the abundance of objects and utensils - carpets, paintings, exotic fabrics, bronze buddhas, majolica dishes, English books, bottles of French perfume. And the hostess herself was dressed in a robe, sewn with heavy gold thread. The spouses did not deny themselves anything - a car from the imperial garage, a wardrobe from the Mariinsky Theater, a whole staff of servants.

The permissiveness of the authorities especially disturbed the working people and the military. At the end of February 1921, the largest factories and factories of Petrograd went on strike. The workers demanded not only bread and firewood, but also free elections to the Soviets. Demonstrations, by order of the then St. Petersburg leader Zinoviev, were immediately dispersed, but rumors of the events reached Kronstadt. The sailors sent delegates to Petrograd, who were amazed at what they saw - factories and plants were surrounded by troops, activists were arrested.

On February 28, 1921, at a meeting of a battleship brigade in Kronstadt, sailors defended the Petrograd workers. The crews demanded freedom of labor and trade, freedom of speech and press, free elections to the Soviets. Instead of the dictatorship of the communists - democracy, instead of the appointed commissars - court committees. The terror of the Cheka - stop. Let the communists remember who made the revolution, who gave them power. Now it's time to return power to the people.

"Quiet" rebels

To maintain order in Kronstadt and organize the defense of the fortress, the Provisional Revolutionary Committee (VRK) was created, headed by sailor Petrichenko, in addition to which the committee included his deputy Yakovenko, Arkhipov (machine foreman), Tukin (foreman of the electromechanical plant) and Oreshin (head of the labor school).

From the appeal of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee (VRK) of Kronstadt: “Comrades and citizens! Our country is going through a difficult moment. Hunger, cold, economic chaos have been holding us in an iron grip for three years now. The Communist Party, ruling the country, broke away from the masses and was unable to bring it out of the state of general ruin. It did not take into account the unrest that had recently taken place in Petrograd and Moscow and which clearly enough indicated that the party had lost the confidence of the masses of the workers. Neither did it take into account the demands made by the workers. She considers them to be the intrigues of the counter-revolution. She is deeply mistaken. These unrest, these demands are the voice of the entire people, of all working people. "

However, the Military Revolutionary Committee did not go further than this, hoping that the support of "all the people" by itself would solve all the problems. Kronstadt officers joined the uprising and advised to immediately attack Oranienbaum and Petrograd, to capture the Krasnaya Gorka fort and the Sestroretsk region. But neither the members of the Revolutionary Committee, nor the ordinary rebels were going to leave Kronstadt, where they felt safe behind the armor of battleships and concrete forts. Their passive position subsequently led to a quick rout.

"Gift" to the X Congress

At first, the position of Petrograd was almost hopeless. There is unrest in the city. The small garrison is demoralized. There is nothing to storm Kronstadt with. The chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council Lev Trotsky and the "winner of Kolchak" Mikhail Tukhachevsky urgently arrived in Petrograd. For the assault on Kronstadt, they immediately restore the 7th Army, which defeated Yudenich. Its number is brought to 45 thousand people. A well-oiled propaganda machine begins to work in full force.

Tukhachevsky, 1927

On March 3, Petrograd and the province were declared a state of siege. The uprising is declared a conspiracy of the unbeaten tsarist generals. Appointed as the main rebel General Kozlovsky- Chief of artillery of Kronstadt. Hundreds of relatives of the Kronstadters became hostages of the Cheka. From the family of General Kozlovsky alone, 27 people were seized, including his wife, five children, distant relatives and acquaintances. Almost all of them were sentenced to prison terms.

General Kozlovsky

The workers of Petrograd were urgently increased their rations, and the unrest in the city subsided.

On March 5, Mikhail Tukhachevsky was ordered "to suppress the uprising in Kronstadt as soon as possible by the opening of the 10th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)." The 7th Army was reinforced with armored trains and squadrons. Not trusting the local regiments, Trotsky summoned the proven 27th division from Gomel, setting the date of the assault - March 7th.

Exactly on this day, artillery shelling of Kronstadt began, and on March 8, units of the Red Army went on an assault. The advancing Red Army men were driven into the attack by barrage detachments, but they did not help either - meeting the fire of the Kronstadt cannons, the troops turned back. One battalion immediately went over to the side of the rebels. But in the area of ​​the Zavodskaya harbor, a small detachment of Reds managed to break through. They reached the Petrovsky Gate, but were immediately surrounded and taken prisoner. The first Kronstadt assault failed.

Panic broke out among the Partychinush. Hatred for them swept the whole country. The uprising is raging not only in Kronstadt - peasant and Cossack revolts are blowing up the Volga region, Siberia, Ukraine, the North Caucasus. The rebels smash the food detachments, drive out or shoot the hated Bolshevik appointees. Workers are on strike even in Moscow. At this time, Kronstadt became the center of the new Russian revolution.

Bloody assault

On March 8, Lenin made a secret report at the congress on the failure in Kronstadt, calling the rebellion a threat in many ways superior to the actions of both Yudenich and Kornilov put together. The leader offered to send some of the delegates directly to Kronstadt. Of the 1135 people who had gathered for the congress in Moscow, 279 party workers headed by K. Voroshilov and I. Konev left for battle formations on the island of Kotlin. Also, a number of provincial committees of Central Russia sent their delegates and volunteers to Kronstadt.

But in a political sense, the performance of the Kronstadters has already brought important changes. At the 10th Congress, Lenin announced the New Economic Policy - free trade and small-scale private production were allowed, the surplus tax was replaced by a tax in kind, but the Bolsheviks were not going to share power with anyone.

From all over the country, military echelons were drawn to Petrograd. But two regiments of the Omsk rifle division mutinied: "We do not want to fight against our brother sailors!" The Red Army men left their positions and rushed along the highway to Peterhof.

Red cadets from 16 Petrograd military universities were sent to suppress the rebellion. The fugitives were surrounded and forced to lay down their arms. To restore order, special departments in the troops were reinforced with Petrograd Chekists. Special departments of the Southern Group of Forces worked tirelessly - unreliable units were disarmed, hundreds of Red Army soldiers were arrested. On March 14, 1921, another 40 Red Army soldiers were shot in front of the formation to ostracize, on March 15 - another 33. The rest were lined up and made to shout "Give Kronstadt!"

On March 16, the congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ended in Moscow, Tukhachevsky's artillery began artillery preparation. When it finally got dark, the shelling stopped, and at 2 am the infantry, in complete silence, marched in columns across the ice of the bay. Following the first echelon with a consistent interval went the second, then the third, reserve.

The Kronstadt garrison was desperately defending itself - the streets were crossed with barbed wire and barricades. Aimed fire was fired from the attics, and when the chains of the Red Army men came close, machine guns in the basements came to life. Often the rebels launched counter-attacks. By five o'clock in the evening on March 17, the attackers were driven out of the city. And then the last reserve of the assault was thrown through the ice - the cavalry, which hacked the sailors intoxicated with the ghost of victory into cabbage. On March 18, the rebellious fortress fell.

Red troops entered Kronstadt as an enemy city. On the same night, without trial, 400 people were shot, the next morning the revolutionary tribunals began to work. The former Baltic sailor Dybenko became the commandant of the fortress. During his "reign" 2103 people were shot, and six and a half thousand were sent to the camps. For this he received his first military award - the Order of the Red Banner. A few years later, he was shot by the same authorities for ties with Trotsky and Tukhachevsky.

Features of the uprising

In fact, only a part of the sailors raised the revolt; later, the garrisons of several forts and individual inhabitants from the city joined the rebels. There was no unity of sentiment, if the entire garrison supported the rebels, it would be much more difficult to suppress the uprising in the most powerful fortress and more blood would be shed. The sailors of the Revolutionary Committee did not trust the garrisons of the forts, so more than 900 people were sent to Fort Rif, 400 to Totleben and Obruchev each. Commandant of Fort Totleben Georgy Langemak, future chief engineer of the RNII and one of the "fathers" "Katyusha", categorically refused to obey the revolutionary committee, for which he was arrested and sentenced to death.

The insurgents' demands were sheer stupidity and could not be fulfilled in the conditions of the just ended Civil War and Intervention. Let's say the slogan "Soviets without Communists": The Communists made up almost the entire State apparatus, the backbone of the Red Army (400 thousand out of 5.5 million people), the command staff of the Red Army, 66% of the graduates of paint courses from workers and peasants, appropriately processed by communist propaganda. Without this corps of managers, Russia would again plunge into the abyss of a new Civil War and the Intervention of the fragments of the white movement would begin (only in Turkey was the 60-thousandth Russian army of Baron Wrangel stationed, consisting of experienced fighters who had nothing to lose). Along the borders were located young states, Poland, Finland, Estonia, which were not averse to chopping off still light brown earth. They would be supported by Russia's "allies" in the Entente.

Who will take power, who and how will lead the country, where to get food, etc. - it is impossible to find answers in naive and irresponsible resolutions and demands of the rebels.

On the deck of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" after the suppression of the mutiny. In the foreground is a hole from a large-caliber projectile.

The rebels were mediocre commanders, militarily, and did not use all the opportunities for defense (probably, thank God, otherwise much more blood would have been shed). Thus, Major General Kozlovsky, the commander of the Kronstadt artillery, and a number of other military experts immediately suggested that the Revkom attack Red Army units on both sides of the bay, in particular, capture the Krasnaya Gorka fort and the Sestroretsk region. But neither the members of the Revolutionary Committee, nor the ordinary rebels were going to leave Kronstadt, where they felt safe behind the armor of battleships and concrete forts. Their passive position led to a quick defeat.

During the fighting, the powerful artillery of battleships and forts controlled by the rebels was not used at full power and did not inflict any special losses on the Bolsheviks.

The military leadership of the Red Army, Tukhachevsky, also acted unsatisfactorily. If the insurgents were led by experienced commanders, the assault on the Fortress would have failed, and the assault would have washed in blood.

Both sides were not shy about lying. The insurgents published the first issue of Izvestia of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, where the main "news" was said that "There is a general uprising in Petrograd." In fact, in Petrograd, unrest at the factories subsided, some ships stationed in Petrograd, and part of the garrison hesitated and took a neutral position. The overwhelming majority of soldiers and sailors supported the government.

Zinoviev, on the other hand, lied that Whiteguard and British agents had penetrated into Kronstadt, who threw gold to the left and right, and General Kozlovsky raised the revolt.

- The "heroic" leadership of the Kronstadt Revolutionary Committee, headed by Petrichenko, realizing that the jokes were over, at 5 am on March 17 in a car drove across the ice of the bay to Finland. A crowd of ordinary sailors and soldiers rushed after them.

The result was the weakening of the positions of Trotsky-Bronstein: the beginning of a New Economic policy automatic pushed Trotsky's position into the background and completely discredited his plans to militarize the country's economy. March 1921 was a turning point in our history. The restoration of statehood and the economy began, an attempt to plunge Russia into a new Troubles was suppressed.

Rehabilitation

In 1994, all the participants in the Kronstadt uprising were rehabilitated, and a monument was erected to them on the Anchor Square of the fortress city.

	Dictatorship of the RCP (b) Bread Monopoly
	The brutal suppression of the uprising
Opponents
Commanders
Vasily Zheltovsky	I.N.Smirnov
Stepan Danilov	V.I.Shorin
Petr Shevchenko	I. P. Pavlunovsky
Nikolay Bulatov	Vasiliev Makar Vasilievich
Timofey Lidberg
Forces of the parties
About 100,000 people	Parts of rifle divisions Several cavalry regiments Several rifle regiments 4 armored trains Parts for special purposes

West Siberian uprising of 1921-22- the largest anti-Bolshevik armed uprising of peasants, Cossacks, part of the workers and urban intelligentsia in Russia in the early 1920s.

The history of the Civil War is divided by historians into several stages, each of which differs in the composition and motivations of the participants, the scale, intensity of the struggle, as well as accompanying circumstances, political, economic and geographical. The final period of the civil war, which is usually defined from the end of 1920 to 1922, inclusive, is characterized by a sharp increase in the size and role of anti-communist uprisings, the main participants and driving force which were the peasants. One of the most significant of them, in terms of the number of rebels, as well as the scale of the territory covered, is the West Siberian uprising of 1921.

Having erupted at the end of January 1921 in the northeastern region of the Ishim district of the Tyumen province, the uprising in a few weeks covered most of the volosts of Ishim, Yalutorovsky, Tobolsk, Tyumen, Berezovsky and Surgut districts of the Tyumen province, Tarsky, Tyukalinsky, Petropavlovsky and Kokchetavsky provinces Kurgan district of Chelyabinsk province, eastern districts of Kamyshlovsky and Shadrinsky districts of Yekaterinburg province. In addition, it affected five northern volosts of the Turin district of the Tyumen province, and responded with unrest in the Atbasar and Akmola districts of the Omsk province. In the spring of 1921, rebel detachments operated on a vast territory from Obdorsk (now Salekhard) in the north to Karkaralinsk in the south, from Tugulym station in the west to Surgut in the east.

In February 1921, the rebels managed to cut both lines of the Trans-Siberian Railway for three weeks, thereby ending relations between Siberia and the rest of Russia. At various times they captured Petropavlovsk, Tobolsk, Kokchetav, Berezov, Surgut and Karkaralinsk, Obdorsk. There were battles for Ishim, Kurgan, Yalutorovsk.

Researchers and memoirists estimate the number of rebels from thirty to one hundred and fifty thousand. But in any case, their number is at least not inferior to the number of Tambov and Kronstadt rebels.

The forces thrown by the Soviet government to suppress the uprising were also great. The total number of regular units of the Red Army and communist formations exceeds the size of the Soviet field army at that time.

They were supervised by a specially created body, which included prominent figures of the political and military Bolshevik elite - the Pre-Siberian Revolutionary Committee I.N. Smirnov, the assistant head of Siberia V.I. Shorin and plenipotentiary representative of the Cheka for Siberia I.P. Pavlunovsky.

Thus, one can speak of the West Siberian uprising as the largest in a series of anti-communist uprisings of the peasantry. In this regard, it is extremely interesting to consider, using the example of this uprising, the issue of the evolution of relations between the Siberian peasantry during the end of the civil war with the Soviet regime, the motives that moved both sides, how objective was the inevitability of their collision, and what subjective factors had greatest influence on the course of events. This course work is devoted to an attempt to cover these issues.

The historiography of the West Siberian uprising is quite clearly divided into the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. As far as the Soviet period is concerned, within it one can trace some changes in attitudes towards the study of the uprising. In the first years after the civil war, a fairly large number of memories of those appeared. who participated in the events on the side of the Reds. With their understandable subjectivity, in these texts you can glean a lot of interesting, as any eyewitness testimony is interesting, information from which, with a certain critical approach to their assessment, you can, if you wish, build a picture of what is happening. Unfortunately, this picture will have one-sided coverage, since the testimonies of the participants in the uprising themselves have not been preserved. For obvious reasons, none of them left memoirs, and their voices can only be heard from the interrogation protocols of captured insurgents, and this category of documents is very specific and requires a particularly careful and thoughtful approach. In addition, these documents, not as fragments, but in bulk, entered the historical turnover relatively recently, only at the end of the last century, and due to this they are little understood by historians.

The works of Soviet historians, with all their diversity, were united in their desire to interpret the West Siberian uprising as a kulak uprising, prepared and carried out under the leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and former Kolchak officers, the participation of the middle peasants and the poor in the uprising was recognized, but underestimated, and was explained by the fact that the working peasantry was deceived or intimidated by the leaders of the uprising. On the other hand, the policy of the Soviet government was recognized as correct and the only possible in those circumstances, only miscalculations and shortcomings in its practical implementation were noted, the blame for which was entirely placed on local workers. The main attention of Soviet historians was drawn to the purely military aspects of the uprising, which were studied in sufficient detail.

However, even in the post-Soviet period, when many previously closed archives were opened and an opportunity appeared to express one's opinion regardless of the party line, there was no qualitative leap in the study and coverage of the West Siberian uprising. The level of use and the breadth of application of the available materials in general did not change, except that the tendentiousness of some researchers changed its sign, and now all the actions of the Soviet government were painted in black light, and, on the contrary, its opponents were painted with light paint.

A happy exception is the activity of the Omsk researcher Vasily Ivanovich Shishkin. A two-volume collection compiled by him Siberian Vendee (Siberian Vendee. Documents. In 2 volumes. Vol. 1 (1919-1920), Vol. 2 (1920-1921). - M .: MF "Democracy", 2000; 2001. comp. V.I.Shishkin), as well as the collection For Soviets without Communists (For Soviets Without Communists: Peasant Uprising in Tyumen Province. 1921: Collected Documents. - Novosibirsk, 2000. compiled by V.I.Shishkin) in its completeness is not has analogues and to this day are practically the only printed source for those who wish to familiarize themselves with the documents of that time.

I basically tried to rely on these works.

In November of the twentieth year, the ships sailed away from the Crimean berths, carrying the army of General Wrangel into exile. And in Transbaikalia, just two weeks earlier, at the end of October of the twentieth, the troops of the People's Revolutionary Army of the buffer Far Eastern Republic, after several unsuccessful attempts, finally knocked out the famous Chita plug. Abandoned by the Japanese allies, the ataman Semyonov took the remnants of his units to China in order to transfer them along the Chinese Eastern Railway to Primorye, where the line of the last front between the Reds and Whites was established for a long time far south of Khabarovsk, near Iman.

And although hostilities still continued in Transcaucasia and Turkestan, few people now doubted their outcome, the Bolsheviks prevailed everywhere. The bloodless country lived with the feeling of an intimate world. And the harder the trials that fell to its lot seemed. The industry was at a standstill. The transport system was on the verge of extinction. Life in cities, in front of which the ghost of starvation constantly stood, could only be maintained by incredible efforts.

The ruined provinces were shaken by peasant uprisings throughout the twentieth year, to suppress which significant forces of regular troops were rushed. Suffice it to recall that an almost 100,000-strong group was concentrated against the Antonov rebels in the Tambov region, headed by the famous civil war commanders Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Kotovsky and many others.

However, even in the ranks of the Red Army, which mainly consisted of the same peasants, the accumulated fatigue and dissatisfaction with the policy of war communism often erupted in the form of open revolts, such as the speech of an associate of Chapaev, the hero of the defense of Uralsk from the White Cossacks, chief of the Sapozhkov or the uprising of the garrison of the city of Verny (Alma -Ata). And finally, in March of the twenty-first year, the unthinkable happened, the Kronstadt sailors rose, the beauty and pride of the revolution.

Do not forget about the rampant criminal gangs that did not have any political color and, therefore, easily adhered to any movement. However, in fairness, I must say that the line between criminal and political banditry was very thin. And the actions of the parties, no matter what banners they were performing, were often accompanied by robbery and violence against the inhabitants. However, the townsfolk, who became feral and embittered during the war years, often grabbed for weapons, which, despite the strictest orders of all sorts of authorities, a lot went around then.

Western Siberia in 1920

Against this background, Western Siberia was no exception.

After the Tobolsk-Peter and Paul battle, Kolchak's army practically ceased organized resistance, those of its units that retained their combat capability, breaking through the partisan barriers, rapidly retreated to the east, to join the ataman Semyonov, or to the south, to China and Mongolia. On November 14, 1919, the thirty-thousandth garrison of Omsk laid down its arms without a fight. The capital of white Siberia fell.

Due to such a rapid development of events, Western Siberia, with its rich land and prosperous peasantry, did not have to fully experience the horrors and deprivations of front-line confrontation, which, of course, favorably distinguished it from other regions of Russia, through which the fiery wave of fratricidal war rolled. But this circumstance soon played its fatal role.

This role was outlined in a few words by the chairman of the Sibrevkom I.N. Smirnov in the twentieth year: Siberia for Soviet Russia important as a reservoir from which you can draw not only food, but also human material. (Siberian Vendee compiled by V.I.Shishkin)

As for human resources, it’s probably not only about conscription into the Red Army, which, moreover, in the conditions of transition to a peaceful track, partly reorganizing into the so-called labor armies, was on the verge of mass reductions. (note. Labor armies, labor armies - armies of the Red Army after the end of the civil war, aimed at working in the Soviet economy while maintaining military discipline and management system during the attempt to build communism in 1920-1921 ....

By a decree of the Council of Workers 'and Peasants' Defense on January 23, the Reserve Army of the Republic was sent to restore the Moscow-Yekaterinburg railway connection.

2nd Special Railway Labor Army (also known as the Labor Railway Army of the Caucasian Front). Transformed from the 2nd Army of the Caucasian Front by a resolution of the Council of Workers 'and Peasants' Defense on February 27. Petrograd Labor Army. Created from the 7th Army on February 10.

Second Revolutionary Labor Army. Created on April 21 from parts of the 4th Army of the Turkestan Front.

In December 1920, the Donetsk Labor Army began to operate

The Siberian Labor Army was formed in January 1921

Just as the Red Army men, instead of demobilization, already as labor armymen had to participate in the restoration of the destroyed economy, so the civilian population, now I am talking about the peasants, in addition to surrendering the surplus appropriation system, were compulsorily widely involved in carrying out various duties - horse-drawn, logging, road repair, etc. These duties, especially, of course, logging, a heavy burden fell on the inhabitants of the taiga regions, which, it seems to me, was one of the reasons that the uprisings began in them in the twentieth year.

Political, economic and geographical features of the area of ​​the uprising.

Here it is necessary to dwell in some detail on the geography of the West Siberian uprising.

In February - April 1921, insurgent detachments and formations operated in the vast territory of Western Siberia, the Trans-Urals and modern republic Kazakhstan, which included in the administrative-territorial division of that time Tyumen province, Kokchetavsky, Petropavlovsky, Tarsky and Tyukalinsky districts of Omsk province, Kurgan district of Chelyabinsk province, eastern districts of Kamyshlovsky and Shadrinsky districts of Yekaterinburg province. * (For the Soviets without communists without communists. * Tyumen province 1921 Collection of documents Siberian chronograph Novosibirsk 2000) it should be added that the area of ​​the uprising was not limited to this, for example, after the defeat of the main forces of the rebels, the remnants of their detachments reached Obdorsk (present-day Salekhard) in the north and to China in the south. (Mikhail Budarin Were about the Chekists. West Siberian Book Publishing House 1974., II Serebryannikov Great Departure, from Ast 2003)

Thus, it can be seen that the main focus of the uprising fell on densely populated counties with developed agriculture, bounded from the south by the Kazakh steppes, from the south-east - by the foothills of Altai, taiga - from the north and east, and the forest-steppe of the Urals from the west. It was crossed from the west by two branches of the Transsib, converging in Omsk, and the Ob and Irtysh served as the main transport arteries for movement in the meridian direction.

Insurrectionary movement of 1920 in western Siberia.

This situation contributed to the fact that during the Kolchak regime, this area was practically not affected by the partisan movement. The partisans acted actively along its perimeter, in the taiga, in the foothills, where the terrain was more favorable to them, and only with the approach of the Red Army did they leave the taiga to take part in the pursuit of the retreating Kolchakites. This persecution often took the character of the complete extermination of not only white soldiers and officers, but also the refugees accompanying them. The robbery was widespread and was not limited to military depots and refugee convoys; cities were also under threat.

Indicative is the story of the defeat of Kuznetsk, present-day Novokuznetsk, by a detachment of the anarchist Rogov in December 1919, which, according to various sources, claimed the lives of a thousand to two thousand people and has not yet received an unambiguous assessment. (see, for example, the Veche Tver newspaper of May 28, 2009, an article by Igor Mangazeev Perpetuating the hero of a horror novel or a discussion on the forum of Siberian ethnographers

It is still unclear that, in addition to the Rogov detachment, several partisan detachments entered Kuznetsk, and which of them is to blame for what happened. However, it should be noted that there were some facts that were not disputed by anyone, among the partisans there were many who were irreconcilable towards those whom they considered their enemies, and almost anyone could get into the circle of these enemies, and here the reprisal was short-lived. But besides them, there were also enough of those who did not think about anything except robbery. The peasants of the surrounding villages entered the city with the partisans, so as not to lose their share.

So, in one week from 4 to 6 "partisan" detachments visited the city, in addition, the criminals released from prison took an active part in the events in Kuznetsk. Mention are also made of the peasants of the surrounding villages, who rushed to plunder Kuznetsk. And most importantly, the memories of the Kuznechans are simply full of statements that in many cases their own neighbors killed or tried to kill people and that many famous names in Kuznetsk are called. We will not name them, since these charges are too serious to be brought against people based on rumors and gossip recorded decades later. So, according to the recollections of a resident of Kuznetsk, Konovalov: "Our blacksmiths and peasants of the surrounding villages robbed them, under the guerrilla brand." Some of the murderers acted straightforwardly - they entered the house and, having killed the owners, left grabbing something that was in plain sight (but the murderers were recognized by the hidden children or someone from the family), others cowardly fired rifles from the bushes, remaining unrecognized and who was shooting, there were only guesses (but they also thought about the neighbors). The role of a certain Aksenova is known, who drove the "Rogovites", showing them who should be killed and where they can profit well. And I was in town. The city was rich, merchant. It is curious here the recollection of one blacksmith woman, who says that their family was so poor that the Rogovites, demanding oats for the horses, did not take it, seeing such poverty, but immediately adds that all the same then the bandits took from them "the four best (!) horses "

For the theme of my text, these events are interesting in that they shed some light on the mood prevalent among peasants and partisans at the time of the transition of Western Siberia to the rule of the Bolsheviks. There is ample evidence of the spread of these sentiments, as well as the way in which these sentiments poured out. It should be remembered that even before the revolution, the Siberian peasant, especially the immigrant not in the first generation, not very dependent on the state, had a certain economic independence, respectively, and had an independent and enterprising character, which, by the way, played an important role in the fact that the Kolchak regime with her mobilizations was rejected by him.

The absence of landlord ownership, the influx of exiles, the insignificance of the administrative apparatus and its remoteness from the villages scattered far from each other formed the specific features of the psychological make-up of Siberians - rationalism, individualism, independence, self-esteem. V.P. Semyonov Tyan-Shansky in 1895 characterized the inhabitants of the region in the following way: “A visitor from European Russia was immediately pleasantly struck by the freedom and ease in the treatment of Siberian peasants with visiting“ officials ”. The Siberian, without any invitation, sat straight down and, in spite of any bosses, sat with him and talked in the most relaxed way "

Shilovsky M.V. The specifics of the political behavior of various social groups Siberia in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries)

The peasants, for the most part, instead of the white army, preferred to send their sons to the partisans, and rightfully considered themselves the same victors of Kolchak, like the Red Army that came from European Russia.

But back to the Kuznetsk incident, it has another side that is directly related to the issue under discussion.

A few words about what happened to Rogov and his squad. The detachment was disarmed by the red troops, and Rogov himself and several people close to him ended up in the Novonikolaevskaya Cheka (now Novosibirsk), on charges of pogrom Kuznetsk. Rogov's fighters were filtered, someone was shot, someone was sentenced to suspended sentences, someone was mobilized into the Red Army or simply released to all four sides. Rogov, after a brutal investigation, accompanied by beatings, nevertheless, taking into account his partisan merits, was pardoned, obviously, considering it no longer dangerous, and having issued an allowance for the arrangement of the farm, was released. After which he went into the taiga and already in May 1920 either he himself led the uprising of peasants and former partisans of the Chumysh region, or gave him his name, and after a while he died. Similar uprisings and unrest of former partisans, dissatisfied with disarmament, mobilization and the attitude of the new government towards them, were relatively easily suppressed, continued until the beginning of 1921.

But it was not only the former partisans who were worried. Here is what Vladimir Shuldyakov writes about their recent mortal enemies, the Cossacks ("The death of the Siberian Cossack troops"in two volumes: I volume - 1917-1920, II volume - 1920-1922 (M. Tsentrpoligraf, 2004)) Cossacks of the district were the first in the Siberian army to lay weapons in front of it. Omsk Regional Executive Committee E. V. Polyudov believed that the Kokchetav Cossacks, not to mention the peasants, were "very revolutionary"

"... The communists perverted the tasks of the true people's power. They forgot that the welfare ... of the working people is the basis of the people's well-being. They thought more about themselves, about their party discipline, and not about us, farmers ... the true masters of the country. the well-known CHEKA, the inconsistent allotment for the objects of our labor, endless underwater duty, constant fears for an extra spoken word, for an extra piece of bread, a rag, an extra thing - all this our life, already sad, turned into hell, turned us into slaves of random upstarts, boys with a dubious past and present. The inept management of our good overwhelmed the cup of patience, and we ... declared an uprising and drove out the communists ... We are fighting for true people's power, for the inviolability of the person and private property, for freedom words, press, unions, convictions ... We are not supporters of executions, blood ... much has been shed before us ... Down with the communes! Long live the people's power of the Soviets and free labor! "

However, the location of the Cossack villages, stretching in a chain along the southern outskirts of the region, for the time being kept the Cossacks from open resistance. But in the Steppe Altai, in the summer of 1920, she operated on the so-called. People's Insurrectionary Army, the number of soldiers in which reached 15 thousand people.

V.I.Shishkin writes that in the twentieth year in Siberia there were five major uprisings, with a total number of participants up to twenty-five thousand people (V.I.Shishkin Partisan insurrectionary movement in Siberia in the early 1920s.

Among them stands out Kolyvanskoe, by the name of the taiga obskoe village, summer 1920. This is perhaps the only case when, with some degree of certainty, we can talk about the leading role of the Socialist-Revolutionary "Siberian Peasant Union", which, despite the fact that that SKS was then almost entirely arrested, subsequently Soviet historians often credited with a major role in the West Siberian uprising. By the way, another not a frequent case, the former Kolchak officers, whose artel worked near Kolyvan at logging sites, took an active part in this uprising. However, one gets the impression that they had to do this under pressure from the rebels. (Vadim Glukhov Epic of the Kolyvan rebellion).

Some regularity can be deduced from the above. In 1920, a more mobile element prevailed in the anti-communist movement - former partisans, Cossacks, taiga hunters, in localities, as during the reign of Kolchak, located, I repeat, along the perimeter of the area of ​​the future West Siberian uprising. That is, the most densely populated area, the inhabitants of which, due to the fact that they were tightly attached to their farms, as well as due to the geographical factor, because we are talking about the forest-steppe, were not inclined to come into conflict with any government, be it red or whites, trying to remain loyal to her under all circumstances.

It remains to add that, on the one hand, these events served as a prologue to the explosion of the twenty-first year, and on the other, they postponed it, since they diverted the attention and the time of Soviet power to their elimination, so it took almost six months for the peasants of Siberia to fully feel the her heavy hand.

The mood of the peasantry and the policy of the Bolsheviks

What happened during this period of time, from the end of 1919 to the beginning of 1921? Why did the peasants, who greeted the Bolsheviks as liberators, not even a year later, began to rush in thousands at the Red Army machine guns almost with their bare hands?

To understand this, it is worth remembering the words of Pushkin related to the Pugachev uprising, about the senseless and merciless Russian revolt. It seems to me that they should be taken on faith with some proviso, namely - the Russian revolt can be senseless and merciless exactly to the extent that the actions of the authorities that caused it were senseless and merciless, which has repeatedly found its confirmation in Russian history. And more than ever it manifested itself precisely in the events of 1921. When the actions of the Bolsheviks were a vivid expression of another feature of the Russian government, which is that often the low quality of management is compensated by the cruelty of the measures and the totality of their application.

So, let's dwell on the other side of the future confrontation, namely the Bolsheviks, who at the end of 1919 became the sovereign masters of Western Siberia.

Having given the land to the peasants in the seventeenth year, the Bolsheviks received their support, thanks to which they were able to seize and retain power, but they did not manage to stop the destruction of industry, as a result of which a food crisis began rapidly in the country, since the city had nothing to offer the peasants in exchange for bread.

The Bolsheviks found a way out of this situation in the food dictatorship, in the introduction of food appropriation, it was supposed to take the so-called surplus from the peasants, leaving them only the most necessary minimum of food.

It is clear that this could only be enforced by force. Lenin called on the workers to crusade for bread. "Either the class-conscious leaders - the workers ... will force the kulak to submit ... or the bourgeoisie, with the help of the kulaks ... will overthrow Soviet power" (PSS, vol. 36, p. 360). Spontaneously formed food detachments poured into the village, whose activities caused the first wave of peasant uprisings in 1918. The struggle for grain hastened in the summer of 1918 the regrouping of class forces in the countryside. Its essence was that power in the countryside was transferred from the general peasant Soviets to the committees of the poor. Lenin considered it a merit of the RCP (b) that it brought civil war into the countryside "from above", split the peasantry in order to gain support from the poorest peasantry against the rural bourgeoisie (see: PSS, vol. 37, pp. 310, 315, 508 - 09).

The policy of an emergency food dictatorship, pursued by them throughout the civil war, reached its peak by 1920, in the sense that its mechanism, two years after its adoption in 1918, was fine-tuned sufficiently to not fail and was applied with all decisiveness.

the lessons of the peasant uprisings of the second half of 1918 did not pass without leaving a trace. They led to the elimination of the kombedov and the government's refusal to rely solely on the "rural semi-proletariat" - the village remained peasant. The kombeds were merged with the village and volost Soviets and thus increased the influence of the poor, closely associated with the Bolsheviks, in them. At the same time (since January 1919) the element of food procurement by workers' food detachments is being replaced by a unified system of food appropriation carried out on a nationwide scale. industrial goods on the basis of direct (non-commercial) distribution. This was one of the main ideas of the "military-communist" organization of economic life. However, the industry destroyed by many years of war could not meet the needs of the village. The "military-communist policy" in the countryside was immediately reduced to the confiscation of foodstuffs from peasant farms, necessary for the half-starved existence of the army and the urban population, and the remnants of industry. The food appropriation system drew the main line of the split between the urban and rural revolutions. Mobilization for military service, various kinds of obligations (labor, guzhevoy, etc.), attempts to directly transition to socialism on the path of organizing collective land tenure further intensified the confrontation between the peasantry and the government. * (Viktor Danilov Peasant Revolution in Russia, 1902-1922.

From the materials of the conference "Peasants and Power", Moscow-Tambov, 1996, pp. 4-23.)

Thus, all these measures were quite effective, in the sense that the products available from the peasants, despite any resistance, were withdrawn by the food army, organized in the image and likeness of a military unit. But in the long run, they led the case to disaster.

First, Lenin's practice of unleashing a civil war in the countryside, like a torch thrown into a powder magazine, blew up the situation, since the numerous conflicts maturing between various groups of peasants received a strong impetus and often acquired the character of a war of all against all, which, according to most historians, took lives much more than the country lost on the fronts of the civil war.

Secondly, the peasants, in addition to active forms of resistance, resorted to passive ones, namely, they slaughtered livestock and reduced plowed areas. So by the twentieth year, arable land in Russia had decreased by 10-15 percent.

As a result of all this, the phantom of hunger strictly followed the Soviet regime, incarnating in flesh and blood in all the territories it occupied. So in the first half of the twentieth year, all the grain-growing provinces of the Don, the Volga region, the Tambov region and the Ukraine were engulfed in peasant uprisings. Against their background, Western Siberia seemed an oasis, the surplus appropriation system was not applied in it until the middle of the year, and all taxes introduced by the Kolchak government were canceled by the Bolsheviks.

However, by the summer of the twentieth year, having suppressed mainly the actions of the Siberians, which were mentioned above, the new government felt itself sufficiently strengthened and then the fatal decree of the Council of People's Commissars, signed by Lenin, thundered:

№1 DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSORS "ON EXCEPTION OF BREAD EXCESS IN SIBERIA"

The workers, the Red Army and the peasantry of the consuming provinces of Soviet Russia are in need of food. This year's poor harvest in a number of provinces threatens to further worsen the food situation of the working people. At this time in Siberia, there are up to hundreds of millions of poods of grain collected in previous years and lying in hoards and ricks unmilled. The peasantry of Siberia, who endured the Kolchak regime and became convinced by bitter experience that, without taking power into their own hands, the workers and peasants are unable to provide themselves with either land or freedom and once and for all get rid of political and economic oppression, should go to the aid of the starving workers and to the peasants of consuming provinces, to give them what they have a lot and what lies without any use, being exposed to the danger of spoilage and decay.

In view of the foregoing, the Council of People's Commissars, in the name of bringing to a victorious end the hard struggle of the working people with their eternal exploiters and oppressors, decides in the order of a battle order:

1. To oblige the peasantry of Siberia to immediately begin threshing and handing over all free surplus grain of the harvest of previous years with their delivery to railway stations and steamship docks.

Note: the allotment of surplus grain from the harvests of previous years, subject to mandatory delivery, is determined and announced by the People's Commissariat of Food simultaneously with the allotment for surplus grain of the new harvest.

2. Upon presentation of the appropriation system, oblige the volost and village councils, the revolutionary committees to immediately involve the entire population in the threshing and delivery of grain; if necessary, the population is involved in threshing in the form of labor service.

3. Declare all local authorities, from volost and village councils, revolutionary committees, and ending with the Sibrevkom, responsible for the threshing and implementation of the appropriation system.

4. Those guilty of evading threshing and surrendering the surplus of citizens, as well as all responsible representatives of the authorities who have committed this evasion, shall be punished with confiscation of property and imprisonment in concentration camps as traitors to the cause of the workers 'and peasants' revolution.

5. In order to facilitate the threshing of low-powered farms and families of the Red Army: a) oblige the military production bureau of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, with the assistance of the Chief Commander of Labor, to attract and send food detachments of 6,000 workers for production work in Siberia, moreover central office supply undertakes to give out 6,000 complete sets of uniforms and warm clothing for such uniforms; b) oblige the People's Commissar to mobilize and send at the disposal of Siberian food agencies up to 20,000 people, organized in harvest squads, starving peasants and workers of European Russia, to work during the autumn and winter with the admission of 20% women to the squads.

6. The People's Commissariat of Education, together with the People's Commissariat of Labor, to develop instructions on harvesting detachments.

7. In order to ensure the complete threshing and delivery of grain surpluses, the chief of the VOKhR troops is obliged to urgently fulfill the demand for armed force for Siberia (in the amount of 9,000 bayonets and 300 sabers) presented by the People's Commissariat of Defense (in the amount of 9,000 bayonets and 300 sabers), and the detachments must be uniform and fully equipped and submitted no later than August 1 of this year.

8. The deadline for threshing and delivery of all surplus from the harvests of previous years is January 1, 1921.<...>

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V. Ulyanov (Lenin)

Business Manager V. Bonch-Bruevich

The allocation of grain forage for the 1920/1921 food year in the RSFSR as a whole, as well as for most regions and provinces, was announced by a decree of the People's Commissariat for Food of July 26, 1920. Of the 440 million poods that were to be alienated in favor of the state, 1O million fell on Siberia (without the Tyumen province) , 17 million - to the Chelyabinsk province, 1 million - to Yekaterinburg. The layout for the Tyumen province was assigned later in the amount of 8,177 thousand poods. In Siberia, 35 million poods of grain fodder out of 110 million (31.8%) owed under the appropriation system were to be surrendered by peasants of one Omsk province. Twice as large on the scale of the Tyumen province - 5 385 thousand poods of grain forage or 65.8% of the total allocation - was the specific weight of the Ishim district (see: HANS F. R. 4. Op. 1. D. 520. LL. 6, 7 ; RGAE. F. 1943. Op. 6. D. 1740. L. 75; Bulletin of the People's Commissariat for Food. No. 15. August 13, 1920; Systematic collection of decrees and orders of the government on the food business. M. 1921. Book 5. With . 528-530).

Thus, from June 20, 1920 to March 1, 1921, six Siberian provinces (Irkutsk, Yenisei, Tomsk, Omsk, Altai, Semipalatinsk) and Tyumen, which was part of the Ural region, had to hand over 116 million poods. bread, which accounted for one third of the state assignment. The peasants pledged to hand over grain, meat (6,270,000 poods of meat were imposed on Siberia), butter, eggs, potatoes, vegetables, leather, wool, tobacco, horns, hooves and much more. In total, 37 allotments were applied to them. In addition, the entire working population from 18 to 50 years old had to perform various duties.

The huge machine went into action. Lenin's decree was subject to immediate and unswerving execution, despite the fact that its implementation would have put the peasants on the brink of starvation. The food workers, accompanied by armed detachments, went through the villages.

And so, the Siberian peasants, who believed that with the end of the civil war, their life would finally enter a peaceful course, saw how the armed people sent from the city cleaned out grain from barns and storage facilities, took cattle, and took everything to railway stations or collection points, where the collected items often deteriorate from careless storage. Moreover, to help the food workers were appointed locals from the poor. By the way, this part of the population, living at the expense of the state, not only did not lose anything, but even won, since part of the collected money went to help it. However, there were relatively few poor people in prosperous Siberia.

It should be remembered here that the idea of ​​the poor as of people who cannot feed themselves in Siberia solely because of their own laziness and stupidity has long and firmly taken root in the Siberian countryside. And I think. that there was not a small grain of truth in this, although, of course, there were exceptions.

Be that as it may, the participation of the poor in the activities of the food organs added fuel to the fire, further embittered the already embittered peasants.

But the matter had not yet reached an open mutiny and, seeing this, the local party and Soviet bodies rushed to carry out the order of the leader, regardless of anything.

TELEGRAM OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OF THE TYUMEN PROVINCE TO ALL FOOD OFFICES

Tyumen<Середина октября 1920 г.>

All organizational work food organs finished. In many volosts, the harvesting of grain is almost finished. The practice of past work has shown that<продерганы>should start at the same time as the end of the harvesting process<к>fulfillment of their combat mission, so as not to give an opportunity to shelter grain by producers. Standing weather makes it possible not to the detriment of the economy<вести заготовку>products. Any delay can affect the course of our work<по>the implementation of the allocation. Therefore, I am ordering, within three days from the moment of receiving this, to bring to the attention of each owner all the appropriations received.

I order the food office commissars to immediately check whether the allocation has been made to the villages, and by the villages - to individual owners. Lists of householders with an indication of the imposed allocation must, in addition to the village councils, be in the food office in order to control and increase the productivity of work. Submit ultimatum demands to the executive committees and village councils for the immediate implementation of the appropriation. Broadly inform the population that the sale of food to the bagmen and speculators will only lead to a reduction in their own rate, for the appropriations given by the state will not decrease. The layout is given, do not allow any rediscounting, amendments, etc. Until completion 60%<разверстки>the chairmen of the executive committees, village councils, deliberately delaying the appropriation scheme and generally passively referring to its implementation, to arrest and escort * (Siberian Vendee)

It is clear that the Bolsheviks had to act in extraordinary circumstances, but we must remember that they also bore the lion's share of the responsibility for creating these circumstances. And now every step they took made matters even more aggravated. The severity of the emergency decree on the ground turned into outright brutality of those who carried it out. And there were no other ways - to fully fulfill the order of the leader.

Those of the local party and Soviet workers who did not show due zeal risked themselves being accused of sabotage and counter-revolutionary activities, and the punishment for this in those days was imposed on them even more severely than for ordinary people. However, there was no shortage of zealous performers, and the higher authorities themselves had to pull back from time to time those who were overly buried.

№33 REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL AND INSPECTORATE COMMISSION FOR CONDUCTING EXPLANATION IN ISHIMSKY UEZD TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE TYUMENSK GUBISPOL COMA OF SOVIETS S.А. NOVOSELOV, SECRETARY OF THE GUBKOM OF THE RKP (b) N.E. KOCHISH AND GUBPROD COMMISSIONER G.S. INDENBAUM

On December 4, 1920, Comrade V.I. Kuznetsov with a pile of accusatory material collected by him during the investigation in the volosts we visited. From all the material and personal opinion comrade. Kuznetsov, the actions of the gubernia commission for the implementation of state appropriations are in full sense the words are counter-revolutionary and aggravate the peasants against the Soviet regime. Comrade Kuznetsov accuses us of being too cruel and rude to the peasants, i.e. we demand from them to carry out the state appropriation system, and we are not agitating among the peasants for the implementation of the state appropriation system. According to his conclusion, our actions are worse than the Kolchak regime. In addition, he has material that the commission whips the peasants and demands fried goose from the peasants for food.

Against such absurd accusations, not only the commission, but the entire detachment is outraged to the core as party comrades. True, during our hard work, sometimes we have to shout, but not at the peasants who honestly carry out the appropriation system, but at certain types of village kulaks who persist in the implementation of the state appropriation system, and then in extreme cases, when this necessitates the interests of the appropriation system.

Your telegrams and orders accuse us of hibernation and empty talk.

You demand to be decisive and not to follow the weeping peasants. Along with this, people come from provincial and other institutions<сотрудники>like comrade. Kuznetsov, who call us counter-revolutionaries and Kolchak's guardsmen. We are now between two fires. On the one hand, we are ordered and ordered to be merciless towards everyone who does not comply with the state appropriation system, and the appropriation system must be unconditionally carried out. On the other hand, we are followed by a tail with piles of investigative material accusing us of robbing the peasants with bread *, cruelty and rudeness. Even the authorized representative of the Ishim Politburo, Comrade. Zhukov<М.И.>personally under the Red Army Prokopiev, he called the detachment a Kolchak gang.

Until now, we have not paid the slightest attention to all the provocation that has been dispersed throughout the entire county. And, working 24 hours a day, we firmly remembered the order given to us by the center about the need to complete the state appropriation system faster and completely. In the current atmosphere, we do not know at all how to work, and all the desire to work disappears. We cannot work any longer under such circumstances. We ask you to take appropriate measures: either push us out of the way of the food campaign, or those who interfere in food policy. Please indicate how we should respond to your orders and what the center's opinion is: to take the requisitioning or ask the peasants to carry out the requisitioning through agitation. Until now, we must be aware that we have resorted to the first method, i.e. demanded the implementation of the allocation.

For the second time, we ask you to make a definite decision in relation to the "troika". If we have committed any crime, we ask us to immediately remove as criminals before the republic. If we remain to continue working, then please come to an agreement with all institutions, such as the provincial check, the people's courts, the workers 'and peasants' inspection, so that they do not interfere in the production work and do not undermine the authority of the food workers in the person of the inhabitants, at least during the production campaign.

Please give the answer to the member of the commission comrade Gurminu or telegraph.

Precommission A. Krestyannikov

Commission members: Lauris

M. Gurmin * (Siberian Vendée)

No. 38 MINUTES No. 57 OF THE EXTENDED MEETING OF THE TYUMEN GOVERNMENT FOOD MEETING

Present: S.A. Novoselov, the provincial food commissar G.S. Indenbaum, secretary of the provincial committee of the RCP (b) IZ. Kochish, P.I. Studitov1, member of the provincial control and inspection commission M.A. Gurmin, the authorized spokesman for the Cheka NS Kuznetsov.

On the order of the day, the report and report of a member of the provincial control and inspection commission comrade Gurmina

Comrade Indenbaum reads the report of the Control and Inspection Commission on the situation in its work after the intervention of the Gubchek Comrade. Kuznetsova.

Comrade Gurmin makes an exhaustive report on the work of the commission. Upolgubcheka comrade Kuznetsov reports materials collected by him to the control and inspection commission, whose work was reduced to confiscations, arrests, etc. The commission sent food detachments to the homes of citizens of the Red Army, demanding better food. In general, the commission did not want to reckon with the decisions and orders of the provincial executive committee and the provincial committee. Comrade Gurmin, a member of the commission, asserts that he does not renounce his words and that everything that he wrote in the report is their real work and their demand, otherwise the commission will not carry on the work. Pointing to the actions of the upolgubchek Comrade Kuznetsov, who undermined the authority in their work, Comrade Gurmin says that if the commission committed crimes,<то необходимо>remove it, if not, then do not interfere with work.

Predgubcheka Comrade Studitov finds that his authorized representative, Comrade Kuznetsov, exceeded his authority, by his actions undermined the authority of the control and inspector commission and thereby weakened the grain supply. For this, Comrade Kuznetsov will be duly punished.

The secretary of the provincial committee, comrade Kochish, points out that Kuznetsov is absolutely not familiar with the prodrabotka. Going to the district, he did not even go to the provincial prodkom to find out how to act. Food work is a mechanism that needs to be approached with caution.

Of the Pre-Executive Committee of Comrade Novoselov also confirms the crime<действий>Kuznetsov, but at the same time pretends to be a commission to instruct<прод>detachments and held them tightly in her hands.

Gubprodkomissar comrade Indenbaum points out that such actions as demonstrated by Kuznetsov's uplip will disrupt the appropriation if this continues in the future.<Инденбаум>indicates to Kuznetsov that he must obey the orders of the gubernatorial committee and the executive committee, otherwise he will be called to order.

Comrade Novoselov makes a proposal, which is unanimously adopted, namely:

1) To admit that Kuznetsov's upolgubcheka exceeded his authority and that he had no right to interfere in the actions to carry out the requisitioning.

2) Suggest the pre-gum to Studitov and the provincial food commissioner to immediately take measures to restore the figure of the previous filing.

3) Suggest the control and inspection commission to immediately start their work with the same impulse, to instruct more<прод>detachment and hold it tightly in your hands.

Chairman of the Provincial Council of Indenbaum

By the way, Lauris was finally shot for the crimes he committed during the collection of food appropriation, but that was only later, after the suppression of the uprising. At about the same time, having fallen into the hands of an insurgent detachment, the provincial food commissar Indenbaum was stabbed to death with bayonets. The fate of the Chekist Kuznetsov is unknown to me.

In the meantime, things went on as usual, food was seized without regard to any standards established by the authorities themselves, up to seeds. Non-food items were also taken away. As it became clear that it was impossible to carry out the requisitioning, the actions against the peasants intensified. They were taken hostage, before they carried out the surplus appropriation, they were put naked in cold barns, beaten, and their property confiscated. The stubborn were brought to trial by the tribunal. This has become a daily practice.

The uprising and its suppression. Some features.

And thus, in the twentieth year, the Siberian peasantry faced a choice. before which at different times different groups of the Russian population found themselves - to resignedly submit to the arbitrariness imposed by the state or, having placed themselves outside the law, to defend their rights with arms in hand.

But the peasants had few weapons, let me remind you that we are talking about people who were initially loyal to the Soviet regime. After the departure of the Kolchakites, a lot of weapons remained in their hands, but at the first demand of the new government, for the most part, these weapons were surrendered. So, when it came to the uprising, the peasants had to arm themselves with anything. One rifle was for several people, and the rest went into battle with drekols and lances made of scythe.

(For comparison - From G. Drogovoz's book History of armored trains - In August-September 1925, one of such operations was carried out in Chechnya, where the local population did not want to come to terms with the establishment of Soviet order. -Caucasian Military District: about 5,000 bayonets, more than two thousand sabers, 24 guns and one armored train.

The operation was personally led by the commander of the district, Ieronim Uborevich. The OGPU fielded 648 fighters under the command of Evdokimov.

The result of the military operation was the arrest of 309 rebels and the seizure of several thousand rifles and revolvers.).

Meanwhile, the situation was heating up, dissatisfaction grew, there were more cases when the peasants tried to repulse their arrested fellow countrymen by force, in these cases they were shot at to kill. However, the last straw that overflowed the peasant's patience was the order to carry out seed surplus appropriation, now it was necessary to hand over what was left for seeds.

On February 8 of the twenty-first year, the radiotelegraph operator on duty in the subpolar Obdorsk heard the call signs of the Chelyabinsk radio station on the air: Obdorsk! Orenburg! Tashkent! Krasnoyarsk! Omsk! Answer for communication! The enemies of the republic in the Urals and Western Siberia began counterrevolutionary revolts. Socialist-Revolutionary-kulak gangs, led by white officers and generals, are committing violence ... (M. Budarin Were about the Chekists)

So in Obdorsk they learned about the beginning of the West Siberian uprising. Obdorsk radio station until mid-March remained the only line connecting European Russia with Siberia.

Everyone expected the uprising and, as usual, it was a complete surprise for everyone.

In January 1921, in the Ishim district, events that had become routine over these several months took place - seed grain was collected at the volost dumping points, it remained to take it to the railway. And none of the Soviet chiefs were surprised by the message that the peasants of the Chelnokovo volost, fearing to be left without seeds by the spring, gathered in a crowd, tried to interfere with the export of grain and entered into a fight with the prodarmeys, who in response opened fire and killed two of the attackers. The usual thing. For the analysis, the already mentioned member of the provincial food committee Lauris with an armed detachment was sent to the Chelnokovskaya volost, again, in a working order, and it seemed like he even restored calm there (Siberian Vendee).

However, after a couple of days the Chelnokovskaya volost was engulfed in an uprising, and with it the neighboring volosts - Churtanskaya, Vikulovskaya, Gotoputovskaya, then Kargalinskaya and Bolshe-Sorokinskaya. At the same time, a similar thing happened in the Yalutorovsky, Tyumensky, Tyukalinsky districts.

By mid-February, it had already covered parts of the Omsk, Kurgan, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg provinces and spread south to Altai. The peasants were joined by the Cossacks of Kokchetav and the Tatar population of the national regions. Their total number is determined by various historians from thirty to one hundred thousand.

In connection with the blocking of both branches of the Transsib by the rebels, Siberia was cut off from the rest of Russia for two weeks.

At various times the rebels captured Ishim, Petropavlovsk, Tobolsk, Berezovo, Obdorsk, Kokchetav.

To lead the liquidation of the uprising on February 12. 1921, a plenipotentiary troika is created as part of the previous. Sibrevkoma and the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) I.N. Smirnov, Siberian Cheka I.P. Pavlunsky and pom. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic V.I.Shorin. At their disposal were parts 21st, 26th, 28th and 29th div., Dep. cavalry brigade, 209th regiment of the 23rd SD, Kazan and Simbirsk regiments, 2 more detachments. cavalry regiment, 6 reserve battalions, a battalion of instructor courses for general education, Vyatka infantry courses, armored trains, armored steamers, artillery, 249th, 250th, 255th regiments, int. services (SCHON), the Tyumen school of lower command personnel, the 6th reserve machine-gun battalion, and all local detachments. Within a few months, the main centers were extinguished, but the fighting continued until the end of the twenty-first year.

In Soviet historiography, there was an opinion about the preparedness of this uprising by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and White Guards, about their deliberate choice of the moment to start it. However, even the very time of this moment suggests that the uprising was rather an act of despair of cornered people, and not a pre-planned action, says the very time when it began.

Indeed, in Russia, almost all peasant rebellions and riots, initiated by the peasants themselves, usually began in the fall, when the harvest was harvested, and the forest could still serve as a refuge in case of defeat. The Siberian winter taiga or steppe does not dispose to active partisan actions and serves as a poor shelter for a large number of people, especially if their families are with them. In addition, it should be taken into account that villages in the agricultural regions of Siberia, with a large number of inhabitants, quite often several thousand people, while being at a great distance from each other.

This, by the way, was one of the reasons for the huge losses of the rebels, since they could feel confident only near their native places, and because of this, they tried, first of all, to defend their villages, entering into head-on clashes with units of the Red Army. It is clear that in battles of this kind, poorly armed peasants found themselves in the most disadvantageous position for themselves.

However, this happened closer to the end of the uprising, when the peasants were forced to go on the defensive. But in February twenty-first they were advancing.

There is no need to say that the uprising was universal. As always, in such cases, there were a significant number of people who, for one reason or another, preferred to stay on the sidelines. Some were afraid of retaliation from the Soviet government, an example of the brutal suppression of uprisings in Altai and in the taiga regions was before everyone's eyes, others did not believe in the success of the resistance, and others were waiting for which side would prevail. The motivation could be different, but in any case, a significant part of the peasantry did not support the uprising, although the overwhelming majority, if not fully sympathized with the insurgents, then fully understood them.

Not a small number of peasants turned out to be among the open opponents of the uprising, this, in my opinion, does not contradict the above, since, if we take the same rural communists, many of whom opposed, if not against the surplus appropriation itself, then against the methods of its implementation and warned that it cannot end well. And so, when their warnings were really confirmed, in the most gloomy version, it was these people who fell under the first, most crushing blow, all the peasant anger accumulated during this time fell upon them.

This, of course, is not about those rural communists who joined the uprising, and sometimes led the rebel detachments.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that speaking about the predominance of certain moods regarding participation or non-participation in the uprising, one should speak about each village separately, due to the Siberian specifics. After all, in social life Siberian peasant the community played a decisive role. And in every single village, all of its inhabitants, in one way or another, followed the will of the majority.

In principle, the organizational moment in the uprising was formed on the basis of this circumstance, people who were authoritative in a given village became commanders, outside of which there were no authorities for its inhabitants. By the way, among the commanders of the uprising and its active participants, the poor and the middle peasants predominated, which was caused not least of all by the fact that the surplus appropriation system, in view of its poor organization, laid a heavy burden on these strata.

The rebels made attempts to overcome their disunity, but took only the very first steps in this direction, forming in several places some semblance of a general command, but in view of the nature of the hostilities, this was all. For the same reason, the announced mobilization failed.

The uprising, like a steppe fire, was thrown from place to place, in order, being extinguished in one place, to flare up in another. The rebels who violently attacked the cities, in cases where they encountered organized resistance, rolled back in order, regrouping, to repeat the attempt.

And it often happened that the defeated insurgent detachments, on the way of their flight, burst into areas not yet touched by the uprising, and the uprising broke out with renewed vigor.

SUBMISSION OF THE SIBERIAN PILOT-CHAPTER V.I. SHORINA TO THE HEAD OF THE RKKA REPUBLIC S.S. KAMENEV

Omsk February 13, 1921 The first report<о>the beginning of the uprising entered the Stasib on February 6. The uprising initially covered an area 100 versts southeast of Tobolsk and at the same time the area of ​​Ust-Ishim and Balshe-Sorokinsky volost.After that, the uprising spread to the Ishim area and along the railway to the west and east of Ishim, with the most significant bands of insurgents grouped south of Ishim and<в>the area of ​​the Golyshmanovo station. At the same time, a rebellion broke out<в>the region of Petropavlovsk, covering the region of the Kurgan-Tokushi railroad. The insurgents mainly concentrated all their attention on the railways and, taking advantage of the extended disposition of our troops guarding the railroad, and their relatively small number, they began to carry out raids, accompanied by damage to the track and the destruction of telegraph communications.<на>various points of the railway. Initially, the scattered offensives of the rebels were not organized in nature, but from their further actions it should be assumed that preliminary agitation was carried out among the local population. The weapons of the rebels are diverse: some are armed with rifles, some are armed with shotguns and revolvers, most of the rebels are on foot, but there are small cavalry detachments of 100-200 horses.

Our initial actions to liquidate the uprising were greatly hampered, on the one hand, by the wide area covered by the uprising, on the other hand, by the relatively small number of troops and frequent disruption of communications and interruption of railway traffic.<В>At present, for the convenience of management, the entire area of ​​the uprisings is divided into two sections: the northern, Ishimsky, where the brigade commander-85 is in charge, and the southern, Petropavlovsky, entrusted to the commander-in-chief-21.

Upon receiving the first news of the uprising in the Ishim and Petropavlovsk regions, free units of the 253rd and 254th regiments of the 29th division were thrown there, and, in addition, two squadrons were sent from Omsk. To decisively suppress the uprising, the 232nd regiment of the 26th division and two battalions of the 256th are being transferred to the Ishim area to reinforce the active forces | regiment of the 29th division, the 249th regiment of the 28th division is transferred to the Petropavlovsk region. Only with the arrival of these forces will it be possible to carry out a decisive purge of the main centers of the uprising ..

Pomgavkom Shorin Nashtasib Afanasyev

(Siberian Vendée)

As a result of emergency measures, the peasants were pushed back from the railway line and driven out of the cities they occupied, now the war was approaching the villages of the rebels, where the most tragic scenes of the West Siberian epic were played out.

In the battles for their villages, the peasants showed fierce stubbornness, and often defended themselves to the last, under artillery and machine-gun fire, while their losses were terrifying. The Bolsheviks themselves call the ratio one to fifteen. When the resistance was broken, reprisals and executions began, often without trial or investigation.

There is a widespread perception of brutality on both sides, and it is difficult to argue with that. However, it should be remembered that its growth took place according to the laws of the logic of the struggle, and was very unequal, in accordance with the moods of the fighters. But the victims on both sides numbered tens of thousands, and the lion's share falls to the lot of the peasantry. Although the losses on the part of the Soviet government were enormous, for example, local party organizations lost half of their members.

The victims of the famine, which broke out in the summer of the twenty-first, should be added to those killed in battles and shot.

As for the slogans of the uprising, the main ones were the Soviets without communists and the abolition of the surplus appropriation system, along with this there was a demand for convocation Constituent Assembly and even the restoration of the monarchy, but it looked more like an initiative of individual commanders, and not an expression of a common will. This story is still waiting to be continued.

By the summer of 1921, the uprising had been suppressed. It was a military, not a political, victory. The government's decision to replace the food appropriation system with a tax in kind had no effect on the course of the uprising, since it became known only after the main centers of the uprising were defeated. The victors reacted rather mildly to the captured rebels, to those of them who were fortunate enough not to be executed under a hot hand, preliminary, however, having shot all those suspected of being more or less active during the uprising. However, then, over a decade, most of the released rebels ended up behind bars or were shot.

The time has come for peaceful construction.

Conclusion

The experience of the Jacobins was close to the Bolsheviks and it seems that they often deliberately cultivated this similarity and it even served as an object of their pride. The words spoken by the winner of Napoleon in Spain and at Waterloo by the Duke of Wellington about the French army of his day echo

* The conscripted battalions of the French army had in their ranks both good and bad soldiers, from the upper, middle and lower classes, people of all specialties and professions. French soldiers rarely needed the usual discipline or punishment required to keep soldiers in line. Good soldiers under the supervision and encouragement of the officers, they cared for the bad and kept them in order, and in general they were the best, most orderly and obedient, blindly obedient and regulated army in Europe. He was ruined by a system of confiscations. The French Revolution for the first time showed the world a new system of warfare, the purpose and result of which was to turn war into a means of generating income, and not a burden for the aggressive side, placing the entire burden on the country that suffered and became the site of hostilities.

The system of terror and grief of the people of France, and the appeal, the execution of which was caused by terror, put into the hands of the government all the male population of the country capable of military service. And all that was left for the government to do, and what it actually did, was to organize the people into military units, arm and teach the first movements with weapons and military exercises.

After that, they were released into the territory of some foreign state - to feed on its resources. By their numbers, they extinguished or overcame any local resistance, and whatever the losses and the misfortunes that the system produced in France, the dead could not complain, and the success drowned out the voices of those who survived. * (R. Aldington, Duke of Moscow Transitbook 2006)

The same, with the amendment that the bayonets were sent not outside the country, but inside it, can be said about the Soviet state. Only this death was delayed by seven decades. The victory of the Bolsheviks against the insurgent peasants turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory, the first step towards their defeat. The system of relations with one's own people, which was being laid just then, in the early twenties, fully developed its resource and collapsed under the weight of accumulated mistakes. But the paradox lies in the fact that all the mistakes of the lost system were fully adopted by those who inherited.

During the West Siberian uprising, volleys thundered last war between the state and its people. The state won. The kingdom of bureaucrats was approaching, now state policy depended only on them. And any person wishing to influence this policy had to first of all become an official, without this his influence was equal to zero. it could dispose of the people at its own discretion, without fear of meeting a massive rebuff. But this victory had a downside. The state turned out to be defenseless in front of the official and in the end fell, betrayed by him. However, the calculation is not over yet. This story is still waiting to be continued.

Kronstadt uprising of 1921

March 17, 2013 Exactly 92 years ago on the streets of Kronstadt the situation was not at all the same as it is now. A Sunday afternoon in the suburban area of ​​St. Petersburg does not bode well for anything unusual, everything goes according to the established scenario of a quiet, peaceful, even somewhat patriarchal life. The streets are more lively than on weekdays. However, 92 years ago, 12-inch shells burst here, machine-gun bursts did not subside for a minute, rifle volleys alternated with bayonets. Thousands of people met in hand-to-hand combat, people fought with ferocity and frenzy. The rebellious Kronstadt did not surrender without a fight. The fighting in the streets went on for more than a day and ended by the morning of March 18.

Who has won? The question seems strange, even in the shortest textbook on Russian history of the 20th century it is quite clearly written that the rebels were driven out of the island of Kotlin, and the Bolsheviks' power was restored in the city and the naval base. However, years will pass and those who took the rebellious Kronstadt will themselves be destroyed by the power for which they fought for life and death with confidence in their righteousness. But so far this was not at all obvious and the specific task - to return Kronstadt - was carried out methodically and purposefully.

Walking through the streets and squares of Kronstadt, now it is difficult to imagine what we will tell our story about. The situation and conditions here have changed painfully, and people are not the same at first glance for a long time. But this is only at the first approximation. History tends to repeat itself and what seemed to be a matter of time long past, suddenly becomes timely and urgent, as if written these days. The connection of times is felt in every detail, if you look closely.

Preconditions for the uprising.

So, 1921. The young country of the Soviets emerges victorious from the Civil War. The economic situation could be called critical. Three years of war and foreign intervention undermined the economy of Russia, which was undermined by the First World War. By the end of 1920, the overall level of industrial production decreased by almost 5 times compared to 1913. The critical situation was with the supply of fuel and raw materials. Many mines in Donbass were flooded and destroyed during the Civil War. The transport infrastructure was in complete decline. Food delivery to the cities was extremely unsatisfactory. The internal market collapsed due to the activities of food and barrage detachments.

At the beginning of 1921 the workers of Petrograd, employed in the smelting industry, received 800 grams daily. Of bread. Shock workers - 600. Other categories of workers from 400 to 200 grams. Part of the wages was paid in kind, and part of the output was exchanged by the workers for food. Families left the city en masse. During the 3 years of the Civil War, the population of Petrograd fell from 2.5 million to 750,000. There was a real famine in the cities. Often, some of the workers were removed from the enterprises and sent to other regions of the country in order to get food. The sailors often did the same. There is evidence that food was sometimes plundered along the way. So, once a whole carload of meat went from Vologda to Petrograd, instead of Moscow, and only the intervention of the army prevented this theft. Naturally, in such a situation, the population of the cities became dissatisfied with the existing situation.

But Russia was an agrarian country, and the peasants felt on themselves all the hardships of the war no less than the population of the cities. The policy of war communism with the activities of food detachments, first of all, affected the villagers. A significant reduction in acreage was associated with the general devastation in the country, but the surplus allocation policy was the main blow to the peasantry. The land belonged to the peasants according to the land decrees of October 26, 1917. By 1920, the land was divided among peasant families. The peasants got the land, and they just wanted to be left alone. But the war dragged on, and the food problem became at the forefront. As the peasant delegates said, "our land is yours." The activities of the food detachments were associated not with the Bolsheviks, but with the Communists. Zinoviev, Trotsky and other party leaders, whose Jewish origin, associated with everything anti-popular, were accused that they had invented a new form state farms, which again led to the enslavement of the peasants.

However, during the war, the peasants were generally loyal to the Bolsheviks. Although sometimes there was resistance to the surplus allocation, but this was all explainable by the struggle with the whites, who were perceived as a greater evil.

In November 1920, Wrangel's armies left Crimea, the Civil War, as a whole, ended, and a series of peasant uprisings against the Bolsheviks and the policy of war communism began in the country.

The winter of 1920-21 was a turning point. Almost 2 million soldiers were demobilized, the economy had to be transferred to a peaceful track. Between November 1920 and March 1921, the number of peasant uprisings increased sharply. On the eve of the Kronstadt mutiny, more than 100 different peasant uprisings swept through the regions of the country - in the Volga region, in the Urals, in Siberia, peasant uprisings broke out again and again. Many sailors came from peasants and discontent from the villages quickly penetrated the naval crews.

Lenin understood the need to put the economy on a peaceful track and abandon the policy of war communism. Back in November 1920, this issue was raised, but detailed proposals were prepared in fact on the eve of the mutiny.

The main cause of discontent in the country was, first of all, hunger and deprivation. There was no plan for the transition from War Communism, and in peacetime, military methods gave the exact opposite effect. This was the impetus for the performance.

A particularly difficult situation at the beginning of 1921 developed in large industrial centers, primarily in Moscow and Petrograd. The norms for the issuance of bread were reduced, some food rations were canceled, and there was a threat of hunger. In February 1921, during the crisis, strikes began in Petrograd. On January 22, 1921, a reduction in rations was announced. The cup of patience was overflowing. Petrograd was in a particularly difficult situation. More than 60% of factories were closed, in conditions of a lack of fuel and food, rumors immediately appeared that the new government - the commissars did not need anything, which only fueled discontent.

The fuel crisis has worsened. On February 11, 1921, it was announced that 93 Petrograd enterprises would be closed until March 1. Among them are such giants as the Putilovsky plant, Sestroretsky, "Triangle" and others. About 27 thousand people were unemployed.

On February 21, a meeting was held at the Pipe Plant at Vasilievsky Island... A resolution was adopted demanding a transition to democracy. In response, the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet decided to close the plant and announce the re-registration of all employees and workers. The unrest of the workers began to develop into open riots. On the morning of February 24, about 300 workers of the Pipe Plant went out into the street. They were joined by workers from other factories and factories in Petrograd.

A crowd of up to 2,500 people gathered on Vasilievsky Island. Not relying on the Red Army, the authorities sent Red cadets to disperse it. The crowd was scattered. In the afternoon, an emergency meeting of the Bureau of the Petrograd Committee of the RCP (b) took place, which qualified the unrest at the factories and factories of the city as a rebellion. The next day, martial law was introduced in the city.

In the evening of February 27, an enlarged meeting of the plenum of the Petrograd Soviet opened, in which the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, MI Kalinin, who had arrived from Moscow, took part. Commissioner of the Baltic Fleet N.N. Kuzmin drew the attention of the audience to alarming signs in the mood of the sailors. The situation became more and more threatening. On February 28, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was held, at which the situation in Moscow and Petrograd was discussed. Suppression of political opposition was recognized as a top priority. The Cheka carried out the arrests of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Among those arrested in Petrograd was one of the leaders of the Menshevik party, F.I.Dan.

Naturally, the unrest in Petrograd, performances in other cities and regions of the country had a serious impact on the mood of the sailors, soldiers and workers of Kronstadt. The sailors of Kronstadt, who were the main support of the Bolsheviks in the October days of 1917, were among the first to understand that Soviet power was essentially replaced by party power, and the ideals for which they fought turned out to be loyal. By mid-February total number naval teams, naval sailors of coastal units, auxiliary units stationed in Kronstadt and on forts exceeded 26 thousand people.

The beginning of the uprising.

To clarify the situation in Petrograd, delegations were sent there. Returning, the delegates reported to the general meetings of their teams about the reasons for the unrest of the workers, as well as the sailors of the battleships Gangut and Poltava, stationed on the Neva. This happened on February 27, and the next day the sailors of the battleships Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol adopted a resolution, which was brought up for discussion by representatives of all ships and military units of the Baltic Fleet. This resolution was, in essence, a call to the government to respect the rights and freedoms proclaimed in October 1917. It did not contain calls for the overthrow of the government, but was directed against the omnipotence of one party.

On March 1, a rally was held on Anchor Square, which was attended by Kalinin, Kuzmin and Vasiliev, as well as about 15 thousand sailors and residents of the city. The authorities tried to calm down the sailors and called for an end to the riots, but they were booed. Petrichenko came to the podium, he read a resolution, which was adopted unanimously (except for Kalinin, Kuzmin and Vasiliev). The communists, who also gathered in the square, also quite a few, voted for the resolution.

RESOLUTION OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMANDS OF THE 1st AND 2nd BRIGADS

After listening to the report of the representatives of the teams sent general meeting teams from ships in the mountains. Petrograd, in order to clarify matters in Petrograd, decided:

1) In view of the fact that these soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants, immediately re-elect the soviets by secret ballot, and before the elections conduct a free preliminary agitation of all workers and peasants.

2) Freedom of speech and press for workers and peasants, anarchists, left-wing socialist parties.

3) Freedom of assembly and trade unions and peasant associations.

4) To convene, no later than March 10, 1921, a non-partisan conference of workers, Red Army men and sailors from the mountains. Petrograd, Kronstadt and Petrograd province.

5) To release all political prisoners of the socialist parties, as well as all workers and peasants, Red Army men and sailors imprisoned in connection with the workers 'and peasants' movements.

6) Select a commission to review the cases of prisoners in prisons and concentration camps.

7) Abolish all political departments, since no party can use privileges to promote its ideas and receive funds from the state for this purpose. Instead of them, local elected cultural and educational commissions should be established, for which funds should be allocated by the state.

8) Immediately remove all barrage units.

9) Equalize the ration for all workers, with the exception of harmful workshops.

10) Abolish communist fighting units in all military units, as well as in factories and factories, different shifts on the part of the communists, and if such shifts or detachments are needed, then they can be appointed in military units from companies, and in factories and plants at the discretion of the workers.

11) Give the peasants the full right to act over their land as they wish, and also have livestock, which must maintain and manage their own forces, i.e. not using hired labor.

12) We ask all military units, as well as comrades of military cadets, to join our resolution.

13) We demand that all resolutions be widely published in the press.

Riots in Kronstadt. Requirements of the sailors, soldiers and workers of the fortress 51

14) Appoint a traveling bureau for control.

15) Allow free handicraft production by own labor.

The resolution was adopted by the brigade meeting unanimously with 2 abstentions.

Formation of the VRK.

In the building of the former Engineering School, major events the beginning of the uprising. On March 2, representatives selected for the delegate meeting gathered in the House of Education in Kronstadt (formerly the Engineering School). It was discovered by Stepan Petrichenko, a clerk from the battleship "Petropavlovsk". The delegates elected a presidium of five non-party members. The main issue at the meeting was the question of re-election of the Kronstadt Soviet, especially since the powers of its previous composition were already ending. Kuzmin was the first to speak. Outrage was caused by his words that the communists would not give up power voluntarily, and that attempts to disarm them would lead to "there will be blood." He was supported by Vasiliev, who then spoke.

With a majority of votes, the meeting expressed no confidence in Kuzmin and Vasiliev. Suddenly it was reported that the communists of the fortress were preparing to resist. A sailor burst into the meeting, shouting “half a coat! the communists go to the building to arrest the meeting. " In this regard, it was decided to urgently create a Provisional Revolutionary Committee (VRK) to maintain order in Kronstadt. The responsibilities of the committee were assumed by the presidium and chairman of the delegate meeting, Petrichenko. The Committee also included his deputy Yakovenko, machine sergeant major Arkhipov, foreman of the electromechanical plant Tukin and head of the third labor school I. Ye. Oreshin.

The reaction of the authorities to the uprising.

The authorities declared the rebels "outlawed". Repressions followed against the relatives of the leaders of the uprising. They were taken as hostages. Among the first to be arrested was the family of the former general Kozlovsky (chief of the fortress artillery).

Petrograd was declared martial law, the authorities made every effort to isolate Kronstadt and prevent the uprising from spreading to the mainland. We managed to do this.

Nevertheless, the beginning of the unrest in the fortress was accompanied by the collapse of the Bolshevik cells in the military and civilian organizations of Kronstadt. As of January 1921, they numbered 2,680 members and candidates for membership in the RCP (b). In the VRK, in the revolutionary troika, in the editorial office of Izvestia VRK (the press organ of the rebels), both individual and collective applications began to arrive on the withdrawal from the party. Many asked to publish their statements in the newspaper. The organization of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" withdrew almost entirely from the party. A lot of applications came from the workers of the industrial enterprises of the city serving the fleet. The withdrawal from the party continued until the last assault on Kronstadt, when it was already clear to everyone that the besieged were doomed. In total, during the Kronstadt events, about 900 people left the RCP (b). Most of them joined the party during the civil war. But there were also those who linked their lives with the party in the October days of 1917. On March 2, the Provisional Bureau of the Kronstadt organization of the RCP was organized, consisting of Ya. I. Ilyin, F.Kh. Pervushin and A.S. Kabanov, which called on the communists of Kronstadt to cooperate with the VRK.

News of the events in Kronstadt provoked a sharp reaction from the Soviet leadership. The Kronstadt delegation, which arrived in Petrograd to explain the demands of the sailors, soldiers and workers of the fortress, was arrested.

On March 4, the Labor and Defense Council approved the text of the government message. The movement in Kronstadt was declared a "mutiny" organized by the French counterintelligence and the former tsarist general Kozlovsky, and the resolution adopted by the Kronstadters was "Black Hundred Socialist-Revolutionary".

On the afternoon of March 5, 1921, Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev, Commander of the Western Front M. N. Tukhachevsky and other leading workers of the RVSR arrived in Petrograd. Trotsky was personally present and gave the order to eliminate the rebellion. At the same time, an important operational order was issued on measures to eliminate the Kronstadt rebellion. Its main points were as follows:

"1. Restore the 7th Army, subordinating it directly to the High Command. 2. Assign temporary command of the 7th Army to Comrade Tukhachevsky, leaving him in the position of commanding officer. 3. Temporary commander-7 t. Tukhachevsky to subordinate in all respects all the troops of the Petrograd district, the commander of the troops of the Petrograd district and the commander of the Baltic Fleet. 4. Commander of the troops of the Petrograd district, Comrade Avrov, should be simultaneously appointed commandant of the Petro-Ukreprayon. " Further in the order it was ordered to offer the Kronstadt rebels to surrender, and otherwise - to open hostilities. The order entered into force on March 5 at 17:00. 45 minutes

An ultimatum was presented to Kronstadt demanding surrender, to which the rebels refused. Military experts offered to support the uprising in Oranienbaum and facilitate its spread to the mainland, but the Military Revolutionary Committee firmly stood on the position of not being the first to use force. They naively believed that an uprising would break out in Petrograd and other regions of the country, sweeping away the power of the communists.

The first assault on Kronstadt.

Meanwhile, on March 8, the 10th Congress of the RCP (b) opened in Moscow. It was on this date that the assault on Kronstadt was scheduled. Trotsky and Tukhachevsky wanted to come to the congress as winners, but the planned performance failed. Trotsky believed that with the first shots the rebels would surrender and therefore hastened the start of the military operation.

The troops were pulled up to Kronstadt and on March 7, the Northern Combat Group (headed by E.S. Kazansky), concentrated in the Sestroretsk area, numbered 3,763 people (of which the most combat-ready unit was a detachment of Petrograd cadets - 1,195 fighters). The southern group (headed by A.I.Sedyakin) numbered 9853 people. The artillery force consisted of 27 field artillery batteries: 18 in the South Group sector and 9 in the Northern Group sector; however, these were predominantly light weapons, unsuitable for fighting the concrete forts and battleships of the rebels; there were only three batteries of heavy guns, but their caliber also did not exceed six inches. In the afternoon of March 8, Soviet air reconnaissance reported that the shells were lying at the fortress with a great undershoot, and "no destruction was found in the city itself and on the two battleships standing in the harbor."

The Soviet forces, which launched an offensive on March 8, were thrown back from the walls of the fortress without losses for the rebels. Suffering serious losses, the Red Army retreated. Some battalions surrendered. The attack failed.

Preparing for the decisive battle.

The next 10 days passed in an atmosphere of gathering strength. Both the Red Army and the rebels were preparing for a decisive battle. However, pulling together forces to suppress the rebellion was not at all an easy task. It was necessary to overcome not only technical difficulties in the operation of transport and a catastrophic shortage of uniforms, but also open sabotage of some groups of troops.

So the area of ​​art. Ligovo since March 10, the 27th Omsk Infantry Division was concentrated , directed from Western Front to strengthen the Soviet troops at Kronstadt. The division had 1,115 command personnel, 13,059 infantrymen, 488 cavalrymen, as well as 319 machine guns and 42 guns. The personnel of the unit had good combat training and glorious military traditions: the division successfully fought against Kolchak and White Poles. However, near Kronstadt, not yet engaging in battle, the commanders and political workers of the 27th division faced difficult ideological problems. The division commander V. Putna noted that the units were sent from Gomel in a fighting mood, but he emphasized that the political staff was understaffed and did not correspond to the staffing table, and most importantly, it turned out to be insufficiently prepared to work in such difficult conditions.

In fact, the soldiers simply refused to go into battle, citing fear of ice, lack of supplies, but more often - by agreeing with the demands of the rebels.

To raise awareness and conduct political work in the Red Army, about 300 delegates were sent from the 10th Congress. They were joined by communists from other regions, aimed at raising the consciousness of the Red Army soldiers. The group was headed by KE Voroshilov, a member of the Presidium of the X Congress. Among the delegates who left for Kronstadt, there were many military specialists - commanders and commissars, active participants in the civil war: Ya.F. Fabritius, I.F. Fedko, P.I.Baranov, V.P. Zatonsky, A.S. Bubnov , I. S. Konev and many others. The delegates left Moscow for Petrograd in several special trains by rail on the night of March 11.

Leaflets of the following content were scattered over Kronstadt: “People of Kronstadt! Your "Provisional Revolutionary Committee" assures: "In Kronstadt there is a struggle for the power of the Soviets." Many of you think that the great work of the revolution is being continued in Kronstadt. But your real leaders are those who conduct business in secrecy, who, out of cunning, do not yet express their real goal. Oh, they know very well what they are doing, they perfectly understand the meaning of the events that are taking place and soberly calculate when it will be possible to take the next step along the path of restoring the power of the bourgeoisie ...

Think about what you are doing. Learn to distinguish words from deeds, for if you do not learn, then the coming weeks will teach you this, and you will quickly see how the living words of your leaders about Soviet power are very quickly replaced by an open struggle against Soviet power, an open White Guard. But then it will be too late.

Now your actions are open whiteguards, covered for the time being with empty words about Soviet power without communists. Empty, because during the hard struggle of the working people for self-liberation without the Communist Party, there can be no Soviet power ...

The White Guards applaud you and hate us; choose rather - with whom are you, with the White Guards against us or with us against the White Guards ...

Time is running out. Hurry up "

In party propaganda, special emphasis was placed on explaining the fundamental decisions of the X Congress on the abolition of food appropriation and other economic measures designed to alleviate the situation of the peasantry and improve financial situation workers. At the same time, a stern and decisive rebuff was given to all attempts at hostile agitation. The verdicts of the revolutionary tribunals against instigators and provocateurs, cowards and deserters were widely publicized among the personnel of the Red Army units stationed near Kronstadt. The decisions of the X Congress largely corresponded to the economic requirements of the rebels, but the communists were not going to share political power.

At this time, the Kronstadt Military Revolutionary Committee was gathering forces for the last battle. The resources of the city were on the limits, although Izvestia VRK published several times reports that "the food situation in the city can be considered quite satisfactory." Nevertheless, the norms for issuing cards were constantly declining, while the Red Army and Petrograd workers were given an increased norm. Subsequently, already in Finland, the sailors recalled with bitterness that the Petersburg workers had betrayed them for half a pound of meat.

Well, on the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of Finland, work was underway to prepare the final suppression of the rebellion. It was necessary to hurry, because in a few weeks the ice would melt and ships with food, fuel and medicine would come to Kronstadt. The Russian emigration put a lot of effort into organizing the supply of Kronstadt on the ice, but these attempts, in general, were suppressed. The Red Cross was able to smuggle a small consignment of flour from Finland, but this was not a mass phenomenon and did not change to better situation with food in the city.

Nevertheless, for the Soviet troops, special lightweight portable bridges were designed in order to force the openings that could form on the ice of the gulf from the explosions of shells. A total of 800 sleds and 1000 walkways were prepared in the South group, and 115 sleds and 500 walkways in the North.

However, the outfit was catastrophically bad. There was not enough warm clothes, linen, greatcoats. So, for example, in the 499th Infantry Regiment, 25% of the Red Army men wore felt boots during the thaw, and 50% in bast shoes. Even the relatively fresh and efficient 27th Omsk Infantry Division had uniforms in extremely poor condition. But the fighting forces of the Red Army were growing every day. According to the summary of the operational department of the headquarters of the 7th Army as of 9th of March, the number of Soviet rifle troops was as follows. Northern battle group: total fighters and commanders - 3285 (including 105 cavalrymen), 27 machine guns, 34 guns. Southern group: the total number of fighters - 7615 people (including 103 cavalrymen), 94 machine guns, 103 guns, there were also armored trains, but the document does not contain details on this score. A brigade of cadets was also stationed here, the number of which is determined in a contradictory document; it numbered approximately 3,500 fighters and commanders, including 146 cavalrymen; the brigade had 189 machine guns and 122 guns and 3 armored trains were attached.

Storming the fortress:

By the day of the decisive assault, March 17, the Soviet command managed to assemble the following forces: 11th and 27th rifle divisions, 187th brigade of the 56th rifle division, communist special forces, red cadets 16 military schools, as well as a number of other small units and numerous artillery. There is no exact data on the quantity. According to the estimates of A.S. Pukhov, the total number of soldiers of the 7th Army was 24 thousand with 433 machine guns and 159 guns, and together with the rear and auxiliary units, the Soviet troops, concentrated for the assault on Kronstadt, amounted to about 45 thousand people.

It was ordered to move through the ice field exclusively in marching columns, while observing complete silence and order, it was possible to crumble into a chain (even in the case of enemy shelling) only in exceptional cases by order of the commander; it was especially stipulated that "in the city, do not enter into any conversations with the rebels, arrest them and send them to the rear." As an example of a specific embodiment of a general combat mission, an excerpt from the order of the commander of the 167th rifle brigade, issued on the eve of the assault on the evening of March 16, should be cited: “The brigade headquarters should establish telephone communication on the ice with units and the headquarters of the combined division, duplicating it with a live chain and messengers. During actions and movement on ice, observe silence, until the last opportunity to use movement in columns or reserve formations. The columns have in their heads shock groups in white coats, equipped with cross-overs, assault ladders; have machine guns on skids. When approaching, remember one cry: "Forward!". There can be no retreat. Do not negotiate with the rebels in the city. Organize proper nutrition parts of ammunition from the Oranienbaum coast. The orderlies with stretchers follow the parts. "

The night of March 17 was dark, moonless, which made it easier for the Soviet troops. In the northern combat area, from the evening the cannonade on both sides ceased, so the Soviet units went on the offensive in complete silence; on the contrary, in the southern section from 1 to 4 hours. at night the red artillery fired intensively, trying to strike at the two most powerful forts of Kronstadt - "Konstantin" and "Milyutin"; after several successful hits from heavy shells, both rebel forts were forced to silence.

The advance units of the attacking infantry descended on the ice in complete darkness at about 2 am, followed by the troops of the second echelon and reserves at various intervals. In the Southern Battle Group, the 32nd and 187th were in the first wave of the offensive. rifle brigades... The rebels noticed the attacking Soviet units rather late: the fighters of the 32nd brigade managed to approach the city without firing a shot, the 187th brigade, advancing to the left, was noticed and fired upon earlier. The Red Army soldiers deployed in a chain and began to overcome the barbed wire. The first took the enemy's blow at 4 o'clock. 30 minutes. 537th regiment under the command of I. V. Tyulenev. The rebels opened intense fire from rifles, machine guns and light weapons at the forward lines of the attackers. At the same time, their heavy batteries opened fire on Soviet units the second line, moving on ice, as well as along the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland.

At 5 o'clock. 30 minutes. a green rocket flew up into the sky - a signal that the attackers had burst into the city. At the same time, the fighters of the special purpose regiment, which was part of the 187th brigade, distinguished themselves. Under enemy fire, the regiment marched at a brisk pace straight to the Petrogradskaya pier - to the center of Kronstadt; a hundred and fifty paces before the goal, the regimental commander Burnavsky and the commissar Bogdanov came out ahead of the chains and ran them into the attack. They managed to walk only a hundred steps, and the attackers lay down under heavy fire. However, this allowed the reserve units to approach, and when the rebels were forced to transfer fire on them.

The street fighting that began within the limits of Kronstadt took on an extremely difficult and protracted character. The coast of the bay and city streets were enveloped in barbed wire fences, the spaces between the houses were blocked off from logs, firewood, debris of buildings, etc. The rebels fired aimed fire from rifles and machine guns from short distances, inflicting noticeable losses on the attackers. They used, as a rule, windows and attics of stone buildings, hiding behind various structures and hiding in basements.

Nevertheless, the fierce battle in the city gradually brought success to the Soviet troops. Heavy and bloody battles unfolded especially in the area of ​​the Petrogradsky Gate and the adjacent Petrogradskaya Street. The rebels here repeatedly launched counterattacks, but each time they were forced to retreat deeper into the city. By 14 o'clock. On March 17, units of the 167th brigade cut off the rebel ships stationed in the harbor from the port. This was a major success for the Soviet troops. In order to suppress a possible sortie by the teams of the rebel battleships, the combat guard of the Soviet troops was posted along the coastline, but clearly insufficient in number (this, apparently, explains the fact that some rebel activists later managed to escape from the ships under cover of darkness). It seemed that victory was already close, but the rebels launched fierce counterattacks. In the area of ​​Yakornaya Square, the head units of the Soviet troops - the 187th and 32nd brigades - came under a cross attack and were forced to retreat. The mutinous artillery fired intensively at the advancing units of the second echelon, which were forced to move in bright sunlight. Fortunately, many of the shells did not explode or, falling at a sharp angle, ricocheted without breaking through the ice. However, the Soviet reserves suffered losses while crossing the Gulf.

In the afternoon, the 80th brigade came to the aid of the vanguard units, together with it, the commander of the combined division P.E.Dybenko and the commissar of the Southern group, K.E. Voroshilov, came to the very center of the battle. The rebels retreated into the interior of the city. A fierce protracted battle began here. The Soviet units suffered losses, for in street battles, the superiority was on the side of the rebels, who knew the topography of the city well; often their groups through basements and attics entered the rear of the Red Army. At the same time, the Northern Group was also forced to slow down its advance and shift to the left, in the direction of the main attack; as a result, the road with Finland could not be cut.

Fierce mutual counterattacks continued in the city for a long time. At about noon, the Soviet units were forced to retreat from the city center to the pier. At this moment, one of the most spectacular episodes of the Battle of Kronstadt took place. The Soviet command threw into battle one of the last reserves - the cavalry regiment of the 27th division. The cavalry attacked the sea fortress across the ice.

P.E.Dybenko described this turning point of the battle as follows:

“By 17 o'clock on March 17, one third of the city was in our hands. But, as it turned out, at this time the rebel headquarters decided to hold out on the strongholds of the city until dark and at night attack the Red Army men exhausted by the daily battle, cut them out and again capture Kronstadt ... But this insidious plan was not carried out by the rebels. At 20:00 on March 17, the Red troops launched a decisive offensive, supported by artillery that arrived on the ice. A cavalry regiment galloping across the ice to support the units in the city caused considerable confusion on the rebels. By 23 o'clock all strong points were occupied by red units, and the rebels began to surrender in whole parties.

By the evening, a sharp turning point was outlined in the battle. The rebels could not withstand the stress of the battle and began to retreat. Together with them, among the first to leave the city, most of the members of the "revolutionary committee" headed by Petrichenko and the officers - the leaders of the rebellion. The teams of both battleships threw out white flags. However, battles with individual enemy groups continued throughout the night and subsided only in the morning of the next day. March 18 at 12 o'clock 10 min. the last order of the Kronstadt operation was finally given:

"1. The Kronstadt fortress was cleared of the rebels. 2. Commander of Kronstadt was appointed military commander. Dybenko. 3. The supreme command of the forces of the fortress and the coastal obyurons is transferred by the komyuzhgroup to comrade Sedyakin, pending the order of the commander-7. "

Outcomes.

Thus, the uprising was suppressed.

Soviet troops captured 2,444 rebels, including three members of the "revolutionary committee" - Valka, Perepelkin, Pavlov. Some of the active leaders of the rebellion, mostly former officers, were already in a few days directly in Kronstadt brought to trial by a military tribunal and executed by its verdict. At the same time, the total losses of the Red Army are estimated at 10,000 people (although the official figures are several times less), some of them are buried in a mass grave on Anchor Square in Kronstadt.

In fact, the introduction of the NEP, the abolition of barrage detachments and surplus appropriation, the permission of small handicraft production, and other changes were the embodiment of the economic program of the rebels. But there were no political shifts, the power of the Soviet bureaucracy and the communists only strengthened, eventually leading to sole reign I. V. Stalin.

March, 25 1921 a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet took place. The delegates stood to honor the memory of the fallen. Then Nikolai Nikolaevich Kuzmin, a fearless commissar who remained faithful to his duty to the end, was greeted with stormy applause, who made a big speech. On the same day in the St. George Hall Winter Palace a civil funeral service was held in honor of the dead Red Army soldiers, and then the mourning procession went through the entire Nevsky Prospekt to the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, where the victims of the battles near Kronstadt were buried. In the Petrograd Military District alone, 487 commanders and Red Army men were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Most of the Kronstadters were accommodated in the forts of the former Russian fortress Ino (Petrichenko was also located here), the rest in camps near Vyborg, in Terioki and other places. Finnish soldiers were guarding the camps.

The fate of the participants in the uprising was tragic. Of the 8,000 who fled to Finland, many returned, where they ended up in concentration camps. Stepan Petrichenko himself lived in Finland, collaborated with Soviet intelligence, was arrested by the Finns in 1941 and extradited to the USSR in 1944. In the Soviet Union, he was sentenced to 10 years in camps and died in Vladimir in 1947 while being transported.

General Aleksandr Nikolaevich Kozlovsky over the years of his life in a foreign land, he changed many professions: he was a teacher of physics and natural science, a road worker, a foreman at a mechanical plant, a mechanic in a garage. He died in 1940 in Helsinki, his family remained hostage, his sons and wife were sentenced to correctional labor and prison terms, and one of his sons committed suicide.

More is known about the commanders of the Red Army, but their fate was also sad. L. Trotsky, as you know, was deprived of his Soviet citizenship and expelled from the country. In the early morning of August 20, 1940, NKVD agent Ramon Mercader killed Trotsky in Mexico.

Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet Zinoviev Grigory. Evseevich On August 24, 1936, Zinoviev was sentenced to capital punishment in the case of the Anti-Soviet Joint Trotskyist-Zinoviev Center. Shot on August 25, 1936 in Moscow.

Mikhail Tukhachevsky and the former commander of the 27th Omsk division V. Putna were shot in Moscow in the basement of the building of the Military Collegium The Supreme Court USSR June 11, 1937

Who has won?

The answer is difficult.

The idea and the course of the country's development won, as the Bolsheviks understood and did.