Introduction

The winter offensive of the Red Army troops in 1942 and the counterattack of the German operational group "Kempf" ended with the formation of a kind of protrusion directed to the west, not far from the cities of Belgorod, Kursk, Orel. At the same time, the opposite situation was observed in the Orel region: the front line, although on a smaller scale, nevertheless sagged to the east, forming a gentle ledge towards the settlements of Efremov and Berezovka. The bizarre configuration of the front prompted the German command the idea of ​​a summer strike against the encirclement of Soviet troops in the Kursk salient.

The area of ​​the Kursk Bulge was suitable for these purposes in the best way. The Wehrmacht no longer had the strength to advance on broad front, they could only count on a relatively local powerful blow. Attacking the foundations of the Kursk salient from the north and south, the Nazis were going to cut off the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts and destroy them. Operation on Kursk Bulge received the name "Citadel" in the German troops.

The alignment of forces

Failing to achieve decisive success in the offensive against the settlement of Oboyanskoye, the German command redirected the strike in the direction of the village of Prokhorovka, setting the troops the task of getting out through the bend of the Psel River to Kursk. Knowing that it was here that they could meet the counterstrike of Soviet tanks, the Nazis decided not to let our troops escape from the narrow section between the railway embankment and the river floodplain.

Tanks of the 2nd SS corps (294 tanks, of which 15 "Tigers") attacked Prokhorovka from the west, and the 3rd Panzer Corps (119 tanks, of them 23 "Tigers") from the south. The SS Adolf Hitler division operated in the area between the Psel River and the railway. Tanks "Panther" at Prokhorovka did not fight, continuing to operate in the Oboyan direction. For ideological reasons, Soviet historiography replaced the captured T-34s with Panthers, which were actually part of the German unit.

The Soviet side put up the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P.A.Rotmistrov (826 tanks and self-propelled guns) against the Nazis at Prokhorovka. Rotmistrov's army was reinforced with two separate tank corps. The 5th Guards Army of A. Zhadov also took part in the battle.

Battle

On July 12, at 8:30 am, after an artillery preparation, Soviet troops launched an offensive on Prokhorovka. In the first echelon of the attack, there were four tank corps. On the German side, there were up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 42 "Tigers". The morning sun was shining directly into the eyes of the Nazis, so our tanks had some advantage at the first stage of the battle. But despite the fact that the Soviet strike was quite sudden, the Germans met the tanks with dense anti-tank artillery and assault guns. Suffering heavy losses, the Soviet 18th Panzer Corps broke through to the Oktyabrsky state farm and captured it. After that there was a clash with large forces of German tanks, among which there were 15 "Tigers". In a fierce oncoming battle, the Soviet units managed to push the Germans back beyond the village of Vasilievsky, however, due to losses, they could not continue the offensive and went on the defensive.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, stubborn fighting began in the vicinity of Prokhorovka: near the Oktyabrsky state farm, near the Prelestny village, to the east settlement Ivanovskie Vyselki and on both sides railroad... In fact, neither side could significantly advance, the battle seemed to "stalled".

At this very time, in a section of the terrain south-west of Prokhorovka, between the floodplain of the Psel River and the railway, a grandiose oncoming tank battle unfolded. The Germans tried to break through this sector in order to break out into the operational space and launch an offensive on Kursk, and the Soviet forces, as already mentioned, it was here that they launched a counterstrike against the Hitlerite army. The total number of tanks that fought on both sides was 518 vehicles, with a quantitative advantage on the side of the Red Army. Due to the high density of the advancing forces, the battle formations of the opponents quickly became mixed. Soviet tanks, having an advantage in maneuverability, could quickly approach the Germans for maximum effective fire, and the German Tigers and the modernized Pz-IV had the best guns, allowing them to strike from long distances. The field disappeared in the smoke of explosions and dust raised by the tracks of combat vehicles.

A smaller but equally fierce tank battle broke out in the vicinity of the village of Kalinin at about 13:00. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, which took part in it, had about 100 vehicles. He was opposed by about the same number of tanks and self-propelled guns of the SS Reich division. After a long and fierce battle, Soviet tankmen retreated to the villages of Vinogradovo and Belenikhino, where they gained a foothold and went over to the defensive.

On July 12, near Prokhorovka, on a strip about 30 kilometers wide, whole line tank battles of various scales. The main battle between the river and the railroad continued until almost dark. By the end of the day, it became clear that neither side had managed to achieve a decisive advantage. Both Hitler and Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. At the same time, the losses of our troops, alas, were much higher. The Germans lost about 80 combat vehicles (different sources provide different data), the Red Army lost about 260 tanks (there are also serious contradictions between sources of information).

Outcomes

Probably, the Battle of Prokhorovka can be compared with the Battle of Borodino in 1812. The only difference is that the troops of the Russian army were then forced to retreat, and the Red Army managed to stop the offensive of the Nazis, who lost almost a quarter of their tanks.

Thanks to the heroism of Soviet fighters, the Germans were unable to advance beyond Prokhorovka, and just a few days later a decisive offensive of the Red Army began, knocking the strategic initiative out of the hands of the Nazis. After Battle of Kursk finally and irrevocably became clear that complete defeat Germany - only a matter of time.

After five days of defensive battles south of Kursk, the command of the Voronezh Front reported to Headquarters that the German offensive was running out of steam and the moment had come for the transition to active operations.

In the evening, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from Headquarters to conduct a counterattack against a large group of German searches. Accumulated in the Mal. Lighthouses, Ozerovsky. For the counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov. transferred from the Steppe Front. The plan for the counterstrike, developed at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front with the participation of the representative of the Headquarters A. Vasilevsky VI of the army commanders, was as follows. The main core of the 5th Guards tank army, reinforced by two tank regiments of the breakthrough, was to, with the support of two self-propelled artillery regiments and a regiment of guards rocket mortars and all available assault aviation, cut the SS Panzer Corps in two, whose strength seemed to have dried up in the previous laziness. At the same time, it was planned to reach the Pokrovka-Yakovlevo line. then turn to the East and West, cutting off the German troops' escape routes and encircling solvable groupings with the assistance of units of the 5th guards army and also the 2nd tank corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.

However, the preparation of the counterstrike, which began on July 10-11, was thwarted by the Germans, who themselves inflicted powerful blows on our defense in this sector of the bottom. One - in the direction of Oboyan, and the second - to Prokhorovka. The first strike, according to the Germans, was more of a distracting nature, and nevertheless, its strength and surprise led to the fact that some parts of the 1st Panzer and 6th Guards armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan.

In different sectors, an offensive began in the direction of Prokhorovka, when the 2nd Battalion of the SS Panzer Regiment "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" (LSSAH), together with the 3rd Battalion under the command of I. Peiper, took a surprise attack on the height 252.2, dominating the Teterevino-Prokhorovka road. After 10 minutes, the Tigers company of the Totenkopf division began to cross the Psel River, trying to expand the bridgehead between the villages of Krasny Oktyabr and Mikhailovka.

Southwest of Prokhorovka in the direction of the village. Yasnaya Polyana led the offensive with the SS Division Das Reich. Due to the sudden disorganized withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation of the Soviet counteroffensive, which began on July 10, was disrupted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front was in a very difficult position.

Only a quick entry into the battle of the 42nd rifle division, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.

The Kempf Group consisted of the 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions, which included about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 Russian tanks. On the night of July 11, the Germans launched a surprise attack from the Melekhovo region to the north and northwest with the aim of breaking through to Prokhorovka. Defended on this direction the infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions, not expecting such a powerful blow, withdrew. To cover the exposed section of the front on the night of July 11-12, 10 IPTABr were deployed from the Stanki reserve. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate ATR battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with the infantry units of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, did not allow the development of an offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only to the Sev. Donets near Novo-Oskonnoye.

July 12, 1943. The decisive day.

Opponents' plans for the decisive day.

The commander of the SS Panzer Corps Paul Hausser assigned the following tasks to his three divisions:

LSSAH - bypass the village. Guard from the north and go to the line Petrovka - st. Prokhorovka. simultaneously strengthening their positions at a height of 252.2.

Das Reich - push back the opposing Soviet troops to the line east of Ivanovka.

Totenkopf - lead an offensive along the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road.

It was an offensive in the direction of st. Prokhorovka from three directions in order to overcome the last line of the Soviet defense and prepare the "gate" for the introduction of the reserves of the Army Group "South" into the breakthrough.

At the same time, the Command of the Voronezh Front, considering the German offensive to be thwarted and the crisis overcome, was going to launch a planned counteroffensive against Luchki and Yakovlev. By this time, the 5th hectare, the tank army began to concentrate two tank corps, which had about 580 tanks, P. Rotmistrov chose the line of deployment of the first echelon of the army to the west and south-west of the station. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. Units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were also prepared for the ular.

By 5 o'clock in the morning. Distracting blow of the Germans from the south.At this time, the German troops of the Kempf group, trying to develop their offensive in the northern direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions of the 69th Army were driven back from the defensive line near the river. Northern Donets - Cossacks and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. There was a threat to the left flank of the deploying 5th Guards Tank Army, and by order of the representative of Headquarters A. Vasilevsky, the front commander N. Vatutin ordered to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the defense zone of the 69th Army.

At 8 a.m.A reserve group under the command of General Trufanov in a counterattack on the penetrated units of the German forces of the Kempf group.

Thanks to the staunch defense of the Red Army units, the German 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov's positions from the south.

At 7:45.Immediately after dawn on July 12, a light rain began, which slightly delayed the start of the German offensive on Prokhorovka, but did not prevent the Soviet 18th Panzer Corps of General Bakharov with the forces of one tank brigade from launching an attack of the 2nd LSSAH battalion on the outskirts of the Oktyabrsky state farm. Up to 40 Soviet tanks launched an attack on the village of Mikhailovka but were repulsed by a battalion of assault guns and withdrew.

From 8 o'clock in the morningLuftwaffe aircraft began intensive bombardment of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka.

AT HALF PAST EIGHTthe main forces of the German troops as part of the tank divisions "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich" and "Totenconf". numbering and singing up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 tanks "Tiger"), went on the offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka in the highway and railway lane. This grouping was supported by all available air force... However, in the first ular of this offensive, only half of the armored forces at the disposal of the German troops were involved - one battalion of LSSAH and Das Reich divisions, two Tiger companies and one T-34 company, a total of about 230 tanks. 70 assault guns and 39 anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder".

At 9:00after a 15-minute artillery barrage, the German group, in turn, was attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army. General Bakharov's 18th Panzer Corps broke through at high speed into the Oktyabrsky state farm, and despite heavy losses, captured it. However, near the villages of Andreevka and Vasilyevka, he met an enemy tank grouping, in which there were 15 Tiger tanks and a battalion of assault guns. Two platoons of "Tigers" (H. Wendarf and M. Wittmann) opened fire on Soviet tanks from a standstill from a distance of 1000-1200 m. Assault guns, maneuvering, fired from short stops. Having lost about 40 tanks, parts of the 18th since. were able to capture Vasilyevka, but were unable to develop the offensive further and at 18 o'clock went on the defensive. From their fire, the Germans lost one Tiger and seven assault guns burned out, as well as three "Tigers", six medium tanks and up to 10 self-propelled guns destroyed and damaged.

At about 11:30The 29th Panzer Corps began the battle for Hill 252.5, where it was met by tanks from the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuvering battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Totenkopf division and with the onset of darkness went on the defensive.

At 14.30The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, suddenly faced the advancing SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" for command. Because. that the 29th Panzer Corps was stuck in the battles for the height of 252.5. the Germans struck the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on the exposed flank and forced it to retreat to its original position. In the course of these battles, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 24 of the 41 tanks put into battle, knocked out and damaged. 12 of them burned down.

The 2nd Panzer Corps, which provided the junction between the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 29th Panzer Corps, was able to push the German units in front of it somewhat, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns brought up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.

12 a.m. German attack from the north.

By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal offensive on Prokhorovka had failed. Then they decided, the Psel was forced, to leave part of the forces north of Prokhorovka in the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Panzer Division and the remaining tank units of the extra SS Totemkopf * (96 tanks and self-propelled guns, motorized infantry regiment, up to 200 MOTORCYCLISTS). The grouping broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and by 13 o'clock captured the height of 226.6.

But on the northern slopes of the heights, the Germans stumbled upon stubborn resistance from Colonel Lyakhov's 95th Guards Rifle Division. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve, consisting of one IPTAP and two separate DIVISIONS of captured guns (one division was equipped with 88-mm anti-aircraft guns). Until 18:00 the division successfully defended itself from the advancing tanks. But at 20:00. after a massive air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses of personnel, the division, under the blows of the approaching German motorized rifle units, withdrew for the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves were already deployed here and the German offensive was stopped.

The 5th Guards Army also failed to fulfill the assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units advanced 1-3 km, after which they went over to the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Tank Army, the 6th Guards Army. The 69th Army and the 7th Guards Army did not achieve decisive success either.

July 13-15German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuehrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel. This decision was also influenced by the successful landing of the allies in Sicily, which took place during the days of the Battle of Kursk.

CONCLUSIONS:

The battles near Prokhorovka and the post-war years were declared "the largest tank battle of the Second World War." At the same time, most of the authors, describing it, agreed that "in a small field not far from Prokhorovka, more than 1000 tanks" met in hand-to-hand combat ". Today this field is even shown to passing tourists, but the analysis even domestic documents wartime proves that this legend relates to them, to put it mildly, very roughly.

The so-called "tank battle at Prokhorovka did not take place on any separate field, as was commonly believed." The operation was carried out on a front with a length of more than 35 km (and taking into account southbound- even more) and was a series of separate battles with the use of tanks by both sides. In total, according to the estimates of the command of the Voronezh Front, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides took part here. Moreover, the 5th Guards Tank Army, operating in a 17-19 km long strip, together with the attached units at the beginning of the battles, numbered from 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns. and the German grouping - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The main events here took place on July 12, which accounts for the maximum loss of materiel and personnel by both sides. In the battles of July 11-13, the Germans lost to the west and south-west of Prokhorovka, according to the report of the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 180 to 218) knocked out, abandoned and destroyed, the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards Tank Army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov's group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (see table). For some unknown reason, the front report does not contain accurate information about the losses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operating here, which are estimated at 55-70 vehicles damaged and destroyed. Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses were inflicted on them not by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.

The counterstrike of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end with the destruction of the German grouping that had wedged in and therefore was considered unsuccessful immediately after completion, but since it made it possible to disrupt the German offensive bypassing the town of Oboyan on Kursk, its results were later recognized as a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks that participated in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the war council - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of the commanders of subordinate units ... And from this we can conclude that the scale of the so-called "Prokhorov battle" could be greatly inflated by the front command. to justify the large losses of personnel and materiel of the front units during the failed offensive.

Battle of Prokhorovka- battle between parts of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It is considered one of the largest in military history battle with the use of armored forces. Occurred July 12, 1943 on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge near the Prokhorovka station on the territory of the Oktyabrsky state farm (Belgorod region of the RSFSR).

The direct command of the troops during the battle was carried out by the lieutenant general tank troops Pavel Rotmistrov and SS Gruppenfuehrer Paul Hausser. An oncoming battle was in full swing, where the tanks were shooting at each other point-blank, ramming, the crews of the wrecked vehicles engaged in hand-to-hand combat.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy grouping.

In the morning July 12, 1943 Rotmistrov's tanks moved in a long echelon against Hausser's tank regiments, which at that time were moving to the isthmus. Two tank avalanches in clouds of dust and smoke rumbled towards each other in a confined space. There was now beginning an open oncoming tank battle, which had never happened before in military history. It did not happen after. A thousand tanks and assault guns rushed, fired, exploded, burned, rumbled and smoked at that moment in the sea of ​​hills and valleys around Prokhorovka. An impressive and vivid description of the first hours of the battle was left by Lieutenant General Rotmistrov. This is one of the best descriptions of the battle in modern Soviet military history literature.

Rotmistrov watched the battle from a hill near Prokhorovka. “Tanks moved across the steppe in small groups, hiding in the copses. The volleys of the cannons merged into one continuous, powerful roar. Soviet tanks at full speed hit the German forward formations and broke through the tank barrier. T-34s shot Tigers at very close range, as the German powerful guns and strong armor did not give them an advantage in close combat. There was no place or time to get out of contact with the enemy, regroup in battle formations or act as part of units. The shells fired from a very close range pierced not only the side armor, but also the frontal one. At such a distance, the armor did not provide protection, and the length of the cannon barrels did not matter. Often, when a tank was hit, its ammunition and fuel exploded, and the torn off towers flew off tens of meters.

Fierce battles were also fought in the skies over the battlefield. Both Soviet and German pilots tried to help their ground forces win the battle. Bombers, attack aircraft and fighters seemed to cover the sky over Prokhorovka. One air battle was replaced by another. Soon the whole sky was covered with thick smoke from the wrecked cars. On the black, scorched earth, the twisted tanks burned like torches. It was hard to understand who was attacking and who was defending. The 2nd battalion of the 181st tank brigade of the 17th tank corps, advancing on the left bank, collided with a group of "Tigers", which opened fire from the spot. The powerful long-range cannons of the Tigers are very dangerous, and Soviet tanks had to try to get close to them as quickly as possible in order to deprive the enemy of his superiority.

Captain P. Skripkin, battalion commander, ordered: "Forward, follow me!" The first shell of the command tank pierced the side of the Tiger. At the same time, another "Tiger" opened fire on the T-34 Skripkin. The first shell pierced the side of the tank, and the second wounded the battalion commander, the driver and radio operator pulled the commander out of the tank and dragged him into the crater. Since the "Tiger" was driving directly at them, the driver Alexander Nikolaev rushed back to the damaged and already burning "thirty-four", started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The T-34 moved along the ground like a blazing ball. The Tiger stopped, but it was too late. A burning T-34 rammed a German tank at full speed. The explosion shook the earth. "

At noon on July 12, Rotmistrov's opponent, Colonel General Goth, was also on the front line. He watched the battle from the headquarters of the Fuehrer regiment. Through a trench periscope, he studied the battlefield, strewn with smoking debris. Hausser's regiments were forced to go on the defensive, but firmly held their positions. Over and over again Soviet tank brigades attacked the main defensive line of the Germans. But each time they were thrown back, despite the fact that the infantrymen were already desperate from the continuous frenzied attacks of many enemy tanks. A heavy battle began on the right flank of the Reich division. There, the Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Corps pushed aggressively into the gap between Hausser's corps and Bright's divisions, which had not yet approached. At this time, the advanced units of the 3rd German Tank Corps were at Rzhavets on the Seversky Donets. The most important problem for the Germans, however, was that General Bright's 3rd Panzer Corps was to force the Donets.

At the same time, Model did not undertake the planned offensive to break through the Russian defenses on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, since the Soviet units launched an offensive in the rear of the 9th Army on the Oryol salient and almost immediately achieved a deep penetration in the sector of the 2nd Panzer Army. Eagle was under threat, the supply base of the entire Army Group Center was in danger, the rear of the 9th Army was at mortal risk. The model was forced to remove several units from the front line in order to throw them against the advancing Russians.

By the morning of July 12, Beck's lead detachment of the 6th German Panzer Division managed to create a bridgehead, and entrenched itself on the northern bank of the Donets. But the pilots of one squadron of the Luftwaffe, who had not yet been informed of the successful German night operation, mistook the formations on the northern bank of the Donets for the enemy and attacked them. Several bombs fell in the immediate vicinity and injured 14 officers and many soldiers. General von Hunersdorf was also wounded, but remained with the division. It was a high price for opening the way to Prokhorovka. But Beck was unable to build on his success. While he was raiding Rzhavets, the main body of the 6th Panzer Division attacked an important hill at Aleksandrovka, ten kilometers to the east. However, the Russians fiercely defended this key point of their position, located at the Donets in the flank of the German offensive. Massive enemy fire pinned down the battalions of the reinforced 4th motorized infantry regiment beyond Aleksandrovka.

The positions of the German troops near Kursk, summer 1943

Hunersdorf did not hesitate a minute. With the tanks of Major Beck, he returned to the southern bank of the Donets. With half a dozen Panthers, he broke into the stubbornly defended village, took command of the commanding heights and thus opened the way for the infantry to enter the village. The enemy's line of defense between Donets and Korocha was finally broken through on 13 July. The 6th Panzer Division could continue to advance north. The tanks of the 7th and 19th Panzer Divisions crawled through Rzhavets to the battlefield at Prokhorovka.

So, near Prokhorovka, two steel avalanches passed into each other's battle formations. And they merged into one immeasurably huge ball, until the very night this ball was spinning, scorching the earth, burning itself. The Germans set out to tame our T-34 and installed an anti-aircraft 88 mm cannon on the Tigers, which hit our tank from a long distance. But in this battle, the "tigers" lost their advantage. The attack was so swift that the enemy did not have time to prepare to repel it. The vaunted "tiger" was clumsy, and the T-34, possessing greater maneuverability, shot the enemy at close range. When the gun failed or the shells ran out, the tanks rammed, the gun barrels broke like matches. Hundreds of tanks were burning among the rye with gaping holes, with torn tracks and towers. Ammunition exploded, thousands of sparks flew in all directions. The towers crashed to the ground. The battle took place on the ground and in the air, burning aircraft fell from a height and exploded.

The crews of the wrecked tanks, leaving the burning vehicles, continued hand-to-hand combat, wielding machine guns, grenades and knives. It was an unimaginable mess of fire, metal and human bodies. Everything was on fire around, and, probably, this is how artists should depict hell - an eyewitness of the battle recalled ...

Here are the impressions made by the younger german officer: “… There is nothing more terrible than a tank battle against superior forces. The numerical superiority has nothing to do with it, we are used to it. But when the enemy has better tanks, it's scary. You give full throttle, but your tank is picking up speed too slowly. Russian tanks are so fast, at close range they have time to swing up a hill or pass a swamp faster than you can turn the tower. And through the noise, vibration, and roar, you hear the impact of the shell on the armor. When they hit our tanks, for the most part there is a deep, lingering explosion, and then the roaring rumble of flaring gasoline ... "

Nobody thought about retreating and leaving the battle. The enemy fought furiously. The Germans had their own aces-tankers. One of them somehow managed to break a whole column of the British - to destroy about sixty units of tanks and vehicles. But on the eastern front, he laid down his head. All the color of the fascist tankers was gathered here. SS divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Death's Head", "Reich". The situation in all sectors was difficult, the Germans introduced all reserves, a battle crisis ensued, and in the afternoon the last reserve entered the battle - one hundred heavy KV tanks (Klim Voroshilov).

By evening, the Germans retreated and went on the defensive. Both sides suffered huge losses... Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy grouping. The commander of the SS Panzer Corps, Obergruppenfuehrer Hausser, was immediately removed from command, having been declared the culprit of the failure in the Kursk direction. In total, in the battles near Kursk, the enemy lost more than half a million people, about 1,500 tanks, 30 divisions were defeated, of which 7 were tank and motorized. Winston Churchill said in those days that the USSR had actually won the war.

75 years ago, a battle broke out that changed world history.

Back in the winter of 1943, Soviet troops surrounded and defeated the 6th German army and captured an entire field marshal. Germany has not yet known defeat and shame on such a scale. No, the German army was still strong, and science and industry in Germany produced perfect tanks and aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles were tested in secret laboratories. They "ran ahead": they created jet aircraft, guided torpedoes, actively experimented with anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles.

And Hitler hoped for revenge.

Wherein irrecoverable losses Wehrmacht in just a year - from the summer of 1942 to the summer of 1943 - exceeded 1.3 million soldiers. In Germany, mobilization was carried out, which exhausted the mobilization reserve. Simply put, they had nowhere else to take soldiers: men in the country ended fatally. Filling the graveyards in our land

The operation, with which they hoped to turn the tide of the war in their favor, was codenamed Zitadelle (Citadel). Its goal: to surround and destroy the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. The arc is a protrusion at the front up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide, facing west.

If they had succeeded, they would have gone to Moscow again. The German command threw 45% of its troops into battle on Eastern Front... Up to 4 million soldiers, 13,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12,000 aircraft took part in the battle on both sides. Similar battles world history dont know.

Before the Battle of Kursk, the Germans received Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft. Tanks-monsters "Panther" and "Tiger" were sent to the troops.

Each "Tiger" lightened the treasury for monstrous money: 250 thousand Reichsmarks. At the same time, it required experienced assembly workers, i.e. fatally plagued the resources of the Third Reich. But the Germans did not take into account the expenses. Everything that was at stake was at stake.

"Tiger" behind the tree

Ours were preparing for the meeting. The warmest welcome awaited the armored monsters.

Tigers and Panthers were tricky. On the contrary, Soviet designers developed a relatively simple and compact weapon - cumulative PTAB (anti-tank aerial bombs) - weighing only 1.5 kg and measuring 2.5 kg of a bomb.

It was not easy to pierce the Tiger's 100-mm frontal armor. It was possible only for powerful self-propelled guns - "St. John's wort". But in the battle of Prokhorovka, ours had little heavy equipment. 152-mm self-propelled guns - nothing at all. There were British Churchill tanks received under Lend-Lease. The Churchill's armor is not bad, but the cannon, alas.

But all ingenious is simple. Little PTAB burned through the German armor from above. With a successful meeting angle, it pierced 60-70 mm of armor. And the thickness of the "Tiger" roof is 30 mm.

Our PTAB was created in just six months. The tests were completed in the spring of 1943, just as Hitler was setting the dates for the Citadel. There is evidence that the plan for this operation was already on Stalin's desk. Our intelligence knew how to do the impossible.

Stalin personally ordered the People's Commissar of ammunition Boris Vannikov to produce 800 thousand PTAB by May 15. The task was completed on time and in the specified volumes. But until July, the bombs were classified and were not used in battles. That the Wehrmacht did not have time to prepare.

The Il-2 attack aircraft took on board up to 220 anti-tank bombs. And he arranged hell for the fascists: after the attack of the stormtrooper regiment, dozens of burning cars and mountains of corpses remained on the ground. Photo: RIA Novosti www.ria.ru

5'th of July German divisions went on the offensive. And they immediately received a hail of fire from the sky: each Il-2 attack aircraft took on board from 192 to 220 PTAB! Captured German tank crews said that thousands of small bombs created hell on earth: burnt armor, exploding gas tanks and ammunition, and horror, horror, horror ... After a couple of calls, a regiment of stormtroopers left dozens of burning tanks and mountains of corpses.

By the way, Western researchers write a lot and willingly about such an effect as the "fear of tanks" of the infantryman. And why does no one shoot blockbusters about the panic "fear of the Il-2" or "PTAB-phobia" of the Nazis?

The Wehrmacht hastily began to disperse the marching and battle formations. When stopped, tanks and self-propelled guns were located under the crowns of trees. Our aerial bombs in such conditions lost their effectiveness: the fuses were triggered prematurely. And the Luftwaffe fighters were ordered: ignoring all other targets, attack only the Il-2. At any cost.

Of course, our assault air regiments suffered heavy losses. Well, how could it be otherwise? But the hero pilots coped with the task: during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, they dropped half a million cumulative bombs on the enemy. They burned not only tanks, but also cars, artillery, fuel and ammunition depots.

After Prokhorovka and subsequent battles, German armored vehicles acquired a bizarre look: metal nets were pulled over the tanks to reduce the cumulative effect of the bombs. "PTAB-phobia" did not let them go for a long time.

And they have no rest

But bombs alone do not win wars. Soldiers are fighting to the death and winning.

Ours were opposed by elite SS units, including the "Reich" and "Death's Head". They were part of Army Group South, commanded by Erich von Manstein.

Manstein should be discussed separately. Born in Prussia, at birth the surname was Lewinsky: the son of a German general, an ethnic Pole. He was adopted by the von Manstein family, whose 16 ancestors were generals of the Prussian-German or Russian service. Erich fought in two world wars and was seriously wounded. Decorated with iron crosses, including the Knight's. Field Marshal received for the capture of Sevastopol.

In 1943 he was 55 years old. Manstein can be summed up in four words. The best mind of the German generals.

So, according to Manstein's recollections, on July 1, Hitler summoned him to his headquarters and announced the timing of the start of the Citadel, and also said that all the units participating in the operation were fully manned. And that Germany "for the first time surpasses the Russians in the number of tanks."

An interesting note. Last years in the circle of some historians it has become fashionable to feel sorry for the Nazis in connection with the "Prokhorov meat grinder" (Western characteristic of a tank battle). In the sense that the "Tigers" they had a cat cried, and with the "Panthers" they were unlucky, they broke on the way to the battlefield. In general, there was almost nothing to fight with. Strange, isn't it? Well, there was nothing to rush into battle. It would be better if they immediately got dragged ...

Nevertheless, there are documents according to which a tank battle in the Prokhorovka area was part of Manstein's plans. The Germans were quite confident in their strength.

We consider this battle to be the largest in the Kursk operation and in the whole war in general. Although historians argue very recklessly: how many tanks did they meet in that battle? It got to the point that almost every researcher now has his own numbers. How to deal with this chaos?

Best choice: trust your own.

On the website of the Military Historical Society, the battle is described as follows: “On July 12, the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place in the Prokhorovka area, in which up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns participated on both sides ... Both sides suffered huge losses. Soviet troops lost 500 tanks out of 800 (60%). Germans - 300 out of 400 tanks (75%). For them it was a disaster. Inspector General of the Wehrmacht tank forces Guderian wrote: out of action ... and there were no more quiet days on the Eastern Front. "

The numbers are, of course, also important. For example, it would be great if General Pavel Rotmistrov near Prokhorovka had fewer light T-70 tanks and more heavy ones. For example, the wonderful KV-1S. And instead of the T-34 with a 76-mm cannon - tanks from the future (from 1944): "thirty-fours" with an 85-mm gun. The blood of our soldiers would have spilled less.

But history does not know the subjunctive mood.

Moreover, the battle is not only about statistics. Here is a case that cannot be read without emotion. In the battle near Prokhorovka, the battalion of the battalion commander Captain Skripkin destroyed two enemy tanks, but was hit and caught fire. Driver-mechanic Nikolaev and radio operator Zyryanov carried out the wounded commander. And then the mechanic drive with the loader returned to the burning car and went to the ram. From fire and impact, the ammunition detonated, everyone died ...

There are photographs that we cannot publish for moral and ethical reasons - how they get what is left of the crew from a burnt-out tank. You can easily find them on the Internet, just be careful: impressionable natures cannot eat and drink for a long time after such pictures.

Just getting out of the flaming tank is a feat. And to return to the tank and continue the battle ... Monuments to such tankers should not be erected from granite. Precious metals.

Forward, under the tanks

How to convey the essence of the feat of our ancestors to the broad masses? And there is a way. You have to feel it. There is an exercise in the army - "running in tanks". It happens like this: you lie down on the ground (a softer option - you jump into the trench). They give you a grenade. Hefty and heavy. And a tank is coming at you. Real. Scary. They ran me around with the old T-55, now there are none. 36 tons, engine 580 horses. Modern ones are heavier and more powerful. But 36 tons is also nothing, it doesn’t work like a child. The earth trembles. The trembling is transmitted to the body, to every cell. Anyone who says it's not scary is lying. Fearfully. But panic is bad for life. When you are already a few meters from the tracks, the driver cannot see you. If you run, you will wind it around the caterpillar.

And then the sun fades: you are under the bottom. Rumble, clods of earth in the face and behind the collar, diesel fumes. As soon as the tank passes - in the stern of it with this grenade ...

Why am I writing this, and what does it have to do with Prokhorovka?

But imagine: a tank is coming at you not to train your mental endurance. And to kill. Spin around, cover with earth, bury alive.

This is a completely different feeling.

By the way, "Tiger" weighed 57 tons.

In the frames of the German photo chronicle of the times of "Citadel" you can see "Tigers", on the sides of which - barbed wire, which served as protection from the Soviet infantry. And many more German tanks covered with zimmerite. It is a mixture of barium and zinc sulfate, sawdust, ocher plus an adhesive base. Zimmerit made the armor of tanks non-magnetic, which saved them from hand mines. It took 100 kg of zimmerite to coat a medium T-4, and 200 kg to a heavy "Tiger".

The mines were laid not by partisans, but by infantry soldiers. They ran to the attacking tanks, and ... Those few who remained alive at the end of the throw - they laid mines.

Today there are "researchers" who, by the method of theoretical reasoning, have come to the conclusion that zimmerite is the stupidity of German engineers. Since, in order to attach such a mine in battle, it was necessary not only to run up to the tank under fire, but also to stand up to its full height. Scary and very dangerous. Who dared to do this? ..

I think the problem is not that several generations have grown up who do not know war. Peace is good, it is right. The problem is that a generation is growing up, whose head does not fit in that there were people capable of such feats.

And they were. Our great ancestors with grenades and mines rushed at such tanks, with which it is scary to even stand next to them.

And as a result - the collapse of the Citadel. Already on August 5, the troops of the Bryansk Front liberated Orel, and the troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod. Fireworks were given in Moscow. And on August 23, ours threw out the Nazis from Kharkov.

Infographics "RG": Leonid Kuleshov

And the Red Army drove the Nazis. Yes, until May 1945 it was still a long way off. Millions will die. But the outcome of the war was clear. At the end of 1943, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt met in Tehran. They discussed not only the opening of a second front, but also the post-war world order.

And about six months after the Battle of Kursk, the Fuhrer summoned Manstein and said that he no longer needed his services. On the grounds that the main mind of the German generals was the master of the offensive. And no offensive is foreseen yet.

It was true. Only - without "bye". Until the very end of World War II, the Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct a single strategic offensive operation.

After the battle: the field near Prokhorovka. According to eyewitnesses, from dust, burning grass and armored vehicles, the day turned into night. An indescribable stench stood over the battlefield, the wounded screamed and groaned, and the burning out tanks exploded.

Infographics "RG": Leonid Kuleshov / Igor Elkov