This section describes the information on the qualitative and numerical composition of naval fleets of states participating in the military actions of the Second World War. In addition, data on the fleets of some countries officially occupied a neutral position, but in fact actually provided to the promotion of topics or other participants in the war. Unfolded or entered into operation after the end of the war, ships were not taken into account. Not taken into account and ships used for military purposes, but were under the civil flag. The vessels transmitted or received from one country (including under Lend-Liza agreements) were not taken into account, as the trophy or recovered ships were not taken into account. Due to a number of reasons, data on dead landing and small ships, as well as boats are given at minimal values \u200b\u200band actually can be significantly more. Also concerns ultra-low submarines. When describing tactical technical characteristics The data on the time of the last modernization or re-equipment was brought.

Describing the warships as a weapon of the war of the sea, it should be noted that the purpose of such war was the struggle for sea communications, as a means for the largest, mass transport. Administration of the opponent is able to use the sea for transport, at the same time widely using it for the same purposes and there is a way to victory in the war. To conquer and use domination at sea, only one powerful navy is not enough for this, for this, there are also large shopping and transport fleets, conveniently located bases and state leadership with marine thinking. Only the totality of all this provides marine power.

To combat the Navy, you have to focus all your strength, to protect the same trade shipping - to divide them. The nature of hostilities on the sea all the time fluctuates between these two poles. It is the nature of hostilities that determines the need for certain warships, in the specifics of their weapons and tactics of use.

By preparation for war, the leading maritime states used different military sea doctrines, but none of them turned out to be effective, correct. And during the war, with the voltage of all forces, it was necessary not only to adjust them, and radically change under the planned military actions.

Thus, the British Navy, based on outdated vehicles of the interwar period, the main emphasis did on large artillery ships. Military fleet Germany formed a mass underwater fleet. The Royal Italian Fleet was built by high-speed lung cruisers and destroyers, as well as small submarines with low technical characteristics. The USSR trying to replace the royal fleet, accelerated the ships of all classes of obsolete samples, based on the doctrine of coastal defense. The basis of the US fleet was heavy artillery ships and outdated destroyers. France has increased its fleet with light artillery ships with limited stroke. In Japan, built battleships and aircraft carriers.

The cardinal changes in the structure of fleets occurred with the mass introduction of radar and hydrocators, as well as the development of means of communication. The use of aircraft identification systems, artillery and anti-aircraft fire management, underwater, surface and air target detection, radio visor also changed the tactics of fleets. Large sea battles went into oblivion, and the war with the vehicle fleet became a priority.

The development of arms (the emergence of new types of deck aircraft, unmanaged missiles, new types of torpedo, min, bombs, etc.) allowed the fleets to carry out independent operational and tactical military operations. The fleet from the auxiliary forces of the ground forces turned into the main shock force. Aviation became an effective means of fighting the fleet of the enemy and the protection of its own.

Considering the course of war in conjunction with technical progress, the development of fleets can be described as follows. In the initial stage of the war, the All-Russian German Navy actually blocked the sea communications of the UK and its allies. To protect them, it took a significant number of antiquity ships, and their equipment with hydrocators, turned underwater boats from target hunters. The need to protect large superwater ships, conmented and ensuring future offensive operations required the mass construction of aircraft carriers. This characterizes the average stage of war. At the final stage, for conducting mass landing operations, both in Europe and in the Pacific occurred is the urgent need for landfill and security vessels.

All these tasks were able to solve only the United States, whose powerful economy over the war years turned allies to debtors for many years, and the country to the ultrasound. It should be noted that the supply of ships under Lend-Liza agreements occurred within the framework of US re-equipment, i.e. Allies passed outdated vessels, with low TTH or without proper equipment. It equally concerned all recipients of help, incl. and the USSR and the UK.

It is necessary to mention that both large ships of the United States and small difference from the courts of all other countries by the presence of comfortable conditions for the crews. If in other countries, in the construction of ships, priority was given to the number of weapons, ammunition, fuel reserves, then American fleets of the crew set in one row with the requirements for the martial qualities of the vessel.

Table continuation

The total number of military fleets of 42 countries (possessing military fleets or at least one ship), who participated in World War II amounted to 16.3 thousand ships, of which they died on not full data of at least 2.6 thousand in addition Fleets included 55.3 thousand small ships, boats and landing vessels, as well as 2.5 thousand submarines, excluding ultra-low submarines.

The five countries having the largest fleets are: USA, Great Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan, who had 90% of warships from a total number, 85% of submarines and 99% of small and landing vessels.

Having large fleets, Italy and France, as well as smaller Norway and the Netherlands, could not effectively dispose of their ships, flooding them part and becoming the main suppliers of trophies to the enemy.

It is possible to determine the importance of species of ships in hostilities only taking into account the steps of war. So at the initial stage of war, underwater boats played, blocking communications of the enemy played the dominant role. In the middle stage of the war, the main role was played by the Esminans and anti-submarine ships, which suppressed the underwater fleets of opponents. At the final stage of the war, aircraft carriers with ships and landing ships were published.

During the period of the war, a trading fleet was surrounded by a tonnage of 34.4 million tons. At the same time, the share of submarines accounted for 64%, aviation - 11%, surface ships - 6%, min - 5%.

Of the total number of across the fooled warships of fleets of approximately 45% of the merit of aviation, 30% - submarines, 19% - the proportion of surface ships.

The content of the really powerful naval forces is burdensome for any economy of the world. Empting huge material resources of the Navy could afford a few countries. The military fleets became rather a policy of politics than an effective force, and having powerful battleships was considered prestigious. But you really had only 13 states in the world. Dreadnuts have: England, Germany, USA, Japan, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Turkey (Turks captured and repaired abandoned by the Germans in 1918 "GEBEN").

After World War I, the desire to chain his own battleships expressed Holland, Portugal and even Poland (with its 40-kilometer coast) and China, but these dreams remained on paper. Only rich hindrustically developed countries could build a battlefield, including Tsarist Russia.

First World War It turned out to be the latter, in which large-scale sea battles occurred between the warring parties, the most large-scale of which was the Battle of the English and German Fleet. With the development of aviation, large ships become becoming and in the future impact force Framed aircraft carrier. Nevertheless, the battleships continued to build and only the Second World War showed the futility of this direction in the military shipbuilding.

After graduating from the First World War in the races of the winning countries, the hull of giant ships was frozen. On the project, for example, french Lyon should have sixteen 340-mm guns. The Japanese laid ships, next to whom English line boss "Hood" It would look like a teenager. Italians completed four superlinkore type "Francesco Koraccholo" (34 500 t, 28 nodes, eight 381-mm cannons).

But the British went on all - their project of linear cruisers of 1921 provided for the creation of monsters with a displacement of 48,000 tons with a speed of 32 nodes and 406-mm cannons. Four cruisers were supported by a four battleship armed with 457-mm implements.

However, the tired war economy of states required not a new arms race, but pauses. Then the diplomats took up for business.

The United States decided to record the ratio of naval forces on the level achieved and forced to go to these other countries of the Entente (Japan had to "persuade" very rigidly). On November 12, 1921, a conference was held in Washington. February 6, 1922, after fierce disputes was signed "Treaty of five powers"who installed the following world realities:

no new buildings for 10 years, except for two battleships for England;

the ratio of fleets between USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy should be 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75;

after a decade pause, no battle can be replaced by a new one if it is under 20 years old;

maximum displacement should be: for lincard - 35,000 tons, for aircraft carriers - 32,000 tons and for a cruiser - 10,000 tons;

the maximum caliber of the guns should be: for linear ships - 406 millimeters, for the cruiser - 203 millimeters.

The Fleet of Great Britain was reduced by 20 dreadnights. Regarding this agreement a famous historian Chris Marshall Posted by: "As a former British Prime Minister A. Belphore could sign such a contract - it is not strongly stacked in my mind!"

Washington Conference Identified the course of the history of military shipbuilding by a quarter of a century and had the most detrimental consequences for him.

First of all, a ten-year pause in construction, and especially the limitation of water displacement, stopped the normal evolution of large ships. In the contracts, create a balanced project of the cruiser or dreadnought was unrealistic. Sacrificed speed-in use well protected, but low-speed ships. Sacrificed protection - descended into water "Cardboard" cruiser. The creation of the ship is the result of the effort of the whole heavy industry, so an artificial restriction on the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the fleet led to the hardest crisis.

In the mid-1930s, when it became obvious new warWashington agreements were denounced (terminated). A new stage began in the construction of heavy ships. Alas, the shipbuilding system was broken. A fifteen-year lack of practice drained the creative thought of designers. As a result, ships were created with serious defects. By the beginning of World War II, fleets of all powers are outdated morally, and most of the ships are physically outdated. Numerous modernization of vessels have not changed the state of affairs.

For all the time of the Washington pause, only two lincars were built - English "Nelson" and "Rodney" (35,000 tons, length - 216.4 m, width - 32.3 m, 23 nodes; booking: belt - 356 mm, towers - 406 mm, cutting - 330mm, deck - 76-160mm, nine 406-mm, twelve 152-mm and six 120-mm cannons). According to the Washington Treaty, Britain managed to overtake himself some advantage: she retained the opportunity to build two new ship. Designers had to break their heads, how to accommodate the maximum combat capacity to the ship with a displacement of 35,000 tons.

First of all, they abandoned high speed. But one engine weight limit was not enough, so the British went on a fundamental change of layout, placing all the artillery of the main caliber in the nose. Such a location made it possible to significantly reduce the length of the armor citadel, but it turned out very powerful. In addition, 356-mm plates were placed with a tilt of 22 degrees inside the housing and were transferred under the outer skin. The slope sharply increased the resistance to armor at large angles of the projectile fall, which takes place when shooting from a long distance. The outer cover broke out from the "Makarovsky" tip from the projectile. The citadel was closed with thick armor deck. From the nose and the sterns installed 229 mm traverts. But outside the battalo, the battleship remained almost unprotected - the classic sample of the "all or nothing" system.

"Nelson" He could not fire the main caliber directly along the stern, but the unstressed sector was limited to 30 degrees. The nasal angles were almost not covered with anti-mining artillery, for all six two-year-old towers with 152-mm cannons occupied the fodder tip. Mechanical installation moved closer to the stern. All ship management focused in a high tower add-on add-on-one innovation. Latest classic dreadnights "Nelson" and "Rodney" Located in 1922, descended into water in 1925, and put into operation in 1927.

Shipbuilding before World War II

Washington contract Restricted the construction of new battleships, but could not stop progress in shipbuilding.

The First World War forced specialists to revise the views on marine operations and on the further technical equipment of warships. Military shipbuilding should have been, on the one hand, use all the production achievements of the modern industry, and on the other by exposing their requirements, encourage industry to work on improving materials, structures, mechanisms and weapons.

Armor

With regard to the manufacture of armored cemented plates of large thickness in post-war period Little improvements were made, since the quality of them almost reached the limit at the beginning of the 20th century. However, it was still possible to improve deck armor, applying special viscous steel. This innovation was especially important due to the increase in the distance of the battle and the appearance of a new threat - aviation. The deck armor in 1914 weighed about 2 thousand tons, and on new links its weight was brought to 8-9 thousand tons. This is due to a significant increase in horizontal protection. Armor decks became two: the main one on the upper edge of the armored belt, and under it - anti-slip. Sometimes the third thin deck is raised above the main one, to break the armor-piercing tip from the shells. We introduced a new type of armor anti-optical (5-20 mm), which was used for the local cover of the personnel from fragments and machine-gun fire with aircraft. In military shipbuilding for building buildings, high carbon steel and electric welding were introduced, which made it possible to significantly reduce the weight.

Armor in its quality remained almost equal to the armor of the First World War, but the caliber of artillery on new ships grew. For onboard armor, there was a simple rule: its thickness should be greater than or approximately equal to the caliber shooting to her guns. I had to increase protection again, but it was no longer impossible to thicken the armor. The overall weight of armor on old linear ships was no more than 10 thousand tons, but on the newest - about 20 thousand! Then they began to make an armored waistly oblique.

Artillery

During the First World War, as in the pre-war years, artillery was rapidly developed. In 1910, in England, the type ships "Orion"armed ten 343-mm cannons. This weapon had a weight of 77.35 tons and produced 635-kg projectile at a distance of 21.7 kilometers. Sailors understood that "Orion" Only the beginning in raising the caliber, and the industry began to work in this direction.

In 1912, the United States goes to 356-mm caliber, at the same time a 14-inch put on their linkers Japan ( Congo) and even Chile ( "Admiral Kohrein"). The gun weighing 85.5 tons and shot 720 kg projectile. In response, the British in 1913 laid five linkers like "Queen Elizabeth"armed with eight 15-inch (381 mm) cannons. These unique ships are deservedly considered the most terrible participants of the First World War. Their main caliber weapon weighed 101.6 tons and sent 879-kg projectile at a speed of 760 m / s per distance of 22.5 kilometers.

Germans who spoiled later than other states managed to build linkers at the very end of the war Bayer and "Baden"Armed with 380-mm implements. The German ships were almost similar to English, but by this time Americans installed on eight 16-inch (406-mm) guns on their new linants. Japan soon goes to such a caliber. Weighing weell 118 tons and fired 1015-kg shell.

But the last word still remained behind the lady of the seas -Added in 1915 a large lightweight cruiser "FuryEs" was intended to install two 457-mm guns. True, in 1917, never entered into operation, the cruiser was converted to an aircraft carrier. The nasal one-refinery tower was replaced with a running deck of 49 meters long. The gun was wearing 150 tons and could send a 27.4 kilometer with a 27.4 kilometer projectile once every 2 minutes. But even this monster was not destined to become the biggest gun in the history of the fleet.

In 1940, the Japanese their superlinkor "Yamato" Armed with nine 460 mm guns installed in three huge towers. The weapon weighing 158 tons, had a length of 23.7 meters and fired with a shell weighing from 1330 before 1630 kilograms (depending on the type). At the angle of elevation of 45 degrees, these 193-centimeter products flew to 42 kilometer, rapidity - 1 shot of 1.5 minutes.

At about the same time, a very successful gun for its last battleships managed to create Americans. Them 406-mm gun 52 Caliber released 1155-kg Startile with speed 900 km / h. When the gun was used as coastal, that is, the limitation of elevation angle disappeared, inevitable in the tower, the shooting range reached 50,5 kilometer.

Similar to the power of the gun were designed in Soviet Union For planned to build linear ships. On July 15, 1938, the first Giant (65,000 tons) was laid in Leningrad, its 406-mmway could throw out thousandklogram shells by 45 kilometers. When, in the fall of 1941, the German troops approached Leningrad, among the first with a distance of 45.6 kilometers they met the shells of an experienced tool - the prototype of the main caliber cannons and not built by the lincard installed on the Sea Research Artillery Polygon.

Ship towers are greatly improved. Firstly, their design allowed to give tools to large elevation angles, which became necessary to increase the range of shots. Secondly, the mechanisms for charging the guns were thoroughly improved, which made it possible to bring the rate of fire to 2- 2.5 shots per minute. Thirdly, the pressing system is improved. In order to properly visit the gun on a moving target, it is necessary to be able to smoothly rotate the towers, weighing more than a thousand tons, at the same time you need to do quite quickly. Before World War II, the highest rotation speed was brought to 5 degrees per second. Anti-mining guns are improved. Their caliber remains the same - sh5-152 mm, but instead of deck installations or the incidents are placed in the towers, it leads to an increase in combat rainformation up to 7-8 shots per minute.

Linear ships began to arm not only to the instruments of the main caliber and the anti-mining (it would be more correct to say-questioned) artillery, but also anti-aircraft guns. As the combat qualities of aviation grew, anti-aircraft artillery increased and multiplied. By the end of the Second World War, the number of trunks reaches 130-150. Anti-aircraft artillery was adopted by two species. First, it is an instrument of universal caliber (100-130 mm), that is, able to fire both by air and for sea purposes. There were 12-20 such guns. They could get a plane at a 12-kilometer height. Secondly, for firing on a quick maneuvering aircraft, low-caliber automatic anti-aircraft tapes were used by a caliber from 40 to 20 millimeters. These systems are usually mounted in multi-rolled circular rotation settings.

Anti-mining defense

Much attention was paid to the designers and the protection of linear ships from the torpedo weapon. In the explosion of several hundred kilograms of the strongest explosives, filling the combat part of the torpedoes, gases with colossal pressure are formed. But the water is not compressed, so the body of the ship receives an instantaneous blow, like a hammer of gases and water. This blow is applied from below, under water, and is dangerous in that the hole immediately breaks great amount water. By the beginning of the First World War it was believed that such a wound is deadly.

The idea of \u200b\u200ban underwater protection device originated in a Russian fleet. At the beginning of the XX century, a young engineer R. R. Svirsky came to the thought of peculiar "Underwater armor" In the form of intermediate cameras separating the explosion place from the vital parts of the ship and weakening the strength of the bulkheads. However, the project was lost at the bureaucratic offices for some time. Subsequently, underwater protection appeared on linear ships.

Four onboard protection systems from a torpedo explosion were developed. The outer covering should be thin, so as not to give massive fragments, there was an expansion chamber - an empty space that gave the possibility of explosive gases to expand and reduce the pressure, then the absorption chamber that took the remaining gas energy. The absorption chamber was put a light bulkhead, formed the filtering compartment, in case the previous bulkhead will pass water.

In the German system of on-board protection, the absorption chamber consisted of two longitudinal bulkheads, and the internal - 50-mm armor. The space between them was filled with coal. English system Conducted to install bulb (convex hemispherical supplies from fine metal on sides), the outer part of which formed the extension chamber, then there was a space filled with cellulose, then two bulkheads-- 37-mm and 19-mm, formed the space, filled with oil and filtration compartment. The American system was distinguished by the fact that there were five waterproof bulkheads behind the fine sheath. The Italian system was based on the fact that a cylindrical tube made of fine steel was covered. The space inside the pipe was filled with oil. The bottom of the ships began to do triple.

Of course, all battleships had fire control systems, allowing automatically to calculate the angles of guns, depending on the range to the target, the speed of their ship and the enemy's ship and the connection to transmit messages from any point of the ocean, as well as delay the enemy's ships.

In addition to the surface fleet, the underwater has developed rapidly. Submarines were significantly cheaper, quickly built and caused serious damage to the enemy. German submariners reached the most impressive success in the Second World War. 5861 Trade ship (taken into account by displacement over 100t.) General tonnage 13 233 672 tons. In addition, they were surpassed 156 warships, including 10 battleships.

To the beginning of the Second World England, Japan and USA were in their arms aircruites. One aircraft carrier had and France. Built his aircraft carrier and GermanyHowever, with a high degree of readiness, the project was frozen and some historicals believe that it was put on his hand chief Luftwaffe Herman Geringwho did not want to get an unemployed deck aircraft.

The beginning of the war, the Baltic Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, the Northern Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, the Pacific Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, post-war combustion

The Soviet fleet before the start of the war with Germany, but during the Second World War took part in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, but it was carried out mainly to artillery duels between the Soviet ships and Finnish coast fortifications.

The beginning of the war.

The death of the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine"

Attacking the USSR in 1941 on June 22, at three o'clock in the morning, the Nazi German Air Forces were first performed by air simulators to the main base of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR Navy in the city of Sevastopol, the airline was also carried out to the city of Izmail.

German aviation, in order to block the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, electromagnetic mines were reset to the main founder base and in the North Bay area.

Farvater - ship speed safe in navigation attitude.

A commemorative event for the story was the order given by the counter-admiral I. D. Eliseyev for 6 minutes of the same day and the same hour - about the opening of fire on opponents, who invaded the airspace of the USSR. It was the first order to repel the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War.

German contact mine in Australian waters during World War II

The air attacks of the Nazis were also subjected to a large number of USSR naval databases. Because of this strategy of Germany, the head of the enemy became the main opponent of the USSR Navy, but air and land.

The fate of the Second World War, as well as in it, as an integral part of the Great Patriotic War, was solved mainly on land, because of what the plans and the actions of the fleet almost completely depended on the interests of the ground forces in the seaside territories. From the personnel of the fleet of sailors along the war, they often sent to land forces. Many auxiliary and transport ships were converted into combat ships, becoming part of the military fleet.

In other words, the situation in this war demanded from fleet of flexibility and non-standardity.

Baltic Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War

From Directive №21 Plan Barbarossa: "In relation to the Soviet Union, the Navy performs the following task: the protection of its own coast, and the prevention of the breakthrough of the enemy naval forces from the Baltic Sea. Since the Russian Baltic Fleet will be lost on the achievement of the German troops of Leningrad and will be in a hopeless situation, large marine operations should be avoided before. After the liquidation of the Russian fleet, the task of full recovery of the message through the Baltic Sea, including the supply of the northern wing of the army, which will need to be secured (min) »

Due to the fact that the enemy managed without interference to mining water in the operational zones of the Soviet fleet, our ships were often walked to the bottom, did not have time to do even shot on the enemy.

Baltets go to the front. Leningrad, October 1, 1941.

On August 28, the main at that time the Baltic Fleet base is Tallinn, this led to the Baltic fleet blockade with minefields in Leningrad and Kronstadt. Despite this, the surface fleet of the USSR in the Baltic Sea also played important role. Ships, although they were limited in movements, but they could freely fire fire on the enemy. During the defense of Leningrad, the ships of the Baltic Fleet actively participated in the air defense of the city, shelling enemy planes with fire of their large-caliber installations.

Thus, the Linor "Marat", which was subjected to the attack of German bombers, as a result of which was actually broken down into two parts, nevertheless, a long time remained in the ranks and led fire on the enemy as a non-intended floating battery.

The underwater fleet in the Baltic Sea acted very successfully: to him, the price of large losses, it was possible to break through the marine blockade and make a great contribution to the destruction of the enemy's marine communications.

The Baltic Fleet also contributed to the land forces in January 1943 during a breakthrough and subsequent removal of the land blockade of Leningrad.

Chernomorsk Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War

As noted above, the high combat readiness of the Black Sea fleet threw the German attempts to deduce its main forces in the first days of the war.

In the course of the war, Romanian, Bulgarian and German naval forces actively acted against the Black Sea Fleet.

The fleet participated in the defense of Sevastopol and Odessa. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet was headed by a Sevastopol defensive area. Defensive detachments were formed from the Black Sea seafarers. The fire of ship guns defended from enemy aviation. The supply of precipitated Odessa was covered with transport ships and warships of the Black Sea Fleet.

Despite the heroic defense as Sevastopol and Odessa, both cities were taken by the Germans.

Defense of Sevastopol. Painting A. A. Deneki.

Aunt barges on the way to landing on Kerch Persh.

The Soviet landing operation in the Kerch Peninsula in 1941-1942 in 1941-1942 was of great importance. This operation began quite successfully, but as a result, the USSR troops were in the environment and were divided.

In 1942-1943, the Black Sea Fleet took part in the Battle of the Caucasus. Submarines of the fleet of Georgian ports Batumi and Poti made 600-mile transitions in order to violate the naval communications of the enemy. Fleet ships and maritime infantry played great importance in the battle for Novorossiysk.

For the entire war, the Black Sea Fleet (without considering the fleets that belonging to it) landed 13 assaults. The most famous and fully successful for the USSR in 1943 were landings in the area of \u200b\u200bSouthern Lakes and Stankers, the defense of "Malaya Land", Novorossiysk and Kerch-Eltigen landing operations, as well as the Konstanz landing.

The Azov Flotilla, which is part of the Black Sea Fleet, participated in the release of ports on the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov.

The ships and the personnel of the Black Sea Fleet participated in 1944 in the liberation of the Crimea, as well as the cities of Nikolaev and Odessa.

Northern Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War

During the war, the tasks of the Northern Fleet included the cover of the seaside flank of the 14th Army from the enemy landings and shelling from the sea, the protection of their marine messages, as well as the application of the enemy's communications, which violated its transportation and deprived initiatives to the sea.

The landing of the landing in the lip is a big western person.

The Northern Fleet also landed the landings and intelligence detachments in the rear of the enemy. A considerable role in the battles in the defense of the Polar region played landing of the landing in the Large Western Persons in 1941 and 1942. During the Soviet offensive in 1944, the fleet landed the landing in the lip of the Small Volokhoka, in the port of Linahamari and in Varanger Fjord.

It should be noted that the ships of the Northern Fleet took a large-scale participation in the emergence and anti-submarine protection of the Arctic conmented allies, who supplied the USSR assistance under the Land Liza program.

The value of the Northern Fleet in the Great Patriotic War is large: the fleet was destroyed over two hundred warships and auxiliary enemy vessels, a large number of enemy transports, there was also a passage of tens of conmented allies, the personnel of the fleet on the land fronts destroyed tens of thousands of people of the live strength of opponents.

Pacific Fleet of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War

Since until August 1945 Soviet Union It did not participate in the war with Japan in the Pacific, part of the vehicles free from military operations and the personnel of the Pacific fleet was transferred through the Northern Sea Path to Other, conducting large-scale military operations of fleets and flotilla.

After the start of hostilities against Japan, during the Manchurian operation in 1945, the Aviation of the Pacific Fleet bombed naval bases, airfields and other various military facilities in Japan in North Korea. The Pacific Fleet was made by the formulation of mine bonds on the approaches to Vladivostok (the main base of the Pacific Fleet) and

Petropalovsk-Kamchatsky, also minimized barriers were delivered in the Tatar Strait. The fleet actively attacked the sea transportation of the enemy, and also contributed to the troops of the Far Eastern Front, conducted by the offensive along the east coast of North Korea.

In August 1945, the Pacific Fleet landed the landings, which captured the ports of Yuki, Rasin and Odezin on the north-east coast of Korea. An operation was also carried out to seize naval bases. From 11 to 25 August, the fleet participated in the South Sakhalin operation, as a result of which all Sakhalin began to belong to the USSR. In parallel from 18 to 25 August, the fleet participated in Kuril amphibian operationAs a result, the USSR troops occupied 56 islands of Kuril Rud (they were part of the USSR in 1946). Airsiants were also carried out in Port Arthur and Far, which ended with success for Soviet troops.

Soviet and American sailors celebrate Japan's surrender. Alaska, 1945.

The Second World War was completed on September 2, 1945 by the surrender of Japan in front of the Allies, however, the world between the USSR and Japan was signed and was not signed. The state of war ceased only in connection with the signing of the joint declaration of the Soviet Union Socialist Republics and Japan October 19, 1956

Post-war fighting

After the war in the seas, rivers and lakes, a huge number of mines remained, which strongly threatened the safety of shipping. Because of this, the sailors continued to carry heavy military service Having been trained in the war of the war of mine barrage. The largest number of mines was concentrated in the Baltic, Barents and Black Seas, as well as in the area of \u200b\u200bNovocel Straitov.

For example, in the Finnish bay by the naval forces of both commercial parties during the war years, about 67 thousand mine installations of various types were established.

Large-scale trawling mines ended only by 1953, when almost complete safety of shipping in all seas, rivers and lakes was provided. But, nevertheless, some mines stayed there to this day. Thus, about 150 thousand mines were established in the Baltic Sea for different estimates. Of these, for the period up to 1953, it was neutralized and only about 50 thousand trawling mines - really, not on such a scale, as it was after the war, continues now.

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Italian fleet in World War II

Italian fleet on the eve of war

Preparation

During the international crisis, which broke out with the beginning of the Ethiopian campaign in the spring of 1935, the Italian fleet for the first time since the First World War was unmobilized. After completing the operation in Ethiopia, many auxiliary services The fleet was reduced, but at the end of 1936 the fleet remained mobilized. Civil War in Spain, various international crises and finally the occupation of Albania - all this forced to keep the fleet in a state of combat readiness.

Such events, of course, have adversely affected the preparation for the future world conflict. The permanent readiness of the ships led to the wear of the mechanisms and the maliciousness of the crew, prevented prospective planning. Moreover, the Italian government notified the armed forces that the beginning of the war is assumed not earlier than 1942. This was confirmed during the signing of the Axis Agreement between Italy and Germany. The fleet made up its plans on the basis of this date.

On June 10, 1940, when military actions were to start, many of the components of what is called "War willingness" have not yet been completed. For example, initial plans provided for building 4 new powerful linkers and finish the full modernization of 4 olds by 1942. Such a nucleus of the fleet would force himself to respect any opponent. In June 1940, there was only "Cavour" and "Cesare". "Littorio", "Vittorio Veneto", "Duilio" and "Doria" still completed equipment on shipyards. To finish the completion of the Roma lincard, 2 years was required, for the completion of "impero" - at least 3 (in reality Roma was completed in the spring of 1943, the work on the "impero" was never completed). Premature start of hostilities found in building 12 light cruisers, many destroyers, escort ships, submarines and small vessels. The beginning of the war delayed their completion and equipment.

In addition, the added 2 years would eliminate the shortcomings in the technical equipment and training of crews. This is especially true for night actions, torpedo shooting, radar and asdic. The absence of a radar was stronger for the combat capability of Italian ships. Enemy ships and aircraft impunity attacked Italian ships at night when they were practically blind. Therefore, the enemy has developed new tactical techniques to which the Italian fleet was completely not ready.

The technical principles of the radar and asdica were known to the Italian fleet since 1936. But the war interrupted scientific works on these weapons systems. To bring them to practical application, expensive industrial designs were required, especially for the radar. It is doubtful that the Italian Fleet and the industry manage to achieve significant results, even having the same 2 years. Nevertheless, the enemy would lose the advantage of the surprises of their use. By the end of the war, it was possible to build only a few aircraft radars, and then, rather experimental installations.

During the war, the Italian fleet was expensive for these and other small disadvantages, which often prevented the use of a favorable situation. Nevertheless, the Italian fleet was well prepared for war and fully justified the funds invested in it.

The preparatory measures of the fleet included the accumulation of all sorts of surpluses, and when the war began, reserves of many types of supply were allowed to satisfy any requirements. For example, shipbuilding shipyards worked without delays the entire war and even after a truce almost exclusively on pre-war reserves. The increasing demands of the Libyan front forced the fleet to convert some ports - in addition not one time - and sometimes unexpected tasks resorting only to their own reserves. Sometimes the fleet served asking and other types of armed forces.

The supply of fuel was completely insufficient, and we will see later that this problem became sharp. In June 1940, the fleet had only 1800,000 tons of oil collected literally around. At that time it was assumed that the monthly expense during the war would be 200,000 tons. This meant that the fleet is enough for only 9 months of war. Mussolini, however, believed that this was more than enough for the "three-month war." In his opinion, military actions could not delay longer. Based on such an assumption, he even forced the fleet to convey a part of stocks - only 300,000 tons - the Air Force and the Civil Industry after the start of the war. Therefore, during the war, the fleet was forced to limit the movement of ships to reduce oil consumption. In the first quarter of 1943 he had to be cut off to a ridiculous digit of 24,000 tons per month. Compared with the initial estimate - 200,000 tons as a necessary minimum, it is easy to understand what influence it has been on operations.

All these flaws bated the magnificent spirit of officers and sailors. During all 39 months of fierce battles before signing ITALY, the truce personnel of the Italian fleet has repeatedly showed samples of mass and individual heroism. Following its traditions, the fleet resisted the plantation of fascist political views. It was hard to force himself to hate Britain, whose fleet was always considered a natural ally.

But when the lot was thrown, the fleet, driven by a sense of duty, began a battle, straining all his strength. He was opposed to powerful opponents, but he endured the test of fire with honor and courage.

Opposition of Fleet Unleashing War and its initial plans

At the beginning of 1940, suspicion that Italy would enter the war, already twist in the air. However, Mussolini has not yet spoke specifically to the headquarters of the three types of armed forces, which intends to intervene in the conflict. In the first months of this fateful year, the government to support exports, forced the fleet to sell Sweden 2 destroyers and 2 destroyers. This fact was completely naturally understood by the fleet as a sign of the reluctance of the government to enter into war, at least in the near future. But a few days after the visit, the vision of Ribbentrop to Mussolini in March 1940, followed by the visit of Samner Wellles, the actual attitude of the government to the war began to clearly clear. Before the headquarters, this decision was brought on April 6, 1940.

On this day, Marshal Badolo - Head of the General Staff - convened a meeting of the three headquarters of the headquarters of the Armed Forces and told them about the "solid solution to intervene to intervene at that time and in the place he would choose. Badolo said that the war on land will be kept in a defensive vein, and in the offensive - on the sea and in the air. Two days later, on April 11, the head of the Navy Admiral Kavanyari expressed his attitude to this statement in writing. Among other things, he noted the difficulty of such events due to the superiority of the enemy in the forces and the unfavorable strategic situation. This made the impossible offensive maritime war. In addition, the British fleet could quickly fill! " Any loss. Kavanyari said that for the Italian fleet it is impossible, and soon it will be in a critical situation. Admiral warned that it would be impossible to achieve initial surprise, and that the operation was impossible against enemy shipping in the Mediterranean, as it was already discontinued.

Admiral Kavanyari also wrote: "Since there is no way to solve strategic tasks Or the defeat by the enemy sea forces, the entry into the war on our initiative is not justified. We will be able to lead only defensive operations. " Indeed, history does not know the examples so that the country unleascing the war immediately passed to defense.

Showing the non-benefit of the situation in which the fleet will be due to inadequate aircraft support, Admiral Kavanyari completed his memorandum with such prophetic words: "Whatever nature has taken the development of war on the Mediterranean, ultimately our losses on the sea will be heavy. When peaceful negotiations begin, Italy may well find himself not only without territorial acquisitions, but also without a fleet and, possibly, without aviation. " These words were not only prophetic, they expressed the point of view of the Italian fleet. All predictions made by Admiral Kavanyari in his letter were fully justified, with the exception of one. By the end of the war, Italy was left without an army and aviation destroyed by powerful opponents, but still possessed a rather strong fleet.

Mussolini, fearing that the world will return to Europe earlier than Italy will tell his word, did not pay attention to these caution. Moreover, he simply shall them, leaning her confidence that hostilities would be very short - no more than three months. However, the Italian fleet was preparing for war on the basis of operational plans, which more than previously expressed. They can be briefly set out like this: keep sea forces focused to obtain maximum defensive and offensive power; As a result, not to participate in the protection of trade shipping except for special rare cases; Leave the idea of \u200b\u200bsupplying Libya because of the original strategic situation. Having France with his enemy, it was considered impossible to conduct ships through the Mediterranean Sea.

Mussolini did not mind these concepts. He assumed that the conflict would not delay, and therefore coastal shipping can be reduced, and Libya will last six months in the reserves that are collected there. It turned out that all the assumptions of Mussolini are incorrect. The Italian fleet discovered that he was forced to do what was not going to do at all. Exactly 3 days after the beginning of the war in Rome from Libya, the requirement came to urgently deliver the necessary supply. And these requirements that increased with the threatening speed had to be performed, of course, the fleet.

On June 16, 1940, the submarine Zoea began loading ammunition for delivery to Tobruk. Due to the proximity of the base to the front line and its removal from other Italian bases, the command did not want to send transport there, even accompanied by escort. Submarine came out at sea on June 19th. It was the first one of countless in Africa.

These operations carried out under pressure from circumstances became the main occupation of the Italian fleet, although not the most beloved. They led to a serious spraying of forces. On June 20, the Flotilla of the destroyers led by the "Artillery" came out of Augusta in Benghazi to transport anti-tank guns and artilleryrs. After 5 days, the first guarded convoy came out of Naples in Tripoli, carrying various goods and 1727 soldiers. On the same day, the Bragadine submarine was published in the sea with a cargo of materials for Tripoli Airport. These few examples clearly show how the "self-acquisition" of Libya was provided. Head of the General Staff Marshal Badolo, demanding from Admiral Kavanyari sending to Libya's first 3 or 4 convoys, every time it was firmly assumed that "this happens for the last time."

Confidence that the war will end in 3 months, soon disappeared. Mussolini was misled by the statements of Hitler's propaganda about landing in England. In fact, at the end of August 1940, the Italian Supreme Command, on the basis of information received from Berlin, had to give an order to prepare for a protracted war, which would last for several years.

Unfortunately for the Italian fleet, the prerequisites, on which his operational planning was based, were fundamentally incorrect. Nevertheless, the fleet stubbornly fought long 39 months in the hardests - and sometimes hopeless - conditions and caused heavy losses to a mighty opponent. Despite the bloody tests, Italian sailors, from Admiral to the last sailor, always stored loyalty to debt, spirit of self-sacrifice and unchanged courage. Their devotion was simply wonderful, since it was a consequence of not blind obedience, but the manifestation of conscious will, which was confirmed at each stage of struggle.

At the beginning of the war, the core of the Italian fleet consisted of 2 old, but modernized battleships and 19 cruisers. The British and the French had 11 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers and 23 cruisers deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. And without that the huge superiority of the allies became just overwhelming, if we take into account their strength outside the Mediterranean theater, which could be used as reinforcements and to replenish losses. Roughly speaking, Italy had a military fleet with a total displacement of about 690,000 tons, and the opponent is four times more.

It is important to consider the dislocation of fleets of warring parties. The Anglo-French forces were based in Toulon, Gibraltar, Bizert and Alexandria. At this time there were no ships in Malta. Italian ships were mostly shared between Naples and Taranto, several cruisers were based on the Sicilli ports. These forces could be united using the Messinsky Strait, although they were dangerous attacks, passing it. In the northern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea, only a few submarines and compounds of torpedo boats for coastal defense were based.

The Adriatic was the inner sea, the strategic cover of which was carried out from Taranto. Tobruk was a nosed-nipped native near the enemy lines, so the gaps were based only by light patrol ships. Dodecanese Islands and their main base on Leros were actually blocked, since the Greek waters could not be considered neutral. Only patrol and sabotage compounds could be based here. Massawa base in the Red Sea, where there was a group of outdated destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats, was completely isolated from the very beginning of the war and had a limited meaning.

Therefore, it can be said that the dislocation of the Italian fleet corresponded to the geographical factor. The main forces were in the center Mediterranean Sea, and the rest - in a number of peripheral points. The situation at the beginning of the war did not foreteen immediate collisions, unless both opposing fleets do not take obviously aggressive positions. The Italian fleet could not do this and, as it was shown earlier, did not even intend. However, as the opponent said, his fleet will lead offensive war, especially the connection to which Admiral Sir Andrew Brown Canningham commanded.

Decisive air support factor

Another major issue for the Italian fleet is a styled: how much can it rely on cooperation with aviation? She had to solve three tasks: to conduct intelligence; cover your ships; Apply strikes on enemy. The four largest fleets of the world after the First World War studied this problem and concluded that they absolutely need to have aircraft carriers and their own specialized aviation parts.

The Italian fleet also created his aviation during the First World War, and she worked well then. After the war, the fleet was engaged in solving complex problems of the interaction of ships and aircraft, which, as expected, will inevitably arise in the future. But after the creation in 1923, the Italian Air Force Flota ordered to stop all the work in the field of aviation due to radical discrepancies in the views between it and the Air Force. Mussolini and Air Force overcame supporters of the creation of marine aviation. For the dead and his supporters from the Air Force Italian Peninsula was a huge aircraft carrier in the center of the Mediterranean Sea. They adhered to the opinions that aircraft Air Force, acting from the coastal bases, will be excellent with any tasks of the sea war. Therefore, every fleet offer to build an aircraft carrier and create its own specialized air units met in bayonets. However, it should be noted that the head of the Navy headquarters in 1938 gave Mussolini to convince himself in the necessarity of the construction of aircraft carriers. But in 1941, Mussolini himself realized his mistake and gave an order to re-equip two large liners in aircraft carriers.

The only compromise achieved in this dispute was the issue of airflow. As a result, the so-called "Aviation for Fleet" was created. In reality, "compromise" did not give a fleet. He received operational control over the intelligence aircraft and he was allowed to send their observers on them. Despite all the clumsiness of a similar scheme, it was still possible to accept, if it was possible to achieve mutual understanding between the Navy and the Air Force. However, the pilots greatly exaggerated their capabilities, and therefore the fleet never managed to achieve serious attention to the problems of the interaction of ships and aircraft. The Air Force founded their doctrines at the postulate "Independent Air War according to its own laws." These laws fleet never managed to understand.

For these reasons, at the beginning of the war, when Italian aviation was more numerous than the enemy, effective cooperation of the fleet and aviation could not achieve. However, such cooperation was absolutely necessary for normal maritime operations. Italian aviation fought with a huge energy, not paying attention to the actions of the fleet. As a result, such a lack of coordination limited the successes of the operations on the sea as the fleet and aviation.

At the opponent, the British fleet from the very beginning controlled his own aviation units. Although they were not too much, they were well trained with joint actions with ships, and the combined operations were held with the most closely interaction of participants. Under such conditions, it is quite clear why the Italian fleet could not carry out many operations that simply suggested.

The result of such restrictions can be seen in the history of the creation and use of torpedo aircraft. The idea of \u200b\u200bsuch an airplane in the fleet arose at the very dawn of aviation - in 1913. The first attempts to realize it were undertaken in 1918, and by 1922 it was possible to achieve some success. There were great hopes for new weapons. With almost his very birth, as an independent type of Armed Forces of the Air Force categorically rejected this idea. The Air Force was able to prevent a fleet to carry out their own experiments. In 1938, the information was obtained that the British fleet was intensively working to create a torpedo aircraft, and the Italian fleet again tried to overcome the resistance of the Air Force. He wanted to revive the divisions of Torpedon's aircraft. In vain. By the beginning of the war there was not even a hint of solving this problem.

It should be mentioned that the Italian fleet created an airlinator, superior in its characteristics of English. It could be discarded from a height of 100 meters at a speed of 300 km / h - compared with 20 meters and 250 km / h for the English aircraft sent. The fleet created some stock of these torpedoes, which were used by the torpedo boats. When the Air Force in the midst of war, they decided to adopt airplanes-torpedoes, they encountered the problem of creating weapons for them already solved by the fleet. Therefore, the fleet passed the Air Force a large number of torpedoes and personnel for their service.

During the war, the Air Force was titanic efforts to improve the overall situation, including their relationship with the fleet. However, the creation of the doctrine of combined operations and receipt practical experience For successful management of this kind of hostilities required many years of work. Of course, during the war, grinding people and techniques, the possibilities of catching did not remain left. Therefore, in terms of air support, the Italian fleet for the whole of the war seriously inferior to his opponents.

Supermarina

Before the beginning of the chronological description of the events of the war, the device should be followed by the device of the Supreme Operational Command of the Fleet, which was responsible for carrying out Morse operations. This headquarters is known as supermarine.

The current state of communications and military art makes absolutely necessary concentration in the same structure located on the shore in a well-protected headquarters, fertility of the collection and coordination of information about marine operations. This requirement is particularly significantly in actions in such a relatively narrow water area as the Mediterranean Sea. Only such a command organization can properly coordinate the disposition of all available military. Therefore, the Italian supermarine had headquarters in the Ministry of Navy until Rome was declared an open city. Later, her headquarters was relocated to a huge underground radio communications center on a rose on Cassia visas.

In a large and complex organization of this kind, naval groups themselves make up only a small part, although on the example of Italians it can be seen that these are the most important figures on the chessboard of the marine war. Such a system leads to the fact that the admiral, who previously commanded the fleet at each step, is split. One part of it becomes a strategist, who studies and plans the preliminary phase of the battle and leads the deployment of forces from the permanent central headquarters on the shore. And the second part is a tactic that commands the fleet directly in battle.

In the case of supermarin, this system, as any creation of human hands, had a number of shortcomings. The most important thing apparently was the desire to centralize the management stronger than it was really required.

The second serious disadvantage was that the commanders on the shore, as well as the commanders of the compounds in the sea, constantly felt: behind the invisible presence of supermarines, sometimes preferred to expect orders or even demand instructions, although they could well, and sometimes they should have been able to act independently . However, as the author himself could notice himself, the supermarine was more likely to refrain from interference than in cases where she took guidance on herself. Trying not to associate the freedom of action of the highest commander in the sea during the deployment phase of the forces and the battle. Supermarar often did not transmit directives that needed to convey, according to their own estimates, or those that were dictated by a more complete visibility of the situation. A retrospective study of these battles shows that the corresponding directive could lead to more successful results.

Another defect of Italian team structures was the hierarchical organization of supermarines. At the top stood the head of the Navy headquarters, he is also the deputy naval minister, because of this strongly loaded by the affairs of the ministry. As a result, in practice, the operational leadership of the supermarin was in the hands of the deputy head of the headquarters, which was often the only person familiar with all the details of the current situation, but whose activity and the initiative were limited. His situation became more complicated by the fact that only his boss personally discussed all the operational problems with Mussolini, who was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and with the Italian Supreme Command. As mentioned above, the headquarters of the Navy did not always know the nuances of the situation to convince the Supreme Command to take the point of view of the fleet. The state of affairs became even more deplorable, since the Italian Supreme Command itself, weakly understood the strategic and technical problems of the maritime war, which was carried out on the Mediterranean.

Head of the German Abvert Admiral Kanaris, a smart and well-informed observer, said Marshal Rommel: "The Italian fleet is mainly high Qualitythat will allow him to resist the best fleets of the world. However, his supreme command is not enough decisiveness. But, most likely, this is the result of what he has to act under the leadership of the Italian Supreme Command, which is controlled by the army. "

The work of various departments was in the functioning of the supermarin as a whole. The most important of them was the so-called operational center. Through it passed all the reports, he gave all the special and extraordinary orders. With the help of big wall card files, the operational center tracked the location of all ships, its own and enemy, in the sea and in ports. The operational center was the point from which the fleet was managed in general and all Italian ships, ranging from battleships and ending with the last tug. This nerve center of the Italian fleet continuously functioned from June 1, 1940, when the supermarine began to operate, and until September 12, 1943, when the head of the Maritime General Headquarters, arriving after signing the truce in Brindisi, took the command of the fleet there.

In general, the supermarine was a highly efficient organization, and its operational center was quite satisfactory with his duties during the whole war. The rest of the supermarines in general lacked the imagination to find that witty solution among thousands of options, which will be the key to success. This weakness was not a disadvantage of individual supermarin officers. Rather, she was a consequence of their overload of the stationery, which did not leave them time to develop and clear the formulation of "operational ideas". It was especially true for officers who held the highest posts.

The work of the supermarin was closely connected and depended on the functioning of communication systems, whose role is so great in all regions of the modern war. Italian fleet from the very beginning paid maximum attention to all types of communication. After all, the first experiments of Marconi on radio at sea were done by the Italian fleet. At the beginning of the war, the fleet had its own branched and highly efficient communication network, which was included in the telephone, radio and telegraph. The complex "nervous system" had its own center at the headquarters of the supermarine. In addition to her, there was a separate secret telephone network that binding all the fleet headquarters of Pa Peninsula and in Sicily. From the supermarin it was possible to contact flagship ships when they were in Spices, Naples or Taranto. This way it was possible to transfer the most secret and urgent messages directly by phone from the operational center without outside interference. When you remember millions of telephone, radio and telegraph messages transmitted during the war years of the fleet communication networks, it is easy to evaluate the effectiveness of their work. Until September 8, 1943, the Roman Center only registered more than 30,000,000 messages.

This communication system used various ciphers whose secrecy was especially important. It was followed by at any cost. In general, this service operated very well, especially when you imagine a huge amount of work done and a large number of ciphers used. The Italian fleet also created a highly efficient radio service and decryption service. This department worked in strict secrecy, and even today it cannot be told about him. The cryptographic service, headed by a small group of talented officers, has done a huge and extremely useful work during the war. For example, the immediate decoding of British intelligence reports was of great importance and helped the fleet to some extent to compensate for the shortcomings of their own intelligence, as it allowed supermarine to use the work of the enemy intelligence service.