Badanov understood that without ammunition, he would not be able to repulse the new attack of Bulk. According to post-war Soviet sources, Vatutin allowed Badanov to leave, but it is more likely that Vatutin continued to insist that the corps hold its positions as the unblocking forces were still moving forward. During these battles tank corps received the honorary title of the Guards, and Badanov was awarded the order Suvorov 2nd degree - it seemed that the encircled troops had already been written off by the Southwestern Front.

Nevertheless, on December 27, after the German attack, Badanov independently began to prepare for a retreat. Here he faced two problems. He had no diesel fuel, and without it, the T-34s were immobilized, which were necessary to break through the ring of the German encirclement. In addition, hundreds of his soldiers were wounded and were now housed in the basements of houses in Tatsinskaya - there was practically no way to evacuate them. While Badanov was developing plans for withdrawal, his deputy at the post of corps commander, engineer-colonel V. Orlov, developed a replacement for the diesel fuel by mixing aviation fuel, gasoline and benzene. The resulting mixture made it possible for the T-34 tanks to move, but pretty soon it damaged the fuel injection system and completely disabled the engine. Badanov ordered that several of the remaining T-34s be filled with this fuel, which were to carry out a breakthrough. By the evening of December 27, Vatutin ordered to parachute a number of military supplies that Badanov needed so much, but only half of them landed at the location of the corps; no aircraft attempted to land to evacuate the wounded or to unload a supply of fuel or ammunition for tanks.

At 22:00 Badanov gathered his remaining officers in the ranks at the Military Council. They came to the conclusion that the tanks of the 24th Panzer Corps still on the move would begin a breakthrough within four hours. All the wounded were abandoned, despite Hitler's order "not to take prisoners." 300 volunteers stayed behind to secure the withdrawal. The only chance of escape was the western sector in the ring of the German encirclement, where a gap formed between the positions of the 4th motorized and 15th tank regiments. On December 28 at 02:00 Badanov ordered his troops to deliver a false strike to the northeast, feigning a breakthrough. At 03:00 he made a major breakthrough with his main forces to the west. Badanov led a column of 11 tanks and 30 trucks with 927 soldiers. Thanks to the diversionary blow, the Soviet column managed to pass unnoticed into the gap formed in the German positions. When the Germans finally discovered that the enemy had left, they destroyed two Soviet tank, but could no longer prevent the retreat of the rest of the, moving on a dark winter night to the north-west to Mikhailov, towards the units of the 3rd guards army... No member Soviet group, which inflicted a diversionary blow, did not emerge from the German encirclement. tank division occupied the deserted airfield in Tatsinskaya, which was again occupied for some time by Luftwaffe aircraft, but the VIII Aviation Corps did not want to resume transport operations from the destroyed air base. Several hundred wounded Soviet soldiers captured at Tatsinskaya were most likely killed in accordance with Hitler's orders. Three days later, when units of the 3rd Guards Army approached, the Germans left Tatsinskaya forever.

After a heavy march on snowy terrain that lasted all day, often on foot, the surviving soldiers of the 24th Panzer Corps reached positions of the 266th rifle division 3rd Guards Army on the Bystraya River. Badanov's corps - now the 2nd Tatsinsky Guards Tank Corps - carried such huge losses that even when the 24th mechanized brigade, which operated separately, was reunited with him, only 30% of its personnel and less than 10% of equipment remained in it. However, Badanov's unauthorized withdrawal angered the Soviet High Command, and Vatutin soon ordered Badanov, who had only 50 tanks and a small number of infantry, to advance across the Bystraya River and retake Tatsinskaya. In fact, Badanov no longer took a special part in Operation Little Saturn, which ended on December 30: Army Group Don was able to stop the Soviet offensive, and now the troops under Vatutin's command had to be reorganized so that they could resume their offensive.

S.V. Borodina

2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps in battles on Kursk Bulge.

70 years ago, on July 12, 1943, the largest oncoming tank battle in the history of World War II took place on Prokhorovskaya land. Many books, monographs, scientific works have been written about him. Most of the authors in their works talk mainly about the events of July 12 - the apogee of the greatest battle. The day before, battles were fought in the Prokhorovka direction. Tank formations consistently, day after day, destroyed military equipment, manpower enemy, with battles held occupied positions. The soldiers showed courage and resilience, striving with all their might to stop the advance of the German troops. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps took an active part in the battles on July 6-9 and in the Prokhorov battle itself.

The success of the conduct of the battle largely depended on the commander's talent, his ability to make quick decisions, objectively assess the current situation and clearly fulfill the assigned tasks. And such qualities were possessed by Burdeyny Alexei Semenovich - the commander of the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps. In his memoirs, P.A.Rotmistrov noted that in the battles at the Kursk Bulge, the commanders of tank and mechanized corps displayed outstanding qualities of military leaders, including A.S. Burdeyny. "It is thanks to the skillful management and skillful use of tank subunits and units that military commanders have shown in practice what tank troops are capable of and what is their role in a war." [Rotmistrov, 1970, p. 68-69].

Before proceeding to a detailed consideration of the participation of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, I would like to dwell on where it began and how its combat path developed, as the name was obtained - Tatsinsky. After all, it was then that the invaluable combat experience of soldiers and officers began to form, which came in handy on the Prokhorov land. The corps was formed in April 1942 on the Southern Front near Voroshilovgrad as the 24th Tank Corps. On December 17, 1942, the Panzer Corps entered the breach and began its legendary deep raid. On December 24, the corps broke into the village of Tatsinskaya and destroyed one of the most important airfields from which the encircled enemy grouping in Stalingrad was supplied. The 24th Tank Corps was reorganized into the 2nd Guards Tank Corps for military merits and received the honorary name Tatsinsky.

Since January 1943, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps took part in the Voroshilovgrad offensive and in the Kharkov defensive operations on the Southwestern Front. When repelling a counterstrike, 4 German TA corps units defended themselves on the left bank of the Seversky Donets. On March 22-23, they struck at the advancing enemy units in the Kreid area (a suburb of Belgorod), after which on March 24, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was transferred to 64 A, and then withdrawn to the reserve of the Voronezh Front and was stationed in the area until July 5 town of Korocha.

While in reserve, the command and enlisted personnel of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps were actively preparing for the upcoming battles, honing their combat skills and equipment management. For example, the soldiers of the 26th Guards. tbr actively used a temporary respite. At the beginning of July 1943, drill was carried out, tank driving over obstacles, cleaning of tank and small arms. On July 4, on a day off, physical training competitions were held between platoons, companies and, on a battalion scale, in gymnastics, grenade throwing, as well as a cross in gas masks for 10 km. In the evening, the personnel went to the 1st battalion for a performance by an amateur art brigade. On this day, the fighters had the last opportunity to rest and prepare for the upcoming battles.

In order to clearly trace the movement of the corps, and form a holistic view of its participation in the Battle of Kursk and the Prokhorov battle, consider the movement and fighting 2 Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps from 5 to 17 July 1943.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was stationed in Koroche. On July 5, the corps was transferred to the subordination of the commander of the 6th Guards Army, Chistyakov I.M.Commander Colonel A.S.Burdein had the following task: to move corps units from the Koroch region to the Sazhnoe, Novye Lozy, Gostishchevo region and prevent the development of the enemy offensive in the north and north-east directions. [Chichenkov, 1996, p. 26]. (Fig. 1.) Burdeyny Alexey Semenovich.

At the beginning of the battles on the Kursk Bulge, one could only guess how events would develop. In the event of a favorable situation, it was planned to defeat the Nazi troops that had wedged into the defense of the 6th Guards Army and go into a counterstrike. These plans are confirmed by a private military order of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front: “To be ready from dawn on July 6, 1943, in cooperation with the 5th Guards. shopping mall to launch a counterattack in the direction: Kryukovo, Krapivenskiye Dvory and further to Gremuchiy, Belgorod. " The layout of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps on July 5, 1943

By the morning of July 6, it became obvious that the situation was not developing as planned ... On this day, advancing with the main forces on Yakovlevo, German troops sought to push back parts of the left wing of the 6th Guards Army beyond the river. Linden Donets. Panzer division "Reich" delivered the main blow in this direction. By 9 o'clock in the course of the battle, the enemy advanced eastward. By order of the commander of the 6th Guards Army, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps crossed to the western bank of the river. Linden Donets and in the course of fierce battles threw enemy units to the west.

During the counterattack, which began on July 6 in the direction of the village. Smorodino fighters of the 2nd Guards performed feats. Tatsinsky tank corps, one of them was made by the tanker Butenko I.E.

In the course of a short skirmish, Ivan Efimovich's crew destroyed three tanks, knocked out one, and in the same battle, on one T-34 tank made two tank rams at once. The feat was not given at a simple cost, the tank caught fire, the driver-mechanic of the guard foreman Caesar was killed, and the guard's radio operator senior sergeant Slivkin was seriously wounded. The wounded comrade Butenko pulled out of the burning tank, entered into a battle with the surviving members of the crew of German tanks. And he also emerged victorious from this battle, having obtained valuable documents from German officer... Per perfect feat Butenko I.E. was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.

But it was not possible to consolidate the success achieved in battles during the day. On the night of July 7, in connection with the advance of the enemy to the north, by order of the front commander, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was withdrawn to its former defensive line along the eastern bank of the river. Linden Donets. [Koltunov, 1970, p. 149-150].

On July 7, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps held its former positions. Defensive battles were fought. 4th Guards tbr was in the reserve of the corps commander. During the day, the enemy made repeated attacks to break through the defenses, and was repulsed by artillery fire. German aviation in groups of 18-25 planes continuously bombed Teterevino, Novye Lozy, Volobuevka and battle formations of tanks.

On July 8, after two days of defensive battles, the tanks of the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps passed through the infantry lines and rushed into the offensive. On the direction of the corps offensive, the enemy concentrated 2 SS Panzer Divisions "Dead Head" and "Reich", numbering more than 150 tanks, most of them of the "Tiger" type.

The enemy's quantitative superiority in technology was complemented by a well-thought-out organization of the fire system. German anti-tank artillery batteries were deployed on the commanding heights. The enemy put up fierce resistance to the offensive of tank subunits on the ground and in the air. Dozens of aircraft, both fighter and bomber aircraft, continuously attacked the battle formations of Soviet tankers, trying to hold back their advance.

German troops sought to develop an offensive in the northern and northeastern directions, for the implementation of these goals tanks and motorized infantry were pulled up from the depths. The difficulties with which our troops faced during the offensive can be learned from combat reports. One of striking examples such difficulties are given in the reports of the 4th Guards tank brigade.

Before the 4th Guards. Tbr the task was set: to go to the starting area to the south of 2 km. Teterevino and be ready to act in the direction of Teterevino, Nechaevka. And that was done. (Fig. 2) Scheme of the offensive of the 4th Guards. tbr on Nechaevka on July 8, 1943

At 14.30 the brigade launched an offensive south-west of Teterevino, Nechaevka. By 18.00, the directing platoon is 1 TB. reached the crossing over the river. Linden Donets near Nechaevka. The crossing was not suitable for tanks, the bridge was blown up, there was no ford, and without the crossing, an offensive was impossible. The line was held until 2.30, after which we retreated to the starting line.

Thus, during the day, serious changes were not achieved. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, having gone over to the offensive, was met with strong counterattacks by enemy tanks supported from the air by aviation, and in spite of successes in certain sectors, it soon retreated to its original position.

On July 9, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was still on the defensive. In some areas, hostilities were conducted, reconnaissance was actively carried out, and the materiel was prepared for further battles. To better understand how the defense was conducted on this sector of the front, let us again turn to the example of the actions of the 4th Guards. tbr.

During the night and morning of July 10, the brigade continued to take up defenses in the Teterevino area, which it had held the day before. The enemy was leading art. min. fire on the battle formations of the brigade. With the onset of darkness, a company of enemy machine gunners approached the battle formations (from the areas of the MTS, which is north of Belenikhino), with whom they fought throughout the night, by dawn the machine gunners were destroyed.

On July 11, they actively prepared for the decisive battle, planned military operations, and clarified the alignment of forces. Combat missions were assigned to the command staff. The technique was brought into combat condition. Thus, the time was used for the final preparation, it was already obvious that the moment of the decisive battle had come. As a result of the regrouping of forces, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps from the 69th Army of Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkina, was transferred to operational subordination 5 tank army July 11 at 18.00.

P.A. Rotmistrov: “Without wasting time, I conducted reconnaissance of the area of ​​operations with the corps commanders and assigned combat missions to the corps. The area for the deployment of the main forces of the army was chosen somewhat west and south-west of Prokhorovka, on a front up to 15 kilometers. Considering that it was necessary to engage in a battle with a very strong enemy tank group, which, according to the information received, had about 700 tanks and self-propelled guns in the Prokhorovka direction, including more than 100 "tigers" and "ferdinands", it was decided to deploy everything in the first echelon at once. four tank corps (18th, 29th, 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd). [Rotmistrov, 1984]

On July 11, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps occupied a position from the Yamka farm to Plota on the left flank. From the memoirs of A.S. Burdeyny: “Soon from P.A. Rotmistrov received an order stating specific tasks for July 12. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was included in the front's shock tank group to deliver a counterstrike. We were faced with the following task: "as part of the 5th Guards Tank Army on its left flank, advance in the direction of Belenikhino, Ozerovsky, break the enemy's resistance in the Belenikhino area and develop the offensive in the direction of Yakovlevo." A powerful and decisive blow was being prepared against the main enemy grouping, which had broken through deep into our defenses, and the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps was assigned an important and very responsible task: acting on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, to actively participate in the defeat of this grouping.

But, as often happens in war, the active actions of the enemy always make significant amendments to the developed plans. Having regrouped forces from the northern to the northeastern direction on the eve of our offensive - on July 11, the enemy conducted active hostilities not only in the direction of the location of the 2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps, but also to the north. On this day, the enemy managed to separate directions press out our troops, but the main thing was that he pinned down significant forces of our troops, intended for a counterattack. As a result, out of five armies in the counterstrike on July 12, only two practically participated - the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards, as well as two separate tank corps - the 2nd and 2nd Guards, subordinate to the commander of the 5th Guards Tank army.

Late in the evening at 20.00 - 21.00, the unit commanders were given information about the enemy's position and assigned tasks to the corps and the immediate tasks of each unit. 25th Guards Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel S.M. Bulygina struck at Teterevino in order to defeat the enemy in the Teterevino, Yasnaya Polyana area; The 4th Guards Tank Brigade was supposed to defeat the enemy and capture the Kalinin and Ozerovsky area, and the 4th Guards Moto rifle brigade the task was to defeat the enemy to the west railroad, take possession of the Sobachevsky farm and, together with a neighbor to the left, the 183rd Infantry Division, reliably cover the corps from the south.

For 26 Guards. tank brigade of Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Nesterov was assigned the task of preventing a possible enemy offensive from the south and southeast in the direction of Belenikhino and north to Prokhorovka. As events in the following days showed, such a precaution was not superfluous.

There was little time, as always before the offensive. Everyone spent the night in hard work on preparing people and equipment for tomorrow's offensive and, of course, in great anxiety. " [Beketov, 2000, p. 124-125].

Before proceeding to consider the specific actions and events of July 12, it is advisable to dwell on the plans and goals of the parties on the eve of the decisive battle. Despite the fact that July 11 did not bring any significant success to the German command, Hitler, High Command, General Staff ground forces continued to blindly believe in victory. For example, the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Manstein, hoped to defeat Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area on July 12. He noted: “The army command assumed that after repelling enemy counterattacks, moving the main direction of its attack and introducing reserves into battle, it would again resume the offensive on July 12 to complete the breakthrough. To stop the battle now would probably mean to miss the victory! " [Manstein, 1957, p. 445, 448].

The Soviet command was able to correctly assess the imminent crisis of the German offensive. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the troops of the left wing of the western and Bryansk fronts to go on the offensive in the morning of July 12 in order to defeat the enemy's Oryol grouping. At the same time, the troops of the Voronezh Front, reinforced by strategic reserves, had to inflict a powerful counterattack on the main forces of the enemy in order to decisively disrupt its offensive in the Prokhorov direction and defeat the wedged strike group. [Soloviev, 2003, p. 99].

This day - July 12 is of great importance not only in the chronology of the events of the Battle of Kursk, Prokhorovsky tank battle, but in the fate of people, the history of the Great Patriotic War and our homeland. Therefore, we will consider the events of this day literally by the hour, we will dwell in detail on the hostilities of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps on the decisive day of the battles.

From the memoirs of A.S. Burdeyny: “At 8.30 am on July 12th, after the strikes of our aviation and artillery preparation, the corps went on the offensive. To our right, the tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army went over to the offensive. Almost simultaneously the enemy went on the offensive. Everything air space above us was filled with planes - both ours and the enemy. The roar of tanks, the howl of shells and the hum of engines in the air merged into a single mighty "hurricane". There have never been such battles anywhere. The battle broke out in the north and south directions almost simultaneously. In the first half of the day, we managed to break through the railway to the western side and knock the enemy out of settlements Yasnaya Polyana, Kalinin and start a battle for the farmsteads Ozerovsky and Sobachevsky, but we could not advance further. ”[Beketov, 2000, p. 125].

At 9.50 the 26th Guards. The brigade receives a combat order to reach the northwestern outskirts of Shakhovo. This was done to cover the left flank of the army. During the day, the battalion fought deterrent battles at occupied centers of resistance. The enemy, with a force of up to 50 tanks and motorized infantry, was moving in the northeastern direction - Shakhovo. The river crossing was blown up. There was an art shootout. The battalion was in the 2nd echelon. The 26th Tank Brigade attacked the Nazis from the Shakhovo area in the direction of Shchelokovo. As a result of a successful oncoming battle, two motorized fascist regiments were defeated. From air strikes, the troops of Colonel A.S. Burdeyny was covered by the 1695th Zenap of Major Sereda in its initial positions. His batteries deployed in the villages of Ivanovka and Vinogradovka.

At 11.15, after a short artillery shelling on the front line of the Germans, two tank brigades of Colonel A.S. Burdeyny - 4th Guards. and the 25th Guards. TBR numbering 94 combat vehicles moved into the attack. The first to go to the front line of the Germans in the MTS area south of Yasnaya Polyana were the tankers of Lieutenant Colonel S.M. Bulygin. A "frame" circled over the area of ​​concentration of the Tatsinsky corps from early morning. Therefore, it is no coincidence that as soon as the attack began, the battle formations of the 25th Guards. tbr immediately came under fire from six-barreled mortars from the area of ​​svkh. "Komsomolets" and with. Ivanovsky Vyselok and at the same time they were attacked by 20 enemy bombers.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of Colonel AS Burdeyny, advancing in the direction of Kalinin by 14.30, struck up an oncoming battle with the SS Reich Panzer Division. In connection with the lagging of the 29th Tank Corps and the threat posed to its open right flank, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps retreated to its original position, where it consolidated itself, repelling the tank attacks of the Nazis. [Koltunov, 1970, p. 169]. On the example of the actions of the 4th Guards. It is clear that each fighter did everything to accomplish the assigned task, but it was not always possible to consolidate the successes of individual units. The corps commander A.S.Burdeyny had information on how the situation was developing throughout the entire sector of the fighting. And the order to retreat to the previous positions was due to the need to maintain the occupied positions and conduct coordinated actions in this direction.

Based on the order of the commander of the 2nd Guards. TTK No. 034 at 12.00 on July 12 from the Belenikhino-Ivanovka defense area, the 4th Guards Tank Brigade launched an offensive in the direction of Kalinin-Sobachevsky, vys. 232.0. At 15.00, three T-34 tanks (guiding platoon) broke into the southeastern outskirts of Kh. Kalinin, where they met a strong anti-tank defense of the enemy. As a result, the brigade halted the offensive. The tanks of the directing platoon were burned by the enemy, the rest of the brigade's tanks withdrew and took up defensive positions. Despite heavy artillery bombardment and intense bombardment from the air, the brigade stubbornly continued to stand in defense 700 m south of x. Kalinin, and only by order of the commander of the 2nd Guards. ttk. at 18.00 they retreated to the starting line and took up defensive positions in the Belenikhino, Ivanovka area. (Fig. 3) The scheme of the offensive of the 4th Guards. tbr at 12.00 on July 12, 1943 at Kalinin.

In order to more fully imagine the atmosphere of the battle, let us turn to the memoirs of Alexei Semenovich Burdeyny: “It is very difficult to describe the picture of that day. Bombs and shells exploded in front, behind, among us, and their howl merged with cannon shots from tanks and artillery pieces into one continuous hum. There is a desperate battle between our fighters and enemy fighters and bombers in the air. Bombers and attack aircraft are throwing bombs and storming the enemy, and he is bombing us with the same "zeal".

All day on July 12 and until late at night, tankmen, artillerymen, sappers, motorized rifle subunits and units, signalmen, all support units, all corps personnel were under continuous fire from enemy tanks, artillery and aviation. No one even thought not only about a minute's rest, but also to eat their own dry rations, drink a mug of cold tea or plain water. It was a day of superhuman stress, but the Soviet soldiers withstood it with honor. "

If we talk about heroism, then it was literally the mass heroism of everyone who took part in this battle.

Here are just a few examples out of a thousand: in a heavy battle near Belenikhino, the tank of the guard of Lieutenant Kozakevich was knocked out (a cannon in the tank was destroyed). Capturing an assault rifle, machine gun, grenades, Kozakevich and his crew jumped out of the tank, took up defenses not far from the tank and entered into battle with the enemy infantry. One by one, the lieutenant's comrades were killed. From a direct hit from an enemy shell, his tank began to smoke as well. Soon the cartridges ran out. Noticing this, the Nazis rushed to Kozakevich with a shout - "Rus, surrender!" In response, the lieutenant rushed to his tank, jumped into it and slammed the hatch. The Nazis shouted something after him, but then there was a strong explosion! All the fascists who were nearby were killed. In front of his fighting friends, the death of the hero killed the guard lieutenant Kozakevich and his crew.

The platoon commander of the 755th artillery battalion N. Bramia and his crew possessed special stamina, diligence and excellent knowledge of their business. Reflecting the attacks of enemy tanks, in the battle in the area of ​​Vinogradovka and Belenikhino, his platoon destroyed two heavy tanks "Tiger" and up to 30 fascists.

The battery commander of the same battalion, Lieutenant V.V. Kaskevich, repelling enemy attacks in the Ivanovskiye Vyselki area, defeated five enemy T-IV tanks and two heavy T-VI tanks. The enemy tanks did not pass in this direction.

The commander of a tank company of the 26th Guards. tbr. Captain K. Goichenko personally destroyed two enemy tanks from his own tank and, being seriously wounded, did not leave the battlefield, continued to fight and set one Tiger tank on fire. In the battle in the Shakhovo area, the commander of the artillery battery of the 26th brigade, senior lieutenant S. Ryabov, distinguished himself. Fighting off the attack of enemy tanks, he was seriously wounded, but remained in position, continuing to direct the battery fire. The enemy attack was repulsed. "

Summing up the results of the hostilities on July 12, it would be advisable to give a description made by P. A Rotmistrov: “In the middle of the day, success in the main direction was clearly indicated. The first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army persistently pressed the enemy, inflicting heavy losses in manpower and military equipment. We won not so much territory, but we did the main thing - in the oncoming battle we stopped and crushed the enemy strike group advancing along the railway to Prokhorovka. The edge of the enemy's tank wedge, broken in the area of ​​the Oboyansk highway, was broken. The brigades of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of the Guards Colonel AS Burdeyny, throwing back parts of the SS Reich division, energetically advanced in the direction of Vinogradovka and Belenikhino. " [Rotmistrov, 1984]. On July 12, the nature of the struggle in the Battle of Kursk changed dramatically. The Soviet troops were already advancing, and the Nazis were forced to go over to the defensive. The last attempt of the German-fascist command to regain the lost strategic initiative failed. And a significant contribution to what has been achieved belongs to the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps. The fighting in the Prokhorovka direction continued.

For several days, intense battles were fought with superior enemy forces. Operating at the junction between the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps, the SS Panzer Division "Reich" launched powerful flank attacks in the direction of Storozhevoye and by fifteen o'clock captured this village, as well as the northern outskirts of the village of Vinogradovka. As a result, there was an immediate threat of the enemy going to the rear of two of our tank corps at once. To eliminate the impending threat was to be done by the forces of the tank corps themselves.

Fierce battles in this area continued until late in the evening, and in one place our tankmen and motorized riflemen counterattacked the enemy, in the other they repulsed his counterattacks. Only with the onset of darkness, both sides, exhausted by the intense battle, went on the defensive. [Rotmistrov, 1984].

Burdeyny A.S. noted that the 4th Guards Tank Brigade suffered especially heavy losses both in men and in tanks. The brigade was faced with the following task - to firmly occupy the defenses in the Belenikhino, Ivanovka area. In the evening at 20.00 12 enemy tanks and before the company of machine gunners launched an offensive on Belenikhino, and already at 20.15 the attack was repulsed by the fire of our tanks, the enemy lost two tanks of 12 people, after which it retreated to the southeastern outskirts of Yasnaya Polyana.

The fight continued the next day. On the morning of July 14, the enemy launched an offensive with a tank group supported by motorized infantry in cooperation with artillery and aviation in three directions from Yasnaya Polyana - Kalinin to Belenikhino, from Ivanovsky Vyselok - Storozhevoe to Vinogradovka, from Kalinin-Sobachevsky to Leski.

On the southern outskirts of Vinogradovka, tanks engaged enemy tanks, which were supported by anti-tank guns, including self-propelled ones. By 20.00 the enemy reached a height of 234.9, where he threw our units back in the direction of Maloyablonovo, Belomestnoye, Pravorot. At 22.00, the corps commander gave the order: the brigade was withdrawn from the battle and concentrated in the Podol'kha region.

By the end of the day on July 14, the position of the units of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was difficult. During these days, the enemy assault aviation was especially rampant. The enemy tanks came close to the western outskirts of Zhimolostnoye, where the corps headquarters was located.

The intensity of the fighting did not decrease. The offensive continued on the positions occupied by the corps. Despite the fact that the enemy used tanks and aircraft, our soldiers successfully resisted and held back the offensive. So at the location of the 26th Guards. tbr on July 15 at 4.40 moved 12-14 enemy tanks and motorized infantry in the direction of the southeastern environs. Maloyablonovo and opened fire on the brigade's tanks from the rear. Unable to withstand the onslaught of the enemy, the brigade fighters were forced to retreat and take up defenses, where they stopped the German tanks. It should be borne in mind that enemy aircraft bombed our battle formations throughout the day. The general picture is accurately and objectively described in his memoirs by A.S. Burdeyny: “On July 15 and 16, heavy fighting broke out again. Obviously, the enemy has not yet given up on his goal - to crush our troops in the interfluve and to merge or combine their main forces with the Kempf task force, advancing from south to north along the Sev. Donets. During these two days, the enemy still managed to push us to the northeast. " [Beketov, 2000, p. 127].

Let's summarize the results of hostilities from 13 to 16 July: German troops failed to build on the success. With the aim of finally exhausting the forces of the advancing enemy, the armies of the Voronezh Front went over to a stubborn defense on the lines they occupied.

By the morning of July 17, the situation developed as follows: after a short but powerful artillery preparation, the 5th Guards Tank Army went on the offensive. The enemy held back our formations with strong rearguards, which included grenadier regiments, tanks, artillery, mortars, sappers. They mined the approaches to heights and settlements, forest edges, crossroads and offered stubborn fire resistance. The 2nd and 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps advanced only 3 to 4 kilometers in a day. [Rotmistrov, 1984].

A.S. Burdeyny: “As always, at dawn on July 17, everyone was already in place and preparing to meet the enemy with fire from all types of weapons. A "frame" hated by all of us appeared in the air - a spotter and reconnaissance aircraft, very maneuverable. He kept himself at a height unattainable for our anti-aircraft guns. The enemy artillery opened rare fire. We all expected that enemy tanks and infantry were about to appear. Hours pass, and there are no enemy tanks. In the middle of the day, an incomprehensible silence settled in front of us.

So far, this silence has not caused any delight in anyone. We simply did not know what the enemy was doing, and we ourselves went over to active actions, sending reconnaissance to all directions. Soon it was established that the enemy had left small rear guards in front of us, and the main forces were retreating to the south and southwest. The headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank Army were not long in coming: we received information that the enemy had begun to withdraw his forces, and then the order to pursue the retreating enemy. Now the initiative has completely passed into our hands. " [Beketov, 2000, p. 127]

The combat path of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps from Stalingrad to the fields of Belarus - entered military history our country. In the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the glory of the tank guards grew and multiplied. Wherever they fought, fighters, sergeants and officers followed the fighting traditions of the corps.

After the Battle of Kursk, the 2nd Guards. tank corps Burdeyny continued its combat path, took part in a number major operations Great Patriotic War. Commander of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of the Guard Major General tank troops A.S. Burdeyny showed his talent as a leader in the Belarusian operation. There he valiantly acted in the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, and during the Minsk operation he covered over a thousand kilometers in battles. The tank crews of the corps were the first to break into Minsk and liberated it together with units of the 5th Guards. TA.

Burdeyny Alexei Semenovich did not leave military service and after the war continued to command the corps. Graduated from the Armored Academy and the Academy. Voroshilov. Since August 1963, he has been holding a responsible position of the head of the Central Automobile and Tractor Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Hero of Socialist Labor, retired Colonel-General Alexander Timofeevich Smirnov, first deputy and friend of Alexei Semyonovich Burdeyny, remembered him and the work carried out during this period: In the years of joint service, I saw in him a person endowed with a great sense of responsibility and organizational gift. These qualities were manifested in the process of developing new military vehicles and delivering them to the troops. Alexey Semenovich paid a lot of attention to military automobile schools and a training automobile brigade. With his participation, new educational buildings, autodromes for the training of driver mechanics appeared. Questions related to the organization of the operation of automobile equipment, the construction of parks, the technical and combat training of personnel have always been in the first place when Alexei Semyonovich traveled to the troops. Moreover, the front-line general was ready to solve even seemingly small issues. For example, in one of the parks Burdeyny drew attention to the fact that it is impossible to simply wash your hands after work. But technicians are constantly dealing with machines, engines. So Alexey Semyonovich made the fathers-commanders in that unit and in others create normal living conditions for their subordinates. Burdeiny was a very demanding, but at the same time attentive, caring commander. At the same time, he was a modest person, he talked about the heroism of his subordinates, but never about his personal.

Since January 1974, Colonel-General A.S. Burdeiny is retired. Died April 21, 1987. Buried at the Kuntsevo cemetery in Moscow.

By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 19, 1945, Guard Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Aleksey Semyonovich Burdeyny was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and a medal " Golden Star"(No. 5026). Awards: 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov, 2nd Class, Order of Kutuzov, 2nd Class, Patriotic War, 1st Class, 2 Orders of the Red Star, medals and foreign orders.

The exploits of the soldiers of the 2nd Tatsinsky Tank Corps, Alexei Semenovich Burdeyny, have not been forgotten to this day. In the village of Tatsinskaya there is a lane named after Burdeyny. After the war, he repeatedly visited the Tatsinsky region, took part in the opening of the "Breakthrough" memorial.

In the Museum of Military Glory of the Third Military Field of Russia, a part of the exposition is devoted to the 2nd Guards. ttk. The showcase displays photographs of the corps soldiers, as well as personal belongings of the commander of the tank corps, Colonel Alexei Semyonovich Burdeyny - his officer's tablet, diploma of graduation from the Armored Academy, gold medal Academy them. Voroshilov and other documents. All these unique things and the dress uniform of Colonel-General A.S. Burdeyny. were donated to the museum by his daughter Lyudmila Alekseevna Rasshupkina. (Fig. 4) Part of the museum exposition dedicated to the 2nd Guards. ttk.

Burdeyny Aleksey Semyonovich - honorary soldier of the military unit and honorary citizen of the hero city of Minsk (was awarded in 1967). A street in Minsk was named after the Hero, a memorial plaque was installed on it, and an eternal flame was lit on Victory Square by the Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General A.S. Burdein, in honor of the 17th anniversary of the liberation of the city from the Nazi invaders, on July 3, 1961.

The documents, reports, orders, combat reports, stored in the archives, signed by A.S. Burdeyny, allow us to trace the actions and location of the units that were part of the corps during the Battle of Kursk by day and hour. This data has great importance and in the course of studying the events of the Prokhorov tank battle. These archival documents provide not only dry figures for the number of equipment in the 2nd Guards Tatsinskiy Tank Corps, but also the care for the soldiers can be traced. In his memoirs about the battles, Aleksey Semenovich always gives examples of the feats of the corps soldiers, who at the cost of their lives defended their homeland from the Nazi invaders.

Bibliography:

1. GANIBO. F. 1140. Op. 6. E.2. L. 40. Order of the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of May 2, 1944 No. 10.

2. Archival materials, military reports of 1943, which are in the funds of the Museum of Military Glory of the Third Military Field of Russia.

3. State military history museum-reserve "Prokhorovskoe field". Belgorod, 2005, 48 pages.

4. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. Lost victories. Translated from German. Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. M. - 1957 588 pp.

5. Ivanovsky E.F. The tankers began the attack. - M.: Military Publishing, 1984 .-- 254 p.

6. Koltunov G.A., Soloviev B.G. Battle of Kursk. M., Military Publishing, 1970 400 pages.

7. Stay young. Book of Memory of the Victims of the Battle of Prokhorovka on July 10-20, 1943. Editor-compiler V.P. Beketov. Belgorod, 2000 515 pages

8. Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1984

9. Rotmistrov P.A. Tanks at war. Publishing house DOSAAF. Moscow. 1970 95 s.

10. Soloviev B.G. Battle of the Arc of Fire. Belgorod: Ed. Fomina N.B., 2003, 288 pages.

11. Chichenkov A.P. Fifty days of fire. Historical chronicle. Belgorod. "Peasant business", 1996 225 p.

Connection history:

The 2nd Panzer Corps began to form in April 1942 by Directive NKO No. 724218ss of 03/31/1942 in Gorky. At first, 3 rooms in the Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin were allocated for the headquarters of the corps. Tank units were recruited in winter camps near the city, and military equipment arrived here.

On April 24, 1942, by directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 170322 dated April 24, 1942, it was transferred to the Bryansk Front. According to the instructions, the headquarters of the 2nd shopping mall was located in the village of Kazaki, 15 kilometers west of Yelets.

On June 28, the German troops of the GRA "South" launched an offensive according to the "Blau" plan. Having broken through the front at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies of the Bryansk Front, units of the 4TA Gotha began to develop an offensive in the direction of Voronezh. To deliver a counterattack on the flank of the breakthrough of the German troops into the zone of the Bryansk Front, the 5TA moved forward (on July 1, 2 and 11TK and 340sd). On the night of July 3, the formations of the 5th Panzer Army were finishing their concentration south of Yelets. On the night of July 4, its commander, AI Lizyukov, received a directive from Moscow obliging to “strike in the general direction of Zemlyansk, Khokhol (35 km south-west of Voronezh) to intercept the communications of the enemy tank group that had broken through to the Don River in Voronezh; actions on the rear of this group to disrupt its crossing of the Don ”. However, a simultaneous counterattack by the forces of the entire tank army did not work out. The situation near Voronezh demanded an immediate transition of the army to the offensive without waiting for the concentration of all corps. On July 5, the enemy broke into Voronezh. Street fighting ensued for the city. The 7th Panzer Corps went into battle first on 6 July, then the 11th Panzer Corps (8 July) and, finally, the 2nd Panzer Corps (10 July). The corps entered the battle, unable to conduct reconnaissance, to fully concentrate. The Sukhaya Vereyka river, which was in the offensive zone of A.I. Lizyukov's army, did not live up to its name and met the advancing tanks with a swampy floodplain. On July 7, 1942, the Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Bryansk Front was divided into the Bryansk Front (3rd, 48th, 13th and 5th Panzer Army, 1st and 16th Tank Corps, 8th Cavalry Corps, Aviation General Vorozheikin's group) and the Voronezh fronts. The commander of the Bryansk front was appointed Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov, from July 12, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky.

2TK was given the task of capturing the settlement of Bolshaya Vereika. With the onset of darkness on July 9, the 148th and 27th tank brigades took up their initial position, and the 2nd motorized rifle brigade went over to the attack. With a quick rush forward, her units burst into the village. The motorized riflemen acted decisively and purposefully. By dawn, they drove the enemy out of most of the village and captured a bridge across the river in the center of the village. The Germans, however, managed to catch hold of the southeastern outskirts of the village and hold it. At dawn, heavy tanks from the 148th Brigade entered the battle. They broke into the enemy's battle formations, crushed its firing points and infantry with caterpillars. Other parts of the corps, overcoming enemy resistance, reached the settlements of Chirikov and Sklyaevo. Our units were entrenched at the so-called "Vereisk heights", leaving cover on the crossings across the Bolshaya Vereika river.

The corps commander set a task for the units for July 11: by the end of the day, capture the Somovo, Bolshaya Tereshchevka line. In the morning, the battle broke out with new strength... KV tanks of the 148th brigade began wading across the river. The Nazis opened heavy fire, trying to prevent the crossing. A direct hit from a heavy projectile knocked out the lead tank. The forcing was temporarily delayed. Enemy artillery and mortars hit the attacking formations with powerful fire. Our artillery, supporting the battle of motorized rifle and tank brigades, also suppressed enemy batteries. The tanks were beaten by direct fire. The battle lasted an hour and a half or two. Gradually, the enemy's fire began to weaken. By noon, tankmen and motorized riflemen of our units crossed the river. The Nazis were completely driven out of Bolshaya Vereika.

However, the enemy did not accept the loss of Bolshaya Vereika and, in order to restore the position under the cover of strong air support, began to attack parts of the corps. Our troops suffered the greatest losses from enemy aircraft. The days passed in a continuous roar and fire. A bloody glow blazed at night. On the outskirts of the village and in it, everything was shredded and mixed with the earth.

Lizyukov's 5TA counterattack did not lead to a major success, but forced to divert from the direction of the main attack part of two strong armored divisions (9 and 11th division) specially replenished for Operation Blau. As a result, even after repelling the counterattack, these divisions remained in the composition of the German troops in the central sector of the front, which significantly weakened the composition of the armies advancing on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The rate was dissatisfied with the actions of 5TA. July 9, 42 there is a message in the Bet directive " 5TA, having in front of a weak enemy no more than one tank division, is marking time for the third day. Due to indecisive actions, army units got involved in protracted frontal battles, lost the advantage of surprise and did not fulfill their task. " On July 15, 1942, the 5TA was disbanded, and A.I. Lizyukov was appointed commander of the 2TK. On July 23, 1942, A.I. Lizyukov had a difficult conversation with the commander of the task force, deputy commander of the Bryansk front, Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov about the unsatisfactory actions of the 2nd tank corps. On the night of July 23, 1942, A.I. Lizyukov was summoned to Lukino for command post task force of the Bryansk Front under the command of General N.E. Chibisov, where he received an order to advance with the forces of his corps after the 148th Tank Brigade, which had already broken through (as it was believed) to Medvezhye. Following the order, A.I. Lizyukov and the commissar of the 2nd tank corps, regimental commissar N.P. Assorov on the KV tank left Bolshaya Vereika after the 26th and 27th tank brigades. Tank KB A.I. Lizyukov was hit, and he himself was killed.

On July 28, 1942, the corps moved to the reserve of the Bryansk Front. On July 31, before the formation, the order number 227 of July 27, 1942 was read out to the personnel of the corps.

On August 22, corps echelons under the command of Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Kravchenko arrived at railway station Log (northwest of Stalingrad). On August 22, the 2TK consisted of 26tbr (37 T-34, 5 T-70, 23 T-60), 27tbr (42 T-34, 5 T-70, 24 T-60), 148tbr (15 KV-1, 5 T -70, 27 T-60). The corps was sent to the Stalingrad Front to repel the offensive on the city from the south of 4TA Gotha. However, while the corps was on the way, the situation changed dramatically. On August 23, 14TK Wittersheim launched an offensive from the bridgehead on the Don near Vertyachiy. By the evening of August 23, German tanks, having passed 70 km, reached the Volga and the village. Market. Parts of 2TK were cut into two parts. One of the echelons with the 148th Tank Brigade was intercepted by the enemy tanks that had broken through at the Konnom junction, and the tankers had to engage directly from the platforms. The rest of the echelons of this brigade and part of the 2nd brigade remained cut off from the corps by the German breakthrough and subsequently acted independently north of the city in the Kotluban area.

26th and 27th brigade and the remaining units of the 2nd mbr were ordered to move to the northwestern outskirts of the city. Corps units took up defenses for from the outskirts city ​​with the left of him parts of 23TK A.M. Hasina. Having received the task, the headquarters of the corps took all measures to withdraw the units to the initial areas, provide the commanders with maps and communicate the combat orders to them. It was also important to coordinate actions with the brigades of the 23rd Panzer Corps and units of the 10th NKVD Division, which, together with the workers' detachments of the militia of the Barrikady, Traktorny and Krasny Oktyabr factories, hastily took up defensive positions along the Mechetka River.

On August 24, 1942, the corps received an order from the commander of the front's tank group, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces A.D. Shtevnev, to strike at dawn in the general direction of Gorodishche, Erzovka and destroy the enemy units that had broken through. General A.G. Kravchenko decided to advance in the direction of the northern outskirts of the Gorodishche and further through the heights to the eastern outskirts of Erzovka with the forces of the 26th tank brigade and the 2nd motorized rifle brigade interacting with it. The 27th tank brigade received the task of advancing in the direction of heights 146.2 (7 kilometers north-west of Gorodishche) and 143.6, the western slopes of height 147.6.

The corps launched the offensive on the morning of 24 August. The 26th and 27th tank brigades reached their initial positions at 7:00 and launched an offensive in the northeastern direction. The aim of the offensive was to reach Erzovka and cut off the "head" of the German tank wedge that had broken through to the market. The first success of the A.G. Kravchenko corps was the capture of Orlovka and the heights around it. A month later, heavy fighting will unfold around them during the second assault on Stalingrad. The capture and retention of these positions by the 2nd Panzer Corps would subsequently significantly complicate the life of the German units storming the city. The 26th and 27th brigades failed to advance further the height of Orlovka. Faced with the strengthened enemy defenses, the corps changed the direction of the strike. At 17.00 on 24 August, the 26th tank brigade was re-aimed to the east and received an order to occupy the village. Market. By 23.00 the order was executed. Thus, with the first counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Corps not only prevented the enemy from spreading into the territory of Stalingrad, but also recaptured tactically important points within the city. There could be no talk of any breakthrough to Stalingrad from the north, recorded in Paulus's order of August 19. Losses of the corps of A.G. Kravchenko in the first battle were relatively small: 8 T-34s, 1 T-70 and 1 T-60 burned down and 16 T-34 wounded, 28 killed and 97 wounded.

On 25 August, 2nd Panzer Corps was reinforced by 56th Panzer Brigade and tried to build on the success achieved the previous day. However, the Germans, who came to their senses from the shock, organized a strong anti-tank defense, and the advance of the advancing units was no more than 800 meters. A.G. Kravchenko showed caution and already from noon ordered to gain a foothold on the achieved lines. The tanks stood still and fired at the enemy firing points that were showing themselves. Hull losses were only 6 tanks. The 56th Tank Brigade was taken away from Kravchenko and replaced by the newly formed 99th Tank Brigade, which had 50 T-34s. When foreign researchers, in particular P. Carell, talk about unpainted "thirty-fours" straight from the factory, they are most likely talking about the 99th brigade. The tanks of the 2nd Panzer Corps were fired far in the rear. Judging by the pictures, these were T-34s with a hexagonal "nut" turret manufactured at the factory # 183 in the Urals.

The attack of the brigades of A.G. Kravchenko's corps on August 26 was also unsuccessful, and corps units went over to the defensive. Losses for this day amounted to 18 T-34 tanks in the 99th brigade, 3 T-34s in the 26th brigade and 6 T-34s, 1 T-70 in the 27th brigade. One cannot fail to note the rather low rate of losses in the 2nd Tank Corps. The "alien" 99th tank brigade (formed from the 21st and 28th training tank battalions) suffered heavy losses. The own brigades of the Kravchenko corps held up well and managed not to lose equipment in the very first days of their stay at Stalingrad. On August 27, the 2nd Panzer Corps received a regiment of the 315th Infantry Division to consolidate its positions. On August 28, the 26th and 27th tank brigades received 21 T-70 tanks each as replenishment. On August 29, on the orders of Shtevnev, the 27th tank brigade (12 T-34, 20 T-70, 15 T-60) and the 2nd motorized rifle brigade attacked in the northwest direction at 16.00. The aim of the offensive was the state farm "Experimental Field". On the previous day (August 28), units of the 16th Panzer Corps entered the area northeast of the state farm. However, it was not possible to break through to meet the Kovalenko group of A.G. Kravchenko's corps on August 29. Met with heavy anti-tank fire, the tanks stopped and fired from their place. Having lost 5 tanks, the brigades withdrew to their original positions in the evening. On August 30–31, the 2nd Panzer Corps defended the occupied lines and gradually handed them over to the arriving 115th Rifle Brigade. On September 1–2, 1942, Shtevnev's tank group was disbanded.

On the morning of September 3, the enemy broke through the defense front of the 62nd Army 18 km from Stalingrad at the Nursery. By 12.00 the Germans were already in Talovaya, a few kilometers from the city. The commander of 62A Lopatin assigned the commander of 2TK Kravchenko the task, together with units of the 87th Infantry Division, to counterattack in the direction of the Experimental Station. At 2.30 p.m. the 27th Tank Brigade set out on the march and by 3.40 p.m. was in the Stalingrad region, north of the Experimental Station. At that time, the brigade included 9 T-34s, 7 T-70s and 15 T-60s. At 17.00, the 99th Tank Brigade followed the 27th Brigade (23 T-34, 7 T-70, 1 T-60). The counterstrike was scheduled for 5:00 the next day. In the final version, the corps of A.G. Kravchenko was supposed to act together with the remnants of the 87th, 98th and 112th rifle divisions. The counteroffensive began at 8:00 am on 4 September. the tanks of the 2TK corps made their way to Gumrak, but in the afternoon they were forced to retreat to their original positions. In the 27th brigade, 1 T-34, 1 T-70 and 13 T-60 remained. On September 5, Gumrak was held by the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division (285 active bayonets), the 27th Tank Brigade (11 T-60) and the reconnaissance battalion (2 armored cars, 4 armored personnel carriers) of the 2nd Tank Corps. To the south of Gumrak, the 99th Tank Brigade (16 T-34, 4 T-70) held on. The Soviet command so far managed to keep the enemy from breaking through to the streets of Stalingrad.

On September 6, 1942, the neighboring right-flank 399th Rifle Division at 9.00 left the occupied line under enemy pressure, thereby exposing the right flank and rear of the battle formation of the 2nd Panzer Corps. The 112th Infantry Division defending the eastern outskirts of Gumrak, having suffered heavy losses, also withdrew. To eliminate the threat to the right flank of the corps and to avoid encirclement, the corps commander ordered the 12th separate reconnaissance battalion to hold the enemy on the section of roads leading from Gumrak to Kamenny Buerak, and with the five light tanks of the 27th brigade remaining on the move, his reserve (three T-34 tanks ) and the seven surviving tanks of the 99th brigade to counterattack the enemy at the turn of heights 155.1 and 146.2. The mission was successfully completed by these extremely limited forces, and the enemy in front of the heights was detained.

By September 7, all the tanks of both brigades of the 2nd Panzer Corps were out of action. The commander of the 27th Tank Brigade was wounded, and the commander of the 99th Tank Brigade was killed. On September 8, the 2nd Panzer Corps was withdrawn to the left bank of the Volga. On September 11, 135, 137, 155, 254, 169 and 99th tank brigades were subordinated to him and the task of defending the eastern bank of the Volga on a front of 84 km was set. The non-moving tanks of the 27th and 99th Tank Brigades were transferred to the 23rd Panzer Corps.

Some parts of 2TK, on ​​the cr. the least tank battalion of the 27th brigade, continued to defend themselves in Stalingrad in the area of ​​height 102 and the village. Red October until September 30th. The tankers received replenishment with tanks from the Stalingrad factories and themselves repaired the damaged equipment and successfully defended themselves by supporting the 112sd units with fire. On the night of October 1, the remnants of the 436th tank battalion of the 27th brigade, having transferred the remaining 2 T-34s and 2 T-60s to the 6th brigade, crossed to the left bank of the Volga.

On September 13-14, 6A Paulus began the assault on Stalingrad. The enemy crushed our defenses at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies. The struggle was now waged on the streets and squares of the central districts of the city itself. Together with other units, the 26th tank brigade of the corps was moved to the place of the breakthrough of the Nazis at the junction of the two armies. In the area of ​​Kuporosnoye, she fought to the last tank.

In mid-September, the corps management and the remaining personnel of the 99th tank brigade and the 12th separate reconnaissance battalion were concentrated in the area of ​​Srednyaya Akhtuba. By order of the front headquarters, the corps temporarily included several units with only a few people in the ranks - 135, 155, 187 and 254th tank brigades, 140th mortar regiment. It was necessary to take up defensive positions on the Sporny, Zaitsevsky, and Golodny islands, to prevent the crossing and capture of the islands by the enemy, to subordinate everything that was on the islands to the defense. The front of the defense, in fact, of the newly assembled compound stretched up to 100 kilometers.

At the end of September, an order was issued to send the corps to be reorganized to Saratov.

The 2nd Panzer Corps, from which, figuratively speaking, only one name and a handful of commanders remained, but which honorably fulfilled its combat mission, defending Stalingrad, was to find a new life in Saratov.

12/16/1942, the corps, replenished, is withdrawn from the reserve of the Southwestern Front and transferred to the 3rd Guards Army. In the same way, through familiar stations, corps echelons again moved to the Stalingrad area. In accordance with the instructions, we unloaded at the Ilovlya station.

After reorganization and reception of reinforcements in the Saratov region, some formations and units were reassigned, and now the corps included the 26th, 99th, 169th tank and 58th motorized rifle brigades, 12th separate reconnaissance battalion, 1257th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, 401st guards mortar division and other units.

December 16-18, the army of the Southwestern Front N.F. Vatutin launched an offensive against Italian, German and Romanian troops in the Middle Don. The enemy front on the Don and Chir rivers was crushed for more than 300 kilometers. By the end of December, the entire Southwestern Front had advanced 150-200 kilometers forward. Parts of 2TK arrived on December 24 at the station. Lipki (58msbr was formed in the YuUVO and was sent to the corps from the station Yug in the Urals with unloading at the station Log, Ilovlya on December 26-29) from where they marched to the area of ​​x. Lysov (western Kalach). After a 140 km march, by December 28, the brigades concentrated in the area of ​​x. Lysov, Staromaksimovsky became a part of 5TA. It was supposed to use the corps to strike into the rear of the enemy's Tormosin grouping. However, in connection with the successful offensive of 1 and 3GvA on the Middle Don and 2GvA on Kotelnikovo, the threat of unblocking the encircled army of Paulus was removed. On December 30, the corps received an order to make 230 km to the location of 3GvA Lelyushenko.

The hull consisted of 40 T-34s and 60 T-70s. Due to the lack of fuel for the T-70 and wheeled vehicles at the 5TA bases, only T-34 tanks made the march. The long march was carried out in difficult winter conditions along the roads covered with snow. To ref. On January 2, the corps headquarters and part of the brigades without vehicles and T-70 tanks were concentrated in the Milyutinskaya area. OK. 20 T-34s remained on the roads due to lack of fuel and oil. Wheeled transport stretched for 350 km along the route of the corps movement from Log station to Milyutinskaya. During January 3-6, the concentration of corps units continued. Upon arrival, the brigade's equipment moved south from Milyutinskaya to the Bystraya River as ambushes to Novomaryevka, Kostino-Bystryanskiy. 58msbr made a march from Log station on foot also due to the lack of gasoline for cars.

On January 6, an order was received to concentrate the corps on the Kalitva river in the Ilyinka, Gusynka area. By the morning of January 7, parts of the corps were concentrated in this area. Movement on the roads was under the influence of German aviation. In the area of ​​concentration, the corps consisted of: 26tbr 8 T-34, 9 T-70, 9 vehicles, 3 37mm, 4 76m guns, 2 DShK, total 320 people; 99tbr 9 T-34, 3 t-70, 10 wheeled vehicles, min. company; 169tbr 9 T-34, 8 T-70, 33 vehicles, 4 zen. guns, 5 dshk; 58msbr - reconnaissance. company, 12 armored vehicles, battery of 76mm guns. The total corps consisted of 26 T-34s and 20 T-70s. The rest of the hull was scattered along the route. Total number hull was 5675 people, 51 tanks (and 60 under repair), 39 armored vehicles.

By January 9, the corps was concentrated in the Gusynka area. According to the plan of the commander of the 3GVA Lelyushenko, the corps was to be introduced into the breakthrough in the 266sd section on the Kalitva river and moving towards the Sev river. Donets seize river crossings. From the side of the enemy, the 7th division, recently transferred from Germany, operated on the Kalitva River. The tank units of the enemy went over to counterattacks, trying to thwart our offensive with vigorous actions. In view of the dangerous actions of the German tank group in the area of ​​Novocherkassky, against which units of the 2GVTK and 1GVMK fought, the direction of the offensive was changed to Novocherkassky. On the morning of January 9, the brigades went on the offensive to the western region. Kh.Novocherkassky. On January 10, units of the corps, together with 158th rifle division, captured Nocherkassky and Litvinov. The actions of the corps put the enemy grouping down. Novocherkassky under the threat of encirclement. On the morning of January 11, with the support of aviation, enemy tanks from three sides (from the east from the Maslov area, from the south from the Gornyatsky mine and from the west from Gusynka) attacked corps units. However, the tankers withstood these attacks, holding their lines. The enemy grouping cut off by sowing. Kh. Novocherkassky was defeated. Losses during the battle amounted to 720 people. killed and wounded. The 58msbr motorized infantry suffered heavy losses. 6 T-34s were shot down, 1 T-34 and 1 T-70 burned down.

On the morning of January 12, the corps brigades launched an offensive from the Litvinov area to the west. bank of Kalitva and by lunchtime the tankers of the 99th brigade captured Dyadin, reaching the Sev river. Donets. The advance of the 26th brigade and the 58th brigade in the Lenin area was more difficult. On the morning of January 13, enemy tanks launched a counterattack against 26tbr and 58msbr from the Ust-Belokalitvenskaya area. In the ensuing battle, 23 enemy tanks were knocked out, 6 serviceable tanks were captured. Our losses amounted to 6 T-70s burned down, 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s were destroyed. German aviation continuously bombed our battle formations. On January 14, tankers of the 99th and 169th brigade captured the Krasny Yar NP on the banks of the Donets and fought on the outskirts of Kalitvenskaya. Stubborn battles continued in the Kalitvenskaya area. On the side of the Germans, Kalitvenskaya was defended by Cossack units from Soviet citizens who went over to the service of the Germans. 169tbr during January 15-16, during heavy fighting, knocked out enemy units from Krasny Yar and Kalitvenskaya. 26th brigade fought to the north in the Nov. Erokhin area, 99th brigade continued to defend the Dyadin region, waiting for the infantry to approach. On January 16, the corps brigades launched an offensive against Kamensk. Coming to Skorodumovka (a suburb of Kamensk on the northern bank of the Donets), the brigades fought here during January 16-20. Old. The village and Skorodumovka passed from hand to hand 5 times. Leaving a barrier in the Skorodumovka area, parts of the corps began to cross the Donets to bypass Kamensk from the south-east. 26tbr to ref. On January 20, she crossed with the 150GVS 50GVSD to the southern bank of the Donets east. Kamensk. Soon in the area of ​​Verkh. Dichinsky and 99tbr. The enemy tried to counterattack our bridgehead with tanks, but this attack was repulsed. From the west in Kamensk, 23TK units fought. Losses of brigades in these battles amounted to 117 people. killed and wounded, 2 T-34 and 3 T-70 burned down; 4 T-34s and 7 T-70s knocked out.

On the evening of January 21, an order from the 3GVA was received in which the corps ordered, in cooperation with the 23TK, to bypass Kamensk from the south and seize the station Likhaya. However, the 58msbr crossing at Nizh. Goveny was repelled by a counterattack by enemy tanks. 99tbr ferrying at the top. Dichinsky tanks also tried to attack Nizh. The attack was stopped by the stubborn defense of the enemy. Meanwhile, in the afternoon, German troops attacked units of the 23TK and 60GVSD in Kamensk and to the ref. days drove them out of the city forcing them to retreat to the north. Donets bank. A further attack from the occupied bridgeheads in these conditions made no sense. On the night of January 26, parts of the corps surrendered their section of the 60th Guards and 203sd and were withdrawn in the Verkh area. Wedge, Astakhov. On January 25, the 2TK consisted of 5411 people, 50 serviceable tanks and 72 under repair, 48 mortars, 521 vehicles, 40 BA. Irrecoverable losses hulls were 3552 people, 23 T-34, 27 T-70.

On the night of January 26, having surrendered their positions, the 50th Guards Corps was sent march from-z Kamensk to the Kruzhilovka area in the North. Donets put himself in order. The reconnaissance was looking for convenient crossings across the Donets. At the end of January, the 3GvA was preparing to go over to the offensive again from the Donets line in order to liberate Donbass. The shock group of the army included 2 GvTK, 1 GvMK, 2 and 23TK.

On January 30, the rifle divisions of the 3GVA launched an offensive from the bridgehead they occupied between Kruzhilin and Bol. Dry breaker. Corps tanks crossed the North. Donets in the area of ​​Davido-Nikolskoye along the specially reinforced sappers crossings on the Donets ice. By this time, the state of mat. parts of the hull were far from shiny. So 169tbr consisted of only 4 T-34 and 4 T-70. To ref. day corps brigades advanced to Ivanovka. Having cleared together with parts of the 14GVSD on the trail. On the day of Ivanovka, the corps brigades continued their offensive reaching Nadezhdino. Developing an offensive in south-west direction parts of the corps during January 31 - February 2 advanced to the line Krasnoe, Andreevka. 61GVSD approached the area of ​​operations of the corps, which, together with the tankers, fought for the station of Popovka. Having entered the area, the Red Corps found itself in a dangerous position due to the threat to rear communications from the Popovka, Samsonovka area, from where German tank units attacked both the 2TK positions and in the north. the direction where the tankers of the 2GvTK Badanov fought and to the east to Verkh. Duvannaya where the 1GvMK Russiyanov fought. The battle for Popovka was led by infantrymen of the 61st Guards Division and 169th Brigade. 99tbr and 58msbr, continuing their offensive to the west, crossed the Luganchik River and occupied the Engels colony. On February 6, Popov's tankmen took possession of the Voroshilovgrad airfield and advanced to Pervozvanovka together with the 279thsd, who had approached from the 279th regiment on February 6.

On February 6, the 8KK and the fresh 243rd were introduced into the breakthrough created by the 2TK units. The brigades of the corps moved to Voroshilovgrad, surrendering their positions to the infantry of the 14GVSK (14, 50 and 61st Guards Rifle Divisions), the tankers transferred their combat area to them, and they themselves received an order, together with the 279th Rifle Division, to advance on the southern and southwestern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. In the battles near Voroshilovgrad, the commanders of the 169th brigade, Colonel Kodenets, and the 99th brigade, Colonel Gorodetsky, as well as the beginning. Corps headquarters Colonel Maltsev. The brigades of the corps, together with the infantry of the 279th infantry division, went south on 7 February. env. Voroshilovgrad in the Rozalinovka area, where until February 13 they fought to capture Voroshilovgrad

.

On February 8, German troops began to withdraw their troops from a large arc formed by the North rivers. Donets and Don to the border of the Miuss river. Leaving the capture of Voroshilovgrad to rifle divisions on February 14, the corps launched an offensive from the southern suburbs of the city in the western direction, occupying the farm. Davydovka and in a southern direction coming out to the north. Lutugino. On February 16, the remaining tanks and ammunition of the corps were transferred to the 1GvMK. The brigades that suffered heavy losses were withdrawn to the Georgievskoye area.

On February 23, parts of the corps liberated a large energy center Donbass - the city of Shterovka. After the liberation of Voroshilovgrad and Shterovka, hostilities in the area of ​​deployment of the 3rd Guards Army slowed down. The troops suffered heavy losses and were tired. The rear was stretched, which made it difficult to supply combat units. The muddy road also made itself felt. At the end of February, the Nazis, having concentrated their forces on certain sectors of the front, launched private counterattacks and stubbornly resisted. A strong enemy counterattack was struck against the troops that had broken through to the Krasnoarmeisk area. The Germans managed to cut off the grouping of our troops.

The corps commander received an order to go to the Izyum area with all his might, to gather subunits and units that were not quite orderly retreating under his command, and to try to stabilize the front. In the following days, parts of the corps, in particular its 58th Motorized Rifle Brigade, waged heavy battles in the Izyum direction. In the early spring of 1943, fierce battles were fought in the Izyum-Barvenkovo ​​direction. The Hitlerite command made great efforts to throw off our units from their positions. In these battles, forces on both sides were exhausted, equipment was ground up. Other battles dragged on, escalated, turned into real massacres.

As already noted, units of the 2nd Panzer Corps during the winter offensive battles suffered significant losses, needed rest and replenishment. As a matter of urgency, the corps was given 40 T-70 tanks - maneuverable, light vehicles armed with 45-millimeter cannons. The corps commander ordered them to be recruited into the 26th and 169th tank brigades. At the same time, about ten thirty-fours were repaired and returned to service.

In March, the situation at the front was even more unfavorable for the Red Army. Fascist troops again captured Kharkov. The corps, at the direction of the front headquarters, was moved to its right flank, to the zone of the 6th Army, to the Kharkov direction. During these days, the formation of two incomplete brigades was to take up defensive positions in the Chuguev area, in the Bazaleevka, Kochetok sector, and prevent the enemy from crossing the Seversky Donets River. Following the order of the commander, the 169th and 26th tank brigades took up defensive positions at the indicated line. The headquarters of the corps was located in a village called Kitsevka. For more than a week, corps units held the occupied lines, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis.

The tank brigades of the corps lost almost all their combat vehicles, and motorized rifle battalions were greatly thinned out. By order of the front headquarters, the corps units withdrew to the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets. At the end of March 1943, the front line stabilized, Soviet units began to gain a foothold on the occupied lines. The enemy troops also stopped, apparently completely exhausted. Both sides went on the defensive.

The corps was taken to the front reserve. The fairly thinned brigades were located in the Urazov area, which is south of Valuyki. Within two months, parts of the corps were replenished with personnel and military equipment, tactical exercises and shooting exercises were conducted. The commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General R. Ya. Malinovsky, assigned the 2nd Panzer Corps the task of being ready to strike in three directions and keeping in mind the fourth - on the left flank. During its stay in the front reserve, the corps was transformed - the tank brigades now had 65 vehicles each, a full complement of crews. The motorized rifle brigade was replenished to the state. The corps included new units - a howitzer and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, a mortar regiment, a sapper battalion. On a special account was the Katyusha division included in the staff.

In early July, the corps was alerted. By an order received at the headquarters at night, its brigades were ordered to relocate from the South-Western Front to the Voronezh Front. On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk began. The 2nd Panzer Corps entered the hostilities a little later. On the night of July 8, its units, having made a march from the Urazov area, concentrated near the Prokhorovka station. The enemy brought up his elite divisions "Death's Head" and "Reich" here. In front of the front, there were up to 300 tanks, a large number of self-propelled artillery and infantry.

On July 8, the corps entered the battle. Fierce battles lasted for three days. The corps operated in the zone of the 6th Guards Army, to the right - the 1st Tank Army. On July 11, battalions of a motorized rifle brigade arrived in the corps' area of ​​operation, marching on foot and therefore belated. Motorized rifle units were assigned to tank brigades to strengthen the defense.

On July 12, after a regrouping of forces, a lengthy air and artillery preparation, the enemy launched its last, furious offensive in the direction of Prokhorovka, Pravoti, and Storozhevoy. About 100 enemy tanks, many self-propelled guns, and four infantry regiments moved to the battle formations of the corps.

By order of the front commander, the corps left the operational subordination of the 69th Army and became part of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The commander ordered: having covered himself with one brigade from a flank attack, with the main forces to advance in the direction of the Sentry. Fighting in the Prokhorovka area, although with less force, continued even after. So, on July 13, the enemy managed to push back units of the 29th Panzer Corps by about a kilometer with a large group of tanks and infantry. Here I had to go over to a tough defense. Until July 16, fire battles raged on the Lutovo, Belenikino, Storozhevoe, Vinogradovka line. The enemy was still snapping.

The corps left the Prokhorovka battle with considerable losses. It was required by forces of the corps parts that were far from complete in terms of staff and small repair units to restore, to bring combat equipment to readiness. Only 7 days were given for this corps. People worked for days, but they could not be fully equipped on their own. Nevertheless, the corps could and should have been considered combat-ready.

During this period, a partial regrouping of the front forces was carried out. The 2nd Panzer Corps was moved closer to the right wing and transferred to the subordination of the 40th Army, which was commanded by Colonel-General KS Moskalenko.

A regrouping usually precedes an offensive. And so it happened this time. The corps, brought into battle after the rifle divisions had captured the first enemy defense position, ahead of the battle formations of other formations, struck in the direction of the city of Lebedin. The corps' tanks at high speed wedged deeper and deeper into the enemy's defenses. The Nazis were forced to pull back their units, fearing encirclement. With a swift maneuver, the brigade, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, went into his rear.

In the direction of Sumy, Lebedin, the corps entered the depths of the enemy defense like a steel wedge. Only in one of the sectors did the Nazis try to stop the advance of the corps. They organized a counterattack by tank units. On the approaches to Lebedin, in the immediate vicinity of the city, corps units met strong enemy resistance. The tactics of the enemy were opposed by the tactics of powerful tank strikes, swift maneuvers with access to the flanks and rear. On August 19, parts of the corps from three sides simultaneously approached Lebedin, rushed into it on the move. The motorized riflemen barely kept up with the tankers, the Nazis did not lose hope of returning the city and launched a series of counterattacks. But with part of the forces the corps was held by Lebedin, while his other brigades were rushing farther and farther forward.

During the day on August 20, 1943, the advancing corps units covered 40 kilometers in short battles. With a further offensive, the tankers fought for the city of Zenkov for several days. At the end of August, corps units fight for Sumy. On September 8, the corps was tasked with developing the offensive in the direction of the city of Lubny. During the night, units with an attached anti-tank fighter regiment concentrated in the starting area. On the morning of September 9, front-line aviation dealt a massive blow to the enemy, and artillery carried out a powerful fire raid. The enemy's defense in this sector was upset, and his fire system was suppressed. Having crossed the Grun River and rounding the battle formations of the rifle divisions of the 40th Army, corps units entered the breakthrough and rushed to the west. Sweeping away the enemy's barriers, they rushed into the village of Lipovaya Dolina on the move, and captured the crossing over the Khorol River.

The dynamics of the actions of the tankers was sometimes so rapid that the enemy could not even hold on to intermediate lines. On September 10, 1943, the corps continued its offensive. In the area of ​​the settlements Rozbishevka, Novoselovka, Petrovka, the Nazis pulled together large forces and organized a powerful counterattack. They managed to shoot down an abandoned tank barrier - a heavy tank regiment, cut off parts of the corps from the main forces of the front. The battle lasted for several hours, the ammunition was coming to an end. The corps was threatened by enemy encirclement. By the end of the day, only 19 combat-ready tanks and nine guns remained in the corps. With these small means, the corps soldiers steadfastly held their defenses on the occupied lines, fought off the Nazi units that were pressing from all sides. The infantry of the 47th Rifle Corps rescued the tankers. Together with them, the tankers continue their offensive.

Having made a march to the area of ​​the town of Lokhvitsy, the tankmen, together with units of rifle corps, launched an offensive on Lubny. On September 18, tank brigades of the corps bypassed Lubny from the south-west, the regiments of the 337th rifle division from the north-east. On a radio signal, a swift attack began from two opposite directions. The enemy troops, who had accumulated in the city, could not contain it, and could not escape by flight - just at that moment the railway bridge flew into the air.

01.11 01.12

Corps participated in? operations of the Great Patriotic War:

1. Stalingrad strategic offensive

• Middle Don front-line offensive operation (operation "Little Saturn")

Millerovo-Voroshilovgrad offensive operation (Operation "Jump")

Kharkov-Belgorod operation (from 4 to 25 March 1943)

Kursk strategic defensive operation

Smolensk strategic offensive operation (Operation "Commander Suvorov")

• Elninsko-Dorogobuzh operation (from August 28 to September 6, 1943)
• Smolensk-Roslavl operation (September 15 - October 2, 1943)

Fighting in the fall of 1943 and the winter of 1944 near Orsha and Vitebsk;

Vitebsk offensive operation February 3 - March 13, 1944

Belarusian strategic offensive operation (operation "Bagration")

• Vitebsk-Orsha front-line offensive operation
• Vilnius front-line offensive operation

Liberation Vilnius, Augustow, Kaunas and access to the state border with East Prussia(from July 27 to August 19, 1944);

Gumbinnen-Goldap front-line offensive operation

East Prussian strategic offensive operation

• Insterburg-Königsberg front-line offensive operation

June 29, 1942 By the end of June, the corps was in the reserve of the commander of the Southwestern Front, and on June 29 it was transferred to the Bryansk Front. On the same day, the corps brigades concentrated in the Stary Oskol area.

June 30, 1942 In the course of subsequent hostilities, due to poor intelligence and conflicting orders from the command, corps units made long aimless marches, leading to wear and tear of materiel and the failure of tanks. For example, the 54th tank brigade made a 158-kilometer march only on June 30, without firing a single shot at the enemy, having lost 8 T-34 and 6 T-60 laggards due to technical malfunctions.

July 2, 1942 On the afternoon of July 2, units of the 24th military corps were attacked by divisions of the 48th (German) military commander. As a result of the battle, due to poor communication between neighbors, units of the 54th brigade were surrounded, but by the evening they managed to escape from the ring. At the same time, 6 T-60s, 1 T-34s were lost and 8 German tanks were destroyed.

July 3 - 5, 1942 In the following days, the corps brigades, conducting continuous rear-guard battles with German tank units, withdrew to the Don. At the same time, a large number of tanks (especially KV-1) were blown up by the crews due to lack of fuel and technical malfunctions. The fact is that the tank brigades were cut off from their rear during the battles and experienced great difficulties in providing repair, evacuation means and fuel. For example, only for July 3, 4th Guards. The TBR blew up 4 out-of-order KVs, and the 54th TBR blew up 3 T-34s on July 5 - 6 (2 due to lack of fuel and 1 stuck in a swamp due to the inability to evacuate).

July 6, 1942 By the evening, units of the 24th military corps approached the crossing of the Don in the Uryv region, where they took up defenses. By this time, the following number of tanks remained in the brigades: in the 54th tank brigade - 14 T-34 and 6 T-60, in the 130th tank brigade - 16 T-36, 17 M3 light, in the 4th Guards. tbr - 15 KB and 11 T-60.

July 7 - 10, 1942. In the following days, corps units fought with German units trying to occupy the crossing of the Don in the Uryva region. However, tankers suffered losses not only from enemy fire. So, on the night from 7 to 8 July 1942, the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 54th brigade, Captain Bessonov and the commissar of the battalion st. political instructor Krivenko, leaving his unit, crossed to the eastern bank of the river, “from where they gave the order to the unit commanders to lead their tanks to the other bank of the Don for their flooding. As a result, 3 T-34s were sunk in the Don, and 5 T-34s were thrown on the battlefield, 2 of which were destroyed (the engine group was blown up). "

July 11, 1942 Due to heavy losses in tanks, the 4th Guards crossed to the eastern bank of the Don. tbr, transferring the remaining 3 KB and 13 T-60 24th ISBR

July 14, 1942 On this day, the 54th tank brigade crossed, transferring the remaining 5 T-34 and 5 T-60 tanks to the 130th tank brigade. In addition to tanks, the motorized rifle battalions of the 4th Guards Brigade were transferred to the 130th Tank Brigade. tbr and 54th tbr.

On July 25, 1942, units of the 24th military corps fought in the Uryv area until the end of July, and then were withdrawn to the rear. As of the evening of July 25, the corps units still had 7 T-34, 31 T-60 and 3 M3 lungs on the move.

From March 1943, he trained as part of the Voronezh Front, and then took part in the Battle of Kursk. After a short rest, since September already as part of the Western Front, he participated in its autumn-winter battles. From May 1944, after a two-month stay in the reserve, until the end of the war, he acted as part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Tactical designations

In the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the tactical sign of the formation was an arrow with a letter of the Cyrillic alphabet above it. The letter denoted the number of the brigade: L - 4th Guards. tbr, B - 25th Guards. tbr, I - 26th Guards. tbr. Under the "arrow" the personal tactical number of the tank was applied (T-34-85 - "236"). The numbers of the 4th Guards tanks began with the number "100". tbr, from the number "200" - 25th Guards. tbr, with the number "300" - 26 Guards. tbr, although the latter rule was not always followed.

Summary sheet by type of combat activity (by number of days)

	on the offensive	on the defensive	in the reserve of the VGK rate	in the front reserve	in the army reserve	in the 2nd echelon	in the 3rd echelon
1941	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1942	-	-	-	-	5	-	-
1943	82	49	25	148	61	-	-
1944	63	53	62	98	99	-	-
1945	15	3	-	108	3	-	-

On the basis of the order of the commander-in-chief of the South-West direction No. 00274 / op dated April 17, 1942, for "more massive use of tanks", by order of the troops of the Southern Front No. 00156 in the Voroshilovgrad region, the 24th tank corps (USSR) was formed from tank brigades.

The 24th Panzer Corps, after heavy May battles on the Southern Front, as part of the 4th Guards Tank, 2nd, 54th Tank and 24th Motorized Rifle Brigades, was in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters until November 1942, restoring its combat effectiveness.

Directive headquarters of the Supreme Command No. 170465 dated June 28, 1942, the corps from the Southwestern Front was reassigned to the Bryansk Front.

At dawn on July 3, 1944, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps broke into Minsk with a powerful attack from the east and northeast. At the forefront of the attack was a tank platoon commanded by Guard Junior Lieutenant D. G. Frolikov from the 4th Guards Tank Brigade, which entered Minsk first.
For the successful fulfillment of the command assignments during the liberation of the capital of Belarus, Minsk, the corps administration, as well as the 4th, 25th, 26th Guards Tank and 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigades of the corps were awarded