Having received the first news of the February revolution in France, Nicholas exclaimed, addressing the officers of the Guards: “On horseback, gentlemen! There is a republic in France! " However, in reality, the tsar did not even think about intervention and a campaign against France, as in 1830. Nicholas saw only deserved retribution in the death of Louis Philippe. But, if he had at the first moment the intention to go to France, then he could not have carried it out according to the situation, since the March revolutions in Vienna, Berlin, Munich, Dresden, in all states of the German Confederation, the flight of Metternich, complete failure the entire Metternich system, the panic fear of the revolution that paralyzed Frederick William in Prussia and the Emperor Ferdinand in Austria, their immediate readiness to surrender - all this seriously confused Nicholas's cards. The king was clearly at a loss. This is evident from his correspondence during this period with Prince Paskevich, the only person whom he fully trusted. It was necessary to "appease the scoundrels." In the first half of 1848, Nicholas could not count on his own strength to accomplish such a task. But now a ray of hope flashed for him: Cavaignac's reprisal against the Parisian proletariat in the terrible days of June 1848 inspired the tsar and filled his hopes. Immediately through the ambassador in Paris, Kiselev, he ordered to convey to General Cavaignac the tsar's heartfelt gratitude. Nicholas understood before many other representatives of the reaction that not only the French, but also the pan-European revolution had been broken on the Parisian barricades, and that the danger had passed. From that time, and especially from the late autumn of 1848, Nikolai's intervention in both Austrian and Prussian affairs was resumed. He scolds his brother-in-law Friedrich-Wilhelm IV for the eyes and irritably "advises" him in the eyes to quickly eliminate the traces of cowardice, that is, the constitution plucked from the king by the Prussian revolution in March 1848. In softer tones, he gives the same advice. to the summer Franz Joseph, who ascended the Austrian throne on December 2, 1848 after the abdication of his uncle, Emperor Ferdinand. Franz Joseph, helpless without the support of Nicholas, listened to the Tsar's advice with slavish obedience. And Nikolai was extremely pleased with both this obedience and the fact that the de facto dictator of Austria, the true successor of Metternich, was Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, in whom Nikolai for a long time saw only something like his governor-general, who was planted in Vienna to carry out the Petersburg "advice". Nikolai was wrong in both Schwarzenberg and Franz Joseph. Schwarzenberg captivated him by the fact that, at his insistence, the delegate of the Frankfurt parliament, Robert Blum, who was captured in Vienna, was shot. But Nicholas did not consider Schwarzenberg a diplomat who would do everything in his power to prevent the tsar in all his eastern plans, as soon as he finally got rid of the fear of revolution. The tsar did not discern in Franz Joseph a very independent, proud and persistent young man who obeys only because he is afraid of revolution, but in the future will not give up the fight against Nicholas in the East.

During this period, the king twice, in 1849 and in 1850, intervened in. affairs of Central Europe - and both times in favor of Austria. As a result of this intervention, Austria won a decisive victory on two of its most important fronts.

Suppression of the Hungarian uprising

Nicholas' first intervention was both diplomatic and military: it happened in 1849 in connection with the Hungarian uprising.

The second intervention was purely diplomatic; it was aimed at eliminating attempts to unite Germany.

The tsar's intervention in the suppression of the Hungarian uprising was primarily due to fears for peace in Poland, if Hungary became a solid independent state. Further, the existence of a state ruled by the revolutionary Kossuth was also considered a threat to the influence tsarist Russia on the Balkan Peninsula. Finally, the victory of all-European reaction would be incomplete if revolutionary Hungary had triumphed.

Nicholas decided to speak only at the very end of the spring of 1849, exactly when the Austrian generals suffered a series of shameful defeats. Paskevich, the governor of the Kingdom of Poland, took over the supreme leadership of this intervention. The Austrian Empire, after the pacification of Hungary, could consider itself saved. But among all the subjects of Franz Joseph, there were no more fierce enemies of Russia than the Hungarians. From that moment on, the Habsburg Power stood firmly on its feet; her "political recovery", as the reactionary press wrote, she soon used against Russia. Nicholas realized this rather late - only in 1854 - when the hostile position of Austria began to appear quite clearly. Talking to the Adjutant General Count Rzhevsky, a Polish native, Nikolai asked him: “Which of the Polish kings, in your opinion, was the stupidest? that he freed Vienna from the Turks. And the most stupid of the Russian sovereigns is me, because I helped the Austrians suppress the Hungarian rebellion. " Nikolai realized his political mistake only when nothing could be corrected.

The second intervention of Nicholas in European affairs followed in 1850. It was also caused not only by the persistent requests of Franz Joseph and Prince Schwarzenberg, but also by certain goals of the tsar himself.

Intervention of Nicholas I in Austro-Prussian relations

After the dissolution, in 1849, of the Frankfurt Parliament, which set itself the goal of uniting Germany, the dream of this unification around Prussia did not leave broad strata of the German bourgeoisie. Nicholas I never wanted to allow this unification. Largely under the influence of his formidable Petersburg brother-in-law - Nicholas I - Friedrich Wilhelm IV and refused to accept the German imperial crown from the "revolutionary gathering", as he was ordered from Petersburg to call the Frankfurt parliament. But under the influence of a common desire for unification, even the reactionary Prussian ministry of the Count of Brandenburg made in 1849-1850. some steps towards the reorganization of the impotent German Confederation. Then Nicholas I in the strongest possible way supported the Austrian Chancellor Schwarzenberg, who announced that Austria would not tolerate the strengthening of Prussia.

Nicholas was not only opposed to the creation of the German Empire in 1849 because the initiative of unification was taken over by the "revolutionary" Frankfurt parliament: he also did not want an excessive strengthening of Prussia. On this issue, he completely agreed with Austrian diplomacy.

Further, Nikolai began to agitate in favor of keeping Holstein in Denmark. On August 2, 1850, representatives of Russia, France, England and Austria signed an agreement in London, which secured Denmark's possession of Holstein. This was the first heavy blow dealt to Prussia. Schwarzenberg was triumphant. Public excitement grew in Prussia. Returning from Warsaw, Count Brandenburg died suddenly; legend attributed his death to the insulting treatment by the tsar and the excitement of the Prussian prime minister in connection with the national humiliation of Prussia. Schwarzenberg, confident in the support of Nicholas, threatened Prussia with war.

In November 1850, a new conflict broke out between Austria and Prussia over Hesse. After the intervention of Nicholas, in the city of Olmutz on November 29, an agreement was signed between Prussia and Austria, and Prussia had to completely reconcile. This "Olmütz humiliation" will forever be remembered throughout Germany as the work of Nicholas.

The tsar triumphed on all fronts of the diplomatic struggle. Speaking later about these years (until 1853), the British minister Clarendon said in one of his parliamentary speech that at that time, by all accounts, Russia possessed not only "overwhelming military power", but also diplomacy, distinguished by "incomparable dexterity." ... The power of Nicholas after the Hungarian campaign and after Olmutz seemed invincible. “When I was young, Napoleon ruled over the continent of Europe. Now it looks like the Russian emperor has taken the place of Napoleon, and that, at least for several years, he, with different intentions and other means, will dictate laws to the continent. " So wrote in 1851 a very knowledgeable observer, Baron Stockmar, a friend of Prince Albert and Queen Victoria of England.

These comparisons between Nicholas and Napoleon became common in those years when it came to Russia's influence on European affairs. In 1849 - 1852 the opinion about the almost complete omnipotence of Nicholas in Central Europe was quite close to the truth. As for England and France, the situation here was more complicated. A thunderstorm was approaching Nicholas from here.

Hungary in 1849 was the last hotbed of the revolutionary storm that had swept half of Europe a year earlier. The eyes of liberals, radicals, socialists from all over the continent were fixed on it.

The flame of revolution was extinguished by the joint efforts of Austrian reaction and tsarism. Hungarian campaign I.F. Paskevich has traditionally been viewed as the crown of the atrocities of the autocracy, although the emotional channel of assessments has subsided over the years, and now the authors limit themselves to a dry statement: "The fate of revolutionary Hungary was decided by the invasion of its territory by a 200,000-strong Russian army"... But such an assessment overlooks the multinationality of the Hungarian kingdom, and the so-called minorities constituted the majority of the population in it, almost all of them - Croats, Germans, Romanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians of Transcarpathia - opposed the revolution. To attribute the defeat of the revolution to the intrigues of the Habsburg court or tsarist intervention alone is to slide on the surface of events. National minorities were frightened by the revolution and the Magyar great power, and they fought for their interests. If this is not taken into account, then we will not be able to build an objective picture of their interests in the Hungarian revolution.

The actions of tsarism in 1848-1849 also need a balanced assessment. - not to justify them, but to find the truth. Previously, historians were tasked with exposing the reactionary nature of the foreign and domestic policy of the autocracy always, everywhere and in everything, and there was no more advantageous example for this than its participation in the suppression of the revolution of 1848-1849. in Europe .

Russia did not at all correspond to the image of an indestructible stronghold of aggressive absolutism that had developed about it abroad. Historian A.S. Nifontov: drought, crop failure, hunger, fires, cholera epidemic. The lack of grain affected the Volga region, the Chernozem region, the Ukraine and the Urals; to top it off, locusts attacked the fields. Dry land contributed to the spread of fires, Penza, Kherson, Oryol, Saratov, Kazan burned down, in the villages the fire turned 70 thousand huts to ashes. The cholera epidemic turned into a national disaster - 1 million 700 thousand people fell ill, of which 700 thousand were fatal.

The disease was mowing down the army more than the fiercest enemy, as evidenced by the Tsar's letter to his "father-commander" Field Marshal I.F. Paskevich: "Crop failure threatens many provinces, and finally the fires consume city after city and many villages and villages." June 21(3 July) In 1848 800 people fell ill with cholera every day and 500 died from it. A month later, on July 26(August 7) the picture has not changed: "There is almost no village in Russia, wherever it raged, but nowhere so much as on the Don and in Orenburg." And on top of all the difficulties - a chronic lack of money in the treasury: "I really don't know how to get out of the budget; now more than ten million are already missing! It's awful. You need to keep a penny everywhere, cut off everything you can and dodge with one necessary thing."... The 1848 budget was reduced with a deficit of 32 million rubles. Gold and silver in substantial quantities were withdrawn from the cellars of the Peter and Paul Fortress for sale abroad.

Court chronicler, Baron M.A. Korf, classmate of A.S. Pushkin at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, witnessed an amusing and revealing episode: having received, as an exception, a pleasant message from the stock exchange, Nicholas I began to sing in a thick bass "Save, Lord, your people ...". The two great dukes who happened immediately took up the prayer, and the august trio sang it to the end.

Catch phrase - "saddle your horses, gentlemen!" as if the news of the uprising in Paris was uttered by Nicholas I at the ball at the heir to the throne - none of those present heard; nothing except "indistinct for listeners" exclamations, they did not hear. Nevertheless, the legend was born immediately, the phrase took root in historiography, and the opinion of "the warlike designs of Nicholas I and his entourage" has survived to this day.

The very first consultations with "friends" in blessed memory of the Holy Union brought both disappointment and insight. "Prepared news from Nemetchina,- wrote in the diary Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich. - Riots are everywhere and preparations are made for a general coup, but the sovereigns sit with folded hands and do nothing. " King Frederick William IV of Prussia and Emperor Ferdinand of Austria could hardly hold onto their thrones under the onslaught of "loyal subjects". Confusion reigned in St. Petersburg can be judged by the fact that the circular dispatch to the ambassadors appeared only ten days after the news of the February uprising in Paris, and the manifesto dedicated to the revolution - a month later. On March 15 (27), Nicholas I wrote to Paskevich: "Yesterday I published my manifesto, it indicates to everyone, both ours and enemies, what I want, without touching others, but not allowing myself to be touched; this is my whole task." Confirmation followed the next day: "So, we must remain in a defensive, almost cordon state sur se qui vive, paying the most vigilant attention to our own edge, so that all attempts at home to tame at the very beginning"... Another month was spent on developing a plan for military protection against the onslaught of the revolution at the turn of the Vistula River. All this was accompanied by threats against the revolutionaries, who in Europe created the impression that tsarism had total punitive plans.

Without money and allies, it seemed sheer madness to go on a hike across the distant lands to Paris. Hence - the moderation of the court. In explaining the tsarist position, Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode instructed the ambassador to France N.D. Kiseleva: Russia "wants peace and the preservation of the territorial order in Europe, established by the Paris and Vienna treatises. She does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of France, she will not take any part in internal strife that may arise; she will not in any way influence the choice of the government that the people wishes to choose "... This was contrary to the principles of the Holy Alliance, which provided for the solidarity of monarchs against peoples, in fact, the king recognized the right of the people to self-determination. Therefore, even such an ardent denouncer of autocracy as M.N. Pokrovsky, considered the thesis about the "irreconcilable" attitude of Nicholas I to the February Revolution to be a legend. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic A. Lamartine assured N.D. Kiseleva: France does not encroach on existing borders; there was even a hint of the commonality of the geostrategic interests of the two countries: "Throughout my diplomatic career, I have often thought and come to the conclusion that the most natural alliance for France is an alliance with Russia." He, Lamartine, does not pacify the Poles, he declared the sympathy for them in the country "artificial" and promised that the government would be able to restrain "club fanatics relying on several thousand villains and criminal elements."

Lamartine's soothing speeches had an effect on Kiselev. Recovering from amazement, he decided, at his own peril and risk, not to hand over to the minister a prepared note on the severance of diplomatic relations with the republic. And, which is significant, his behavior was approved by the high authorities, even the king himself.

The danger crept not from the nest of all the revolutions of Paris, but from places, to the nearby empire. The unrest that shook the Austrian monarchy threatened the many-sided and multi-tribal power with disintegration, and at the same time - the collapse of the entire fragile European balance. Nikolai Pavlovich in confidential correspondence with I.F. Paskevich was sad: "Everything there is heading for destruction, and I see neither the strength, nor the head, nor the ways of the disintegrating heterogeneous kingdom to fasten, unite and solder. Such a neighborhood is extremely difficult, and this is why I so reluctantly enter Moldova" .

The latter requires clarification - what does Moldova have to do with it? All of a sudden, the "rebellion" spread to the Danube principalities, although they were under the auspices and supervision of the autocracy. A fire broke out at the very borders: Austria-Hungary - which was part of the Habsburg possessions of Transylvania. And now and "this side(i.e. the Danube principalities. - V.V. ) an invasion from Transylvania with the help of Poles and all kinds of rabble threatens; if this is the case, our troops will enter on Seret, although, I confess, I really do not want this ",- wrote Tsar Paskevich on July 10 (22), 1848.

The instruction, which was supplied to Major General A.O. Dugamel, sounded as if innocent: Russia "It is determined to adhere to defensive tactics and not allow the revolutionary stream to penetrate its borders. It will respect the independence and integrity of neighboring countries. It dissociates itself from everything that can be interpreted as a desire to interfere in their internal affairs." But, "under the sign of strict secrecy" Lord of Moldova M. Sturdze was promised in case "disturbing complications" support "more pronounced"... The latter resulted in open intervention.

Chance accelerated the course of events - the tsarist troops entered Moldova on June 28 (July 10), 1848, one might say, by misunderstanding, without having an order from St. Petersburg, but by order of Dugamel. That, "Frightened by the troubles in Wallachia, he suggested Herzenzweig to join Moldova on his own ... I am not convinced of this need and I am afraid of great difficulties",- wrote Nicholas I to Paskevich.

The frustrated General Herzenzweig, a serviceable campaigner, deciding that he had involuntarily disobeyed the emperor, fired a bullet in his forehead. Nicholas feared protests in Europe and did not want to cast a shadow over the image of the patron saint of the Orthodox. The need to cooperate with the Turkish troops, known for their licentious behavior, was also embarrassing.

But both Paris and London were calm. In the House of Commons, the head of the Foreign Office, G.J. Palmerston, assured the dismayed MPs that "the Russian government has no intention of encroaching on Turkish suzerainty", which was true. "Having tamed the rebellion in Moldavia, I want to turn back my troops and in no case cross Seret and enter Wallachia",- the emperor shared his views with Paskevich on July 5 (17).

But much more serious than the Moldovan, a rebellion broke out in neighboring Wallachia, and Russian troops they did not return to their homeland. Petersburg tried to shift the thankless task of suppressing the Wallachian revolution to the Ottoman Empire. It cannot be said that in Winter Palace did not feel embarrassed, inciting the Turks against the Christian principality.

"Turkish troops,- thought Chancellor K.V. Nesselrode in a dispatch to the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, - preserve traditional customs and indulge in the most unbridled excesses when they are used against Christian peoples, " what can plunge the principalities "into tears, sorrow and poverty" and encourage residents to perform "as one man against the hated invasion"... But what are the ends - so are the means ...

On September 13 (25), 1848, Turkish troops occupied Bucharest. A day later, on September 15 (27), the Russian corps of General A.N. Leaders. The Turks met him with "a kind of obedience to fate", but did not dare to object. Actually, Leaders did not have to carry out punitive functions, there was no serious resistance to his regiments, "rebellious Wallachian militia", according to Nicholas I, she went over to his side. In St. Petersburg, a deceptive impression was created that "the spirit of rebellion did not penetrate the masses" . "New republic, - the participant of the campaign, Colonel Daragan, shared his impressions, - composed of the smallest number of conspirators, gave us honor and place without a fight ... The old order was established without effort " .

Actually "spirit of rebellion" was driven underground, but not eradicated, but "conspirators" retired to emigration, but did not reconcile. Russian troops remained in Wallachia, in case of a terrible turn of events in Hungary, they stood ready to strike it from the south. Among other things, their presence was a deterrent for the Turkish troops in Wallachia and prevented the loss here official Russia their positions.

And one more circumstance, almost consigned to oblivion, should be borne in mind when assessing the actions of Nicholas I: he needed a weak Habsburg monarchy, torn apart by national contradictions, at the head of the German Confederation. The only alternative is a combination with Prussia at the helm of the "Nemetchina", as it was called in the royal family.

His brother-in-law, the brother of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, King Frederick William IV, Nikolai Pavlovich despised for his weakness and facelessness. But behind it was a well-knit, rapidly growing economic power, claiming the main role in the German Confederation, which would turn it from an almost geographical concept into a leading power in Central Europe. And the king feared this most of all, he himself was going to run the affairs here, hiding behind the Austrian screen. How his words sound like a spell - "there will be no unity of Germany, no other nonsense" .

Of course, the optimal option seemed to be in which the Habsburgs themselves would have hit the hydra of the rebellion. In the winter of 1848/49, comforting news came from Austria: the imperial troops were gaining the upper hand. But in the spring the Hungarian revolution found a second wind, a threat hung over the very existence of the Danube monarchy. Previous Austrian requests for help have turned into harassment. On April 1 (13), the tsar flattered himself with hope: "There is no reason for us to enter Transylvania. This is the business of the Austrians."... Meanwhile, it was to this principality that the Hungarian troops retreated, and the main military operations were deployed there. Nikolai decided to intervene.

In Hungary, the corps of the Adjutant General Count Ridiger marched quickly. According to his testimony, "Despite all the tricks of the Hungarian government to arm the people against us in all the places through which the corps entrusted to me passed, the inhabitants remained in their homes, not in the least thinking about weapons"... The troops did not meet anything similar to popular resistance. The king sighed with relief: "Thank God that the first act of the campaign, and perhaps one of the most difficult, was accomplished without firing a shot."... The thought arose that it would be possible to get by with a little blood. Failed. The main forces of the revolutionary army retreated to Transylvania and, having entered this area, Paskevich's regiments fell into the thick of all imaginable contradictions: social, national and religious, which resulted in a civil war and turned into a bloody interethnic massacre.

* * * Transylvania became part of the Kingdom of Hungary in the 11th century, and Magyars were added to the Vlachs who inhabited it. In the XII-XIII centuries. the kings, taking care of strengthening their power, encouraged the resettlement of the Szekeys (representatives of one of the Hungarian ethnic groups), who were entrusted with the protection of the border, as well as the Germans, mainly from Saxony (hence their everyday name - Saxons), a significant part of them settled in the cities and took up craft and trade.

At sharp turns in history, Transylvania found itself outside the Hungarian state, in the system of lands directly subordinate to the Habsburg crown, while the rule of the Magyar nobility in it remained unshakable. Ethnic diversity in the principality was complemented by a religious one: the Hungarians adhered to the Catholic and Reformation (Calvinist) faith, half of the Vlachs retained Orthodoxy, the other adopted Uniatism, and the Germans became Lutherans. It was not only language and faith that delimited the population, much more to blame for the archaic state system, which happily survived the Middle Ages.

In the 40s of the XIX century, according to rough estimates, 1.3 million Vlachs (Romanians), 0.6 million Hungarians and 0.2 million Germans lived in Semigradie, as the land was called otherwise. But in the legal field, three "historical nations" were recognized - Magyars, Germans and Szekeys, represented in the legislative assembly of the principality - Diet.

Romanians were not recognized as an "official" nation and had no representation; they were denied recognition of their language and culture, which deprived them of the legal opportunity to defend their national rights. They also found themselves in an unequal position with regard to the social: their feudal elite lost their lands or lost their lands in the Middle Ages, therefore, the Romanian community did not have a complete social structure - in its midst landowners as a special category were absent. Therefore, in Transylvania, a large Magyar landowner and a feudal-dependent Romanian peasant opposed each other.

Semigradie did not become a melting pot of various ethnic groups - history, language, religion, customs divided them. They occupied a different place in the state, social and political life principalities and retained the alienation that struck the officers of Paskevich's army: "The four described tribes, so heterogeneous, lived on such a small piece of land, shunning each other. For several hundred years they could not bring them together: the neighbor did not recognize the neighbor's language, never became related; the same city is called by each tribe in its own way. Such relations naturally gave rise to distrust, enmity, contempt or hatred of one people towards another " .

Social antagonism in the region was complicated and deepened by ethnic disunity and donned a national form. In the Romanian community, an intelligentsia stratum was formed and strengthened - teachers, priests, students, high school students, officers of two border regiments, bankers, industrialists - they led the national movement. Not being associated with feudal land ownership, they adhered to rather radical views on the agrarian question.

True, at first, young people of all nationalities enthusiastically welcomed the Pest revolution in March 1848. Romanians - teachers and students of the law academy in Kluzh (Kolozhvar, Klausenburg), officials, judges participated in general demonstrations. Editor of the influential Gazeta de Transylvania, G. Baritsiu, "shedding tears of affection" acquainted the readers with the 12 points of the revolutionary program adopted in Pest.

However, a sobering up soon followed, as this revolutionary program infringed on the interests of the peasants of Transylvania. The middle Hungarian nobility, who was at the head of the revolution, showed a willingness to undertake large-scale agrarian reforms and provide the peasants with the plots of land they had. But in Transylvania there were 77 thousand, and with families - 385 thousand landless villagers - zhellers, who were not entitled to anything in the spirit and letter of the March laws. And very few of the peasants who received the right to land retained their full allotment and became "reference owners", the rest - half, a quarter, one eighth and even one sixteenth of the allotment. Their revolution condemned them to land shortages.

Flaws in agrarian legislation were the main reason for the demarcation of both social and national: the Magyar landowner - the Romanian peasant. The village did not want to wait. Already in April, the peasant movement became so widespread that courts-martial were cracked down on its participants and gallows were erected in the villages. The danger also lurked in the 12th point of the Pest program, categorically, without consulting the Transylvanians, which provided for the unification of the principality with the Hungarian kingdom.

In such a difficult situation, preparations were made for the all-Romanian meeting in Blaže (Balazfalve, Blasendorf) 3-5 (15-17) March 1848, in which, according to various estimates, 20 to 40 thousand people took part.

Everything connected with the meeting is important - the opening, the procedure, the adoption of the national oath, speech, decision.

On the first day, its participants swore allegiance "Emperor of Austria and Grand Duke of Transylvania" Ferdinand and the Romanian nation and vowed to protect it from "any attack and oppression"... The decisions adopted by the meeting provided for the provision of Romanians with representation in the diet, in the administration, in judicial institutions in proportion to their number, the status of Orthodoxy and Uniatism equal to other confessions, protection from arrests by political reasons, the immediate abolition of the corvee and the allotment of land to the peasants, without specifying the size of the allotment. The block of civil legal issues included such requirements as the introduction of freedom of speech, assembly and press, the abolition of censorship and class privileges, the distribution of taxes and duties in accordance with income.

Blazhskaya program is a document of deep democratic content, testifying to the European level of thinking of its various compilers. Not a word, not in writing in documents, or orally in speeches, did the participants in the meeting oppose the Hungarian revolution. But the letter is one thing, the spirit is another. In the legislation of the revolution, an unconditional priority was given to the individual, and the Romanians were told: you will receive all civil rights, why should they also specifically stipulate national rights? In the Blazh Declaration, the priority was given to the national principle. Without exception, all articles of the adopted program began with the words "Romanian nation". Consistent implementation of the principle: administration, court, education in the areas inhabited by Romanians are in their hands, representation in the Diet in proportion to the population meant the establishment of the predominance (if not power) of the Romanian bourgeoisie in the principality.

There was nothing in the documents adopted at the meeting that infringed on the rights of other Transylvanian peoples, its participants pledged to show respect for their interests, but notes of chauvinism were already sounded in their speeches. For the first time, the ideologist of the movement was Simion Bernutsiu, a 40-year-old student of the German Academy of Law in Sibiu (Nadysbene, Hermannstadt), previously unknown to anyone. His stormy and gloomy eloquence did not leave his audience indifferent, fanatical devotion to the national idea affected the minds and hearts.

Deeper into the era Ancient Rome praising the valor of the ancestors, he declared: "The Romanian nation does not want to rule over others, but wants to have equal rights with everyone"; also spoke in favor of cooperation with "peoples who recognize the freedom of nations and respect it in practice." But then it turned out that the Magyars, i.e. exactly the people with whom it was necessary to cooperate, according to Bernutsiu, was excluded from the number of freedom-loving:

"You, whose ancestors once ruled in this beautiful country and in many others, fell into slavery and lost your historical lands. Tyrants - three nations: Magyars, Saxons and Szekei ... expelled you, the most numerous ...

Romanians! Do not forget the glory of your ancestors, the Romans, the rulers of the world! "

Bernutsiu's speeches were permeated by a fierce anti-Hungarian spirit: the Hungarians decided to unite Transylvania with Hungary in order to "in the meantime, delete the privileges of Ardala(Romanian name for Transylvania. - V.V. ) "and then denationalize "all non-Hungarian peoples, merging them into a single and strong Magyar nation ... Ardyal is the true property of the Romanian nation, which rightfully acquired it about one thousand seven hundred years ago and since then and to this day keeps, protects and cultivates this land".

Bernutsiu directed his critical zeal not against the Hungarian magnates, but against the Magyars as such, and at the same time against the Saxon Germans. His rhetoric, of course, did not in the least contribute to the rallying of different ethnic groups inhabiting Transylvania, but on the contrary, contributed to their delimitation, split and confrontation, to which everything came.

In Russian historiography, much has been written about the gloomy role of the Habsburg court in setting peoples against each other. And yet, the maneuvers of reaction are secondary in the unfolding tragedy, primarily the interweaving of ethnic strife and social antagonism. It was all: the intrigues of the conservative forces fully armed with centuries of experience in pursuing the "divide and rule" policy, the spontaneous monarchism of the peasants. But this alone cannot be reduced to the reason for the almost universal transition of the Serbs of Vojvodina, Croats, Rusyns of Transcarpathia, Slovaks, Germans and Romanians of Transylvania, first into opposition to the revolutionary regime, and then into the camp of reaction.

Collectively, minorities made up two-thirds of the population of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen and lived there in compact masses for centuries. Ethnic Magyars were inferior to them in number. The implementation of the principle of national equality would lead to the loss of the leading role by the Hungarians in most lands, to the undermining of the economic positions of the Hungarian nobility, to the elimination of their political hegemony in the kingdom. The leaders of the revolution were not ready for this.

The example of Transylvania is instructive. The last two points of the Blazh program, 15 and 16, were key, for they assumed a complete reorganization of the state and political structure of the principality - the development by the Constituent Assembly with a representative "of all nations" and based on "principles of freedom, justice, equality and brotherhood" new constitution.

Article 16 warned "accompanying nations" that the question of unification with Hungary should not be raised until the Romanians are represented in "legislative chamber" with a deliberative and decisive vote; if the Diet starts to discuss "union without us"- the Romanian nation will protest.

All this served as a formidable warning to both the local Transylvanian authorities and the revolutionary government in Pest. Probably, there still existed, albeit weak, but the possibility of a compromise at the expense of significant concessions to "foreign nationals". They did not use it; Blazh's response was a decision to hastily implement a union with Hungary.

A tense, nervous atmosphere reigned in Cluj when a delegation from the Blazh Assembly arrived there. One of its participants, G. Baritsiu, recalled: "The square was decorated with hundreds of tricolor Hungarian flags with the words" Unification "on some," Unification or death "on others"... The streets were crowded with people who were threatening towards the "separatists". The mission of the delegates from Blaz ended in failure, they did not want to be listened to, and the petition they brought was put on the back burner. On May 17 (29), the Diet voted to unite with Hungary. Frightened Germans, members of the meeting, who were open opponents of the union, raised their hands in favor, and then fled.

The fateful decision finally split the Transylvanian society, and confrontation did not have to wait long, as unrest in the villages did not stop. Residents of the village of Michaltsy seized the land of a Hungarian landowner. A squad sent to suppress. consisted of Sekeys, committed a real massacre on May 29 (June 10). The first blood was shed. The conflict, social in its essence, turned into an interethnic clash, demonstrating the inextricable connection in the principality of these two principles.

The young Romanian leaders were outraged and began to form their own detachments, the Austrian command did not deny them weapons. The local authorities decided to suppress the evil by issuing an order to arrest members of the committee elected in Blazh, but only two were detained. Persecutions began against "bureaucrats", as the Romanian intellectuals were called. The latter began to leave for the inaccessible villages of the Western Carpathians and the military border under the protection of the granichars - peasant soldiers who guarded the borders of the empire. The clergy, Orthodox and Uniate among the Romanians, Lutheran among the Germans, campaigned in favor of the Habsburgs.

Meanwhile, the Hungarian revolution was threatened with intervention, and it was preparing to rebuff. In August 1848, they announced mobilization into the army. In Transylvania, recruiters ran into resistance in Romanian, German and even some Hungarian villages: first give me land, but for now let the "counts" who started the revolution fight — that was the meaning of the responses received. Detachments of troops seized recruits by force, in the Luna community it came to a carnage that ended in the death of dozens of villagers.

On September 3-13 (15-25), the second meeting was held in Blaz. The peasants came to him armed with spears, pitchforks, flails, some even with guns. The meeting formed "a mixed commission of Romanians, Hungarians and Saxons, peasants, townspeople and educated persons" to study the question of punishment "everyone guilty of extortion, robbery, persecution, arrest, violence, murder, in everything that came from the system of terrorism." The Hungarian Revolution was thus declared a terrorist regime.

The "assembled people" further stated that "does not want to recognize the unification of Transylvania with Hungary, against which he previously protested and did not take part in(meetings) Diets during its discussion. " The task was to seek the opening of the Transylvanian Assembly as soon as possible. "from Romanian, German(Saka) and Hungarian(sekeyskikh) deputies elected on a proportional basis depending on the size of each of the mentioned nations "... The participants in the meeting stated that they recognize only the authority of the emperor and will accept the orders of his government and orders of his command. As a matter of fact decisions taken were a declaration of war on the Hungarian revolution and at the same time an application for the decisive word in the management of Transylvania.

A stab in the back of the Magyars was inflicted at a difficult time for those times. The Habsburgs recovered from their initial fear and losses. In June, Prince Windischgrez suppressed the uprising in Prague, in July Field Marshal I. Radetzky defeated the Italians near Custozza and occupied Milan, in August Kaiser Ferdinand returned to Vienna, however, as a result of the October uprising, he again fled. In September, the Croatian Ban I. Jelacic invaded Hungary, and although he was defeated as a result, the Kaiser, by his rescript, managed to dissolve the Hungarian Parliament and declare Hungary and Transylvania under a state of siege.

In October, the German community of Hermannstadt declared the union of Transylvania with Hungary invalid. The Romanian committee elected in Blaž drew up a grandiose plan for almost universal armament of compatriots, deciding to form 15 legions led by tribunes - everything was done according to the ancient Roman model. The result was modest - it was possible to put under arms 2 thousand people, not counting the two regiments of granichars and peasant detachments, who were going to "work", then dispersed to their homes.

In response, on October 2 (14), a mass gathering of the Szekeys took place in Lutitsa (Adyadfalva) with the participation of officers and soldiers of the Szekeys border regiments who had left the subordination of the imperial command. Those gathered swore allegiance to the Hungarian revolution, formed their own detachments and went to war with the Romanians. The bloody feud was growing.

Volunteers-Honved and Szekei destroyed and burned villages along the Murosh River around Cluj and Turda (Torda). The detachment formed in Lutica defeated the Granichars and the Romanian militias near Regin, the city itself was plundered and burned, after which many Szekei returned to their villages, and the rest were scattered by the imperial troops. The nobles hastily fortified their estates, calling for help from the Hungarian National Guard. The peasants sharpened scythes and pitchforks, seized estates, dealt with their inhabitants. On October 10 (22), the Romanians who burst into Zlatna set the village on fire and plunder. Residents of the towns of Abrud and Romia laid down their arms in front of the couple of lawyer Abram Yanku, nicknamed "the king of the mountains", and escaped such a terrible fate. A "battle" took place in the Zerand committee near Tyrnava, in which hundreds of poorly armed Romanian peasants were killed.

In November, power in most rural areas, in the cities of Brashev (Brassho, Kronstadt) and Sibiu, was in the hands of the commander of the Austrian troops in Transylvania, Field Marshal Puchner, the Romanians and the Germans. In December, the pendulum of luck swung in the Hungarian direction. Emperor Ferdinand, under pressure from his entourage, dissatisfied with the "passivity" of the monarch, abdicated in favor of his nephew, 18-year-old Franz Joseph. The government in Pest, demonstrating its independence, was in no hurry to recognize him as king. In the last days of 1848, who was leaving Transylvania, the corps of General Yu. Bem, a Polish revolutionary and a capable commander, entered Transylvania.

The Romanians were caught off guard by the abrupt turn of events. On December 16 (28), 250 of their representatives gathered in Sibiu. The idea of ​​merging all the lands inhabited by Romanians into one state-administrative entity was discussed. But so far, we had to deal not with a large-scale project, which meant the breakdown of the entire structure of the power inherited from the Middle Ages, but with alarming current affairs. Boehm was rapidly advancing across Transylvania and approaching Sibiu. Puchner suggested calling for help from the tsarist troops stationed in neighboring Wallachia. Representatives of the two communities agreed. The petition was signed by all the members of the Rumanian committee, even the notorious democrats, who until recently had been burning with indignation against the reactionary autocracy. It was dangerous to oppose - in the village of Sechele, a local priest threatened to shoot an orator who dared to express his doubts. Following the German petitioners, Bishop A. Shagun left for Bucharest.

The headquarters of the 5th Army Corps and the consulate in Bucharest were closely and wary of the tragedy unfolding in the neighborhood. Here are some excerpts from the reports that came from there to St. Petersburg.

Dugamel's dispatch of October 26 (November 7): “The German and Wallachian populations enthusiastically rallied around the Austrian banner, while the Szeklers only recognize the orders emanating from Pest. Hostile actions began on both sides ... Where the Vlachs are most powerful, they commit unheard-of atrocities against the Hungarians; the Hungarians, for their part, slaughter the Vlachs wherever the latter are in the minority. This is a terrible racial war. The Seklers, although inferior in numbers to the Vlachs, are accustomed almost from early childhood to the craft associated with weapons, and much more belligerent than the latter ". German families fled from Hermannstadt and Kronstadt.

On December 20 (January 1), two deputations arrived at General Leaders with a request "save the lives of 80 thousand people", according to their testimony, the Austrians will hold out no more than 18 days.

However, in St. Petersburg they still harbored the illusion that the Austrians would cope with the "mutiny" themselves. Dugamel wrote on December 25 (January 6): having received a message about desperate situation Germans in Transylvania, he and the Turkish Commissioner in military aid they were refused, and they turned to the Wallachian ruler. He can send a battalion of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry and two cannons. With such forces, there is nothing to meddle in Transylvania, they will be defeated and will lead the Hungarians on their tail into Wallachia.

New dispatch of December 28 (January 9) after the quartermaster of the 5th corps, Colonel Nepokoichitsky, went to reconnoitre the neighbors: "Everywhere in Transylvania, Russian troops are impatiently awaiting and salvation is only expected from our armed intervention." The inhabitants of Rotenturm (a village near the pass of the same name across the Carpathian Mountains) imagined that the colonel had arrived to accommodate the arriving troops, prepared a meeting for them with bread and salt and were disappointed to learn that there was no question of this yet. Nepokoichitsky reached Sibiu, where he upset Puchner with the message that General Leaders was not authorized to enter Transylvania. The imperial troops are in a state of decay here, and their defeat is inevitable, the colonel summed up his impressions.

The same dispatch contains information about the mission of Bishop A. Shaguna: “These days, the Romanian Bishop of Transylvania arrived here from Hermannstadt, asking for help. revenge of the Hungarians ".

Citing these testimonies, we are aware of the source's bias - the Romanian militia also committed monstrous atrocities. On the other hand, there were people among the leaders of the revolution who sought to put an end to the bloodshed. General Behm's successes were not in the least due to the fact that he tried in word and deed to reconcile the warring parties. In his first appeal to the population, he announced that he considers all residents of the region, without distinction of nationality and faith, to be equal and have the same rights. "to any post, if they faithfully and honestly serve the state and have the necessary qualities"... He explained: the state language is Hungarian, but each community in its internal life is free to use its own. Boehm, unlike many other administrators, did not evade, but obey the laws of the Hungarian revolution.

Nicholas I hesitated for a long time and did not dare to intervene. "The entry of our troops, not forced by extreme necessity, would inevitably complicate general political relations in Europe and could serve as a pretext for such interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states in the future,"- believed the Minister of War A.I. Chernyshev. Only on January 19 (31), two detachments of Major General Engelgart and Colonel Skaryatin total number in 6 thousand bayonets and sabers went to Brasov and Sibiu.

"Our soldiers were greeted with open arms, went out to meet them with bread and salt ... A large number of German and Wallachian emigrants, ready to cross the border, hastened to return to their homes."

The Foreign Ministry considered it necessary to provide an explanation: an action of local importance and humanitarian character was undertaken, only a temporary occupation of two cities will take place. "the most urgent need" .

But the length of stay was determined not by Chernyshev and not even by the tsar, but by General Bem. His modest eight-thousandth detachment turned into a formidable forty-five thousandth army, victoriously marching along the edge. On December 13 (25), he entered Cluj and announced to the residents that they "freed from the yoke of reaction and military despotism" and "freedoms guaranteed by the Hungarian constitution", re-entered into force, and the past consigned to oblivion. Boehm combined amnesty and tolerance with revolutionary decisiveness. But he had to overcome the resistance of the nobles, enveloped in a thirst for revenge, and his partner in the administration of the province, Commissioner L. Chanyi, who believed that it was possible to restore "order" and punish "traitors to the motherland" only with the help of military courts and extraordinary tribunals.

In March 1849 Boehm achieved complete success by defeating Puchner's army. Having occupied Brasov and Sibiu, the Russian detachments hastily retreated with battles, the Romanian committee fled to Bucharest. The center of resistance was preserved in the Western Carpathian Mountains, about a tenth of the area of ​​the principality. The freedom-loving mountaineers-Mots, with whom Yanku enjoyed indisputable authority, repulsed all attempts to penetrate their land. Russian officers with some surprise and at the same time highly appreciated the fighting qualities of the troops of the "mountain king": "They were real popular partisans. Elusive as air, they appeared wherever they smelled prey ... At the sign given to them, armed crowds gathered at the designated point. He appeared and led them. At the end of the expedition, they dispersed to their homes, containing , however, a cordon line with agreed signs around the mountains " .

In the spring of 1849, the Hungarian revolution seemed to have gained the upper hand in a heroic confrontation with the Habsburgs. In early March, young Franz Joseph proclaimed a new constitution for the empire, according to which Transylvania, Banat, Croatia and Dalmatia seceded from the Kingdom of Hungary, which caused a wave of indignation in Magyar circles. The protest that swept the masses resulted in a cascade of victories over the Austrian army. Pest was liberated and the revolutionary government returned there. On April 19, the National Assembly declared the Habsburg dynasty deposed and elected the revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth as ruler of the country.

The act of deposition cannot be unequivocally evaluated, for it deprived the Hungarians of the sympathies of the royalist-minded public in the West and gave the "offended" Franz Joseph the opportunity to seek support abroad to restore his legal rights. Probes in St. Petersburg turned into insistent demands. They did not cause delight among the addressees.

Statements in the Soviet press like the following: "The request of the Austrian government was immediately granted,"- contradict the truth. Paskevich believed that the Viennese cunning people would certainly cheat Russia: the Austrians "want B v deigned to bear the brunt of the war. " The emperor agreed with him: "There is no reason to enter Transylvania. This is the business of the Austrians ... When the whole business is ruined, it would be foolish to correct their mistakes with Russian blood." On another occasion, Nicholas I wrote to his correspondent: "The Austrians, having not managed themselves, now want to rake in the heat with someone else's hands. But I do not want that." .

However, realizing the full degree of danger hanging over the crown of an inexperienced youth, the king changed his point of view. In the Danube principalities, under the cover of external calm, discontent smoldered. Consul K.E. Kotzebue reported from Bucharest about "extreme excitement in the minds." The diplomat feared that Boehm would not turn neighboring Transylvania into a fortress of the revolution: "As long as this province remains in the hands of the rebellious Hungarians, it will serve as a kind of citadel for the demagogues of all nations, from where they will try to spread their doctrines in neighboring countries," creating "a constant danger not only for the Danube principalities, but also for Bukovina, Galicia and even for our western provinces" .

So, not only monarchical solidarity, but also anxiety for the state of minds of his own loyal subjects prompted Nicholas I to make a decision on intervention.

On May 8 (20), 1849, Franz Joseph arrived in Warsaw, where the tsar was, and begged for support. In the circular Russian ministry Foreign Affairs reported a formal request from the Austrian side to help suppress the uprising, which calls into question the tranquility of the two empires. The Russian cabinet regretfully rejected the "waiting and passive attitude", but it was a question of security and a violation of the European equilibrium to the detriment of Russia.

Ever since the times of Potemkin and Suvorov, the Russian command disliked the Austrian colleagues, and therefore put forward the demand for absolute independence of the actions of the expeditionary forces. But before giving the order to the troops, it was necessary to find out the possible reaction to the invasion of the main European countries. The probes in the capitals have produced calming results.

Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, who had already managed to suppress the revolution in Rome, triumphed in France.

In Italy, I. Radetsky and J. Gainau dealt with the movement.

There remained Great Britain, where three approaches to the planned punitive action coexisted: vowel- the press frightened the "Cossack invasion", the public held meetings, parliamentarians exposed the "intrigues of the Muscovites"; official- the government condemned interference in the internal affairs of other states and the violation of their sovereignty; secret, which can be regarded as a well-disguised promotion of reprisals against the Hungarian revolution.

On the whole, the British position did not inspire serious fears. Ambassador to London F.I. Brunnov reassured his superiors: "The opinion is growing that the moment has come when Austria, being unable to restore order, will be forced to resort to material assistance from Russia." That was how the diplomat spoke roundly about the proposed invasion. The Cabinet may "in the appropriate case consider itself compelled to be restrained or to protest, in isolation or jointly with France." And that's all.

There was even no protest. "Austria is important element balance of power in Europe,- said Palmerston in parliament. - Anything that can directly or accidentally weaken or cripple Austria, reduce it from the position of a power of the first rank and turn it into a secondary one, will be a great misfortune for Europe. "... You can't say it more frankly! The renowned field marshal, Duke A. Wellington, privately taught how to suppress the Hungarians: not to engage in hats, to move large forces against them, forty thousand. Palmerston clearly feared public interference and advised: "Finish it soon!" .

The tsarist command seriously prepared for the invasion: the army of Paskevich and the corps of Adjutant General Ridiger loomed over Hungary from the north, and the corps of Leaders struck from the Danube principalities. From the west - the Austrian army of J. Gainau, a total of more than 200 thousand soldiers and officers. The Magyars fought bravely and skillfully. Of their generals, Bem received special praise from Russian officers - "skillful, adventurous, active" .

According to the tradition firmly established in Russian historiography, Paskevich's campaign was painted entirely in black paint. In terms of the most general assessment, without going into details, this is true, but it is the details that are extremely important in this case.

In Transylvania, both revolutionary and national ideas turned out to be deeply involved in anger, hatred and blood. Therefore, one cannot reproach a “man in the street” for striving to save his life and children, to preserve his hard-earned or goodness inherited from ancestors. It cannot be portrayed as if the Russian army broke into Transylvania and, under the whistle of a Cossack whip, betrayed everything to fire and sword. The classical formula - peoples against tyrant monarchs - had no chance of success here; in the Romanian villages, in the cities inhabited mainly by Germans, the invaders were greeted not with a drekolya stake, but with bells and flowers. Therefore, to talk about the "pacification" of Transylvania by the Cossacks - as it is still affirmed in our mass press - is to mislead the reader.

Here are the "travel experiences" Russian officer: “The transition from Mühlenbach to Sas Varos was not happy. These ruined villages and houses along the road, the fresh monuments of internecine Transylvania, brought us sadness. courtyards, burnt walls, pipes sticking out like mausoleums in a cemetery - all this was disheartening ".

And here are the "pictures of morals": the deputy of the Hungarian Assembly of the Romanians Dragos, trying to promote the reconciliation of the two peoples, struck up negotiations in Abruda with the leaders of the mountaineers-Mots. The partisans of Major L. Khatvani burst into the city and hanged two prefects, L. Butyan and P. Dobry. The enraged mountaineers led by Yanku drove out the Hatvani detachment from Abrud; Dragosh, suspected of treason, was killed, and his body was cut into pieces. With coming Russian army there was a threat of mass revenge: "The Wallachs, taking advantage of the defeat of the Hungarian army, have again begun to indulge in riots and threatened to rob and kill the Hungarians." .

Under the circumstances, Paskevich's army was met with sympathy by the Romanian and German population of the region, i.e. by the majority of residents: "On June 10, the troops entered Kronstadt with a ceremonial march ... The inhabitants greeted us with great triumph"; "the inhabitants of Hermannstadt went out to meet the village of Shelemberg, from where many people and many carriages accompanied us to the city. Regimental music met us there. From the windows they showered us with wreaths of flowers"; "The population of Medias was loyal to the emperor and greeted us as liberators ... As soon as our troops were in position, all Medias came to look at them. The valley of Kekel, famous for its vineyards, turned into a noisy promenade, in which the soldiers played the most honorable role"; "Segesvar(Shegeshvar, Sighisoara. - V.V. ) received us with undisguised joy. He bore the yoke of the Hungarians with great reluctance. " Before the arrival of the Russian army, government commissioner Gaal Sandor hanged ten residents, which increased the discontent of the population. The corps was met by a hundred "young maidens crowned with flowers" everyone is in white robes. On behalf of the city, they presented bouquets to General Leaders.

In Sas-Varosha, the "king of the mountains" Yanku appeared to Leaders, "a young man of about 25 years old, blond, very handsome in himself, and with such a kind, pleasant face that it is impossible to believe that he has already pronounced so many inexorable sentences against people"... The general supplied him with money, and considerable money - 20 thousand rubles. and ammunition.

The above does not change the general negative assessment of the armed intervention of tsarism in the affairs of the Austrian Empire, which contributed to the preservation of the integrity of this public education, the triumph of conservative principles in it - and is intended to warn against oversimplification and lack of weight in judgments when interpreting extremely complex and dramatically unfolding events.

At the same time, there is no need to talk about the triumph of reaction along the entire line, the Habsburgs made significant concessions without encroaching on some of the cardinal achievements of the revolution, on its agrarian legislation in particular. Nor can the tsar's dignitaries be portrayed entirely as mossy retrogrades. Let's refer to the advice. given by Paskevich to the autocrat: "I do not know your thoughts about Austria, but if its existence is necessary for your politics, then amnesty is needed and the previous constitution is needed", i.e. constitution of 1848

The war was unpopular even among the generals. The Austrian commander J. Gainau was hated by everyone, starting with the tsar, for his arrogance, extreme cruelty, constant desire to put a leg to an ally, disruption of the supply of food and fodder, which he carefully took away for his troops. "About the actions of the Austrians, we share the same thoughts,- the tsar confessed to Paskevich. - But you can't change them; so, we must patiently endure evil, if only the overall result was desired by us ".

The bloody massacres of Gainau abhorred the Russian officer corps, in whose custom it was to spare those who laid down their arms. There was undisguised sympathy for the brave enemy: "As soon as the Hungarians surrendered, we looked at them not as enemies, but as unfortunates."

Paskevich shared the same feeling. In connection with the transfer of the captured Hungarian generals to the Austrians, he turned to the king in expressions that did not allow for double interpretation: "Can I give all those who hope for your goodness to the gallows? For the fact that they have surrendered before your troops?" It seemed that if the king had said no, and dozens of glorious lives would have been saved.

But Nicholas I, a prisoner of the ideas of legitimacy and monarchical solidarity, did not heed the field marshal: "They are rebels and it is low and mean to get close to them, it is enough that we have mercy on them." The king added that the young "The emperor intends to forgive everyone after the trial of the former officers of his army."

Nothing like this! The 18-year-old monarch neglected the personal appeals of Tsarevich Alexander and Paskevich to him for mercy. By sending the latter the cross of Maria Theresa, he was hypocritical in the accompanying letter: "If I followed only the impulses of my heart, I would gladly draw the veil of oblivion over the past", but the debt to the country is heavy. Hundreds of people were shot and hanged, including 13 generals who went down in history as the Arad Martyrs.

The last two months of the revolutionary epic are very important for characterizing interethnic relations in Transylvania. General Boehm fiercely resisted the overwhelming Russian forces that had entered. At the end of June, he undertook a sabotage, which is difficult to explain from the point of view of military tactics, in Moldova, crossing the Oytuz Pass with a detachment of 2.5 thousand people and 12 cannons. He pushed aside the weak Russian barriers and appealed to the population to free themselves from the tsarist guardianship. The appeal was also signed by some of the revolutionaries who left Wallachia, led by C. Bolliac.

Boehm quickly realized that the Russian troops in his rear could tightly block the passes of the Carpathian Mountains and trap him, so he hastily returned to Transylvania. It can be assumed that he decided on a hopeless expedition not without prompting from the Romanian side. The Wallachian revolutionary Nicolae Balcescu, who arrived in Ardyal, in a letter dated June 7 (19), drew before the general the bright prospects of the invasion of the Danube principalities. Either with a twist of heart, or showing great vivacity of imagination, he wrote: what the Romanians have always wanted is this "to unite your movement with the Polish and Hungarian and fight together against Russia, under whose yoke they are all ... By joining Wallachia and Moldova, Your Excellency will secure the devotion of 8 million Romanians to the cause of freedom ... You will transfer the war to the south of Russia, where it is most vulnerable ".

In the battle of Sighisoara on July 18 (30), Boehm was defeated. He himself was wounded and taken away from the battlefield on a cart, his adjutant, the wonderful poet Sandor Petofi, died a heroic death. The general managed to gather the remnants of his forces for the last battles. He did not want to surrender, and after the surrender of the main forces of the Hungarian army of A. Gergey near Shiria (Villagos) on August 1 (13), accompanied by several Poles, he fled to Turkey.

It remains for us to turn the last page of the dramatic history of Transylvania in 1848-1849. and talk about attempts to establish cooperation between the revolutionary forces of the Danube principalities and Hungary.

Beautiful in design, in fact it did not stick - differences and strife began immediately after the exchange of pathetic declarations about the brotherhood of peoples. The very orientation of the two movements threw them apart, and then pushed them against each other, their fundamental prerequisites were incompatible: the goal of the Magyars is a single centralized state "Hungarian political nation"; the goal of the Romanians is a very significant degree of not only national-cultural, but also national-state independence, federalization of the lands of the crown of St. Stephen, which would inevitably entail the undermining of economic positions and the loss of the political hegemony of the Magyar nobility in most of them.

Hence the misunderstanding, rejection, and then the collision of the Hungarian revolution with the national movements of the Romanians, as well as the Germans. The future with harsh inevitability promised a clash of different national movements among themselves - all of them, without exception, bore within themselves the germ of chauvinism, all thought of the unification of national lands with a fair hold of "aliens", looking for evidence in the forgotten darkness of history.

Balcescu made a serious attempt to reach a Romanian-Hungarian agreement. In May 1849 he arrived, or rather penetrated, into Hungary, whose government took refuge in provincial Szeged and showed some inclination towards reconciliation. Balcescu was the embodiment of moderation. He, of course, was aware of what the equalization of the rights of the nationalities living in Transylvania would lead to: "With the advent of democracy, the majority in the assembly will go to the Romanians and Slavs. And general difficulties will force everyone to live in a confederation." He did not talk about such dangerous things to his negotiating partners and offered an acceptable option of "appeasement" for them. On July 2 (14), the document was signed. Undoubtedly, the tsarist intervention contributed to the acquiescence of the Magyars: the revolution had only a month to live.

In the "Pacification Project", official Hungary recognized the rights of Romanians as a nation to use native language in the school and the administration of localities with a predominantly Romanian population, undertook obligations to abolish not in words, but in deeds corvee duties, to restore destroyed and burned down houses. The only Hungarian language continued to function in the legislature and the higher court. An agreement was reached on the creation of a Romanian legion, which was to swear allegiance to Hungary and Romania and fight under the Hungarian banner against despotism.

With incredible difficulties Balcescu made his way into the mountains to meet with Yanku. He said that time was lost, he refused to cooperate with the Hungarians, but promised not to raise weapons against them in the future, which did not prevent him, however, from accepting money and ammunition from the tsarist command. Balcescu, with a few companions, had to carry off his feet. Later, he colorfully described the vicissitudes of the flight, the details of which characterize the atmosphere of that time.

In the mountains they made their way secretly, fearing "to be arrested and killed by reactionary peasants who might mistake us for Hungarians." Such were the sentiments of those whom Balcescu recorded as the allies of the revolution. "Out of anguish" he is ill.

At Muresh, the fugitives were detained by a Russian mounted patrol. Balcescu treated the soldiers to tobacco, and they let them go in peace, not knowing what dangerous traveler they were dealing with - after all, a dark-haired, painfully thin man was going to raise "8 million Romanians" to revolt against Russia.

Then the wretched, disguised as peasants, joined the wagon train with pots, jugs and other pottery utensils. The convoy ran into the Hungarian gendarmes, who were found on the carts under the dishes "master's clothes", but confiscated it and did not detain the "thieves". The fugitives ate poorly, soaked in the rain, spent the night in haystacks, and from this "dog's life" Balcescu recovered. In the villages, he bargained for an hour with the women for each kreutzer - to pass for a real merchant.

The escape succeeded; but the plan of cooperation between the peoples failed. Balcescu carefully and quite biasedly analyzed the reason for the failure, and the Romanians, the Magyars, the Serbs, and the Slavs in general, and, of course, the insidious "Muscovites" with their intrigues and intrigues got it: "This winter I got acquainted with the Moscow spirit of the Slavs of Austria, which spread among the Romanian people of Banat and Transylvania."

And yet the main thing was not in the mistakes of the leaders and not in the imaginary "intrigues of the Russians", which, in fact, before the appearance of units of the 5th Infantry Corps there, could not be found in the daytime with fire, but that history did not prepare the ground for the desirable revolutionaries cardinal achievements.

In this region, in a single space, lived national communities that were different in language, culture, legal status in the state, material well-being, social structure and mentality.

The driving force of the revolution was the large nobility, middle and small; it shared the political program of the Hungarian revolution, reacted with restraint to the agrarian and enthusiastically supported the 12th point of the Pest program on the unification of Transylvania with Hungary. A different system of values ​​corresponded to a different social structure of the Romanian community.

The brain center of the movement was the diverse intelligentsia, who welcomed the political program of the Hungarian revolutionaries, ready to go further in the agrarian area. The stratum of the national bourgeoisie (merchants, bankers, tenants, owners of workshops and manufactures), already quite influential, but little connected with large land ownership, shared these views and sought to achieve national autonomy, which essentially meant a claim to power in the principality.

The peasantry, for the most part feudal-dependent and almost universally illiterate, showed indifference to democratic institutions unknown to them, and the peasants exercised freedom of speech with great expressiveness in a tavern. The village demanded land, believed in the good intentions of the emperor and followed its "scribes", who spoke in a language she could understand.

The national idea in the principality was inextricably linked with the question of the unity of the Hungarian kingdom and power in it. With at least some kind of democratic approach, the lands of the crown of St. Stephen either disintegrated or turned into a federation and even a confederation, which the Hungarian revolutionaries rejected from the doorway, and not by the evil will of Kossuth "with comrades", but because any country, freed from the fetters dependence, is extremely jealous of its integrity and sovereignty and does not tolerate anything seen as an encroachment on its territory. The chances of reaching a consensus in a given state of society at the stage of mentality development reached by its intellectual elite were equal to zero.

Balcescu achieved the maximum possible - limited cultural and national autonomy. But, if the agreement were carried out, it would soon be rejected by the Romanian side as insufficient.

The tragic collision of the Hungarian revolution with the national movements of the "accompanying" peoples is therefore not an accident, but a pattern.

Ignorance and savagery "in the lower ranks" gave the conflict a bloody form of internecine massacre. The deep feeling of national hatred that struck the Russian officers could not be overcome either by appeals, or impulses, or by the sacrifice of the petrels of the revolution:

"Dako-romun, locked in the very tops of the gorges, in the distant outskirts of the city, looks from the threshold of his poor Greek church at the magnificent temples and huge houses of the Germans, Hungarians and Seklers and ponders plans for his belated vengeance. Here is the whole history of Transylvania. In Kronstadt you can feel it " .

The human world is multifaceted by its nature, and it appeared as such in the Transylvanian miniature. Cut it one size fits all, even revolutionary. seems impossible, the revolution did not rally, but divided the peoples. And the campaign of Paskevich, punitive in relation to the Hungarian revolution, appears as a saving one for the numerous Romanian and German population of the region. Literature 30. Vinogradov B.H. Essays on social and political thought in Romania. M., 1975, p. 120; Cherestesiu V. Op. cit., p. 424.

46. ​​Ibid, fol. 46-47.

47. Averbukh R.A. Decree. cit., p. 287.

48. Opinions and Policy of H.J. Palmerston. London, 1852, p. 482.

49. Averbukh P.A. Decree. cit., p. 298-299.

50. Daragan. Decree. cit., p. 129, 248.

51. See B. Vinogradov Izvestia, 18.1X. 1996.

52. Daragan. Decree. cit., p. 221.

53. Dinistoria Transilvaniei.p. 126.

54. Daragan. Decree. cit., p. 237-238.

55. Ibid, p. 66, 114, 136, 138.

56. Ibid, p. 222.

57. Shcherbatov (A.G.). Decree. cit., p. 173.

58. Ibid, p. 318.

59. Daragin. Decree. cit., p. 178; Shcherbatov (A.G.). Decree. cit., p. 172, 331.333, 439.

60. Anul 1848 in Principatele Romane, v. VI. Bucuresti, 1910, p. 268.

61. RGVIA, f. Military Scientific Archive, 1849, d. 5349, fol. 263.

62. Ghica I. Amintiri din pribegie, v. 2. Bucuresti, 1910, p. 39.

63. Istoria Romaniei, v. IV. Bucuresti, 1964, p. 164-165.

64. Balcescu N. Opere.v. IV, p. 226-227.

65. Daragan. Decree. cit., p. 67.96

Many historians consider the suppression of the revolution in Hungary by Russian troops in 1849 as almost the main foreign policy mistake of Nicholas I. However, an objective analysis shows that this intervention was a completely rational and inevitable step.

Criticism of the decision adopted by Nicholas I is based on two theses. First, there were obvious losses in the image, since Russia has since been given the nickname "gendarme of Europe." Secondly, just five years later, the Habsburgs will oppose their savior, and Russia will have to keep troops on the Austrian border, which will be so lacking near Sevastopol.

However, Nicholas I did not make any mistake.

Field marshal on his knees

The revolutions that broke out in Europe in 1848 are called “the spring of nations”. Demands for democratic reform were intertwined with aspirations for independence and attempts to unite nations split into small states.

Russia looked against the general background as an unshakable bastion of autocracy. Revolutionary fermentation was not observed even in the Kingdom of Poland, which was ruled with an iron hand by Field Marshal Ivan Fedorovich Paskevich, who bore the title of Prince of Warsaw.

The hardest thing was for Austria, which, due to the large number of peoples inhabiting it, was often called the "patchwork empire".


Hungary, led by the revolutionary government of Lajos Kossuth, set out to create an independent republic. At the same time, the Slavic peoples demonstrated loyalty to the house of the Habsburgs, since they hoped to achieve an equal rights with the Germans and Hungarians.

In the spring of 1849, the most capable Hungarian military leader, Arthur Görgey, inflicted a series of defeats on the Austrians, which greatly alarmed Nicholas I. noted in the anti-Russian uprising of 1831. Galicia would also have become part of Hungary, where in 1846, with the complicity of the Austrian authorities, Ukrainian peasants staged a massacre of Polish landowners. The Poles dreamed of putting "cattle in place", and then using Galicia as a springboard for inciting rebellion, and then the invasion of Russian Poland.


Nicholas I and Paskevich did not like this scenario in any way, and they decided to help the Austrians, who, moreover, simply prayed for it.

On May 3, 1849, Field Marshal-Lieutenant Count Kaboga, who arrived in Warsaw, handed Paskevich a letter from the head of the Austrian government, Prince Schwarzenberg, in which he reported that the Hungarians were in several transitions from the capital of Austria and without the help of the Russians, its fall was inevitable. Save Austria! Kaboga pleaded. - Every day, every hour is precious! " - and, falling to his knees, he kissed the hand of Prince Varshavsky.

Duel of wits

Paskevich needed to make a decision immediately. It was possible to obtain the sanction of Nicholas I, who was in Moscow, only after 12-15 days - an unacceptable period.

The 10,000th detachment of Lieutenant General Panyutin was formed as a "fire brigade", the personnel of which were supplied with a four-day ration and, being put in wagons, were sent along the Warsaw-Vienna railway to the capital of Austria. It was the first in Russian military history the case of the transfer of troops by rail.

Soon, learning that Görgey did not begin to advance on Vienna, Paskevich ordered Panyutin to stop at Gradisch and join the Austrian Main Army of Field Marshal Gainau.

On May 16, Nicholas I arrived in Warsaw, and five days later - the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph. The agreement they signed on May 29 determined the order and goals of the allies' actions. For their help in defeating the Hungarians, the Austrians pledged to ensure the supply of the 100-thousandth Russian army with transport, food and ammunition, and if it was impossible to cover all the needs and compensate for the costs incurred in money.

The enemy, including the militia units, had an army of nearly 200,000. The main, or Upper Danube army of Görgey consisted of approximately 45 thousand bayonets and sabers. However, before on their way, Paskevich's troops would have had to cross weapons with the 25,000-strong Upper Tisza army of Dembinsky, defending the exits from the Carpathians to the Hungarian plains. The 30,000th South Tisza army of Pregel tried to neutralize Jelachich's South Austrian army, equal in number. Józef Boehm was in Transylvania with 60 thousand, but his destruction was part of the task of General Leaders, acting independently of the Russian corps. Up to 50 thousand were in the reserve and fortress garrisons.


Having crossed the mountains, the Russian troops had to reach a huge plain, cut from north to south by the Tisza River, cross this water line and then push the enemy westward to Weizen.

Thus, Görgei had to find himself between the Russian hammer and the Austrian anvil.

"Why do you hate us?"

On June 15, 1849, Paskevich's troops marched to the Carpathians. At the army was the 22-year-old son of the emperor, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich - in the future a famous reformer and general-admiral of the Russian fleet.

The Slavic population of the "patchwork empire" greeted the tsarist troops with enthusiasm. “There was a rumor that the Russian army had moved on the Hungarians, and no one doubted that the end had come ... scourges, and whomever they reach will never get up. "

On June 23, a successful battle for the Russians with a five-thousand-strong detachment of General Vysotsky near the town of Shamosh took place. Here is what the participant of the campaign Likhutin tells about him: “Our troops, which overtook the enemy for the first time, seized him with fierceness; hand-to-hand combat ensued immediately. Of the units following behind, who were probably already in bivouacs, the Cossacks and whoever could galloped forward alone and rushed into battle. It was said that in single battles, the opponents, breaking their weapons, tormented each other with their hands and teeth ... Although the matter was not great, his impression on the Hungarians, apparently, was very strong. I myself happened to hear the questions of the Magyars in Kashau the day after the Samos affair; "Why are you fighting with us with such ferocity? What have we done to you?"

In an effort to facilitate the supply, and at the same time capture the bridge across the Tissa, Paskevich moved the 4th corps to Tokai, famous for its wines.

The Russian cavalry rushed through the city on the move, but then came under fire from the enemy artillery standing on the opposite bank and lost several people killed. Several shots were fired from private houses. Then let us give the floor to Likhutin: “At the first shots from the windows, the soldiers naturally rushed to the houses from which they fired, broke down doors and gates, scattered small barricades arranged in the entryway and gates, and burst into the houses. Some residents, including one woman, were captured with guns still smoking from the shots, all of whom were killed; the massacre was quick and strangled the people's war, if it was possible, at the very beginning ... "


Is it possible to agree with Likhutin, especially considering that he himself does not question the legitimacy of the Russian people's war in 1812, is a difficult question. However, the memoirist described the results of such a brutal lesson quite convincingly. According to him, during the entire campaign of 1849: “Our people drove along the roads alone, on horseback or in carriages and carts, like at home. However, during the entire continuation of the war, no incident or misfortune happened to any officer; residents everywhere remained calm and even single people were received calmly and hospitably. Accidents happened only with the lower ranks, who were always drunk. "

Ring for Görgey

In Tokay, the Russians faced a dangerous enemy - cholera, which rapidly spread in the heat in the marshy plains of the Tissa.

Meanwhile, the government of Lajos Kossuth was evacuated to Szegedin, while Buda and Pest were occupied by the Austrians. On July 11, Gainau and Görgei fought at the walls of the Comorne, after which both armies headed for Pest in a race, moving along the opposite banks of the Danube. The Hungarians walked along the left bank, and near Weizen, where in the foothills the Danube channel turned south, Görgey was to be intercepted by Paskevich. Indeed, on July 15, the Hungarian vanguard stumbled upon Bebutov's cavalry regiment.

Having occupied the heights surrounding Weizen, the Hungarians repulsed the cavalry and horse artillery that had rushed to the aid of Bebutov under the command of General Zass. The battle escalated into an artillery duel, which subsided with the onset of darkness.

The memoirists were surprised that Paskevich brought troops into battle reluctantly and did not try to launch a serious offensive against the enemy. The reasons for this strange behavior are obvious. The field marshal pushed his opponent south - into the "embrace" of the Austrians, who had to do all the bloody work. However, the overly energetic actions of Zass frightened Görgei away, and he, changing the route of his movement, decided to move to the northeast - to Tokai and Debrechin. This meant that the prince of Warsaw would have to deal with him.


On July 17, Russian troops patted the enemy's rearguard, forcing him to choose from all possible roads to Tokay the most inconvenient ones, passing through mountain gorges. Görgei himself was wounded in the head, and his troops were so demoralized that during one of the stops they fell into panic, mistaking the drum signal “rise” for the “alarm” signal.

Apart from cholera, events developed for the Russians according to a perfectly acceptable scenario. During this period, there were even voices in Hungary that it would be good to proclaim the country an independent kingdom headed by the son of the Russian emperor, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich.

Meanwhile, Görgei decided to turn sharply to the south in the Tokay region in order to move to join the South Tisza army. He himself, with the main forces, moved through Gross-Vardane, and along a more obvious route for the Russians - through Debrichin - he sent the thousandth corps of Nagi-Shandor, which on August 2 was defeated by Paskevich.

Nicholas I, congratulating the field marshal on the victory, expressed regret that Görgei himself had left. In his reply, Prince Varshavsky maintained equanimity: “Görgei knows war and he can only be destroyed by maneuvering, not fighting. He will not fight, realizing his weakness. I will lock him in a ring, although it is difficult for me to maneuver, having 4 thousand carts behind me. "

In Transylvania, on July 31, Leader defeated Bem at Shegeshwar, after which he moved west to Arad, helping to tighten the loop in which Görgey fell. Bem rushed ahead of his winner. Joining Dembinsky's army and actually removing his compatriot from the command, he tried to breathe morale into the despondent army by moving on the Austrians.

On August 9, the battle of Temeshvar broke out, in which the victory remained with Gainau, and where Panyutin's detachment showed itself splendidly. Bem's associate, Vysotsky, wrote that the remnants of the defeated troops "wandered in small parties along various roads, soldiers without officers, officers without soldiers, artillery dispersed at random ... No one had the desire to fight, everyone demanded that they enter into negotiations."

And what about Görgei? All he had to do was cut circles, which were getting narrower. And he preferred to lay down his arms, "betraying the Hungarian people and, in particular, the officers who had previously served in the ranks of the Austrian troops, excluding only himself, the magnanimity and justice of the Russian tsar."

The surrender took place on August 13, 1849 in the vicinity of Vilagos. About 30,000 Hungarian troops surrendered. Many captured generals were later shot by the Austrians as traitors. Görgey Paskevich managed to protect. He died in 1916 at the age of 98!

The losses of Russians in the Hungarian campaign in the dead and killed reached 12 thousand, and eleven people out of every twelve became victims of cholera.

The disputes with Vienna regarding compensation for the expenses incurred by the Russians continued for a long time. An angry Paskevich wrote to the emperor about the Austrians: "In gratitude for their salvation, they are capable of much."

What exactly was the best guess of Prince Schwarzenberg, who shrewdly predicted that "Austria will still surprise the world with its ingratitude."


Sadly, but even if Nicholas I knew in advance what form this ingratitude would take, in 1849 he would still have saved the Habsburgs. After all, if during the Crimean War Austria still limited itself to diplomatic demarches, then Republican Hungary inevitably joined the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance, and a new anti-Russian uprising would break out in the Kingdom of Poland. And then Crimean War would have ended much worse.

Plan
Introduction
1 State of the Hungarian and Austrian armies
2 Start of hostilities
3 Actions of Skaryatin and the failures of the Austrians
4 Entry into the war of Russian units
4.1 Parts assigned to the campaign
4.2 Grouping of Hungarian forces
4.3 Offensive planning

5 First successes
5.1 Fights at the Front
5.2 Battles of Comorne

6 Speech by the Russian army
6.1 Failure at Weizen
6.2 Maneuvering Russian Corps

7 July battles
7.1 Hungarians' actions on communications
7.2 Goergey's transition to southern Hungary
7.3 Capturing the Tiszafüred Ferry
7.4 Maneuvering and fighting at Debrecen
7.5 Austrian action

8 Defeat of the Hungarians
8.1 Removing the blockade from Temeshwar
8.2 Disarming Görgey in front of the Russian troops
8.3 Capitulation of Comorne

9 Military action in Transylvania
9.1 Overview of the forces of the opposing sides
9.2 The occupation of Kronstadt
9.3 Actions of Grotengelm and Engelhardt
9.4 Uncertainty of the Leader's actions
9.5 Battle of Hermannstadt
9.6 Grotengelm's successes
9.7 Great offensive in Transylvania
9.8 Battle of Shegeshwar
9.9 Bem's Plans
9.10 Battle of the Grossshauern Heights
9.11 Second battle at Hermannstadt
9.12 Defeat of the Hungarian rebels

10 End of hostilities
11 Assessment of the actions of Paskevich and Leaders
Bibliography

Introduction

Suppression of the Hungarian Uprising of 1848-1849

1. The state of the Hungarian and Austrian armies

The forces that the Hungarian rebels could have at their disposal were initially small. On May 7, 1848, the Hungarian government approved the formation of 10 battalions of Honvedians (10,000 men); On June 29, the recruitment of 200,000 people was announced, of which 40,000 immediately; in August, the establishment of a mobile national guard of 32,000 men was ordered. In September, the Hungarian government had only 18,000 people at its disposal; in October, the number of Hungarian troops increased to 25,000. By the time the main Russian forces entered the war, the number of the Hungarian army had increased significantly: there were 25 battalions of regular troops (from the Austro-Hungarian army), 18 hussar regiments (144 squadrons), 50 batteries ( 400 guns); the Honveda militia - 147 battalions, Italian and Polish legions; the total number of troops reached 190,000. Hungarian army was imbued with a patriotic spirit, and energetic, enterprising leaders - Görgei and the Polish emigrant Boehm - emerged in it. The main forces of the Hungarians were distributed as follows:

• Görgey's detachment - 50,000 men - was stationed on both banks of the Danube in the Comorne region;
• Detachment Klapka - 18,000 people - near Neisol and Rosenberg;
• Dembinsky's detachment - 20,000 people - near Leitschau;
• Damyanich's detachment - 15,000 people - Kashau;
• Bem's detachment - 30,000 people - was stationed in Banat and guarded the mountain passes to Transylvania;
• Pertsel's detachment - 10,000 people - was in Zombor near Nagykurtyosh.

The main forces of the Austrian troops (about 80,000 people), under the command of Prince Windischgrez, before the outbreak of hostilities were composed of:

• 1st Infantry Corps (Field Marshal-Lieutenant Jelachich) - 16 battalions, 24 squadrons, 52 guns (21,418 people);
• 2nd Infantry Corps (Field Marshal-Lieutenant Count Vrbne) - 17.3 battalions, 7 squadrons, 54 guns (20,358 people);
• 3rd (reserve) corps (field marshal-lieutenant Serbelloni) - 5 battalions, 25 squadrons, 108 guns (15 250 people);
• The garrison of Vienna - 17 battalions, 10 squadrons, 36 guns (22,852 people).

2. The beginning of hostilities

Hungarian troops went on the offensive first and attacked the Austrian army on October 18 near the town of Schwechat (a few versts south of Vienna). The Hungarians were defeated and retreated to Presburg. The Prince of Windischgretz did not pursue them, considering it impossible to leave Vienna, where important political events: Emperor Ferdinand, under the yoke of surging events, decided to give up the throne in favor of his nephew Franz Joseph.

Both sides took advantage of the lull that had come at the main theater to prepare for further struggle. At this time, in the border zone of Hungary and Transylvania, individual detachments of the Hungarians continued to successfully fight the Austrian garrisons and Serbian militias. Bem's actions in Transylvania were especially successful.

In December, the Austrian army went on the offensive and, after a number of private successes, occupied Pest on the 24th. The main mass of the Hungarian troops (16,000), under the command of Görgey, then withdrew to Weizen, and the rest (up to 10,000), under the command of Perzel, to Szolnok on the Tisza River.

Thanks to the indecisive actions of Windischgrez, the scattered forces of the Hungarians by February 1849 managed to unite and gather on the upper Tisza. The Pole Dembinsky was chosen as the chief commander of all the rebel troops.

In the battle of February 14-15 at Kapolna near Fyzeshaboni, Dembinsky was defeated, and his troops retreated across the Tisu River. After that, the command passed to Görgey, who defeated the Austrians in the battle of Gödöllö and Ishaseg on March 25. The Austrians, retreating to Pest, lifted the blockade of Comorne, which was occupied by the Hungarian garrison. Windischgrz was replaced by General Welden. Velden pulled all his troops to Pressburg, leaving a small garrison at Ofen.

3. Actions of Skaryatin and the failures of the Austrians

In Transylvania, the commander of the Austrian troops, General Puchner, who had no hope of getting support, turned for help to the commander of the Russian corps that occupied the Danube principalities, General Leaders. With the permission of Emperor Nicholas I, at the end of January 1849, two small detachments of Major General Engelhardt (3 battalions, 2 hundred and 8 guns) and Colonel Skaryatin (4 battalions, 5 hundred and 8 guns) entered Transylvania and occupied Kronstadt and Germanstadt.

The appearance of Skaryatin's detachment near Germanstadt on January 23 forced Behm to stop pursuing the Austrians he was pressing and retreat to the Maros River.

In February, Boehm concentrated his forces near the city of Medias, where he was attacked by Puchner. Moving away from Medias, Boehm bypassed the Austrians with a skillful maneuver and on February 27 fell on Skaryatin's detachment near Germanstadt. Left to his own forces, Skaryatin was forced to retreat to the border of Wallachia.

Kaliani, who replaced the sick Puchner, took the Austrian troops to Kronstadt, where Boehm went. The further stay of small Russian detachments was risky and they were ordered to return to Wallachia.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary Hungarian government, assessing the successes of Bem in Transylvania, summoned him in mid-April with part of the troops to the main theater to command all forces.

4. Entry into the war of Russian units

The position of the Austrian troops, demoralized by various setbacks, was critical. The Austrian government, having lost hope of putting out the rebellion, turned to Russia for help. Emperor Nicholas I ordered the mobilization of the army from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th corps located on the western border.

4.1. Units assigned to the campaign

• 2nd corps of Lieutenant General Kupreyanov - 4th, 5th, 6th infantry, 2nd light cavalry and 2nd artillery divisions (48,967 people);
• 3rd Corps of Adjutant General Ridiger - 7th, 8th, 9th Infantry, 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Artillery Divisions (44,928 people);
• 4th corps of infantry general Cheodaev - 10th, 11th, 12th infantry, 4th light cavalry and 4th artillery divisions (52,274 people);
• 5th Corps of Adjutant General Leaders - 14th and 15th Infantry, 5th Light Cavalry and 5th Artillery Divisions and 3rd Cossack Don Regiment (28,676 people);
• 9th Infantry Division of General Panyutin (10659 bayonets and 48 guns).

The 5th corps of Leaders, by agreement with Turkey, was on a business trip to the Danube principalities to ensure order there. Panyutin's 9th Infantry Division was located at the southern borders of the Kingdom of Poland and was assigned to a campaign to reinforce the Austrian troops.

In April 1849, the Russian army, under the command of Field Marshal Prince of Warsaw, Count Paskevich-Erivansky, moved to Galicia. The Austrian government, fearing an offensive to Vienna from the side of Görgey's detachment, achieved a hasty dispatch of the infantry division of General Panyutin there. The division was transported by Warsaw-Vienna railway from Krakow to Ungarisz Hradis from April 27 to May 3.

4.2. Grouping of Hungarian Forces

By the time the Russian troops entered Austria, the Hungarian forces were grouped in three places. In the fortress of Komorn and near it - 58,000 people of the corps of Görgei; on the Danube at the mouth of the Tisza - 29,000 men of the Perzel-Vetter corps and in Transylvania - 42,000 people of the Bem corps; in addition, individual detachments and parties were in the mountainous districts of the Carpathians - in the border regions of Galicia.

4.3. Offensive planning

The Russian army, after the occupation of Galicia, deployed on the Jordanów-migrud-Duklja line. Overall plan action allied forces was next.

The combined division of Panyutin was to advance together with the Austrian army of Gainau (80,000 men) from the Edenburg-Pressburg-Tiernau line to Comorn and Ofen; a detachment of Adjutant General Grabbe (14,000 people) - from Yordanov to go to Kubin with the assignment to guard Galicia; the right column of Count Ridiger (31,500 people) - move through Neymark (?) and the southern valleys of the Carpathians to join the left column of Prince Paskevich (71,000 people) and follow from Dukla to Eperiesh and Kashau, for a joint offensive towards Pest; a detachment of Lieutenant General Grotengelm (8500 people) from Bukovina through Vatra-Dorn to follow to Transylvania and demonstrations to Bistrita to distract the enemy's attention from the 5th corps of General Leaders, which was supposed to advance from Ploiesti (in Wallachia) through Kronstadt and Germanstadt to pacify Transylvania ; the Serbian units of Ban Jelacic (44,000 men) blocking Petervardin were to act in connection with Leders; Transylvanian corps (12,000 people) of the Austrians - to advance from Chernetsi (in Wallachia).

Thus, up to 300,000 soldiers were sent into Hungary and Transylvania against 200,000 Hungarians.

5. First successes

On June 6, the Russians reached the Lublau-Bartfeld line without firing, causing panic in the Hungarian revolutionary government. The militia of Vysotsky (who replaced Dembinsky), located on the routes from Dukla and Neymark to Eperiesh (17,000 people), retreated to Kashau.

On June 11, the Russians occupied Eperiesh, and their equestrian vanguard had a dashing affair with Shomosh. On June 18, the vanguard of the army entered Miskolc, and the rest of the troops settled between this point and Forro. The Hungarians retreated to Hatvan.

The 4th corps, advanced to the Tokay-Debrecen line, took the last one on June 21; the revolutionary government fled. After collecting food supplies, the corps returned to Tokai, destroying the bridge on the Tisza.

The column of General Grabbe, without encountering resistance, took the path from Yordanov to Shemnitz. Following the occupation of Miskolc, the Russians were forced to stop, awaiting the arrival of the stragglers, and also in view of the strong development of cholera.

The main Austrian army at the beginning of June was located on a front of 160 miles between the cities of Raab and Trencin (in the valley of the upper Vag). The main apartment was in Pressburg, where there was the only bridge over the Danube. Panyutin's division - in Bösing and Modern (20 versts from Presburg).

Görgey, who had lost a lot of time on secondary operations and bickering with Kossuth, decided to defeat the Austrians before the Russians arrived. On June 4, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Hungarian corps went over to the offensive.

5.1. Fights at the Front

The first blow was directed to the area between the Neuheiselle arm of the Danube and the Vah, but ended in failure. Görgey decided to renew the offensive on June 8. In turn, Gainau also ordered part of his forces on June 8 to push back the enemy troops beyond the Wag and the Neuheisel Arm.

The clash of both sides took place near the village of Zygard. The Austrians driven out of it retreated to the village of Pered, where they also could not resist. The arrival of Panyutin's division made it possible for the Austrians to go on the offensive again, Görgei, having learned about the Russians joining them, took up a position near the village of Pered.

On June 9, the Allies (22,000 men with 96 guns) attacked Hungarian troops (18,000 men, 60 guns) at Pered. After a stubborn battle, Görgei retreated, and the ensuing darkness stopped the pursuit.

This was the first battle of large Russian forces in which they played a decisive role.

5.2. The battles of Comorne

On June 15, Gainau attacked the Kmeti division, which was stationed at Marzalto, and then the 7th Hungarian corps, which occupied the Raab fortification. After a stubborn battle, the Hungarians retreated to Comorne.

On June 20, Gainau managed to drive the Hungarian troops into the line of fortifications. Goergey on the same day in the evening, having concentrated significant forces unexpectedly for the Austrians, attacked the 1st Austrian corps. Only the timely arrival of Panyutin's division made it possible to successfully repel this surprise attack.

On June 29, Görgei attacked the Austrian army for the second time and, thanks to the actions of Panyutin, was also forced to retreat.

During these events, Gainau received information from Comorne about the approach of the Russian army to Ofen-Pest. On June 30, the Austrians at Ofen, and the flying Russian detachment of Count Adlerberg at Pest, made contact.

6. Speech by the Russian army

On June 26, the 2nd and 3rd Russian corps set out from Miskolc. By this time, the troops received a 25-day supply of food. To ensure the rear route, which passed along the Miskolc-Kashau-Bartfeld-Duklja highway, the detachment of General Selvan (10 battalions, 18 guns and 3 squadrons and hundreds) was ordered to join the Osten-Saken detachment (8 battalions, 12 squadrons, 4 hundred and 32 guns), and occupy the intermediate base in Galicia with the 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps.

On July 1, the 3rd corps arrived at Khatvan, and the 2nd at Hort. On July 2, Paskevich received a notice from Gainau about the possibility of Görgei's movement from Comorne to Weizen, and in this case he assumed, leaving the blockade corps near Comorne, with the main forces heading along the left bank of the Danube to suppress the Hungarians, whom the Russians were supposed to intercept from Weizen.

6.1. Failure at Weizen

Indeed, Görgey, leaving an 18-thousandth garrison in Comorne, under the command of Klapka, with 27,000 men marched on the night of July 1 to Weizen with the goal of marching into southern Hungary. This movement led to an unsuccessful battle for the Russians at Weizen, after which Görgey's troops withdrew to the north.

When, on July 5, the Russians moved to Weizen, only small detachments of Hungarians remained there, delayed by the movement of the transports. Without offering resistance, they withdrew to a strong position near the village of Retshag, from where they filmed that same day in the evening. Further pursuit of the retreating was entrusted to the cavalry of the 3rd corps, whose infantry stopped at Retshag.

The 5th corps was detained in Weizen, as a result of the news of the movement of the detachments of Perzel and Vysotsky from Szolnok to Kapolna near Eger or Khatvan. For the same reason, the 4th corps, sent from Mezokovesd to Miskolc, was ordered to arrive at Hatvan.

6.2. Maneuvering Russian corps

When the direction of Görgei's movement became clear, Paskevich, in order to prevent his connection with the southern troops and ensure his communications, ordered the 2nd and 3rd corps to go to Gyöngyösh, the 4th to Mezökövesd, the troops guarding the rear: the Roth detachment to retreat from Miskolc to join the 4th corps, to General Selvan, taking measures to defend the fortifications of Kashau, Eperiesh and Bartfeld, in the event of Görgey's movement to Kashau, without getting involved in the battle, retreat to the troops of Osten-Saken, to the borders of Galicia. For the retreating for direct observation, a detachment of General Zass (3 cavalry regiments with a battery) moved.

Thus, the 100-thousandth Russian army was set in motion to neutralize the 20-thousandth militia army, which was striving, as soon as possible, to escape from the blows of a strong enemy.

7. July battles

7.1. Actions of Hungarians on communications

To counter the militias of Pertsel and Vysotsky and to guard the huge convoy on July 5, a detachment of Count Tolstoy was formed. On July 8, his cavalry, directed from Asod to Zhambok, clashed near the village of Tura with the Hungarian cavalry, supported by infantry. A cavalry case took place, which, thanks to the timely arrival of the infantry (7 battalions), brought by Lieutenant General Labyntsev from Asod, ended with the retreat of the Hungarians. The pursuit was carried out as far as Zhambok.

Pertsel was forced to abandon further operations on the messages of the Russian troops and withdrew to Szolnok, and then received the assignment to defend the r. Tisu.

On July 8, near Losonets, the rearguard of Görgey's troops (Nagy Sandor's corps) was overtaken by a small flying detachment of Colonel Khrulev (2 squadrons, 1 hundred and 2 guns).

Görgey, fearing a delay in the mountains, led his army with an intensified march, and on the 10th reached Miskolc, which had already been cleared by the detachment of Major General Roth.

7.2. Goergey's transition to southern Hungary

Having safely got out of the mountains, Görgey decided to detain the Russian army in northern Hungary as long as possible in order to gain time to seize the Temeshvar fortress and strike the Austrians.

The Russian army on July 10 was still between Khatvan and Abranya. On July 11, the vanguard of the 4th corps, sent to Miskolc, collided with the Hungarian corps of Peltenberg and was forced to retreat due to the inequality of forces. On the 12th, the entire 4th corps went on the offensive and forced Peltenberg to retreat beyond the river. Shayo, where the rest of Görgey's troops were stationed. An attempt by Cheodaev to attack the army of Görgey in a position beyond the river. Chaillot ended unsuccessfully, leading only to an artillery contest.

7.3. Capture of the Tiszafüred Ferry

Meanwhile, the news that Paskevich received on the night of July 11 from the 4th corps, about Görgei's exit at Miskolc and his movement towards Tisza, caused the order for the 2nd and 3rd corps to concentrate on July 14 at Kerechend and follow to the Tiszafüred ferry. From there, both corps were to follow on the left side of the river, across the path of the Hungarian army, which the 4th corps was ordered to detain at Tokay.

On July 13, a detachment of Prince Gorchakov (5th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade of the 8th Infantry Division and 3 Cavalry Regiments) was sent to capture the Tiszafüred crossing, defended by a 2,000-strong detachment. At dawn on the 14th, after crossing the first echelon of pontoons, the Hungarians retreated. By 12 noon, a bridge was built, and the Russians took up positions east of Tiszafüred.

After the retreat of the Hungarian troops beyond the river. Shaio Paskevich ordered the 4th corps to retreat to Mezökövesd, and the 3rd and 2nd corps to Tiszafüred, at the same time the Grabbe detachment, following from the west, and Sakena - from Kashau, head through Miskolc to Tokai. On July 16, Grabbe, who stumbled at Gesteli (on the Gornada River) on all the forces of Görgey, retreated with damage. Görgey, having learned about the approach of the Osten-Saken detachment and the crossing of the Russians at Tiszafüred, retreated through the Tokay to Nyiregyhaza.

7.4. Maneuvering and fighting at Debrecen

Due to the news of the failure that befell Grabbe's detachment and fears that Görgey, having defeated Osten-Saken, would rush north on the route of the Russian troops, Paskevich abandoned the occupation of Debrecen (to block Görgey's path to the south) and decided to take a wait-and-see position on both banks Tisy, moving the bridge to the village of Tisachege.

On July 17, the 2nd and 3rd corps passed to Tisacheg, and the 4th was detained at Mezokovesd. On the 18th, Paskevich, fearing the energetic actions of Görgei, moved the 2nd and 4th corps to the Gornad River, but on the way they received a report about the retreat of Görgey, and on the 20th, about the occupation of Saken Tokay's detachment and the movement of the Hungarians towards Nyiregyhaza. After that, the field marshal again sent troops to Debrecen.

Meanwhile, Görgey, having learned about the concentration of the Russians at Tisachege, decided to retreat across the Berettio River to cover the Grosvardein. Hiding behind the lateral vanguard of Nagy Sandor (8000 men with 41 guns), following from Nyiregyhaza through Debrecen to Beretjoujfalu, the main forces of the Hungarians moved to Bemosy-Perch towards Kishmarie.

Nagy Sandor was ordered to avoid a serious battle. But on July 21, as the Russian army approached, he entered into battle with it under the walls of Debrecen and was defeated, and the remnants of his corps barely had time to retreat to Grossvardein.

7.5. Austrian actions

Upon the departure of Görgei from Comorne, Gainau, having received information about the difficult situation of Jelachic in southern Hungary and that Temeshvar, whose garrison was commanded by General Rukavina, was barely holding on, moved to Ofen-Pest, which took 10 July. On July 4, Jelacic's troops were defeated at Hendyesh (?) And retreated to the right bank of the Danube. It was necessary to hurry to the rescue of Temesvar.

Meanwhile, the government of the rebellious Hungary moved its residence from Pest to Szeged, where a fortified camp was erected. It was there that the Austrian commander-in-chief now sent his army (46,000 men and 248 guns).

The Hungarians, who could not collect more than 38,000 people in the Segedin camp, retreated beyond the Tisza to a position near Seryoga (?). The general command over the Hungarian troops was again entrusted to Dembinsky.

When moving from Pest to Szeged, to support himself on the right - from the side of Vetter and to the left - from Perzel, Gainau moved his army in 3 columns: right (3rd Austrian corps) to Teresiopol, left (4th Austrian corps) - to Szolnok; the latter, after being replaced by the 1st Austrian corps of Schlick, joined the middle column, which consisted of the divisions of Panyutin and Bechtold and was moving to Szeged.

Among the Hungarians, in turn, the following happened: Pertsel joined Dembinsky, and Fetter retreated beyond the Tisza, leaving Kmeti's division at Josefsdorf to monitor Jelacic.

On July 21, the middle column of the Austrians occupied Szeged, and the next day took possession of the ferry and the outskirts of Uiseged. On July 24, Gainau, after a stubborn battle, took possession of the position only in the evening.

Dembinsky, not pursued by the Austrians, retreated to Temesvar, which was blocked by Vechey's corps, where he took a strong position. On the way, Kmeti's division joined him, withdrew from Josefsdorf. The retreat of the Hungarians to Temesvar deprived them of the opportunity to unite with Görgey, since the path to Arad, the only convenient one for this purpose, was in the hands of the Austrians.

8. Defeat of the Hungarians

8.1. Removing the blockade from Temeshwar

The revolutionary government, dissatisfied with the actions of Dembinsky, handed over the command over the southern army to Bem. The latter arrived from Transylvania to the army on July 28 in the morning, when the Austrians were already approaching.

Boehm intended to withdraw his forces to Arad, but the vanguard troops were already so close that a battle was inevitable. By the day of the battle, the balance of forces had changed significantly. At Gainau, behind the detachment of the barrier to Arad, there were about 28,000 people with 200 guns, while Behm gathered up to 45,000 people. Despite the superiority of forces and private, short-term successes during the battle, the Hungarians were defeated and fled to the village of Lugosh. The Temeshvar fortress was liberated from a long siege.

8.2. Disarming Görgey in front of the Russian troops

Görgey, who reached Arad, where he hoped to unite with Dembinsky, met Schlick's Austrian corps, blocking his path to the south. At the same time, the vanguard of the Russian army was approaching him from Debrecen. Seeing that further continuation of the struggle on his part, except for the ruin of the country, does not promise anything, Görgey, with the consent of Kossuth, on August 1, in the vicinity of the village of Vilagosh near Arad, laid weapons with an army of 30,000 people, with 144 guns, in front of the Russian 3rd corps Ridiger.

On August 6, the Arad fortress surrendered to the Russian advance detachment. The remnants of the southern Hungarian army, pursued by the Austrians, were scattered. Some of them went to Transylvania, and some went beyond the Turkish border. The detachment of Vechey, who turned towards Görgey, at the village of Boroshieno, having learned about his fate, also laid down the weapon.

Further actions of the allies boiled down to cleansing the country of small gangs.

8.3. Capitulation of Comorne

At the end of August, the Russian army began to move back to the borders of the Empire. In northern Hungary, a detachment of General Ridiger remained, which was supposed to be there until the fall of the fortress of Comorne, to assist in the siege of which a detachment of Count Grabbe was sent. The commandant of Comorne Klapka, upon the departure of the main forces of the Austrian army of Gainau to the south, acted so successfully that the Austrian blockade corps found itself in a very difficult situation, and only the arrival of reinforcements to it changed the situation.

Upon receiving news of the fate of both Hungarian armies, Klapka surrendered on September 21-23 on very honorable terms. The Petervardin fortress was handed over to Jelachich's detachment even earlier (on August 26).

9. Military operations in Transylvania

9.1. Overview of the forces of the opposing sides

Simultaneously with the entry of the Russian army from Galicia into Transylvania, the 5th corps of General Leaders from Wallachia (26,000 people, 88 guns) entered, and to help him from Bukovina to Bistritsa, a detachment of General Grotengelm (11,000 people, 32 guns). In addition, the Austrian detachment of Count Klam-Galas (10,000 people, 32 guns, from the troops driven back to Wallachia by the Hungarians) and the detachment of General Danenberg, left to ensure his rear and maintain order in the principalities, were subordinated to the leader.

Transylvania, thanks to the successful actions of Bem, cleared of the Austrian troops, in whose hands only the Karlsburg fortress remained, was occupied by a 32,000-strong Hungarian detachment with 110 guns. The Hungarians were scattered, guarding the southern and eastern mountain passes, occupying garrisons inland, and were also engaged in the siege of Karlsburg. On the southern border, to protect the Rotenturm Pass and Germanstadt, there were about 2500-3500 people and 6 guns, to protect the Temesh and Terzburg passages and the road to Kronstadt - about 4000.

9.2. The occupation of Kronstadt

Leaders' original goal was to pacify Transylvania. He sent the main forces (21 battalions, 26 squadrons and 48 guns) through the Temesh Pass to Kronstadt and the column of General Engelhardt (4 battalions, 2 hundred and 8 guns) to the Terzburg Pass to distract the enemy (she also had to go to Kronstadt). From Moldavia, a detachment of 4 battalions, fifty and 8 guns headed for Kezdivasharhei, where, after the occupation of Kronstadt, a number of expeditions were supposed to be undertaken by separate detachments of the main forces.

On June 7, the vanguard, under the personal leadership of Leaders, unexpectedly for the Hungarians appeared in front of the position at Predeal. After a six-hour battle, the Hungarians retreated to the main position at the Temesh Gorge. On June 8, thanks to a successful outflanking of the position from the right flank through the mountains, which were considered inaccessible, the Hungarians hastily retreated.

9.3. Actions of Grotengelm and Engelhardt

The Hungarian detachment, which delayed the offensive of Engelhardt, on June 9, after the case in the Temesh Gorge, retreated, and Engelhardt advanced towards Zeiden. Until June 18, Leders undertook a number of expeditions to the side of Kezdivashakhei and to Udvarhei, where Austrian power was restored and food supplies were collected.

The Grotengelm detachment (8 battalions, 7 squadrons and hundreds, 32 guns) and about 3,000 Austrian troops subordinate to him on June 6 set out from Vatra Dorn, from Bukovina, to Bistritsa in two columns. After weak resistance, having knocked down the 6-thousandth Hungarian detachment of Dobay, on which the defense of northern Transylvania lay, from a position at Borgoprund, Grotengelm occupied Orosborgo. Here he was attacked on June 15 by Boehm with 12,000 men and 12 guns. After a stubborn battle that lasted until the evening, the Hungarians were driven back and retreated in disarray, pursued as far as Fiad.

After that, Grotengelm withdrew his troops back, and on the 16th defeated the Hungarians who had gathered north of Bistritsa and retreated to Tequendorf. On the 17th, Grotengelm concentrated at Orosborgo, the connection between his detachment and Leaders was not organized and they were in obscurity about each other.

9.4. Uncertainty of Leaders' actions

In mid-June, Leedsrs, who did not have accurate information about the position of Behm's troops, assumed, leaving detachments (8 battalions, 12 guns) to cover Kronstadt and the Temesh Gorge, to advance to Fogarash - a junction of routes to Germanstadt, Maroshvasharhey, Chiksered and Kronstadt. At the first two points, according to rumors, the main forces of the Hungarians were supposed.

In the transition to the north of Kronstadt near the village of Uzon (?) On June 23, a clash with the Gal Sandor detachment occurred, which, not accepting the battle, retreated to Chiksereda. Only his rearguard, caught by the Bug Uhlan regiment, was defeated and lost up to 600 prisoners.

After that, Leders, in anticipation of the arrival of the Austrian detachment of Klam-Galas, who were following along Wallachia to Kronstadt, temporarily abandoned enterprises in western Transylvania. He stationed the main forces at Marienburg, the vanguards at St. Ivan, St. George and Vledeni; Kronstadt and Temesh Gorge were occupied by 4 battalions, 1 hundred, 4 guns.

9.5. Battle of Hermannstadt

On June 30, Engelhardt's detachment (8 battalions, 12 squadrons and hundreds, 20 guns) with a surprise attack captured the citadel of Fogarash.

Meanwhile, Leaders, leaving the approaching detachment of Klam-Galas to support the Kronstadt district, moved with the main forces to Germanstadt; On July 7, his vanguard stood between the city and the Rotenturm Gorge. On the 8th, after a stubborn battle, he captured the Rottenturm fortifications; the Hungarians, having suffered great losses, retreated to Wallachia, but near the village of Kineni they were disarmed by Turkish troops.

On July 9, Germanstadt was occupied, whose garrison had retreated to Medias the day before. This strengthened the position of the Russians in southern Transylvania and provided a second route of communication - through the Rothenturm Gorge to Wallachia.

9.6. Grotengelm's successes

During this period, the actions of Grotengelm's detachment in northern Transylvania were also accompanied by success. On June 28, he defeated the 6-thousandth detachment of Bem at the position at Bistrita and threw it back to Seretfalvo. On July 4, he defeated Damascene's detachment (3,000 men) on the way between Seretfalw and Tequendorf. On July 11, they scattered a 14,000-strong detachment of Hungarian recruits near Sasregen. Both Russian detachments at that time were only 150 miles away.

Boehm, leaving the troops that had failed at Bystrica, went to Chiksereda, where he formed an 8-thousandth detachment of Sekler. Having pushed aside the advance detachment of Klam-Galas, which was at St. George, he marched with 4,000 people in the Oytuz Gorge to Moldova in the hope of raising the Moldovan Seklers in order to, by joint actions, pull the Russians out of Transylvania.

Meanwhile, the part of the forces left by him against the Austrians was defeated by Klam-Galas. In view of this, on July 14, Bohm set out for the borders of Transylvania.

9.7. Great offensive in Transylvania

Leaders, after the occupation of Hermannstadt and upon receiving news of Behm's actions, decided to put an end to the Seklers.

On July 14, under the command of Leaders himself, a column (10 battalions, 32 guns, 14 squadrons and hundreds) set out from Germanstadt to Shegeshvar-Udvarhei; 16th column of General Dick (6 battalions, 10 guns, 3 hundreds) to Fogarash towards Udvarhei. The troops of Klam-Galas (13 battalions, 30 guns, 25 squadrons and hundreds) were sent through Kezdivashakhei to Chiksereda and moved from Kronstadt on July 19. In addition, Grotengelm was ordered to go over to the offensive of his detachment from Sasregen to Maroshvasharhey. General Dannenberg was supposed to invade through the Oytuz Gorge to Berechka (?). Provision of Germanstadt was entrusted to the detachment of General Gasford (6 battalions, 12 guns, 4.5 hundred).

The first column reached Shegeshwar on July 17; the second, after a minor skirmish at Reps, reached Begendorf on July 19 (20 miles south of Shegeshvar); the third, on July 23, took Chiksereda. Thanks to such a concentric movement of the columns, Bem's militias were driven out and concentrated at Udvarhei.

9.8. Battle of Shegeshwar

Occupying a central position, Boehm decided to attack the Leaders column and, having broken it, capture Hermannstadt and communications through the Rotenturm Gorge. This plan would be excellent if it were in line with Bem's forces.

On July 19, with 6000-7000 people, he moved to Shegeshvar. A stubborn battle took place here, which lasted a whole day and ended complete defeat Hungarians, who have lost up to a third of all their strength. Boehm himself barely escaped, but this energetic man did not lose heart.

9.9. Bem's plans

Throwing the defeated troops, he rode off to Maroshvasharhey, where up to 14,000 people were gathered with 24 guns. With this detachment, he quickly moved to Hermannstadt, intending to defeat the small forces (5,000 people) of Gasford. Stein's detachment was to take part in this operation, blocking Karlsburg with part of the forces, and partly covering the blockade at Mühlbach-Reusmarkt (a total of 6,000-8,000 people). Thus, 20,000-22,000 Hungarians were to fall on Gasford.

Meanwhile, Gasford on July 20 attacked Stein's detachment in the vicinity of Reusmarkt and inflicted such a defeat on him, after which he almost ceased to exist. This victory greatly eased Gasford's position in the subsequent struggle with Boehm.

Meanwhile, Leaders, who had been awaiting the arrival of General Dick's detachment, set out from Shegeshwar for Udvarhei only on 21 July. On the campaign, having learned about the gathering of significant forces of the Hungarians in Maroshvasarhei and Bem's departure there, he turned to this point. On the 22nd, he got in touch with Grotengelm's detachment, from which he received information about the movement of Behm's troops to the south. Fearing for the fate of the weak detachment of Gasford and the city of Hermannstadt, where carts and significant reserves were left, he forced a march to rescue them.

9.10. Battle of the Grossshauern Heights

Gasford, who received news of the advance of significant Hungarian forces back on July 22, reacted to him with distrust, since it was received shortly after the Shegeshwar battle was reported.

Only on the morning of the 24th, having made sure of the proximity of the enemy, he took up a position on the Grossshoern Heights (3 versts from the city) with a detachment of 5 battalions, 12 guns and 2 hundred. This small detachment had to endure a stubborn battle, as the city was cluttered with carts and crowds of leaving residents. Yielding to the superiority of the enemy forces, the Russians were forced to start a retreat, having withstood a bayonet battle on the streets of the city with the Hungarians who had rushed into it.

Under their onslaught, the Russians reached the village of Vesten. At Tolmach at about 11 am Gasford stopped the detachment for the night, where he decided to stubbornly delay the enemy's advance on the position at the entrance to the Rotenturm Gorge.

9.11. Second battle at Hermannstadt

Leaders' troops on July 23, having made a 36-mile transition, reached Galfalva, from where 5 hundred Cossacks were moved to Hermannstadt to disturb the rear of Behm.

On the day of the battle at Grossshoern, this column approached Marktschelken. At dawn on the 25th, the Russian cavalry approached Grosschoern, where it was met by the Hungarian rearguard. The arrival of the Russian vanguard Engelhardt there (6 battalions, 12 guns) forced Behm, who was preparing to attack Gasford's position at Vesteni, to move his troops to the Grossshoern, towards the Leaders column.

On July 25, the last battle took place near Germanstadt, which completed the defeat of the rebel forces in Transylvania. The remnants of the Hungarian troops retreated into the Maros Valley. The Russian troops, exhausted by forced marches, could not pursue the retreating enemy.

9.12. Defeat of the Hungarian rebels

On July 30, Leders set out from Hermannstadt to Karlsburg. On the 31st at Mühlbach he scattered Stein's Hungarian detachment. Finally, after a 136-day siege, Karlsburg was liberated. After that Leders moved through the Maros Valley to Hungary for joint actions with the main forces of the Russian army.

On August 4, having received information about the presence of Hungarian troops between the villages of Lekintsa and Dobra, he took up a position near the village of Piskolt in anticipation of an attack from the Hungarians. But the next day the news of Görgey's surrender came, and Leders sent the Hungarians a surrender proposal. On August 6, a detachment of 12 battalions, 8 squadrons with 74 guns (the remnants of the army that had retreated from Temesvar) laid down their weapons, and Bem, who was with him, fled to Turkey. Following this, Dejofi, Lazarus and Frummer, who had gone to Transylvania, surrendered.

Leaders withdrew his detachment, leaving the final establishment of order in the country to the Austrians. Simultaneously with the movement of the Leaders column to the west, Grotengelm's detachment, after small clashes with the partisans, marched to Klausenburg, where, according to rumors, there was a 7,000-strong Hungarian detachment. On August 3, after a small skirmish with the cavalry, Grotengelm occupied the city. On the 5th, upon receiving news of what had happened at the main theater, he undertook several expeditions to the west and north, culminating in the surrender of small Hungarian detachments.

10. End of hostilities

Thus, the war turned out to be over, it remains to restore legal power in the rebellious provinces. But even here the Austrians could not do without the assistance of the Russian troops.

The 15th Infantry Division was left in Transylvania for this purpose; other troops of the 5th corps moved into the borders of Russia.

The participation of the Russians in the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion cost them 708 killed, 2447 wounded and 10 885 dead (out of 85 387 people who had been ill at different times). In addition, extraordinary expenditures for the troops under martial law in Hungary and Russia, as well as food for the army in the theater of war, amounted to about 47.5 million rubles.

11. Evaluation of the actions of Paskevich and Leaders

In the activities of the two main groups of Russian troops (Prince Paskevich and General Leaders), it should be noted that the field marshal, who exaggerated the number and quality of the Hungarian militia troops, acts with excessive caution, seeking to achieve success with maneuvers, and not with a decisive battle.

Within 2 months, Paskevich forces a 100,000-strong army to march up and down the steppes of Hungary, in vain chasing after 25,000-30,000 of Görgey's men. Three times, having the opportunity to do away with the enemy (at Weizen, Miskolc and Debrecen), he misses him. Being in an internal position relative to two groups (Görgei and Pertsel), occupying a position on the chord of the arc along which Görgei's army moves after the Weizen battle, thus having an advantage in the shortest distances, Paskevich's army turns out to be late everywhere.

The skillfully executed retreating march-maneuver of Görgey, which threatened the messages of the Russian army, knocks down all the complex calculations of the field marshal, who, fearing a private failure, pulls back the troops that blocked the exits from the mountains to the Hungarians, gathering his forces almost at one point with tiresome marches, taking a wait and see attitude. Having at his disposal numerous cavalry, Prince Paskevich does not use it at all.

Leaders' actions in Transylvania, on the contrary, are distinguished by decisiveness and extraordinary energy. With 35,000 men, he fights 40,000-45,000 Hungarians, not counting the hostile population of eastern Transylvania. Skillfully forcing the Temesh Gorge, with a series of successive and victorious blows, without missing a single opportunity, he defeats the brave and skillful Bem. Attention is drawn to the energy shown by him when moving to the rescue of Gasford.

This war undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the development of military affairs in the Russian army. Easy successes and easy victories, in connection with the praise from the Austrians, caused a lull of attention to the disorder that existed in the Russian troops. Involuntary complacency was expressed in stagnation in military affairs, which was one of the reasons that led Russia to

(10,000 people); On June 29, the recruitment of 200,000 people was announced, of which 40,000 immediately; in August, the establishment of a mobile national guard of 32,000 men was ordered. In September, the Hungarian government had only 18,000 people at its disposal; in October, the number of Hungarian troops increased to 25,000. By the time the main Russian forces entered the war, the number of the Hungarian army had increased significantly: there were 25 battalions of regular troops (from the Austro-Hungarian army), 18 hussar regiments (144 squadrons), 50 batteries ( 400 guns); the Honveda militia - 147 battalions, Italian and Polish legions; the total number of troops reached 190,000. The Hungarian army was imbued with a patriotic spirit, and energetic, enterprising leaders - Görgei and the Polish emigrant Boehm - advanced in it. The main forces of the Hungarians were distributed as follows:

• Gergey's detachment - 50,000 men - was stationed on both banks of the Danube in the Comorne region;
• Detachment Klapka - 18,000 people - near Neisol and Rosenberg;
• Dembinsky's detachment - 20,000 people - near Leitschau;
• Damyanich's detachment - 15,000 people - Kashau;
• Bem's detachment - 30,000 people - was stationed in Banat and guarded the mountain passes to Transylvania;
• Pertsel's detachment - 10,000 people - was in Zombor near Nagykurtyosh.

The main forces of the Austrian troops (about 80,000 people), under the command of Prince Windischgrez, before the outbreak of hostilities were composed of:

• 1st Infantry Corps (Field Marshal-Lieutenant Jelachich) - 16 battalions, 24 squadrons, 52 guns (21,418 people);
• 2nd Infantry Corps (Field Marshal-Lieutenant Count Vrbne) - 17.3 battalions, 7 squadrons, 54 guns (20,358 people);
• 3rd (reserve) corps (field marshal-lieutenant Serbelloni) - 5 battalions, 25 squadrons, 108 guns (15 250 people);
• The garrison of Vienna - 17 battalions, 10 squadrons, 36 guns (22,852 people).

The beginning of hostilities

Hungarian troops went on the offensive first and attacked the Austrian army on October 18 near the town of Schwechat (a few versts south of Vienna). The Hungarians were defeated and retreated to Presburg. The Prince of Windischgrez did not pursue them, considering it impossible to leave Vienna, where important political events were being prepared at that time: Emperor Ferdinand, under the yoke of surging events, decided to give up the throne in favor of his nephew Franz Joseph.

Both sides took advantage of the lull that had come at the main theater to prepare for further struggle. At this time, in the border zone of Hungary and Transylvania, individual detachments of the Hungarians continued to successfully fight the Austrian garrisons and Serbian militias. Bem's actions in Transylvania were especially successful.

In December, the Austrian army went on the offensive and, after a number of private successes, occupied Pest on the 24th. The main mass of the Hungarian troops (16,000), under the command of Görgey, then withdrew to Weizen, and the rest (up to 10,000), under the command of Perzel, to Szolnok on the Tisza River.

Thanks to the indecisive actions of Windischgrez, the scattered forces of the Hungarians by February 1849 managed to unite and gather on the upper Tisza. The Pole Dembinsky was chosen as the chief commander of all the rebel troops.

In the battle of February 14-15 at Kapolna near Fyzeshaboni, Dembinsky was defeated, and his troops retreated across the Tisu River. After that, the command passed to Görgey, who defeated the Austrians in the battle of Gödöllö and Ishaseg on March 25. The Austrians, retreating to Pest, lifted the blockade of Comorne, which was occupied by the Hungarian garrison. Windischgrz was replaced by General Welden. Velden pulled all his troops to Pressburg, leaving a small garrison at Ofen.

Skaryatin's actions and the failures of the Austrians

The appearance of Skaryatin's detachment near Germanstadt on January 23 forced Behm to stop pursuing the Austrians he was pressing and retreat to the Maros River.

Kaliani, who replaced the sick Puchner, led the Austrian troops to Kronstadt, where Boehm went. The further stay of small Russian detachments was risky and they were ordered to return to Wallachia.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary Hungarian government, assessing the successes of Bem in Transylvania, summoned him in mid-April with part of the troops to the main theater to command all forces.

Entry into the war of Russian units

The position of the Austrian troops, demoralized by various setbacks, was critical. The Austrian government, having lost hope of putting out the rebellion, turned to Russia for help. Emperor Nicholas I ordered the mobilization of the army from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th corps located on the western border.

Units assigned to the campaign

Fedor Vasilievich Ridiger

• 2nd corps of Lieutenant General Kupreyanov - 4th, 5th, 6th infantry, 2nd light cavalry and 2nd artillery divisions (48,967 people);
• 3rd Corps of Adjutant General Ridiger - 7th, 8th, 9th Infantry, 3rd Light Cavalry and 3rd Artillery Divisions (44,928 people);
• 4th corps of infantry general Cheodaev - 10th, 11th, 12th infantry, 4th light cavalry and 4th artillery divisions (52,274 people);
• 5th Corps of Adjutant General Leaders - 14th and 15th Infantry, 5th Light Cavalry and 5th Artillery Divisions and 3rd Cossack Don Regiment (28,676 people);
• 9th Infantry Division of General Panyutin (10659 bayonets and 48 guns).

The 5th corps of Leaders, by agreement with Turkey, was on a business trip to the Danube principalities to ensure order there. Panyutin's 9th Infantry Division was located at the southern borders of the Kingdom of Poland and was assigned to a campaign to reinforce the Austrian troops.

In April 1849, the Russian army, under the command of Field Marshal Prince of Warsaw, Count Paskevich-Erivansky, moved to Galicia. The Austrian government, fearing an offensive to Vienna from the side of Görgey's detachment, achieved a hasty dispatch of the infantry division of General Panyutin there. The division was transported by Warsaw-Vienna railway from Krakow to Ungarisz Hradis from April 27 to May 3.

Grouping of Hungarian Forces

By the time the Russian troops entered Austria, the Hungarian forces were grouped in three places. In the fortress of Komorn and near it - 58,000 people of the corps of Görgei; on the Danube at the mouth of the Tisza - 29,000 men of the Perzel-Vetter corps and in Transylvania - 42,000 people of the Bem corps; in addition, individual detachments and parties were in the mountainous districts of the Carpathians - in the border regions of Galicia.

Offensive planning

The column of General Grabbe, without encountering resistance, took the path from Yordanov to Shemnitz. Following the occupation of Miskolc, the Russians were forced to stop, awaiting the arrival of the stragglers, and also in view of the strong development of cholera.

The main Austrian army at the beginning of June was located on a front of 160 miles between the cities of Raab and Trencin (in the valley of the upper Vag). The main apartment was in Pressburg, where there was the only bridge over the Danube. Panyutin's division - in Bösing and Modern (20 versts from Presburg).

Görgey, who had lost a lot of time on secondary operations and bickering with Kossuth, decided to defeat the Austrians before the Russians arrived. On June 4, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Hungarian corps went over to the offensive.

Fights at the Front

Arthur Görgey

The first blow was directed to the area between the Neuheiselle arm of the Danube and the Vah, but ended in failure. Görgey decided to renew the offensive on June 8. In turn, Gainau also ordered part of his forces on June 8 to push back the enemy troops beyond the Wag and the Neuheisel Arm.

The clash of both sides took place near the village of Zygard. The Austrians driven out of it retreated to the village of Pered, where they also could not resist. The arrival of Panyutin's division made it possible for the Austrians to go on the offensive again, Görgei, having learned about the Russians joining them, took up a position near the village of Pered.

On June 9, the Allies (22,000 men with 96 guns) attacked Hungarian troops (18,000 men, 60 guns) at Pered. After a stubborn battle, Görgei retreated, and the ensuing darkness stopped the pursuit.

This was the first battle of large Russian forces in which they played a decisive role.

The battles of Comorne

On June 15, Gainau attacked the Kmeti division, which was stationed at Marzalto, and then the 7th Hungarian corps, which occupied the Raab fortification. After a stubborn battle, the Hungarians retreated to Comorne.

On June 20, Gainau managed to drive the Hungarian troops into the line of fortifications. Goergey on the same day in the evening, having concentrated significant forces unexpectedly for the Austrians, attacked the 1st Austrian corps. Only the timely arrival of Panyutin's division made it possible to successfully repel this surprise attack.

On June 29, Görgei attacked the Austrian army for the second time and, thanks to the actions of Panyutin, was also forced to retreat.

Failure at Weizen

Indeed, Görgey, leaving an 18-thousandth garrison in Comorne, under the command of Klapka, with 27,000 men marched on the night of July 1 to Weizen with the goal of marching into southern Hungary. This movement led to an unsuccessful battle for the Russians at Weizen, after which Görgey's troops withdrew to the north.

When, on July 5, the Russians moved to Weizen, only small detachments of Hungarians remained there, delayed by the movement of the transports. Without offering resistance, they withdrew to a strong position near the village of Retshag, from where they filmed that same day in the evening. Further pursuit of the retreating was entrusted to the cavalry of the 3rd corps, whose infantry stopped at Retshag.

On July 13, a detachment of Prince Gorchakov (5th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade of the 8th Infantry Division and 3 Cavalry Regiments) was sent to capture the Tiszafüred crossing, defended by a 2,000-strong detachment. At dawn on the 14th, after crossing the first echelon of pontoons, the Hungarians retreated. By 12 noon, a bridge was built, and the Russians took up positions east of Tiszafüred.

After the retreat of the Hungarian troops beyond the river. Shaio Paskevich ordered the 4th corps to withdraw to Mezökövesd, and the 3rd and 2nd corps to Tiszafüred, at the same time the Grabbe detachment, following from the west, and Sakena - from Kashau, head through Miskolc to Tokai. On July 16, Grabbe, who stumbled at Gesteli (on the Gornada River) on all the forces of Görgey, retreated with damage. Görgey, having learned about the approach of the Osten-Saken detachment and the crossing of the Russians at Tiszafüred, retreated through the Tokay to Nyiregyhaza.

Maneuvering and fighting at Debrecen

Due to the news of the failure that befell Grabbe's detachment and fears that Görgey, having defeated Osten-Saken, would rush north on the route of the Russian troops, Paskevich refused to occupy Debrecen (to block Görgey's path to the south) and decided to take a wait-and-see position on both banks Tisy, moving the bridge to the village of Tisachege.

On July 17, the 2nd and 3rd corps passed to Tisacheg, and the 4th was detained at Mezokovesd. On the 18th, Paskevich, fearing the energetic actions of Görgei, moved the 2nd and 4th corps to the Gornad River, but on the way they received a report about the retreat of Görgey, and on the 20th, about the occupation of Saken Tokay's detachment and the movement of the Hungarians towards Nyiregyhaza. After that, the field marshal again sent troops to Debrecen.

Meanwhile, Görgey, having learned about the concentration of the Russians at Tisachege, decided to retreat across the Berettio River to cover the Grosvardein. Hiding behind the lateral vanguard of Nagy Sandor (8000 men with 41 guns), following from Nyiregyhaza through Debrecen to Beretjoujfalu, the main forces of the Hungarians moved to Bemosy-Perch towards Kishmarie.

Nagy Sandor was ordered to avoid a serious battle. But on July 21, as the Russian army approached, he entered into battle with it under the walls of Debrecen and was defeated, and the remnants of his corps barely had time to retreat to Grossvardein.

Austrian actions

Julius Gainau

Meanwhile, the government of the rebellious Hungary moved its residence from Pest to Szeged, where a fortified camp was erected. It was there that the Austrian commander-in-chief now sent his army (46,000 men and 248 guns).

The Hungarians, who could not collect more than 38,000 people in the Segedin camp, retreated beyond the Tisza to a position near Seryoga (?). The general command over the Hungarian troops was again entrusted to Dembinsky.

Among the Hungarians, in turn, the following happened: Pertsel joined Dembinsky, and Fetter retreated beyond the Tisza, leaving Kmeti's division at Josefsdorf to monitor Jelacic.

On July 21, the middle column of the Austrians occupied Szeged, and the next day took possession of the ferry and the outskirts of Uiseged. On July 24, Gainau, after a stubborn battle, took possession of the position only in the evening.

Military action in Transylvania

Overview of the forces of the opposing sides

Simultaneously with the entry of the Russian army from Galicia into Transylvania, the 5th corps of General Leaders from Wallachia (26,000 people, 88 guns) entered, and to help him from Bukovina to Bistritsa, a detachment of General Grotengelm (11,000 people, 32 guns). In addition, the Austrian detachment of Count Klam-Galas (10,000 people, 32 guns, from the troops driven back to Wallachia by the Hungarians) and the detachment of General Danenberg, left to ensure his rear and maintain order in the principalities, were subordinated to the leader.

Grotengelm's successes

During this period, the actions of Grotengelm's detachment in northern Transylvania were also accompanied by success. On June 28, he defeated the 6-thousandth detachment of Bem at the position at Bistrita and threw it back to Seretfalvo. On July 4, he defeated Damascene's detachment (3,000 men) on the way between Seretfalw and Tequendorf. On July 11, they scattered a 14,000-strong detachment of Hungarian recruits near Sasregen. Both Russian detachments at that time were only 150 miles away.

Meanwhile, the part of the forces left by him against the Austrians was defeated by Klam-Galas. In view of this, on July 14, Bohm set out for the borders of Transylvania.

Great offensive in Transylvania

Leaders, on the occupation of Hermannstadt and upon receiving news of Shegeshvar's actions

Throwing the defeated troops, he rode off to Maroshvasharhey, where up to 14,000 people were gathered with 24 guns. With this detachment, he quickly moved to Hermannstadt, intending to defeat the small forces (5,000 people) of Gasford. Stein's detachment was to take part in this operation, blocking Karlsburg with part of the forces, and partly covering the blockade at Mühlbach-Reusmarkt (a total of 6,000-8,000 people). Thus, 20,000-22,000 Hungarians were to fall on Gasford.

Meanwhile, Gasford on July 20 attacked Stein's detachment in the vicinity of Reusmarkt and inflicted such a defeat on him, after which he almost ceased to exist. This victory greatly eased Gasford's position in the subsequent struggle with Boehm.

Meanwhile, Leaders, who had been awaiting the arrival of General Dick's detachment, set out from Shegeshwar for Udvarhei only on 21 July. On the campaign, learning about the gathering of significant forces of the Hungarians in Maroshvasarhei and Bem's departure there, he turned to this point. On the 22nd, he got in touch with Grotengelm's detachment, from which he received information about the movement of Behm's troops to the south. Fearing for the fate of the weak detachment of Gasford and the city of Hermannstadt, where carts and significant reserves were left, he forced a march to rescue them.

Only on the morning of the 24th, having made sure of the proximity of the enemy, he took up a position on the Grossshoern Heights (3 versts from the city) with a detachment of 5 battalions, 12 guns and 2 hundred. This small detachment had to endure a stubborn battle, as the city was cluttered with carts and crowds of leaving residents. Yielding to the superiority of the enemy forces, the Russians were forced to start a retreat, having withstood a bayonet battle on the streets of the city with the Hungarians who had rushed into it.

Under their onslaught, the Russians reached the village of Vesten. At Tolmach at about 11 am Gasford stopped the detachment for the night, where he decided to stubbornly delay the enemy's advance on the position at the entrance to the Rotenturm Gorge.

Second battle at Hermannstadt

Leaders' troops on July 23, having made a 36-mile transition, reached Galfalva, from where 5 hundred Cossacks were moved to Hermannstadt to disturb the rear of Behm.

On the day of the battle at Grosschoern, this column approached Marktschelken. At dawn on the 25th, the Russian cavalry approached Grosschoern, where it was met by the Hungarian rearguard. The arrival of the Russian vanguard Engelhardt there (6 battalions, 12 guns) forced Behm, preparing to attack Gasford's position at Vesteni, to move his troops to Grossshoern, to meet Leaders' column.

Maros to Hungary for joint actions with the main forces of the Russian army.

On August 4, having received information about the presence of Hungarian troops between the villages of Lekintsa and Dobra, he took up a position near the village of Piskolt in anticipation of an attack from the Hungarians. But the next day the news of Görgey's surrender came, and Leders sent the Hungarians a surrender proposal. On August 6, a detachment of 12 battalions, 8 squadrons with 74 guns (the remnants of the army that had retreated from Temesvar) laid down their weapons, and Bem, who was with him, fled to Turkey. Following this, Dejofi, Lazarus and Frummer, who had gone to Transylvania, surrendered.

Leaders withdrew his detachment, leaving the final establishment of order in the country to the Austrians. Simultaneously with the movement of the Leaders column to the west, Grotengelm's detachment, after small clashes with the partisans, marched to Klausenburg, where, according to rumors, there was a 7,000-strong Hungarian detachment. On August 3, after a small skirmish with the cavalry, Grotengelm occupied the city. On the 5th, upon receiving news of what had happened at the main theater, he undertook several expeditions to the west and north, culminating in the surrender of small Hungarian detachments.

End of hostilities

Thus, the war turned out to be over, it remains to restore legal power in the rebellious provinces. But even here the Austrians could not do without the assistance of the Russian troops.

The 15th Infantry Division was left in Transylvania for this purpose; other troops of the 5th corps moved into the borders of Russia.

The participation of the Russians in the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion cost them 708 killed, 2447 wounded and 10 885 dead (out of 85 387 people who had been ill at different times). In addition, extraordinary expenditures for the troops under martial law in Hungary and Russia, as well as food for the army in the theater of war, amounted to about 47.5 million rubles.

Assessment of the actions of Paskevich and Leaders

In the activities of the two main groups of Russian troops (Prince Paskevich and General Leaders), it should be noted that the field marshal, who exaggerated the number and quality of the Hungarian militia troops, acts with excessive caution, seeking to achieve success with maneuvers, and not with a decisive battle.

Within 2 months, Paskevich forces a 100,000-strong army to march up and down the steppes of Hungary, in vain chasing after 25,000-30,000 of Görgey's men. Three times, having the opportunity to do away with the enemy (at Weizen, Miskolc and Debrecen), he misses him. Being in an internal position relative to two groups (Görgei and Pertsel), occupying a position on the chord of the arc along which Görgei's army moves after the Weizen battle, thus having an advantage in the shortest distances, Paskevich's army turns out to be late everywhere.

The skillfully executed retreating march-maneuver of Görgey, which threatened the messages of the Russian army, knocks down all the complex calculations of the field marshal, who, fearing a private failure, pulls back the troops that blocked the exits from the mountains to the Hungarians, gathering his forces almost at one point with tiresome marches, taking a wait and see attitude. Having at his disposal numerous cavalry, Prince Paskevich does not use it at all.

Leaders' actions in Transylvania, on the contrary, are distinguished by decisiveness and extraordinary energy. With 35,000 men, he fights 40,000-45,000 Hungarians, not counting the hostile population of eastern Transylvania. Skillfully forcing the Temesh Gorge, with a series of successive and victorious blows, without missing a single opportunity, he defeats the brave and skillful Bem. Attention is drawn to the energy shown by him when moving to the rescue of Gasford.

This war undoubtedly had an adverse effect on the development of military affairs in the Russian army. Easy successes and easy victories, in connection with the praise from the Austrians, caused a lull of attention to the disorder that existed in the Russian troops. Involuntary complacency was expressed in stagnation in military affairs, which was one of the reasons that led Russia to the Sevastopol defeats. - M .: Eksmo, 2006.Soviet
Russia / USSR