Brest Peace (Brest peace treaty, Brest-Litovsk peace treaty) is a peace treaty between the participants of the First World War: Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, signed on March 3, 1918 in Brest Fortress. Ratified by the Extraordinary IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The signing of peace at that moment was urgently demanded by the internal and external situation in Soviet Russia. The country was in a state of extreme economic ruin, the old army actually disintegrated, and a new one was not created. But a significant part of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party advocated the continuation of the revolutionary war (a group of "Left Communists" under the leadership. At the peace negotiations, the German delegation, taking advantage of the fact that the offensive of its army was rapidly developing at the front, offered Russia predatory peace conditions, according to which Germany would annex the Baltic states , part of Belarus and Transcaucasia, and also received indemnity.

“To continue this war over how to divide the weak nationalities captured by them between strong and rich nations, the government considers it the greatest crime against humanity and solemnly declares its determination to immediately sign the terms of peace ending this war on the specified nationalities equally fair for all without exception. conditions "- With these words, the Leninist Decree on Peace, adopted on October 26 by the Congress of Soviets, formulated the essence of the Bolshevik foreign policy. Only that peace will be just, which will allow all occupied and oppressed peoples, both in Europe and on other continents, to determine their fate by a free vote, which should take place after the withdrawal of all occupying armies. Having set this bold goal, achievable only after the overthrow of all colonial empires, Lenin cautiously adds that the Soviets are ready to enter into peace negotiations even if their program is not accepted - the Bolshevik government is ready to consider any other conditions for peace. It is determined to conduct all negotiations quite openly before the whole people and declares, unconditionally and immediately, the secret imperialist treaties confirmed or concluded by the former governments of the landowners and capitalists. As Lenin explained to the congress, this message is addressed to the governments, as well as to the peoples of the belligerent countries. Indirectly, it called on the peoples to rise up against existing governments, but directly urged these governments to conclude an immediate truce. This dual appeal was the key dilemma of the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks and the beginnings of the Brest-Litovsk tragedy.

Russia, exhausted by the war, accepted the decree on peace with a sigh of relief. Official and patriotic circles in France and Britain responded with indignant cries. Allied ambassadors and heads of allied military missions in Russia more or less imagined that Russia was incapable of waging war.

Despite the revolutionary calls, the Bolsheviks wanted to establish diplomatic contacts with the allies. Immediately after the defeat of Kerensky's troops, Trotsky proposed to resume normal relations with the British and French. The Bolsheviks, and Trotsky more than others, feared that the Germans, by setting unacceptable peace conditions, might again draw Russia and the Entente into the war. In Russia, Trotsky's proposal was ignored. Allied embassies ignored him.

The Allied ambassadors held a meeting at which they decided to ignore Trotsky's note and recommend that their governments leave it unanswered on the grounds that the Soviet regime was illegal. The governments of the allied countries followed the advice and decided to establish official relations only with the High Command of the Russian army, that is, with General Dukhonin, who was in Mogilev. By this act, they, so to speak, elevated the headquarters of the army to the level of a rival government. In addition, Dukhonin was warned against any negotiations on a ceasefire and hinted in no uncertain terms that if Russia pulled out of the war, they would be retaliated by a Japanese attack on Siberia. Trotsky immediately protested and threatened that he would arrest any Allied diplomat who tried to leave Petrograd to contact anti-Bolshevik circles in the provinces. He appealed to the diplomats of neutral countries with a request to use his influence to conclude peace. On the same day, General Dukhonin, who refused to comply with the order to cease fire, was removed - later, his own soldiers brutally dealt with him, having learned that he did not want to stop the war. Krylenko, a former ensign of the tsarist army and one of the leaders of the military organization of the Bolsheviks, was appointed to the place of the Supreme Commander.

Relations between Russia and Europe immediately hardened, which predetermined the future intervention. It couldn't be otherwise. With the determination of the allied powers to continue the war, their ambassadors could not help but use their influence against the authorities, which threatened to withdraw Russia from the war. This alone inevitably led them to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. The circumstances from the very beginning pushed the embassies and military missions to get involved in the Civil War.

Trotsky wanted to prevent this and prevent the British, French and Americans from binding themselves with indissoluble obligations. With Lenin's consent, he did his best to impress them: Europe should be interested in Russia not feeling abandoned and forced to sign peace with Germany on any terms.

On November 14, the German High Command agreed to begin negotiations for an armistice. Krylenko ordered a ceasefire and "brotherhood fronts", hoping that through contact with the Russian troops, the German army would be infected with the revolution. On the same day Trotsky notified Western powers: “The Supreme Commander of the armies of the Republic, ensign Krylenko, proposed to postpone the start of armistice negotiations for 5 days until November 18 (December 1), in order to again invite the allied governments to determine their attitude to the matter peace talks...»

Even as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky remained the chief propagandist of the revolution. He staked on the possible or actual antagonism between the authorities and the people and turned to the first so that the second could hear him. But since he did not give up trying to reach an understanding with existing governments, he combined his revolutionary appeals with an extremely flexible and subtle diplomatic game.

On November 19, a meeting of peace delegations took place, and the Germans immediately proposed to conclude a preliminary truce for a month. The Soviet delegation refused and instead asked for an extension of the ceasefire for a week to give the other Western powers time to reflect on the situation. Trotsky again turned to the Allied embassies, and again he was met with icy silence. However, he instructed the Soviet negotiators not to sign a truce until the Central Powers pledged not to transfer troops from the Russian front to the Western and—a rather unusual condition—until they allowed the Soviets to carry out revolutionary agitation among the German and Austrian troops. The German General Hoffmann, commander of the Russian front, rejected both demands. For a moment it seemed that the negotiations were broken and Russia was returning to the war.

Until now, all the important questions arising from the truce have remained open. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs decided in favor of separate peace negotiations, but not a separate peace. And even those who, like Lenin, were already inclined towards a separate peace, were not yet ready to achieve it at any cost. The main goal of the Soviet government was to buy time, to loudly declare their peaceful aspirations amid a sudden lull on the fronts, to determine the degree of revolutionary ferment in Europe and to probe the positions of allied and enemy governments.

The Bolsheviks had no doubts about the imminence of a social upsurge in Europe. But they began to wonder whether the road to peace goes through the revolution or, conversely, the road to revolution goes through the world. In the first case, the revolution will put an end to the war. In the second Russian revolution, for the time being, we will have to negotiate with the capitalist authorities. Only time could show in which direction events were moving and to what extent the revolutionary impulse from Russia determined or did not determine their direction. There is no doubt that the proletariat of Germany and Austria is restless, but what does this indicate - about the imminent collapse of the enemy or about a crisis in the distant future? The peaceful delegations of the Central Powers showed a strange willingness to make concessions. On the other hand, the hostility of the Entente seemed to weaken for a moment. The allied countries still refused to recognize the Soviets, but in early December they agreed to exchange diplomatic privileges, which are usually granted to recognized governments. Soviet diplomatic couriers were allowed to travel between Russia and Western Europe, the countries mutually recognized diplomatic passports, Chicherin was finally released from prison and returned to Russia, and Trotsky exchanged diplomatic visits with some Western ambassadors.

But at the same time, the Bolsheviks feared that the Entente would conclude a separate peace with Germany and Austria and, together with them, strike a blow at the Russian revolution. Most often, this fear was voiced by Lenin, both in public speeches and in private conversations. When it opened inner history war, she showed that his fears were justified. Austria and Germany repeatedly and secretly, together and separately, probed their Western enemies for peace. Fear of revolution was growing in the ruling circles of France and Great Britain, and the possibility of reconciliation between the Entente and the Central Powers, a reconciliation prompted by fear, could not be ruled out. It was not a real, but only a potential threat, but it was enough to convince Lenin that only a separate peace in the East could prevent a separate peace in the West.

The peace conference in Brest-Litovsk began on 9 December. Representatives of the Central Powers let it be known that they "agreed to immediately conclude a common peace without forcible annexations and indemnities." Ioffe, who led the Soviet delegation, proposed "to take a ten-day break so that the peoples whose governments have not yet joined the current negotiations on universal peace" have the opportunity to change their minds. During the adjournment, only the peace conference commissions were in session, and their work proceeded strangely smoothly. The actual negotiations did not begin until December 27, before Trotsky's arrival.

Meanwhile, the Council of People's Commissars took a number of demonstrative steps. He activated propaganda against German imperialism, and Trotsky, with the help of Karl Radek, who had just arrived in Russia, edited the leaflet "Die Fackel" ("Torch"), which was distributed in the German trenches. On December 13, the government allocated 2 million rubles for revolutionary propaganda abroad and published a report on this in the press. On the 19th, the demobilization of the Russian army began. In addition, German and Austrian prisoners of war were released from compulsory work, they were allowed to leave the camps and work at large. The Soviet government canceled the Russian-British treaty of 1907, according to which the two powers divided Persia among themselves, and on December 23 ordered Russian troops to leave Northern Persia. Finally, Trotsky instructed Joffe to demand that the peace negotiations be moved from Brest-Litovsk to Stockholm or any other city in a neutral country.

Exactly two months after the uprising, on December 24 or 25, Trotsky went to Brest-Litovsk. On the way, especially in the front area, he was greeted by delegations from local Soviets and trade unions, who asked him to speed up the negotiations and return with a peace treaty. He saw with amazement that the trenches on the Russian side were practically empty: the soldiers simply dispersed. Trotsky realized that he was going to face the enemy with no military force behind him.

The meeting took place in a deserted and gloomy setting. The city of Brest-Litovsk, at the beginning of the war, was burned and razed to the ground by the retreating Russian troops. Only the old military fortress remained intact, and the general headquarters of the eastern German armies were located in it. Peaceful delegations settled in gray houses and huts inside the fenced area of ​​the temporary camp. The Germans insisted that negotiations be conducted there, partly for reasons of their own convenience, partly to humiliate the Soviet envoys. They behaved with diplomatic courtesy. Ioffe, Kamenev, Pokrovsky and Karakhan, intellectuals and hardened revolutionaries, behaved at the negotiating table with the clumsiness that is natural for newcomers to diplomacy.

When Trotsky arrived, he was not satisfied with this state of affairs. At Lenin's urging, he went to the conference to give it a completely different look. The first meeting he attended as head of the Soviet delegation took place on 27 December. Opening it, Kühlmann stated that the Central Powers agreed to the principle of "peace without annexations and indemnities" only in the event of a general peace. Since the Western Powers have refused to negotiate and only a separate peace is on the agenda, Germany and her allies no longer consider themselves bound by this principle. He refused, as the Soviets demanded, to transfer the talks to a neutral country and lashed out at Soviet agitation against German imperialism, which, he said, cast doubt on the sincerity of the Soviets' peaceful disposition. His colleagues turned the Ukrainians against the Soviet delegation, who declared that they represented an independent Ukraine and denied Petrograd the right to speak on behalf of Ukraine and Belarus.

Trotsky got involved in this tangle of interests, characters and ambitions when, on December 28, he spoke for the first time at the conference. He simply dismissed the Ukrainian machinations. The Soviets, he announced, had no objection to Ukraine's participation in the talks because they had proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination and intended to respect it. Nor does he question the credentials of the Ukrainian delegates representing the Rada, a provincial copy or even parody of the Kerensky government. Kuhlmann again tried to provoke an open quarrel between Russians and Ukrainians, which would allow him to benefit from the struggle of the two opponents, but Trotsky again avoided the trap. Remembering the accusations and protests of the previous day, he refused to apologize for the revolutionary propaganda that the Soviets were carrying out among the German troops. He came to negotiate peace terms, Trotsky said, not to restrict his government's freedom of expression. The Soviets do not object to the fact that the Germans are leading among Russian citizens counterrevolutionary agitation. The revolution is so sure of its rightness and the attractiveness of its ideals that it is ready to welcome an open discussion. Thus, the Germans have no reason to doubt the peaceful mood of Russia. It is the sincerity of Germany that causes doubts, especially when the German delegation announced that it no longer binds itself to the principle of peace without annexations and indemnities.

Two days later, the delegations discussed the preliminary peace treaty presented by the Germans. The treaty's preamble contained the polite cliché that the signatories expressed their intention to live in peace and friendship. This was followed by a dramatic dispute over the principles of self-determination and the fate of the nations located between Russia and Germany. The dispute was mainly between Trotsky and Kuhlmann, occupied more than one meeting and took the form of a conflict between two interpretations of the term "self-determination". Both sides argued in the tone of supposedly dispassionate, academic debates on legal, historical, and sociological topics; but behind them gloomily stood the realities of war and revolution, of conquest and forcible annexation.

In almost every paragraph of the preliminary agreement, some noble principle was first affirmed, and then it was refuted. One of the first reservations provided for the liberation of the occupied territories. This did not prevent Kuhlmann from declaring that Germany intended to occupy the occupied Russian territories until the conclusion of a general peace and for an indefinite period after it. In addition, Kuhlmann argued that Poland and other German-occupied countries had already exercised their right to self-determination, since German troops local authorities were restored everywhere.

Each stage of the competition became known to the whole world, sometimes in a distorted form. The occupied nations, whose future was at stake, listened with bated breath.

On January 5, Trotsky asked for a break in the conference so that he could acquaint the government with the German demands. The conference had been going on for almost a month. The Soviets had won a lot of time, and now the party and the government had to make a decision. On the way back to Petrograd, Trotsky again saw the Russian trenches, the very abandonment of which seemed to cry out for peace. But now he understood better than ever that peace could be achieved only at the cost of complete submission and disgrace to Russia and the revolution. Reading the newspapers of German and Austrian socialists in Brest, he was shocked by the fact that some of them considered the peace conference a staged spectacle, the outcome of which was clear in advance. Some of the German socialists believed that in fact the Bolsheviks were agents of the Kaiser. One of the main motives driving Trotsky's actions at the negotiating table was the desire to wash away the stigma from the party, and now it seemed that his efforts had borne some fruit. Finally, demonstrations and strikes in support of peace began in enemy countries, and loud protests were heard from Berlin and Vienna against Hoffmann's desire to dictate terms to Russia. Trotsky came to the conclusion that the Soviet government should not accept these conditions. We must play for time and try to establish between Russia and the Central Powers a state that will be neither war nor peace. In this conviction, he appeared at Smolny, where they were waiting for him excitedly and impatiently.

Trotsky's return coincided with a conflict between the Soviet government and the finally convened Constituent Assembly. Against the expectations of the Bolsheviks and sympathizers, the Right SRs received the majority of votes. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs decided to dissolve the assembly and carried out the intention after it refused to ratify Lenin's decrees on peace, land and the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

On January 8, two days after the dissolution of the assembly, the Central Committee was completely immersed in the debate about war and peace. In order to sound the mood of the party, it was decided to conduct them in the presence of Bolshevik delegates who had arrived at the Third Congress of Soviets from the provinces. Trotsky reported on the Brest-Litovsk mission and presented his formula: "no peace, no war." Lenin urged to accept the conditions of the Germans. Bukharin advocated a "revolutionary war" against the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs. The vote brought a striking success to the supporters of the revolutionary war - the left communists, as they were called. Lenin's proposal for an immediate peace was supported by only fifteen people. Trotsky's resolution received sixteen votes. Thirty-two votes were cast for the Bukharin call for war. However, since outsiders took part in the voting, it was not binding on the Central Committee.

Soon the entire Bolshevik party was divided into those who advocated peace and those who supported the war. Behind the latter stood a significant but heterogeneous majority, with the powerful support of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, as one, were against peace. But the faction of supporters of the war was not sure that they were right. She opposed peace rather than defended the resumption of hostilities.

On January 11, at the next meeting of the Central Committee, the military faction furiously attacked Lenin. Dzerzhinsky reproached him for cowardly abandoning the program of the revolution, just as Zinoviev and Kamenev had abandoned it in October. To agree to the Kaiser's dictate, Bukharin argued, means to stick a knife in the back of the German and Austrian proletariat - a general strike against the war was just going on in Vienna. According to Uritsky, Lenin approached the problem from a narrowly Russian rather than an international point of view, and he made the same mistake in the past. On behalf of the Petrograd party organization, Kosior rejected Lenin's position. The most resolute defenders of peace were Zinoviev, Stalin and Sokolnikov. As in October, so now Zinoviev saw no reason to wait for a revolution in the West. He argued that Trotsky was wasting time in Brest and warned the Central Committee that later Germany would dictate even more painful conditions.

Lenin was skeptical of the Austrian strike, to which Trotsky and the supporters of the war attached such importance. He painted a picturesque picture of Russia's military impotence. He admitted that the world he defends is an "obscene" world, implying a betrayal of Poland. But he was convinced that if his government renounced peace and tried to fight, it would be destroyed and another government would have to accept even worse terms. He did not neglect the revolutionary potential of the West, but believed that the world would accelerate its development.

So far, Trotsky has tried his best to convince the communist left of the impracticability of a revolutionary war. At the suggestion of Lenin, the Central Committee authorized Trotsky to delay the signing of the peace by all means, only Zinoviev voted against. Then Trotsky proposed the following resolution: "We are ending the war, we are not concluding peace, we are demobilizing the army." Nine members of the Central Committee voted in favor, seven against. So the party formally allowed Trotsky to stick to his former course in Brest.

In addition, during the same break, Trotsky delivered a report at the Third Congress of Soviets. The overwhelming majority of the congress was so categorically in favor of the war that Lenin kept a low profile. Even Trotsky spoke more emphatically of his objections to peace than to war. The congress unanimously approved Trotsky's report, but made no decision and left it to the discretion of the government.

Before Trotsky set out on his return trip, he and Lenin entered into a personal agreement that introduced one significant change in the decisions of the Central Committee and the government. The reason for the unauthorized departure of Trotsky and Lenin from the official decision of the Central Committee and the government was the uncertainty of the decision itself: having voted for the formula "no peace, no war", the Bolsheviks did not foresee the probability that haunted Lenin. But the personal agreement of the two leaders, as it turned out later, allowed for a double interpretation. Lenin was under the impression that Trotsky promised to sign a peace at the first threat of an ultimatum or a resumption of the German offensive, Trotsky believed that he undertook to accept the terms of the peace only if the Germans actually launched a new offensive, and that even in this case he undertook to accept only those conditions which the Central Powers have hitherto proposed, and not the more severe ones which they will dictate later.

By mid-January, Trotsky was back at the negotiating table in Brest. In the meantime, strikes and peaceful demonstrations in Austria and Germany were either crushed or deadlocked, and the opponents greeted the head of the Soviet delegation with new self-confidence. On the this stage discussions came to the fore Ukraine and Poland. Kuhlman and Chernin were secretly preparing a separate peace with the Ukrainian Rada. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were hard at work promoting the Soviet revolution in Ukraine: the orders of the Rada were still in force in Kyiv, but Kharkov was already under the rule of the Soviets, and a representative of Kharkov accompanied Trotsky on his return to Brest. Ukrainian parties strangely changed places. Those who, under the tsar and Kerensky, stood for an alliance or federation with Russia, tended to separate from their big brother. The Bolsheviks, who had previously favored secession, now called for a federation. The separatists turned into federalists and vice versa, but not for reasons of Ukrainian or Russian patriotism, but because they wanted to secede from the established state system in Russia or, on the contrary, to unite with it. The Central Powers hoped to capitalize on this metamorphosis. Disguising themselves as supporters of Ukrainian separatism, they hoped to seize Ukraine's desperately needed food and raw materials and turn the dispute over self-determination against Russia. The weak, insecure Rada, on the verge of falling, tried to rely on the Central Powers, despite the oath of allegiance given to the Entente.

Even now Trotsky did not object to the participation of the Rada in the negotiations, but officially notified the partners that Russia did not recognize separate agreements between the Rada and the Central Powers. Trotsky, of course, understood that his opponents managed to confuse the issue of self-determination to a certain extent. It is unlikely that Trotsky would have been especially tormented by the remorse of Soviet power imposed on Ukraine: you cannot strengthen the revolution in Russia without spreading it to Ukraine, which has cut like a deep wedge between North and South Russia. But here, for the first time, the interests of the revolution clashed with the principle of self-determination, and Trotsky could no longer invoke it with the same clear conscience as before.

He again took an offensive stance on the question of Poland and asked why Poland was not represented in Brest. Kuhlmann pretended that the participation of the Polish delegation depended on Russia, which must first recognize the then Polish government. Recognition of Poland's right to independence does not imply recognition that it enjoys de facto independence under German-Austrian tutelage.

On January 21, in the midst of the discussion, Trotsky received news from Lenin about the fall of the Rada and the proclamation of Soviet power throughout Ukraine. He contacted Kyiv himself, checked the facts, and notified the Central Powers that he no longer recognized the right of the Rada to represent Ukraine at the conference.

These were his last days in Brest-Litovsk. Mutual accusations and reproaches reached such a pitch that the negotiations reached an impasse and could not drag on any longer.

On the last day before the break, the Central Powers confronted Russia with a fait accompli: they signed a separate peace with the Rada. The separate peace with Ukraine served as a pretext for the Central Powers to take Ukraine under their control, and therefore the powers of the Ukrainian partners did not matter in their eyes. It was precisely for this reason that Trotsky could not continue the negotiations, for to do so would be to promote a coup d'état and all its consequences: the overthrow of the Ukrainian Soviets and the separation of Ukraine from Russia.

The next day there was a famous scene at the meeting of the subcommittee, when General Hoffmann unfolded a large map with marked on it the lands that Germany was going to annex. Since Trotsky said that he was "ready to bow before force" but would not help the Germans save face, the general apparently thought that by laying out the German claims directly, he could shorten the road to peace. On the same day, January 28 (February 10), a second meeting of the political commission took place, Trotsky got up and made the last statement:

“We are leaving the war. We inform all peoples and their governments about this. We give the order for the complete demobilization of our armies ... At the same time, we declare that the conditions offered to us by the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary are fundamentally contrary to the interests of all peoples. These conditions are rejected by the working masses of all countries, including the peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The peoples of Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Courland and Estonia consider these conditions to be violence against their will; for the Russian people, these conditions mean a constant threat ... ".

Before the delegations left, however, something happened that Trotsky had overlooked—something that confirmed Lenin's worst fears. Kuhlman said that in view of what had happened, hostilities would be resumed, because "the fact that one of the parties demobilizes its armies does not change anything, either in fact or in law" - only its refusal to sign peace matters. Kühlmann himself gave Trotsky some reason to ignore the threat when he asked if the Soviet government was even prepared to establish legal and commercial relations with the Central Powers and how they could communicate with Russia. Instead of answering the question, as his own conviction suggested, what could oblige the Central Powers to adhere to the "no peace, no war" formula, Trotsky arrogantly refused to discuss it.

He stayed in Brest for another day. He became aware of a quarrel between Hoffmann, who insisted on the resumption of hostilities, and civilian diplomats, who preferred to agree to a state between war and peace. It seemed that on the spot the diplomats got the better of the military. Therefore, Trotsky returned to Petrograd confident and proud of his success. He gave humanity the first unforgettable lesson in truly open diplomacy. But at the same time he allowed himself to be optimistic. He underestimated the enemy and even refused to heed his warnings. Trotsky had not yet reached Petrograd when General Hoffmann, with the consent of Ludendorff, Hindenburg and the Kaiser, was already ordering the German troops to march.

The offensive began on February 17 and was not met with any resistance. When the news of the offensive reached Smolny, the Central Committee of the party voted eight times, but never came to an unequivocal decision about how to get out of the situation. The committee was equally divided between the supporters of peace and the adherents of war. Trotsky's single voice could break the deadlock. Indeed, in the next two days, February 17 and 18, only he alone could make a fateful decision. But he did not join any of the factions.

He was in a very difficult position. Judging by his speeches and actions, many identified him with the military faction, and indeed he was politically and morally closer to it than to the Leninist faction. But after all, he gave Lenin a personal promise that he would support peace if the Germans resume hostilities. He still refused to believe that this moment had come. On February 17, he, along with the supporters of the war, voted against Lenin's proposal to immediately request new peace negotiations. Then he voted with the peaceful faction against the revolutionary war. Finally, he came up with his own proposal, advising the government to wait with new negotiations until the military-political results of the German offensive were clarified. Since the military faction supported him, the proposal passed by a margin of one vote, his own. Then Lenin raised the question of concluding peace if it turned out that the German offensive was a fact and if no revolutionary opposition came out against it in Germany and Austria. The Central Committee answered the question in the affirmative.

Early the next morning, Trotsky opened the meeting of the Central Committee with a review of recent events. has just informed the world that Germany is protecting all peoples, including her opponents in the East, from the Bolshevik contagion. Reported appearance in Russia German divisions from the Western Front. German planes were operating over Dvinsk. An attack on Revel was expected. Everything pointed to a full-scale offensive, but the facts have not yet been reliably confirmed. Lenin insistently suggested that we immediately turn to Germany. We must act, he said, there is no time to waste. Either war, revolutionary war, or peace. Trotsky, hoping that the offensive would cause a serious public outburst in Germany, continued to argue that it was too early to ask for peace. Lenin's proposal was again rejected by a one-vote margin.

But on the same day, February 18, before evening came a dramatic change. Opening the evening meeting of the Central Committee, Trotsky announced that the Germans had already captured Dvinsk. Rumors spread widely about a pending offensive into Ukraine. Still hesitating, Trotsky proposed to "probe" the Central Powers for their demands, but not yet ask for peace talks.

Three times Trotsky opposed asking the Germans for peace talks, and three times offered only a preliminary test of the waters. But when Lenin again put his plan to the vote, Trotsky, to everyone's surprise, voted not for his own proposal, but for Lenin's. The peaceful faction won by one vote. The new majority asked Lenin and Trotsky to draft an appeal to the governments of enemy countries. Later that night, a meeting of the central committees of the two ruling parties, the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, took place, and during this meeting the military faction again gained the upper hand. But in the government, the Bolsheviks managed to defeat their partners, and the next day, February 19, the government officially turned to the enemy with a request for peace.

In anxious expectation and fear, four days passed before an answer came to Petrograd from the Germans. In the meantime, no one could say on what terms the Central Powers would agree to reopen negotiations, or if they would agree at all. Their armies were advancing. Petrograd was open to attack. A committee of revolutionary defense was formed in the city, and Trotsky headed it. Even while seeking peace, the Soviets had to prepare for war. Trotsky asked the Allied embassies and military missions whether the Western powers would help the Soviets if Russia entered the war again. However, this time the British and French were more responsive. Three days after the request for peace was sent, Trotsky informed the Central Committee (in Lenin's absence) that the British and French had offered military cooperation. To his bitter disappointment, the Central Committee flatly rejected him and thereby rejected his actions. Both factions turned against him: the defenders of peace because they feared that accepting help from the Allies would reduce the chances of a separate peace, and the advocates of war because considerations of revolutionary morality, which prevented them from entering into an agreement with Germany, prevented them from agreeing to cooperate with " Anglo-French imperialists. Then Trotsky announced that he was leaving the post of Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He cannot remain in office if the party does not understand that the socialist government has the right to accept aid from the capitalist countries, provided that it maintains complete independence. In the end, he convinced the Central Committee, and Lenin firmly supported him.

Finally, a response arrived from the Germans, shocking everyone. Germany gave the Soviets forty-eight hours to think about a response and only three days to negotiate. The conditions were much worse than those offered in Brest: Russia must carry out a complete demobilization, abandon Latvia and Estonia and withdraw from Ukraine and Finland. When the Central Committee met on February 23, it had less than a day to make a decision. The outcome again depended on Trotsky's single vote. He yielded to Lenin and agreed to ask for peace, but nothing obliged him to accept new, much more difficult conditions. He did not agree with Lenin that the Soviet Republic was completely incapable of defending itself. On the contrary, he leaned more towards the military faction than before. And yet, despite his fears about peace, despite his confidence in the ability of the Soviets to defend themselves, he again ensured with his voice the victory of the peaceful faction.

His strange behavior cannot be explained without a closer look at the arguments and motives of the factions and the balance of power between them. Lenin sought to obtain a "breathing space" for Soviet Republic, which would make it possible to restore relative order in the country and create a new army. For a respite, he was ready to pay any price - to leave Ukraine and the Baltic countries, to pay any indemnity. He did not consider this "shameful" world to be final. Lenin hoped that during the respite in Germany, a revolution could mature and reverse the Kaiser's conquests.

To this, the military faction objected that the Central Powers would not allow Lenin to use the respite: they would cut Russia off from Ukrainian grain and coal and Caucasian oil, subdue half of the Russian population, finance and support the counter-revolutionary movement, and stifle the revolution. In addition, the Soviets are unable to form a new army during a short respite. Armed forces will have to be created in the process of struggle, because this is the only possible way. It is true that the Soviets may be forced to evacuate Petrograd and even Moscow, but they will have enough room to retreat where they can muster their strength. Even if it turns out that the people do not want to fight for the revolution, as well as for the old regime - the leaders of the military faction did not at all consider that this would necessarily happen - then every advance of the Germans, accompanied by horrors and robberies, will shake off fatigue and apathy from the people, will force to resist him and, finally, arouse truly popular enthusiasm and raise him to a revolutionary war. On the wave of this enthusiasm, a new, formidable army will rise. The revolution, untainted by miserable capitulation, will be revived, it will stir the soul of the foreign proletariat and dispel the nightmare of imperialism.

Each faction was convinced of the disastrous course proposed by the other side, and the discussion took place in an electrified, emotional atmosphere. Apparently, Trotsky alone argued that from a realistic point of view, both lines have their pros and cons, and both are admissible, based on principles and revolutionary morality.

It has long been a hackneyed thought among historians - to which Trotsky himself later had a hand - that the Leninist course had all the virtues of realism, and that the military faction embodied the most quixotic aspect of Bolshevism. Such a view is unfair to the leaders of the supporters of the war. Indeed, Lenin's political originality and courage elevated him in those days to the height of genius, and subsequent events - the fall of the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs and the abolition of the Brest Treaty before the expiration of the year - confirmed his correctness. It is also true that the military faction often acted under the influence of conflicting feelings and did not propose a coherent course of action. But in their best moments, its leaders proved their case convincingly and realistically, and for the most part their arguments were also justified in practice. The respite that Lenin received was, in fact, half illusory. After the peace was signed, the Kaiser government did everything in its power to crush the Soviets. However, he was placed by the struggle on the Western Front, which took away huge forces. Without a separate peace in the West, Germany would not have been able to achieve more, even if the Soviets had not accepted the Brest-Litovsk Diktat.

The other argument of the military faction, that the Soviets would have to create a new army on the battlefield, in battles, and not in the barracks during a quiet respite, paradoxically, was very realistic. This is how the Red Army was ultimately created. It is precisely because Russia is so exhausted by the war that she could not raise a new army in relatively calm times. Only a severe shock and an inevitable danger, which compelled to fight, and to fight immediately, could awaken the energy hidden in the Soviet system and force it to act.

The weakness of the military faction was not so much in its wrongness, but in its lack of leadership. Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, Radek, Ioffe, Uritsky, Kollontai, Lomov-Oppokov, Bubnov, Pyatakov, Smirnov and Ryazanov, all prominent members of the party, were the main spokesmen for its opinion. Some were distinguished by a huge mind and were brilliant orators and publicists, others were brave, people of action. The position of the leader of the military faction was empty, and she threw inviting glances at Trotsky. At first glance, there was little to prevent Trotsky from meeting their expectations. Although he said that the Leninist strategy, like the opposite, had its merits, he did not hide his internal rejection of this strategy. It is all the more striking that at the most critical moments he supported Lenin with all his authority.

He was in no hurry to become the leader of the military faction, as he understood that this would immediately turn the differences into an irreparable split in the Bolshevik party and, possibly, into a bloody conflict. He and Lenin would have been different sides barricades; as leaders of warring factions, divided not by the usual differences, but by matters of life and death. Lenin had already warned the Central Committee that if he again did not receive a majority of votes on the question of peace, he would leave the committee and the government and turn against them to the rank and file members of the party. In this case, Trotsky remained the only successor to Lenin as head of government. Precisely in order to prevent the party from sliding into a civil war in its own ranks, in decisive moment Trotsky voted for Lenin.

The peaceful faction won, but its conscience was troubled. Immediately after the Central Committee decided on February 23 to accept the terms of the Germans, it unanimously voted to begin immediate preparations for a new war. When it came to appointing a delegation to Brest-Litovsk, a tragicomic episode occurred: all members of the committee shied away from dubious honor; no one, even the most ardent supporter of peace, wanted to put his signature on the treaty. Trotsky asked the Central Committee to consider his resignation from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which was actually under the control of Chicherin. The Central Committee asked Trotsky to remain in office until peace was signed. He only agreed not to publicly announce his resignation and said that he would not appear in any government office again. At Lenin's insistence, the Central Committee obliged him to attend at least those government meetings where foreign affairs were not discussed.

After recent tensions, victories and failures, Trotsky was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. It seemed that his efforts in Brest had gone to waste. He was reproached, not without reason, for giving the party a false sense of security, as he repeatedly assured them that the Germans would not dare to attack.

On March 3, Sokolnikov signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, making it more than clear that the Soviets were acting under pressure. In less than two weeks, the Germans captured Kyiv and a significant territory of Ukraine, the Austrians entered Odessa, and the Turks entered Trebizond. In Ukraine, the occupying authorities liquidated the Soviets and restored the Rada, though only in order to disperse the Rada a little later and put Hetman Skoropadsky at the head of the puppet administration in its place. The temporary victors flooded the Leninist government with demands and ultimatums, one more humiliating than the other. The most bitter was the ultimatum, according to which the Soviet Republic was to immediately sign a peace treaty with "independent" Ukraine. The Ukrainian people, especially the peasants, offered desperate resistance to the invaders and their local tools. By signing a separate treaty with Ukraine, the Soviets would unequivocally renounce all Ukrainian resistance. At a meeting of the Central Committee, Trotsky demanded that the German ultimatum be rejected. Lenin, not for a moment forgetting about future revenge, was determined to drink the cup of humiliation to the end. But after each German provocation, both in the party and in the Soviets, opposition to peace grew stronger. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had not yet been ratified, and ratification was in doubt.

On March 6, an emergency congress of the party was held in the Tauride Palace, which was supposed to decide whether to recommend ratification to the future Congress of Soviets. The meetings were held in strict secrecy, and the minutes were not published until 1925. An atmosphere of deep despondency reigned at the congress. The provincial delegates discovered that in the face of the threat of a German offensive, the evacuation of government offices from Petrograd was being prepared, although even the Kerensky government refused to take this step. The commissars were already "sitting on their suitcases" - only Trotsky was to remain in place to organize the defense. Until recently, the desire for peace was so strong that it overthrew the February regime and brought the Bolsheviks to power. But now that peace has come, reproaches fall primarily on the party that achieved it.

At the congress, the main controversy inevitably flared up around Trotsky's activities. In his sharpest speech, Lenin urged the ratification of peace.

At the party congress, Lenin made the cryptic remark that the situation was changing so rapidly that in two days he himself might oppose ratification. Therefore, Trotsky tried to get the congress to formulate a resolution that was not too harsh. However, in the depths of his soul, Lenin did not expect an encouraging response from the Entente, and again he was right.

At that time, the appointment of Trotsky as Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs was just being discussed or decided in the inner-party soviets. On behalf of the Leninist faction, Zinoviev assured Trotsky that Trotsky's tactics "were by and large the correct tactics, which were aimed at rousing the masses in the West." But Trotsky must understand that the party has changed its position, that it is pointless to argue about the wording "neither peace nor war." When it came to electing the Central Committee, he and Lenin received the most votes. While condemning his line, the party nevertheless placed full confidence in him.

Four hectic months have passed since the Soviets ratified peace. The Council of People's Commissars moved from Petrograd to Moscow and settled in the Kremlin. Allied diplomatic missions also left Petrograd, but in protest against a separate peace they left for provincial Vologda. Trotsky became People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and began to "arm the revolution." The Japanese invaded Siberia and occupied Vladivostok. German troops crushed the Finnish revolution and forced the Russian fleet to withdraw from the Gulf of Finland. In addition, they occupied the whole of Ukraine, Crimea and the coasts of the Azov and Black Seas. The British and French landed at Murmansk. The Czech Legion rebelled against the Soviets. Encouraged by the foreign interventionists, the Russian counter-revolutionary forces resumed the deadly war against the Bolsheviks, subordinating principles and conscience to it. Many of those who only recently called the Bolsheviks German agents, first of all Milyukov and his comrades, accepted help from Germany to fight the Bolsheviks. Famine began in Moscow and the cities of Northern Russia, cut off from the granaries. Lenin announced the complete nationalization of industry and called on committees of the peasant poor to requisition food from wealthy peasants in order to feed the urban workers. Several real rebellions and several imaginary conspiracies were put down.

Never before has the conclusion of peace brought so much suffering and humiliation as the Brest “peace” brought to Russia. But Lenin, throughout all these troubles and disappointments, cherished his offspring - the revolution. He did not want to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, although he violated its terms more than once. He did not stop calling the German and Austrian workers to revolt. Despite the stipulated disarmament of Russia, he gave sanction to the creation of the Red Army. But under no circumstances did Lenin allow his supporters to take up arms against Germany. He summoned to Moscow the Bolsheviks, who led the Ukrainian Soviets, who wanted to strike at the occupying authorities from the underground. Throughout Ukraine, the German war machine crushed the partisans. The Red Guard watched their agony from behind the Russian border and languished with the desire to rush to help, but Lenin curbed it with a firm hand.

Trotsky had long ceased to resist the conclusion of peace. He agreed with the party's final decision and its consequences. Solidarity with the people's commissars and party discipline in equal measure obliged him to adhere to the Leninist course. Trotsky faithfully followed this course, although he had to pay for his loyalty with internal struggle and hours of bitter torment. Supporters of the revolutionary war among the Bolsheviks, deprived of a leader, confused, fell silent. All the louder and more impatiently did the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries speak out against peace. In March, immediately after the treaty was ratified, they withdrew from the Council of People's Commissars. They continued to participate in almost all government departments, including the Cheka, as well as in the executive bodies of the Soviets. But, embittered by everything that was happening, they could not be in opposition to the government and at the same time be responsible for its actions.

Such was the situation when, at the beginning of July 1918, the Fifth Congress of Soviets met in Moscow. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to go through with the matter and disengage from the Bolsheviks. Again there were angry protests against peace. The Ukrainian delegates went up to the podium to talk about the desperate struggle of the partisans and beg for help. The leaders of the Left Social Revolutionaries Kamkov and Spiridonova condemned the "Bolshevik treason" and demanded a war of liberation.

Trotsky on July 4 asked the congress to sanction an emergency order issued by him in his capacity as commissar for military and naval affairs. Severe discipline was introduced into the Russian partisan detachments by order, as they threatened to disrupt the peace with unauthorized skirmishes with German troops. Trotsky said that no one has the right to appropriate the functions of the government and independently decide on the start of hostilities.

On July 6, noisy debates were interrupted by the assassination of the German ambassador, Count Mirbach. The murderers Blyumkin and Andreev, two Left SRs, senior officials of the Cheka, acted on the orders of Spiridonova, hoping to provoke a war between Germany and Russia. Immediately after this, the Left SRs rose in revolt against the Bolsheviks. They managed to arrest Dzerzhinsky and other chiefs of the Cheka, who headed for the headquarters of the rebels without protection. The Social Revolutionaries occupied the post office and the telegraph office and announced the overthrow of the Leninist government. But they did not have a leader and a plan of action, and after two days of skirmishes and skirmishes, they surrendered.

On July 9, the Congress of Soviets met again, and Trotsky reported on the suppression of the uprising. He said the rebels had taken the government by surprise. It sent several reliable detachments from the capital to fight against the Czechoslovak legion. The government entrusted its security to the same Red Guard, which consisted of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who staged the uprising. The only thing that Trotsky could put up against the rebels was a regiment of Latvian riflemen under the command of Vatsetis, a former colonel of the General Staff and in the near future commander in chief of the Red Army, and a revolutionary detachment of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war under the command of Bela Kun, the future founder of the Hungarian Communist Party. But the uprising had an almost farcical character, if not from a political, then from a military point of view. The rebels were a band of bold but unorganized guerrillas. They were unable to coordinate their attack and eventually surrendered not even to force, but to the persuasion of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky, who was just establishing discipline in the ranks of the Red Guards and partisans and reforming their detachments into a centralized Red Army, took advantage of the uprising as an objective lesson that clearly showed the correctness of his military line. The leaders of the uprising were arrested, but amnestied after a few months. Only a few of them, those who abused their high position in the Cheka, were executed.

Thus, while Trotsky fought back the stubborn echo of his own passionate protest against peace, the fateful Brest-Litovsk crisis ended.

In the west, a territory of 1 million square meters was torn away from Russia. km, in the Caucasus, Kars, Ardagan, Batum retreated to Turkey. Russia pledged to demobilize the army and navy. According to an additional Russian-German financial agreement signed in Berlin, she was obliged to pay Germany an indemnity of 6 billion marks. The treaty was ratified on March 15, 1918 by the Extraordinary Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

On the Soviet side, the agreement was signed by the deputy. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and secretary of the delegation. The Brest Treaty remained in force for 3 months. After the revolution in Germany 1918–1919, the Soviet government on November 13, 1918 unilaterally annulled it.

According to the frankly predatory terms of the treaty, Poland, the Baltic States, part of Belarus, Ardagan, Kars and Batum in Transcaucasia departed from Soviet Russia. Ukraine (actually occupied by the Germans by agreement with the Central Rada) and Finland were recognized as independent. Total losses amounted to 780 thousand square meters. km, 56 million people, up to 40% of the country's industrial proletariat, 70% iron, 90% coal. Russia pledged to demobilize the army and navy and pay a huge indemnity of 6 billion gold marks.

Russian government pledged to completely demobilize the army, withdraw its troops from Ukraine, the Baltic states and Finland, and conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The Russian fleet was being withdrawn from its bases in Finland and Estonia.

Russia paid 3 billion rubles in reparations

The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central European countries.

The November Revolution in Germany swept away the Kaiser's empire. This allowed Soviet Russia to unilaterally annul the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on November 13, 1918 and return most of the territories. German troops left the territory of Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus.

Effects

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, as a result of which huge territories were torn away from Russia, which consolidated the loss of a significant part of the country's agricultural and industrial base, aroused opposition to the Bolsheviks from almost all political forces, both from the right and from the left. The treaty almost immediately became known as the "obscene peace". Patriotically minded citizens considered him a consequence of the previous agreements of the Germans with Lenin, who was called as early as 1917 German spy. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were in alliance with the Bolsheviks and were part of the “Red” government, as well as the faction of “Left Communists” that had formed within the RCP (b) spoke of “betrayal of the world revolution”, since the conclusion of peace on the Eastern Front objectively strengthened the Kaiser’s regime in Germany, allowed him to continue the war against the allies in France and at the same time eliminated the front in Turkey, allowed Austria-Hungary to concentrate its forces on the war in Greece and Italy. The agreement of the Soviet government to stop propaganda work in the territories occupied by the Germans meant that the Bolsheviks surrendered the Ukraine, the Baltic states and most of Belarus.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk served as a catalyst for the formation of a "democratic counter-revolution", expressed in the proclamation of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik governments in Siberia and the Volga region, and the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in June 1918 in Moscow. The suppression of speeches, in turn, led to the formation of a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship and a full-scale civil war.

Literature

1. Lenin's decree on peace. - M., 1958.

3. “Trotsky. Armed Prophet. years." Part 2. / Per. from English. . - M.:, 2006. S.351-408.

4., Rosenthal. 1917: Package-set of documentary materials on history. - M., 1993

6. Reader on the history of the CPSU: A guide for universities. This year / Comp. and others - M., 1989.

7. Shevotsukov of the history of the civil war: A look through decades: Book. For the teacher. - M., 1992.

The Brest peace is one of the most humiliating episodes in the history of Russia. It became a resounding diplomatic failure of the Bolsheviks and was accompanied by an acute political crisis within the country.

Peace Decree

The "Peace Decree" was adopted on October 26, 1917 - the day after the armed coup - and spoke of the need to conclude a just democratic peace without annexations and indemnities between all warring peoples. It served as the legal basis for a separate agreement with Germany and the other Central Powers.

Publicly, Lenin spoke about the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, he considered the revolution in Russia only initial stage world socialist revolution. In fact, there were other reasons as well. The warring peoples did not act according to Ilyich's plans - they did not want to turn bayonets against the governments, and the allied governments ignored the peace proposal of the Bolsheviks. Only the countries of the enemy bloc that were losing the war went for rapprochement.

Terms

Germany declared that it was ready to accept the condition of peace without annexations and indemnities, but only if this peace was signed by all the belligerent countries. But none of the Entente countries joined the peace negotiations, so Germany abandoned the Bolshevik formula, and their hopes for a just peace were finally buried. The talk in the second round of negotiations was exclusively about a separate peace, the terms of which were dictated by Germany.

Betrayal and necessity

Not all Bolsheviks were willing to sign a separate peace. The left was categorically opposed to any agreements with imperialism. They defended the idea of ​​exporting the revolution, believing that without socialism in Europe, Russian socialism is doomed to perish (and the subsequent transformations of the Bolshevik regime proved them right). The leaders of the left Bolsheviks were Bukharin, Uritsky, Radek, Dzerzhinsky and others. They called for guerrilla warfare against German imperialism, and in the future they hoped to wage regular fighting we are creating the Red Army.

For the immediate conclusion of a separate peace was, above all, Lenin. He was afraid of the German offensive and the complete loss of his own power, which, even after the coup, was largely based on German money. It is unlikely that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was directly bought by Berlin. The main factor was precisely the fear of losing power. Considering that a year after the conclusion of peace with Germany, Lenin was ready even for the division of Russia in exchange for international recognition, then the terms of the Brest Peace would seem not so humiliating.

Trotsky occupied an intermediate position in the inner-party struggle. He defended the thesis "No peace, no war." That is, he proposed to stop hostilities, but not to sign any agreements with Germany. As a result of the struggle within the party, it was decided to drag out the negotiations in every possible way, expecting a revolution in Germany, but if the Germans present an ultimatum, then agree to all conditions. However, Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation in the second round of negotiations, refused to accept the German ultimatum. Negotiations broke down and Germany continued to advance. When the peace was signed, the Germans were 170 km from Petrograd.

Annexations and indemnities

Peace conditions were very difficult for Russia. She lost Ukraine and Polish lands, renounced her claims to Finland, gave away the Batumi and Kars regions, had to demobilize all her troops, abandon the Black Sea Fleet and pay huge indemnities. The country was losing almost 800 thousand square meters. km and 56 million people. In Russia, the Germans received the exclusive right to freely engage in entrepreneurship. In addition, the Bolsheviks pledged to pay the royal debts of Germany and its allies.

At the same time, the Germans did not comply with their own obligations. After signing the treaty, they continued the occupation of Ukraine, overthrew the Soviet regime on the Don and helped the White movement in every possible way.

Rise of the Left

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk almost led to a split in the Bolshevik Party and the loss of power by the Bolsheviks. Lenin hardly dragged the final decision on peace through a vote in the Central Committee, threatening to resign. The split of the party did not happen only thanks to Trotsky, who agreed to abstain from the vote, ensuring the victory of Lenin. But this did not help to avoid a political crisis.

The Brest Peace of 1918 was a peace treaty between representatives of Soviet Russia and representatives of the Central Powers, which marked the defeat and withdrawal of Russia from the First World War.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on March 3, 1918 and annulled in November 1918 by the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR.

Prerequisites for the signing of a peace treaty

In October 1917 another revolution took place in Russia. The Provisional Government, which ruled the country after the abdication of Nicholas 2, was overthrown and the Bolsheviks came to power, the Soviet state began to form. One of the main slogans of the new government was "peace without annexations and indemnities", they advocated an immediate end to the war and Russia's entry into a peaceful path of development.

At the very first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks presented their own decree on peace, which provided for an immediate end to the war with Germany and an early truce. The war, according to the Bolsheviks, dragged on too long and became too bloody for Russia, so its continuation is impossible.

Peace negotiations with Germany began on November 19 at the initiative of Russia. Immediately after the signing of peace, Russian soldiers began to leave the front, and this did not always happen legally - there were many AWOLs. The soldiers were simply tired of the war and wanted to return to civilian life as soon as possible. Russian army could no longer participate in hostilities, as it was exhausted, as well as the whole country.

Signing of the Brest peace treaty

Negotiations on the signing of the peace proceeded in several stages, since the parties could not reach an understanding in any way. The Russian government, although it wanted to get out of the war as soon as possible, did not intend to pay an indemnity (monetary ransom), since this was considered humiliating and had never been practiced before in Russia. Germany did not agree to such conditions and demanded payment of an indemnity.

Soon allied forces Germany and Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum to Russia, according to which it could withdraw from the war, but at the same time lose the territories of Belarus, Poland and part of the Baltic states. The Russian delegation found itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, the Soviet government did not like such conditions, as they seemed humiliating, but, on the other hand, the country, exhausted by revolutions, did not have the strength and means to continue its participation in the war.

As a result of the meetings, the councils made an unexpected decision. Trotsky said that Russia did not intend to sign a peace treaty drawn up on such terms, however, the country would not participate in the war further either. According to Trotsky, Russia is simply withdrawing its armies from the field of hostilities and will not offer any resistance. The surprised German command said that if Russia did not sign the peace, they would start the offensive again.

Germany and Austria-Hungary again mobilized their troops and launched an offensive into Russian territories, however, contrary to their expectations, Trotsky kept his promise, and the Russian soldiers refused to fight and did not offer any resistance. This situation caused a split within the Bolshevik Party, some of them understood that they would have to sign a peace treaty, otherwise the country would suffer, while some insisted that the world would be a shame for Russia.

Terms of the Brest Peace

The terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were not too favorable for Russia, as it lost a lot of territory, but the ongoing war would have cost the country much more.

• Russia lost the territories of Ukraine, partly Belarus, Poland and the Baltic States, as well as the Grand Duchy of Finland;
• Russia also lost a fairly significant part of the territories in the Caucasus;
• The Russian army and fleet were to be immediately demobilized and completely had to leave the battlefield;
• The Black Sea Fleet was to go to the command of Germany and Austria-Hungary;
• The treaty obligated the Soviet government to immediately stop not only hostilities, but also all revolutionary propaganda on the territory of Germany, Austria and the allied countries.

The last point caused especially a lot of controversy in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, since it effectively forbade the Soviet government to promote the ideas of socialism in other states and interfered with the creation of the socialist world that the Bolsheviks so dreamed of. Germany also ordered the Soviet government to pay all the losses that the country suffered as a result of revolutionary propaganda.

Despite the signing of the peace treaty, the Bolsheviks feared that Germany might resume hostilities, so the government was urgently transferred from Petrograd to Moscow. Moscow became the new capital.

The results and significance of the Brest Peace

Despite the fact that the signing of the peace treaty was criticized as Soviet people, and representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the consequences were not as dire as expected - Germany was defeated in the First World War, and Soviet Russia immediately annulled the peace treaty.

100 years ago, on March 3, 1918, the “obscene” Brest peace was signed. Russia was officially defeated and withdrew from the world war.

After February, Russia lost the ability to wage war with the Central Powers. As the military operations of the summer of 1917 showed, the Russian army was disorganized, decayed and could not carry out offensive operations. The further degradation of Russia led to the fact that the army lost the opportunity even to defend itself. The policy of the Provisional Government and the Western-Febralists led to the fact that the Russian statehood was destroyed. The Time of Troubles began, caused by the fundamental contradictions that had accumulated over the centuries in the Russia of the Romanovs.

It was a disaster. Russia writhed in agony. The national outskirts were seething. The policy of the national separatists became one of the causes of a large-scale civil war. Even before October, peasant Russia exploded - the Peasants' War. The peasants divided the landlords' lands, burned the estates, venting the hatred that had been accumulating for an entire era on social injustice. A criminal revolution has begun - the eternal companion of unrest. Gangs were formed that terrorized entire settlements and areas. The Cossacks remembered their liberties. The industry and transport system was falling apart, the cities and the army were left without supplies. The village did not want to feed the city, which did not supply them with manufactured goods. Hunger began.

Russia could not fight. The generals were mired in intrigues, many top military leaders supported the February-March coup in order to occupy high positions in the "new Russia". Then part of the generals opposed the Provisional Government in order to restore order, but the rebellion failed. Another part of the generals took the path of supporting the formation of various national "armies". The provisional government, by its actions, finished off order, unity of command, discipline in the troops. The rear, the transport system collapsed, industry could not supply the army and cities. That is Russia has lost the ability to wage a regular war- to supply millions of soldiers with everything necessary. The soldiers themselves (yesterday's peasants) and the Cossacks did not want to fight anymore, they wanted peace and return home, to take part in the redistribution of the land. And the Provisional Government was so hated or completely indifferent to it that when the Bolsheviks went to take power, no one defended the temporary workers.

The old monarchical Russia is dead. Died with her and new Russia"- pro-Western democratic-bourgeois persuasion. And socialist, Soviet Russia - statehood, army, economy, etc. - had yet to be created. Under these conditions, other powers were preparing to divide the “skins” of the Russian bear. Our enemies - Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, were preparing to occupy the western regions of Russia. Our Western "partners" - England, France and the United States, divided the Russian land into spheres of influence and were also preparing to capture strategic ports, cities and points. The masters of the West needed Russia's resources to build their "new world order".

Under these conditions, the Soviet government was forced to conclude a truce and start peace negotiations. Negotiations dragged on. The Bolsheviks were aware of the difficulties of the German bloc. Germany itself was barely holding on. The blockade completely exhausted the country. The army still had a powerful potential and was ready to fight. And the population was tired of the war, the economy was bursting at the seams. There were practically no resources to continue the war. There was only hope for forcing Russia to peace and seizing its resources, with the withdrawal of part of the troops from the Russian front to the Western one. The condition of Austria-Hungary and Turkey was even worse, they were on the verge of complete collapse (following the example of Russia). Therefore, the Bolsheviks hoped that while negotiations were going on, a revolution would take place in Germany and the Central Powers would lose the war. This will allow Russia to maintain the status quo.

However, the Germans also understood the complexity of their situation and their allies, they were not going to delay the peace agreement. The Ukrainian factor also helped them - Ukrainian nationalists concluded a separate, separate agreement with Germany. This made it possible, on “legal” grounds, to launch an invasion of Ukraine, where Soviet troops were already able to occupy Kyiv and most of Little Russia, freeing it from the Ukronazis. In addition, Trotsky, who was an agent of the influence of the US masters, provoked the Germans in every possible way in order to resume hostilities and, in a crisis, strengthen his position in the Bolshevik elite. On January 28 (February 10), 1918, Trotsky issued a provocative declaration that Soviet Russia was ending the war, demobilizing the army, but not signing peace. In response, the Germans stated that Russia's failure to sign a peace treaty automatically entails the termination of the truce.

On February 18, 1918, German troops launched an offensive along the entire front. A few days later they were supported by Austro-Hungarian troops. The Turkish army launched an offensive in the Caucasus even earlier. On February 19, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin sent the German government the consent of the Soviet government to sign the German terms. The German side demanded an official written notification, and continued the offensive of the troops in the north in two directions: on Revel - Narva - Petrograd and on Pskov. Within a week they occupied a number of cities and created a threat to Petrograd.

On February 22, Trotsky, recognizing the failure of his negotiations with the German delegation, resigns from the post of People's Commissar for foreign affairs. G. V. Chicherin becomes the new People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (he headed the department until 1930). At the same time, Trotsky, for supporting Lenin during a discussion in the party leadership, rose even more. Lenin already on March 4 appoints Trotsky chairman of the Supreme Military Council, and on March 13 - People's Commissar of War. That is, Trotsky became the military leader of Soviet Russia, concentrating enormous power in his hands.

On February 23, the German side transmitted a response that contained even more difficult conditions. The SNK was given 48 hours to accept the ultimatum. The first two paragraphs of the document repeated the ultimatum of January 27 (February 9), that is, they confirmed the territorial claims of the Central Powers. In addition, it was proposed to immediately clear Livonia and Estonia from Russian troops. German police forces were brought into both areas. Germany demanded: immediately make peace with the Ukrainian Central Rada, withdraw troops from Ukraine and Finland, return the Anatolian provinces to Turkey, immediately demobilize the army, withdraw its fleet in the Black and Baltic Seas and the Arctic Ocean to Russian ports and disarm it, etc. d.

On February 23, 1918, a historic meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) was held. Lenin demanded the conclusion of peace on German terms, threatening otherwise to resign, which in fact meant a split in the party. Trotsky, despite his negative attitude towards the peace treaty, refused to participate in the discussion, and supported Lenin. In the end, Lenin received the majority of votes. During the voting, Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky, Ioffe and Krestinsky abstained, which allowed the historic decision to sign peace by a majority of 7 votes to 4 with 4 abstentions. The "left communists" headed by Bukharin came out against the world.

At the same time, the Central Committee unanimously decided to "prepare an immediate revolutionary war." Soviet Russia began to take emergency measures to recreate the army, first on a volunteer basis, and then on traditional military service. On February 23, the Council of People's Commissars of February 21 “The socialist fatherland is in danger!”, As well as the “Appeal of the Military Commander-in-Chief” N.V. Krylenko, which ended with the words: “... All to. All in defense of the revolution." A mass enrollment of volunteers in the Red Army detachments began, created in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR "On the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army" dated January 15 (28), 1918.

On the same day, February 23, late in the evening, a joint meeting of the Bolshevik and Left SR factions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee took place. The Left SRs decided to vote against peace. After the joint meeting, a separate meeting of the Bolshevik faction alone began. When voting, Lenin collected 72 votes against 25 votes for the "Left Communists". On February 24, Lenin, with great difficulty, by 126 votes to 85 with 26 abstentions, managed to push his decision through the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The Left SRs called for the organization of a mass guerrilla war against the German troops, even if such a war ended with the loss of Petrograd and significant territories of Russia.

The Soviet delegation returned to Brest-Litovsk on March 1. On March 3, the contract was signed. On March 6-8, 1918, at the 7th emergency congress of the RSDLP (b), Lenin also managed to push through the ratification of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. During the voting, the votes were distributed as follows: 30 for ratification, 12 against, 4 abstained. On March 14-16, 1918, the IV Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets finally ratified the peace treaty - by a majority of 784 votes against 261, with 115 abstentions. The congress also decided to transfer the capital from Petrograd to Moscow in connection with the danger of a German offensive.

According to the terms of the Brest Peace, Russia was to carry out the complete demobilization of the army (the old tsarist army, as well as the Red Army) and the complete demining of its part of the Black and Baltic Seas. The Baltic Fleet was withdrawn from its bases in Finland and the Baltic. Russia ceded to Germany the areas lying west of the line Brest-Litovsk - Kamenets - Litovsk - Pruzhany - Zelva - Bridges - Orel - Dokudova - Dzevenishki - west of Slobodka - Gervyata - Mikhalishki - east of Sventsyany - Malengyany - Drysvyaty - Druya ​​and further along the Western Dvina to Oger, and, leaving Riga to the west, the boundary line went to the Gulf of Riga, passing along it in a northern direction between the mainland and the Moonsund archipelago and to the exit from the Gulf of Finland, which remained entirely to the east of the boundary line. Russia conceded to Turkey the districts of Ardagan, Kars and Batum, and withdrew troops from all parts of Eastern Anatolia.

Soviet Russia was to immediately make peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize its peace treaty with Germany and its allies. Russia withdrew troops from the territory of Ukraine. The same applied to the Baltic provinces, where the border ran along the Narva River, Lake Peipsi and Pskov. Finland and the Åland Islands were also cleared of Russian troops.

Russia also paid 6 billion marks in reparations plus the payment of losses incurred by Germany during the Russian revolution - 500 million gold rubles. The appendix to the treaty guaranteed a special economic status for Germany in Soviet Russia. Citizens and firms of the Central Powers were removed from the scope of Soviet nationalization decrees, and those who had already lost their property were restored to their rights. That is, German citizens were allowed to engage in private business in Russia. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk restored the customs tariffs of 1904 with Germany, which were extremely disadvantageous for Russia. In addition, Russia was forced to confirm all debts to the Central Powers (which were abandoned in January 1918), and resume payments on them.

Thus, the Vistula provinces (Kingdom of Poland), Little Russia, Belarus, Estland, Courland and Livonia provinces, the Grand Duchy of Finland departed from the German sphere of influence. Moreover, the boundaries of the new territorial entities (under the rule of Germany) were not clearly defined. An area of ​​780,000 square meters was torn away from Russia. km. with a population of 56 million people (a third of the population Russian Empire) and on which before the revolution there were: 27% of cultivated agricultural land, 26% of the entire railway network, 73% of iron and steel were smelted, 89% of coal was mined and 90% of sugar was produced, 40% of industrial workers lived, etc.

Results

Despite the peace agreement, the German troops continued the offensive. On March 1, the power of the Central Rada was restored by German troops in Kyiv. On April 5, German troops entered Kharkov, in late April - early May they entered the Crimea and the southern part of the Don region, capturing Simferopol on April 22, Taganrog on May 1, and Rostov-on-Don on May 8, causing the fall of Soviet power on the Don . On the Don, the Germans helped establish ataman P. N. Krasnov in power. A puppet government was created in the Crimea. In June, the Germans entered Georgia. Using the absence of a border treaty between Soviet Russia and Ukraine as a formal pretext, the Germans seized a number of key points on Russian territory. In Finland, the Germans helped suppress the Reds. A nationalist regime has established itself in Finland, planning to build a “Great Finland” at the expense of Russian lands. In the Caucasus, Turkey continued its offensive with the aim of capturing Baku, Dagestan and regions North Caucasus with the Muslim population.

Thus, the Austro-German and Turkish intervention made it possible to seize vast areas from Russia and support the creation of anti-Soviet state formations. This led to a new round civil war and increase its scope. With the help of the interventionists (they were later joined by the British, French, Americans and Japanese), various anti-Soviet forces strengthened and launched a counteroffensive.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed the Austro-German high command to concentrate all the main forces against the Entente troops in France and Italy, and to organize the last decisive strategic offensive on the Western Front. So, the German command transferred from the Eastern Front to the Western Front about half a million soldiers and officers, and on March 23 offensive operation. Turkey was able to strengthen its position in Mesopotamia and Palestine. However, significant military forces of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey were diverted to continue the intervention, guard and plunder the occupied territory of the western part of Russia.

The Entente accepted the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with extreme hostility. England and France have already divided Russia into spheres of influence and have begun to intervene. On March 6, an English landing landed in Murmansk, on April 5, a Japanese landing in Vladivostok, on August 2, a British landing in Arkhangelsk, etc.

By the autumn of 1918, it became obvious that the Entente would win and eventually Germany would capitulate. In Berlin, it was decided, in the context of the growing Civil War in Russia and the beginning of the intervention of the Entente, to conclude additional agreements to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. On August 27, 1918, in Berlin, in the strictest secrecy, a Russian-German supplementary treaty to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and a financial agreement were concluded. It was signed on behalf of the government of the RSFSR by Plenipotentiary Adolf Joffe, and on behalf of Germany by Paul von Ginze.

According to its terms, the demarcation commission was to determine in detail and immediately establish the eastern border of Estonia and Livonia. German troops east of the demarcation line immediately withdrew. Russia recognized the independence of Ukraine and Georgia, renounced Estonia and Livonia, bargaining for itself the right to access the Baltic ports (Revel, Riga and Windau). Also, to facilitate Russian trade through Estonia, Livonia, Courland and Lithuania, free transit of goods through them in both directions was established; low rail and freight rates; free navigation along the Western Dvina. The Soviet side negotiated for itself control over Baku, ceding a quarter of the products produced there to Germany.

Germany also agreed to withdraw its troops from Belarus, from the Black Sea coast, the Crimea, from Rostov and part of the Don basin, and also not to occupy any more Russian territory. Germany undertook not to interfere in the relations of the Russian state with the national regions and to encourage them to separate from Russia or to form independent state formations. Germany guaranteed that Finland would not attack Russian territory, especially Petrograd. The secret agreement (the so-called “Ginze note”) recorded the mutually expressed consent of the parties to make mutual efforts to fight inside Russia against the Entente interventionists, Volunteer army and the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps.

Thus, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the Additional Treaty, with which Russian liberals and Westerners are so fond of reproaching Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and which were signed by Soviet Russia, which actually had no army, under the threat of a German invasion and capture of the capital, were much more profitable than Gorbachev's shameful capitulation - Yeltsin in 1991. In addition, already in the same 1918, Russia got the opportunity to abandon the conditions of the “obscene peace”.

Lenin showed great foresight. He made huge concessions to Germany and her allies, not only because of the lack of an army, but also inevitable defeat and the fall of the German bloc. Lenin repeatedly said that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk would not last even a few months and that a revolution in Germany was inevitable. On November 3, 1918, the sailors in Kiel rebelled in Germany, thousands of soldiers joined them. Soon the uprising engulfed Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen and other cities. A Soviet republic was proclaimed in Bavaria. On November 5, the Soviet government suspended diplomatic relations with Germany. On November 9, the revolution in Germany won. On November 11, Germany signed an armistice with the Entente powers. On November 13, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was annulled.

As the American historian Richard Pipes noted: “By presciently accepting a humiliating peace that gave him the necessary time and then collapsed under his own weight, Lenin earned the wide confidence of the Bolsheviks. When, on November 13, 1918, they tore up the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, following which Germany capitulated to the Western Allies, Lenin's authority in the Bolshevik movement was raised to an unprecedented height.

Eve of negotiations in Brest-Litovsk

100 years ago, on March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk, documenting the loss of Russia's territory, where a third of its population lived. Since the time of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, Russia has not experienced catastrophes comparable in scale. Our country managed to surpass the territorial losses dictated by the enemy in Brest only at the end of the 20th century. The peace of Brest-Litovsk was not a surprise: Russia was doomed to catastrophe by the events that exactly a year preceded Brest - the betrayal of the highest military leaders who forced the holy Emperor Nicholas II to abdicate, which at that ill-fated time became an occasion for all-class rejoicing. With the fall of the autocracy, the process of decomposition of the army inevitably began, and the country lost the ability to defend itself.

With the fall of the autocracy, the process of decomposition of the army began

And so, when the anemic Provisional Government fell and the Bolsheviks seized power, on October 26 (November 8) the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets issued a "Decree on Peace" with a proposal addressed to all the belligerent states to conclude a truce and start peace negotiations without annexations and indemnities. On November 8 (21), the Council of People's Commissars sent a telegram to I. about. the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army, General N. N. Dukhonin, with the order to enter into negotiations with the command of the enemy troops on a truce. The next day, the Commander-in-Chief had a telephone conversation with V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and a member of the Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs N.V. Krylenko on the same topic. Dukhonin refused the demand to immediately start negotiations, citing the fact that the headquarters could not conduct such negotiations that were within the competence of the central government, after which it was announced to him that he was resigning from his post and. about. Commander-in-Chief and that Ensign Krylenko is appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief, but he, Dukhonin, must continue to fulfill his former duties until the new Commander-in-Chief arrives at the Headquarters.

N. V. Krylenko arrived in Mogilev, at headquarters, with a retinue and an armed detachment on November 20 (December 3). The day before, General Dukhonin ordered the release of Generals L. G. Kornilov, A. I. Denikin, A. S. Lukomsky and their accomplices, arrested by the order of A. F. Kerensky, from the Bykhov prison located near the headquarters of the Bykhov prison. Krylenko announced to Dukhonin that he would be delivered to Petrograd, at the disposal of the government, after which the general was taken to the carriage of the new commander-in-chief. But after the release of the Bykhov prisoners, a rumor spread among the soldiers guarding the headquarters that L. G. Kornilov was already leading a regiment loyal to him to Mogilev in order to seize the headquarters and continue the war. Spurred on by provocative rumors, the brutalized soldiers burst into Krylenko’s car, took out his predecessor, while Krylenko himself either tried or did not try to interfere with them, and committed brutal reprisals against his yesterday’s commander-in-chief: first they shot him, and then finished him off with his bayonets - the mere suspicion that attempts were being made to keep the army from collapsing and continue the war infuriated the soldiers. Krylenko reported the massacre of Dukhonin to Trotsky, who found it inexpedient to initiate an investigation into this incident so as not to irritate the revolutionary soldiers and sailors.

11 days before the assassination of General Dukhonin, on November 9 (22), V. I. Lenin, catering to the "pacifist" moods of the front masses, sent a telegram to the troops: truce with the enemy. It was an unprecedented case in the history of diplomacy - it was proposed to negotiate a peace treaty as an amateur soldier. A parallel with this action was only the order of another leader of the revolution - L. D. Trotsky - to publish secret treaties and secret diplomatic correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to compromise both the Russian and other governments in the eyes of the public - Russian and foreign.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, headed by Trotsky, sent a note to the embassies of neutral countries proposing mediation in peace negotiations. In response, the embassies of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland only informed about the receipt of the note, and the Spanish ambassador informed the Soviet People's Commissariat of the transfer of the note to Madrid. The proposal to start negotiations on the conclusion of peace was all the more ignored by the governments of the Entente countries allied with Russia, who firmly counted on victory and had already previously divided the skin of the beast they were going to finish off, it seems, anticipating the sharing of the skin of the bear that was allied to them yesterday. Naturally, a positive response to the proposal to start peace talks came only from Berlin and Germany's allies or satellites. The corresponding telegram arrived in Petrograd on 14 (27) November. On the same day, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars telegraphed the governments of the Entente countries - France, Great Britain, Italy, the USA, Japan, China, Belgium, Serbia and Romania - about the start of negotiations, offering to join them. Otherwise, the corresponding note said, "we will negotiate with the Germans alone." There was no reply to this note.

The first phase of negotiations in Brest

Separate negotiations began on the day of the assassination of General N. N. Dukhonin. In Brest-Litovsk, where the headquarters of the German command for Eastern Front, the Soviet delegation headed by A. A. Ioffe arrived. It included L. B. Kamenev, the most influential political figure among the participants in the negotiations, as well as G. Ya. Sokolnikov, the Left Social Revolutionaries A. A. Bitsenko and S. D. Maslovsky-Mstislavsky and, as consultants, representatives of the army: Quartermaster General under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General V. E. Skalon, Generals Yu. M. Karakhan, who was responsible for translators and technical staff. The original feature in the formation of this delegation was that it included representatives of the lower ranks - soldiers and sailors, as well as the peasant R. I. Stashkov and the worker P. A. Obukhov. Delegations from Germany's allies were already in Brest-Litovsk: Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. The German delegation was headed by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R. von Kuhlmann; Austria-Hungary - Minister of Foreign Affairs Count O. Chernin; Bulgaria - Minister of Justice Popov; Turkey - Grand Vizier Talaat Bey.

At the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviet side proposed to conclude a truce for 6 months, so that hostilities would be suspended on all fronts, German troops would be withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands, and so that the German command, taking advantage of the truce, would not transfer troops to the Western Front. These proposals were rejected. As a result of the negotiations, they agreed to conclude a truce for a short period, from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17), with the possibility of its extension; during this period, the troops of the opposing sides had to remain in their positions, so there was no longer any talk of leaving Riga by the Germans, and as for the ban on the transfer of troops to the Western Front, Germany agreed to stop only those transfers that had not yet been started . In view of the collapse of the Russian army, this transfer was already underway, and the Soviet side did not have the means to control the movement of enemy units and formations.

A truce was declared and put into effect. During ongoing negotiations, the parties agreed to extend it for 28 days, starting from 4 (17) December. Negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty were tentatively decided to be held in the capital of a neutral country - in Stockholm. But on December 5 (18), Trotsky reported to Commander-in-Chief Krylenko: “Lenin defends the following plan: during the first two or three days of negotiations, fix the annexationist claims of the German imperialists on paper as clearly and sharply as possible and break off the negotiations on this for a week and resume them either on Russian soil in Pskov, or in a hut in no man's land between the trenches. I join this opinion. There is no need to travel to a neutral country.” Through Commander-in-Chief Krylenko, Trotsky gave instructions to the head of the delegation, A. A. Ioffe: “The most convenient thing would be not to transfer the negotiations to Stockholm at all. This would alienate the delegation very much from the local base and would make relations extremely difficult, especially in view of the policy of the Finnish bourgeoisie. Germany did not object to the continuation of negotiations on the territory of its headquarters in Brest.

The resumption of negotiations was, however, postponed due to the fact that upon the return of the delegation to Brest on November 29 (December 12), during a private meeting of the Russian delegation, the chief military consultant, Major General V. E. Skalon, a descendant of the great mathematician Euler by his mother, committed suicide . According to the characterization of General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, the brother of a Bolshevik, who then held the position of the manager of the Council of People's Commissars, “Skalon, an officer of the Life Guards of the Semenovsky Regiment, was known at headquarters as an ardent monarchist. But he worked in the intelligence department, was a serious and well-versed officer in military affairs, and from this point of view he had an impeccable reputation. In addition ... his irreconcilable attitude towards everything that was even a little bit to the left of the absolute monarchy should have made him treat the negotiations with particular acuteness ... - to inform the headquarters in detail and carefully about the progress of the negotiations.

General Scalon, being an extreme monarchist in his views, continued to serve in the General Staff when it submitted to the Council of People's Commissars. A characteristic and typical detail of that era: liberal generals, supporters of a constitutional monarchy or a direct republic, like the Bykhov prisoners, then considered it their duty to remain faithful to the allies who contributed to the overthrow of the tsarist government, therefore the white struggle, which they led, was guided by the help of the Entente, in while successive monarchists from military circles, unwilling to attach importance to the differences in political concepts of the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, subsequently either avoided participation in the Civil War or continued to serve in the army that became Red, in the hope that Lenin and Trotsky , for all their commitment to utopian projects, the hand will be stronger than that of worthless temporary ministers, and that they will create a regime in which it will be possible to restore controllability of the armed forces, or the monarchist-minded generals fought with the Reds, relying on the support not of the Entente, but of the occupying German authorities like P.N Krasnov.

General V. E. Skalon, having agreed to the role of consultant to the Soviet delegation, could not stand this role to the end and shot himself. Various opinions were expressed about the reasons for his suicide, the most convincing are the words spoken by a member of the German delegation, General Hoffmann, with which he addressed General Samoilo, who replaced Skalon: “Ah! So, you have been appointed to replace poor Skalon, whom your Bolsheviks left! Could not bear, poor fellow, the shame of his country! Brace yourself too!” This arrogant tirade is not contradicted by the version from the memoirs of General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, who believed that Skalon committed suicide, struck by the arrogant demands and arrogance of the German generals. General Skalon was buried at St. Nicholas Garrison Cathedral in Brest. The German command ordered to put up a guard of honor at the burial and fire a volley befitting a military leader. The funeral speech was delivered by Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who arrived at the opening of the second phase of the negotiations.

In the course of the renewed negotiations, the Soviet delegation insisted on the conclusion of peace "without annexations and indemnities." The representatives of Germany and its allies agreed with this formula, but on a condition that made its implementation impossible - if the Entente countries were ready to accept such a peace, and they just waged war for the sake of annexations and indemnities and at the end of 1917 firmly hoped to win. The Soviet delegation proposed: “In full agreement with ... the statement of both contracting parties that they have no plans of conquest and desire to make peace without annexations, Russia withdraws its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia occupied by it, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. The German side insisted that Russia recognize the independence of not only Poland, Lithuania and Courland occupied by German troops, where puppet governments were created, but also Livonia, part of which had not yet been occupied by the German army, as well as participation in peace negotiations delegation of the separatist Kyiv Central Rada.

At first, the demands for the surrender of Russia by the Soviet delegation were rejected

At first, these demands, in essence, for the surrender of Russia by the Soviet delegation were rejected. December 15 (28) agreed to extend the truce. At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, a 10-day break was announced, under the pretext of an attempt to seat the Entente states at the negotiating table, although both sides thereby only demonstrated their peacefulness, fully understanding the futility of such hopes.

The Soviet delegation left Brest for Petrograd, and the question of the course of the peace talks was discussed there at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). It was decided to drag out the negotiations in the hope of a revolution in Germany. The delegation was supposed to continue the negotiations in a new composition, headed by the people's commissar for foreign affairs, L. D. Trotsky himself. Showing off, Trotsky subsequently called his participation in the negotiations "visits to the torture chamber." He was not interested in diplomacy at all. He commented on his very activities as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs as follows: “What kind of diplomatic work will we have? Here I will issue a few leaflets and close the shop. The impression he made on the head of the German delegation, Richard von Kuhlmann, is quite consistent with this remark of his: “Not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses of glasses looked at his counterpart with a boring and critical look. The expression on his face clearly indicated that he... would have been better off ending the negotiation he was not sympathetic with a couple of grenades, throwing them across the green table, if it was in any way consistent with the overall political line... sometimes I wondered if he had arrived he generally intends to make peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagate Bolshevik views.

K. Radek, a native of Austro-Hungarian Galicia, was included in the Soviet delegation; at the negotiations he represented the Polish workers, with whom he really had nothing to do. According to the plan of Lenin and Trotsky, Radek, with his assertive temperament and aggressiveness, had to maintain the revolutionary tone of the delegation, balancing the other participants in the negotiations, Kamenev and Ioffe, who were too calm and restrained, as it seemed to Lenin and Trotsky.

Under Trotsky, the renewed negotiations often took on the character of verbal battles between the head of the Soviet delegation and General Hoffmann, who also did not hesitate in expressions, demonstrating to the negotiating partners the impotence of the country they represent. According to Trotsky, “General Hoffmann ... brought a fresh note to the conference. He showed that he did not like the behind-the-scenes tricks of diplomacy, and several times put his soldier's boot on the negotiating table. We immediately realized that the only reality that should really be taken seriously in these useless conversations is Hoffmann's boot."

On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), at the invitation of the German side, a delegation of the Central Rada headed by V. A. Golubovich arrived from Kyiv in Brest, who immediately declared that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia did not extend to Ukraine. Trotsky agreed to the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the negotiations, stating that Ukraine was actually at war with Russia, although formally the independence of the UNR was proclaimed later, by the “universal” of January 9 (22), 1918.

The German side was interested in the speedy completion of the negotiations, because, not without reason, they feared the threat of the decomposition of their own army, and even more so - the troops of the allied Austria-Hungary - the "patchwork empire" of the Habsburgs. In addition, in these two countries, the food supply of the population has deteriorated sharply - both empires were on the verge of starvation. The mobilization potential of these powers was exhausted, while the Entente countries at war with them had unlimited possibilities in this regard, due to the large population in their colonies. In both empires, anti-war sentiment grew, strikes were organized, councils were formed in some cities, modeled on Russian councils; and these councils demanded an early conclusion of peace with Russia, so that the Soviet delegation at the talks in Brest had a well-known resource for putting pressure on partners.

But after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on January 6 (19), 1918, the German delegation began to act more assertively. The fact is that until then there was still, at least virtually, the possibility that the government formed by the Constituent Assembly would stop peace negotiations and resume allied relations with the Entente countries, broken by the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars. Therefore, the failure of the Constituent Assembly gave the German side confidence that in the end the Soviet delegation would agree to conclude peace at any cost.

Presentation of the German ultimatum and reaction to it

Russia's lack of a combat-ready army was, as they say today, a medical fact. It became absolutely impossible to convince the soldiers, who, if they had not yet fled from the front, without exception into potential deserters, to remain in the trenches. Once, when overthrowing the tsar, the conspirators hoped that the soldiers would fight for a democratic and liberal Russia, their calculations turned out to be beaten. The socialist government of A.F. Kerensky called on the soldiers to defend the revolution - the soldiers were not tempted by this propaganda. From the very beginning of the war, the Bolsheviks campaigned for an end to the war of peoples, and their leaders understood that soldiers could not be kept at the front by calls to defend the power of the Soviets. On January 18, 1918, the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, sent a note to the Council of People's Commissars with the following content: “Desertion is progressively growing ... Entire regiments and artillery go to the rear, exposing the front for significant stretches, the Germans walk in crowds along an abandoned position ... Constant visits enemy soldiers of our positions, especially artillery, and their destruction of our fortifications in abandoned positions are undoubtedly of an organized nature.

After the formal ultimatum presented to the Soviet delegation in Brest by General Hoffmann, demanding consent to the German occupation of Ukraine, Poland, half of Belarus and the Baltic states, an intra-party struggle flared up at the top of the Bolshevik Party. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), held on January 11 (24), 1918, a bloc of "left communists" was formed, headed by N. I. Bukharin, who spoke out against Lenin's capitulatory position. “Our only salvation,” he declared, “is that the masses will learn by experience, in the course of the struggle itself, what a German invasion is, when cows and boots will be taken from the peasants, when workers will be forced to work 14 hours, when they will take them to Germany, when the iron ring is inserted into the nostrils, then, believe me, comrades, then we will get a real holy war. Bukharin's side was taken by other influential members of the Central Committee - F. E. Dzerzhinsky, who attacked Lenin for betraying them - not the interests of Russia, but the German and Austro-Hungarian proletariat, whom, as he feared, the peace treaty would keep from the revolution. Objecting to his opponents, Lenin formulated his position as follows: “For a revolutionary war, an army is needed, but we have no army. Undoubtedly, the peace that we are forced to conclude now is an obscene peace, but if war breaks out, our government will be swept away and peace will be made by another government. In the Central Committee, he was supported by Stalin, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov and Sergeev (Artem). A compromise proposal was put forward by Trotsky. It sounded like this: "no peace, no war." Its essence was that in response to the German ultimatum, the Soviet delegation in Brest would declare that Russia was ending the war, demobilizing the army, but would not sign a shameful, humiliating peace treaty. This proposal received the support of the majority of the members of the Central Committee during the voting: 9 votes against 7.

Before the delegation returned to Brest to resume negotiations, its head, Trotsky, was instructed by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars to drag out the negotiations, but if an ultimatum was presented, sign a peace treaty at any cost. On January 27 (February 9), 1918, representatives of the Central Rada in Brest-Litovsk signed a peace treaty with Germany - its consequence was the occupation of Ukraine by the troops of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who, having occupied Kyiv, eliminated the Rada.

On February 27 (February 9), the head of the German delegation, R. von Kuhlmann, presented the Soviet side at the talks in Brest with an ultimatum demanding an immediate renunciation of any influence on the political life of the territories torn away from Russian state, including Ukraine, part of Belarus and the Baltic states. The signal to toughen the tone during the talks came from the capital of Germany. Emperor Wilhelm II said then in Berlin: “Today the Bolshevik government directly addressed my troops with an open radio message calling for rebellion and disobedience to their top commanders. Neither I nor Field Marshal von Hindenburg can tolerate this state of affairs any longer. Trotsky must by tomorrow evening ... sign a peace with the return of the Baltic states up to the Narva - Pleskau - Dunaburg line inclusive ... The Supreme High Command of the armies of the Eastern Front must withdraw troops to the indicated line.

Trotsky at the talks in Brest rejected the ultimatum: “The peoples are looking forward to the results of the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. The peoples are asking when will this unparalleled self-destruction of mankind, caused by the self-interest and lust for power of the ruling classes of all countries, end? If ever a war was waged in self-defense, then it has long ceased to be such for both camps. If Great Britain takes possession of the African colonies, Baghdad and Jerusalem, then this is not yet a defensive war; if Germany occupies Serbia, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania and Rumania and seizes the Moonsund Islands, then this is also not a defensive war. This is a struggle for the division of the world. Now it's clearer than ever... We're getting out of the war. We inform all peoples and their governments about this. We give the order for the complete demobilization of our armies ... At the same time, we declare that the conditions offered to us by the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary are fundamentally contrary to the interests of all peoples. This statement of his was made public, which was regarded by all parties involved in the hostilities as a propaganda action. On the part of the German delegation at the talks in Brest, an explanation followed that the refusal to sign a peace treaty meant a breakdown in the truce and would entail the resumption of hostilities. The Soviet delegation left Brest.

Breakdown of the truce and resumption of hostilities

On February 18, German troops resumed fighting along the entire line of their Eastern Front and began to rapidly move deep into Russia. Within a few days, the enemy advanced about 300 kilometers, capturing Revel (Tallinn), Narva, Minsk, Polotsk, Mogilev, Gomel, Chernigov. Only near Pskov on February 23 was there real resistance to the enemy. Together with the officers and soldiers of the not completely decomposed Russian army, the Red Guards who arrived from Petrograd fought. In the battles near the city, the Germans lost several hundred soldiers killed and wounded. February 23 was subsequently celebrated as the birthday of the Red Army, and now as the day of the Defender of the Fatherland. And yet Pskov was taken by the Germans.

There was a real threat of capturing the capital. On February 21, the Petrograd Revolutionary Defense Committee was formed. A state of siege was declared in the city. But it was not possible to organize an effective defense of the capital. Only regiments of Latvian riflemen reached the line of defense. A mobilization was carried out among the St. Petersburg workers, but its results were scanty. Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who for the most part voted for the Bolsheviks in the elections to the Soviets and constituent Assembly, a little more than one percent were ready to shed blood: a little more than 10 thousand people signed up as volunteers. The fact is that the Bolsheviks were voted for because they promised immediate peace. To deploy propaganda in the direction of revolutionary defencism, as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had done in their time, was a hopeless affair. The head of the metropolitan party organization of the Bolsheviks, G. E. Zinoviev, was already preparing to go underground: he demanded that funds be allocated from the party treasury to support the underground activities of the Bolshevik party committee in Petrograd. In view of the failure of the negotiations in Brest, on February 22, Trotsky resigned from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. A few days later, G. V. Chicherin was appointed to this position.

The Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) held continuous meetings these days. Lenin insisted on resuming peace talks and accepting the demands of the German ultimatum. Most members of the Central Committee took a different position, offering as an alternative a guerrilla war with the occupation regime in the hope of a revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary. At a meeting of the Central Committee on February 23, 1918, Lenin demanded consent to the conclusion of peace on the terms dictated by the German ultimatum, otherwise threatening to resign. In response to Lenin's ultimatum, Trotsky declared: “We cannot wage a revolutionary war with a split in the party ... Under the circumstances that have arisen, our party is not able to lead the war ... maximum unanimity would be needed; since it is not there, I will not take the responsibility of voting for the war.” This time, Lenin's proposal was supported by 7 members of the Central Committee, four headed by Bukharin voted against, Trotsky and three more abstained from voting. Bukharin then announced his withdrawal from the Central Committee. Then the party decision to accept the German ultimatum was carried through the state body - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. At a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 24, the decision to conclude peace on German terms was adopted by 126 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions. The majority of the Left SRs voted against, although their leader M. A. Spiridonova voted for peace; the Mensheviks headed by Yu. O. Martov and from the Bolsheviks N. I. Bukharin and D. B. Ryazanov voted against peace. A number of "left communists", including F.E. Dzerzhinsky, did not appear at the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in protest against agreeing to the German ultimatum.

Conclusion of a peace treaty and its contents

On March 1, 1918, the Soviet delegation, this time headed by G. Ya. Sokolnikov, returned to Brest for negotiations. The negotiating partners, representing the governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, categorically refused to discuss the draft developed by the German side, insisting on its adoption in the form in which it was presented. On March 3, the German ultimatum was accepted the Soviet side and the peace treaty was signed.

In accordance with this agreement, Russia took upon itself the obligation to stop the war with the UNR and recognize the independence of Ukraine, effectively transferring it to the protectorate of Germany and Austria-Hungary - the signing of the agreement was followed by the occupation of Kyiv, the overthrow of the government of the UNR and the establishment of a puppet regime headed by Hetman Skoropadsky . Russia recognized the independence of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Courland and Livonia. Some of these territories were directly included in Germany, others passed under the German or joint protectorate with Austria-Hungary. Russia also transferred Kars, Ardagan and Batum with their regions to the Ottoman Empire. The territory torn away from Russia under the Brest Treaty was about a million square kilometers, and up to 60 million people lived on it - a third of the population of the former Russian Empire. The Russian army and navy were subject to radical reductions. The Baltic Fleet was leaving its bases located in Finland and the Ostsee region. An indemnity in the amount of 6.5 billion gold rubles was assigned to Russia. And the annex to the agreement included a provision stating that the property of citizens of Germany and its allies was not subject to Soviet nationalization laws, those of the citizens of these states who lost at least part of their property had to be returned or compensated. The refusal of the Soviet government to pay foreign debts could no longer apply to Germany and its allies, and Russia undertook to immediately resume payments on these debts. Citizens of these states were allowed to engage in entrepreneurial activities on the territory of the Russian Soviet Republic. The Soviet government undertook to ban all subversive anti-war propaganda against the states of the Quadruple Alliance.

The peace treaty concluded in Brest was ratified on March 15 by the Extraordinary IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets, despite the fact that a third of the deputies, mainly from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, voted against its ratification. On March 26, the treaty was ratified by Emperor Wilhelm II, and then similar acts were adopted in the states allied with Germany.

The consequences of the peace treaty and the reaction to it

The cessation of the war on the Eastern Front allowed Germany to transfer about half a million of its soldiers to the Western Front and launch an offensive against the armies of the Entente, which, however, soon bogged down. For the occupation of the western territories torn from Russia, mainly Ukraine, it took 43 divisions, against which it deployed under various political slogans guerrilla war, which cost Germany and Austria-Hungary more than 20 thousand lives of soldiers and officers; Hetman Skoropadsky's troops, who supported the regime of German occupation, lost more than 30 thousand people in this war.

After the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a full-scale civil war began in Russia.

In response to Russia's withdrawal from the war, the Entente states undertook interventionist actions: on March 6, British troops landed in Murmansk. This was followed by the landing of the British in Arkhangelsk. The Japanese units occupied Vladivostok. The dismemberment of Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided anti-bolshevik forces non-separatist orientation is a wonderful slogan for organizing military operations aimed at overthrowing the Soviet regime - the slogan of the struggle for "a united and indivisible Russia." So after the signing of the Brest Peace in Russia, a full-scale Civil War began. The call put forward by Lenin at the beginning of the World War "to turn the war of the peoples into a civil war" was carried out, however, at the moment when the Bolsheviks least of all wanted it, because by that time they had already seized power in the country.

His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon could not remain an indifferent spectator of the tragic events taking place. On March 5 (18), 1918, he addressed the All-Russian flock with a message in which he assessed the peace treaty concluded in Brest: “Blessed is the peace between peoples, for all brothers, the Lord calls everyone to work peacefully on earth, He has prepared His incalculable blessings for everyone . And the Holy Church unceasingly lifts up prayers for the peace of the whole world... The unfortunate Russian people, involved in a fratricidal bloody war, unbearably thirsted for peace, just as the people of God once thirsted for water in the scorching heat of the desert. But we did not have Moses, who would give his people to drink miraculous water, and the people did not cry out to the Lord, their Benefactor, for help - people who renounced the faith, persecutors of the Church of God, appeared, and they gave peace to the people. But is this the peace for which the Church prays, for which the people yearn? The peace now concluded, according to which entire regions inhabited by the Orthodox people are torn away from us and surrendered to the will of an enemy alien in faith, and tens of millions of Orthodox people fall into conditions of great spiritual temptation for their faith, a world according to which even Orthodox Ukraine from time immemorial is separated from fraternal Russia and the capital city of Kyiv, the mother of Russian cities, the cradle of our baptism, the repository of shrines, ceases to be a city of the Russian state, a world that gives our people and Russian land into heavy bondage - such a world will not give the people the desired rest and tranquility. The Orthodox Church will bring great damage and grief, and incalculable losses to the Fatherland. And meanwhile, the same strife that is destroying our Fatherland continues in our country... Will the declared peace eliminate these discords crying to heaven? Will it bring even greater sorrows and misfortunes? Alas, the words of the prophet are justified: They say: peace, peace, but there is no peace(Jer. 8, 11). The Holy Orthodox Church, which from time immemorial has helped the Russian people to gather and glorify the Russian state, cannot remain indifferent at the sight of its death and decay... As the duty of the successor of the ancient collectors and builders of the Russian land, Peter, Alexy, Jonah, Philip and Hermogenes, We call... Raise your voice in these terrible days and loudly declare before the whole world that the Church cannot bless the shameful peace now concluded on behalf of Russia. This peace, forcibly signed on behalf of the Russian people, will not lead to fraternal cohabitation of peoples. There are no pledges of calm and reconciliation in it, the seeds of malice and misanthropy are sown in it. It contains the germs of new wars and evils for all mankind. Can the Russian people come to terms with their humiliation? Can he forget his brothers separated from him by blood and faith? better than war... We do not call you, Orthodox people, to rejoice and triumph over the world, but to bitterly repent and pray before the Lord... Brothers! The time has come for repentance, the holy days of Great Lent have come. Cleanse yourself from your sins, come to your senses, stop looking at each other as enemies and separating native land to the warring camps. We are all brothers, and we all have one mother, our native Russian land, and we are all children of one Heavenly Father... In the face of the Terrible Judgment of God that is taking place over us, let us all gather around Christ and His Holy Church. Let us pray to the Lord that He soften our hearts with brotherly love and strengthen them with courage, so that He Himself will grant us men of understanding and counsel, faithful to the commandments of God, who would correct the evil deed done, return the rejected and gather the squandered. ... Convince everyone to pray fervently to the Lord, that He turn away His righteous anger, our sin for our sake, driven by us, and strengthen our relaxed spirit and raise us from heavy despondency and extreme fall. And the merciful Lord will take pity on the sinful Russian land ... ".

Germany could not avoid the fate of the lost Russian Empire

This was the first message of Patriarch Tikhon devoted to a political topic, while it did not touch upon issues domestic policy, it does not mention political parties and politicians, but, faithful to the tradition of the patriotic service of the Russian First Hierarchs, the holy Patriarch expressed in this epistle his grief over the catastrophe that Russia is experiencing, called on the flock to repentance and an end to pernicious fratricidal strife, and, in essence, predicted the course of further developments in Russia and in the world. Anyone who carefully reads this epistle can be convinced that, composed on the occasion of an event a hundred years ago, it has not lost its relevance in our day.

Meanwhile, Germany, which forced Russia to capitulate in March 1918, could not avoid the fate of the lost Russian Empire. In April 1918, diplomatic relations were resumed between Russia and Germany. The Soviet ambassador A. A. Ioffe arrived in Berlin, and the German ambassador Count Wilhelm von Mirbach arrived in Moscow, where the seat of government was moved. Count Mirbach was killed in Moscow, and the peace treaty did not prevent A. A. Ioffe and the staff of the Soviet embassy from conducting anti-war propaganda in the heart of Germany itself. Pacifist and revolutionary sentiments spread from Russia to the armies and peoples of her former opponents. And when the imperial thrones of the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns shook, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk turned into a piece of paper that did not bind anyone to anything. On November 13, 1918, it was officially denounced by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR. But at that time, Russia was already thrown into the abyss of fratricidal slaughter - the Civil War, the signal for the beginning of which was the conclusion of the Brest Treaty.