Tsushima battle
Goodbye, comrades, with God - hurray!
The boiling sea below us.
We didn’t think yesterday,
That today we will die under the waves.
Neither the stone nor the cross will tell where they lay
To the glory of the Russian flag ...

The day came May 14, the squadron (The squadron on the eve of the battle: squadron battleships "Prince Suvorov" (flag of Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvensky, commander captain 1st rank Ignatius), "Emperor Alexander III" (captain 1st rank Bukhvostov), ​​"Borodino" (captain 1st rank Serebrennikov), "Eagle" (Captain 1st Rank Jung), "Oslyabya" (flag of the deceased Rear Admiral Felkersam, Captain 1st Rank Beer), "Sisoy the Great" (Captain 1st Rank Ozerov), "Nicholas I" (flag of Rear Admiral Nebogatova, captain 1st rank Smirnov); coastal defense battleships: "General-Admiral Apraksin" (captain 1st rank Lishin), "Admiral Senyavin" (captain 1st rank Grigoriev), "Admiral Ushakov" (captain 1st rank Miklouho-Maclay); armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" (1st rank captain Rodionov 1st); cruiser "Oleg" (flag of Rear Admiral Enquist, 1st rank captain Dobrotvorsky), "Aurora" (1st rank captain Egoriev), "Dmitry Donskoy" (1st rank captain Lebedev), "Vladimir Monomakh" (captain 1st rank Popov), "Svetlana" (captain 1st rank Shein), "Emerald" (captain 2nd rank and Ferzen), "Pearl" (captain 2nd rank Levitsky), "Almaz" (captain 2nd rank Chagin); auxiliary cruiser "Ural" (captain of the 2nd rank Panferov); destroyers: 1st Detachment - "Bedovy" (Captain 2nd Rank Baranov), "Bystry" (Lieutenant Richter), "Buyny" (Captain 2nd Rank Kolomeitsev), "Bravy" (Lieutenant Durnovo); 2nd detachment - "Loud" (captain 2nd rank Kern), "Terrible" (captain 2nd rank Andrzheevsky), "Brilliant" (captain 2nd rank Shamov), "Impeccable" (captain 2nd rank Matusevich), "Vigorous" (captain 2 ranks Ivanov); transports "Anadyr" (captain 2nd rank Ponomarev), "Irtysh" (captain 2nd rank Ergomyshev), "Kamchatka" (captain 2nd rank Stepanov), "Korea" (captain Bakanov), tugboats "Rus" and "Svir" (ensign Fleet Rosenfeld) and the hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma"), divided into two columns, went in a nine-knot course along the northeast course of 50 °, heading to the Tsushima Strait. Its structure was the same as the day before. The right column was headed by the battleship "Suvorov" under the flag of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, the left - the battleship "Nikolai I" under the flag of Rear Admiral Nebogatov. Between which was a detachment of transports, with the 1st and 2nd destroyer detachments in guard on both sides. Ahead of them were the reconnaissance cruisers "Svetlana", "Almaz" and "Ural" moving in a wedge formation. Behind the squadron were both hospital ships.
About seven o'clock on the right side, smoking with two chimneys, another ship appeared, going on an approaching course. When the distance to it was reduced to fifty cables, the light enemy cruiser "Izumi" was identified in it. For an hour he walked with Ekadra in one course. By radio, transmitting reports to Admiral Togo, informing him of which ships the squadron consists of, where it is, at what speed and what course it is going, how the squadron is built. Admiral Rozhdestvensky gave a signal to the ships of the right column to aim the guns on the starboard side and aft towers on the Izumi. But they only limited themselves to taking him at gunpoint. At ten o'clock to the left, ahead of the traverse, at a distance of about six cables, four enemy ships appeared: Hasidate, Matsushima, Itsukushima (one-pipe) and Chin-Yen (two-pipe). These were battleships of the second class, old, with low speed, with a displacement of four to seven thousand tons. A combat alarm was sounded on our ships. The guns on the port side and the twelve-inch bow towers were directed at the enemy detachment. But Admiral Rozhestvensky again refrained from decisive action. Gradually, the enemy battleships v moved away from the squadron so much that they barely became visible.
Now, on the same left side, four more light and high-speed cruisers appeared to replace them. They were identified as "Chitose", "Kassagi", "Niitaka" and "Otava". The four cruisers, like the previous ships, went on the same course, gradually approaching the squadron. They also had the duty to notify their commander of the movement of our fleet. The auxiliary cruiser Ural had an improved wireless telegraph apparatus capable of receiving and sending telegrams over a distance of up to seven hundred miles. With the help of such a device, it was possible to interrupt the reports of Japanese cruisers. From the "Ural" on the semaphore they asked for permission from Rozhestvensky. But he answered:
“Don't stop the Japanese from wiring.
In the "Ural" they were forced to abandon their very reasonable intention.
Despite the fact that enemy forces were gathering from all sides, the Suvorov squadron was informed that today is the greatest holiday, the day of the coronation of their imperial majesties. On the ships, the teams were gathered for a festive prayer service. By this time, the squadron had reorganized in a new way. The first and second armored detachments, increasing their speed, overtook the left column and took it into their wake. The transports kept to the right, at the tail of the squadron, outside the battle line, under the cover of the cruisers. There were also five destroyers of the second detachment. "Vladimir Monomakh" was ordered to go to the right side of the transports to protect them from the "Izumi". The light cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud, playing the role of rehearsal ships, also switched to the right and, together with four destroyers of the first detachment, kept close to the wake column of the newest battleships. Thus, the marching system has changed in combat.
Prior to that, the squadron had been marching for two whole hours in full view of enemy reconnaissance ships. And none of us knew where the enemy was with his main forces. He could be far away, he could be close, and then he would have to rebuild under enemy fire from a marching row to a combat one. Four enemy cruisers continued to go on the left, in full view of the Russian squadron. The distance to them was reduced to forty cables. These cruisers were at the sight of our guns all the time. Many worried why the commander did not give the order to open fire. Suddenly from the battleship "Eagle", from the left middle six-inch tower, a shot was heard, made by accident by the gunner. Everyone shuddered. The shell roared off as intended and fell near the bow of the second Japanese ship. On other ships, realizing our shot for the beginning of the battle, they opened fire. The enemy began to shoot back. Its shells fell perfectly, they exploded from falling into the sea and, together with the fountain of water, raised clouds of black smoke. Obviously, such shells were intended specifically for zeroing.
However, not yet having sufficient forces, the Japanese were forced to retreat and turned sharply to the left. The fight lasted about ten minutes without a single hit from one side to the other. The signal was raised on the Suvorov.
- "Do not throw shells for nothing"
For some time the coming fog hid the Japanese reconnaissance ships from us. The commander, obviously wanting to take advantage of this, began to rebuild his battleships in some new order. Why, for what purpose - no one knew.
At the signal of the commander, the first and second armored detachments were to, increasing the course to eleven knots, turn sequentially to the right by eight points. This order was carried out as follows: first, the flagship turned to the right at a right angle, and then, reaching the place of its turn, the "Alexander", "Borodino" and "Oryol" did the same. In other words, all these ships, making a turn sequentially, followed the lead stream. At this time, Japanese scouts again appeared from the darkness. In order not to reveal his plan in front of them, Rozhdestvensky canceled his first order in relation to the second detachment, and this detachment continued to follow the wake column. Many of the officers believed that the four best battleships would be deployed to the front line by turning "all of a sudden" to the left. But this did not happen. When these ships formed a right angle with the rest of the squadron, the commander gave the order:
"Turn the first armored detachment sequentially eight points to the left."
There was confusion. "Alexander" went into the wake of "Suvorov", and "Borodino", not understanding the signal, made a turn to the left simultaneously with the flagship. In the end, the first detachment lined up in a wake column. This column, moving forward and forming a ledge, went separately from the rest of the squadron on a parallel course with it. Again the squadron was in two columns, of which the right was led by "Suvorov", the left - by "Oslyabya". The distance between these two parallel columns was thirteen cables. At 13:25 on the right along the course, the main forces of the Japanese began to loom vaguely on the horizon. The battleship "Mikasa" was the lead under the flag of Admiral Togo. It was followed by the battleships Sikishima, Fuji, Asahi and the armored cruisers Kassuga and Nissin. Following these ships came six more armored cruisers: "Izumo" under the flag of Admiral Kamimura, "Yakumo", "Asama", "Azuma", "Tokiwa" and "Iwate". The enemy squadron crossed the course of the Russian squadron from right to left. It was striking that all the enemy ships, like the reconnaissance ships that had appeared before, were painted olive-gray and therefore merged magnificently with the surface of the sea, while the Russian ships were black with yellow pipes. As if on purpose they made them so that they stood out as clearly as possible on the gray sea surface. The Russian squadron, as before, marched in two columns in the right column "Suvorov", "Alexander III", "Borodino", "Orel", in the left column all the other ships and vessels, the battleship "Oslyabya" headed the column. Such a formation turned out to be unprofitable for the Russian squadron. Admiral Rozhestvensky decided to take the second line of ships into his wake, but for this he had to move thirteen cables to the left. There was too little time for reflection. At 13 hours 40 minutes "Suvorov" turned four points to the left. The other three battleships of the first detachment began to turn sequentially behind him. But this rebuilding, performed near the enemy, in front of his eyes, only led the squadron into complete confusion.
The first detachment, heading diagonally to the line of the left column, increased in comparison with the last one by only two knots. However, at such a speed it was impossible to have time to advance in time and take their place at the head of the squadron. Only "Suvorov" and "Alexander III" managed to achieve the intended goal. But, having come to the line of the left column and turning to the previous course northeast 23 °, they immediately slowed down and did not think that two more battleships, Borodino and Oryol, were following them. The latter, in order not to fit into the leading ships, also reduced the speed to nine knots. A mess began: the second and third detachments, not warned in advance by the commander about reducing the speed, continued to push: "Borodino" and "Eagle", who did not have time to take their place in the wake column, were under pain of being out of order. Then, in order to let them go ahead, the battleship "Oslyabya", leading the left column, was first forced to reduce the speed to the smallest, and then, fearing to collide with the "Eagle", completely stopped the car and as a sign of this raised black balls on the lower yard of its foresail - masts. What remained to do to the rest of the ships following the Oslyabey? They reduced their speed and went out of order - some to the right, others to the left. The squadron was partially confused, crowded, representing a grandiose target.
At this time, the enemy battleship "Mikasa", leading its squadron, was approximately at a distance of about forty cables. The impression was that the Japanese, diverging from our ships in counter-courses, wanted to attack the rearguard. But "Mikasa" unexpectedly turned in the direction of the Russian squadron, and then, continuing to describe the circulation, lay down almost on the opposite course and went with it in the same direction. Following the movement of the flagship, other enemy ships began a sequential turn. They did it well. However, there was a great risk in this maneuver. The wake formation of the enemy squadron, forming a loop, doubled for a while.
It seemed that fate smiled once at Rozhdestvensky. The opportunity presented itself to at least partially wash away their shameful mistakes. The Japanese squadron described the loop for fifteen minutes. During this time, the four best battleships of the first detachment and "Oslyabya" from the second detachment, if they had rushed in front of the enemy's head with all their swiftness, would have managed to approach him almost closely, as they say, on a pistol shot. What an extremely bad situation the admiral of Togo would have been in! Once the maneuver he had begun could not be stopped until it was completed. Otherwise, his squadron would have huddled together. At the same time, his ships, which were on the back line of the loop, could not have fired through the front line. But Rozhestvensky did not use the opportunity, if not to defeat the enemy, then at least inflict sensitive damage on him, the Russian squadron with the commander was unlucky, the signal “Hit the head” went up on the “Suvorov”. Another minute passed before Admiral Togo made a full sixteen-point turn on his battleship Mikasa. The shot rang out at him from thirty-two cables. The shell made its flight. Our other ships also opened fire. But the effect of concentrating artillery fire was immediately negative. Bursts of shells from different ships were confused - each other. Near "Mikas" the sea boiled from the rising columns of water. But not a single ship could distinguish its own bursts from those of others and had no opportunity to adjust its fire.
The enemy began to answer two minutes later. And it was immediately revealed how great the advantage of his squadron was thanks to its training. One ship led the zeroing, and then gave the signal the distance to the rest. And only after that a series of volleys followed, giving a large percentage of hits. A whirlwind of shells covered the target.
At first, "Suvorov" received blows only from the battleship "Mikasa". But as the Japanese ships, making a turn, lay down on a reverse parallel course, in other words, every minute or one and a half, other ships began to bombard it with shells: "Fuji", "Sikishima", "Asahi", "Kassuga" and Nissin.
Soon six Japanese cruisers concentrated their fire on the battleship Oslyabya, and the Suvorov became the main target of their four strongest battleships and two armored cruisers. Hitting it was like a solid hail of steel. The shells were high-explosive. During explosions, scattering into thousands of small fragments, they gave huge flashes of fire and puffs of black or bright yellow suffocating smoke. And everything that could burn, even paint on iron, immediately ignited. The volleys of their guns, the explosions of enemy shells and the clang of destructible iron mixed into a continuous roar, shaking the ship from keel to klotik.
Small fragments, chips, smoke, splashes of water fell into the conning tower on the Suvorov through the gaps. And outside, obscuring everything around, a wall of flame, smoke and sea tornadoes was chaotically vibrating. There was no way to make correct observations. And nobody wanted it. Everyone in the conning tower was shocked and demoralized by the unexpected disaster. Horror forced them to hide behind a vertical wall of armor, pinning them to the deck. Only the sailors stood in their places - at the helm, at the rangefinder, talking pipes and telephones. But they could not do otherwise. And from the command staff, some squatted down, others knelt down. And Admiral Rozhdestvensky himself, this proud and arrogant man, hiding from the fragments, gradually bent lower and lower. Finally, before the fire of his enemy, he was forced to kneel. He was the first to set such an example to others. Hunched over with his head drawn into his shoulders, he looked more like a discouraged passenger than a squadron commander. Only occasionally did one of the young officers look out for a moment through the slot. Many already had minor injuries.
Both fleets went to the northeast on approximately parallel courses, but the Japanese made 16 knots against the Russian 9, and the Russians were gradually squeezed to the right. The distance in this phase of the battle fluctuated, for the most part, from 28 to 32 cables, and did not fall below 23 - 25 cables. By 14.15 Togo was on the true Ost course, by 14.23 - on the ESE course, and after 4 minutes he turned a little more to the south, threatening to cover the head of the Russian column. The stormy sea burst into the gun ports on the windward side and shook the ships strongly, making it difficult to aim the guns. However, the Japanese quickly took aim and maintained extremely accurate fire. The shooting of Russian ships in the initial phase of the battle was also good. But the Russian squadron could fire only about 134 shots per minute, and the Japanese fleet - 360 shots. The Japanese ships were a homogeneous squadron. They did not have much difference in speed, in artillery armament. In our country, only four of the newest battleships were the same, but they, put in a common column with different types and obsolete ships, seemed to be on a par with the worst of them. During the battle, this defect was fully reflected. The Russian squadron had a course of nine knots, the Japanese fifteen or sixteen. And in accordance with these data, the tactics of the enemy were determined. The hostile combat column kept pushing ahead of ours so much that its sixth or seventh ship was abeam "Suvorov". This gave her the ability to unleash concentrated fire on our forward battleships. Obviously, Admiral Togo wanted to first destroy the core of the Russian squadron, and then start reprisals against the rest of the ships. The Russian squadron could not do that. The small course of the squadron put it in a subordinate position. The distance to the Japanese lead ship was so great that even the Suvorov had little chance of being hit. For each of our subsequent matelots, this distance was increasing all the time. In addition, the enemy combat column tried to cut the course of our squadron, pushing its head to the right. Thanks to this maneuver, Admiral Togo put his flagship in the position of least danger, hiding from the shells of the Russian front battleships. "Eagle" was number four, but for its stern artillery "Mikasa" was out of the firing angle. What can we say about terminal ships? For them, he was completely out of reach.
Meanwhile, there was an order from Admiral Rozhdestvensky - to hit the enemy lead ship. And many of our commanders, not daring to take independent actions, tried not to violate the combat order of their commander. But this was their greatest mistake. Shells from the rear of our ships fell, not reaching the intended target. It would be better to shoot at those ships that were on the traverse.

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya"
From the very first moment, thanks to the admiral's absurd maneuvers, "Oslyabya", as we know, was put in such a position that it had to stop the machines so as not to ram the ship in front. The enemy took advantage of this and, making a sequential turn by sixteen points and lying on a course parallel with us, opened the strongest fire on him.
The hits began immediately. The third round hit the bow of the battleship and, having completely ripped out the left hawse, tore the entire tank apart. The anchor fell overboard, and the rope was etched down and hung on the gum bracket. The Japanese quickly took aim at the standing target while still at the turn, and the leading ships transmitted the distance to those coming from behind. Each new ship, making a turn, sent its first cruel greetings to the battleship Oslyabya. The shells began to pour down in a hail, incessantly bursting at the waterline, in the nose. And the battleship dutifully substituted its sides and did nothing to get out of the fire. When he had the opportunity to move forward, and when all three machines in fourteen thousand five hundred indicator forces began to hammer inside him, and all three propellers seethed behind the stern, he already had several holes in the bow, not protected by armor. A call flashed through the ship:
- Bilge-fire division, run to the forward living deck!
There, at about 13.58, near the first bulkhead, at the very waterline, a large-caliber shell exploded and made a large gap in the port side. Streams of water poured into her, pouring into the first and second compartments of the living deck. Through the cracks formed in the deck, through the hatch and into the broken fan pipes, water went into the left bow six-inch cellar, and into the turret compartment. Even the burning electric bulbs were not visible from the smoke and gases in these compartments. The hole was semi-submerged, but due to the stroke and strong swell, it could not be repaired. The spill of water on the living deck was stopped by the second bulkhead in front of the bow traverse, and in the holds it reached the compartment for bow dynamos and underwater mine vehicles. The result is a trim on the nose. In addition, the battleship began to roll to the port side. The bilge rooms, led by engineer Uspensky, worked energetically, but they only partially managed to eliminate the roll, artificially flooding the corridors and starboard cartridge magazines. The main electrical main, interrupted by a shell, stopped giving current, as a result of which the ten-inch tower stopped working. She only fired three shots. Although the miners connected the broken ends of the highway, it was too late. The tower was hit by two large shells. Unable to withstand their terrible explosion, she jumped off the rollers and skewed to one side. The armor plates on it parted, and the muzzle of the ten-inch guns, like two huge dry stumps, stuck out at different angles towards the enemy. The roof of the tower was torn off. Apparently, one of the shells exploded in the embrasure. Inside the tower, one man had his head blown off, and everyone else was seriously wounded. Moans and screams were heard. Gunnery Bobkov was carried out of the tower with his leg torn off. Lying on a stretcher, on the way to the operation center, he cursed someone, swore in the most desperate words.
The upper front bridge was broken. There was a range finder that served to determine the distance to the enemy. With him there were several sailors and Lieutenant Paletsky. By the explosion of a shell, they were blown away in different directions and so mutilated that no one could be recognized except the officer. He lay with his chest torn apart, rolled his maddened eyes and, dying, shouted unnaturally loudly:
Izumo ... Cruiser Izumo ... thirty-five cables ... Izumo ... five ... thirty ...
A minute later Paletsky was a corpse.
Soon the upper bow casemate of the six-inch gun was broken. He was hit by two shells. The armor plate that covered it from the outside slid down and closed the port opening, and the cannon flew out of the trunnions. Then two more six-inch guns fell silent. All the small guns on the port side were out of order in just twenty minutes. Most of the servants are with. They were knocked out, and the rest, together with the battery commander, could not find anything to do, and disappeared into the armored deck.
A shell exploded near the conning tower. The drummer who was here was left with an ugly stump without a head and without legs. Shrapnel from the shell flew through the slots into the cabin. Conductor Prokus, who was at the helm, fell dead. The senior flag officer, Lieutenant Kosinsky (naval writer, author of the "Bakovy Vestnik" books), and the ship's officers were seriously wounded. Some of them went to the operations center and never came back here. Commander Baer, ​​with a pale face splattered with blood, jumped out of the wheelhouse and, holding a smoking cigarette in his hand, shouted loudly:
- Call me senior officer Pokhvisnev!
Some of the sailors ran to carry out his order, and he himself, holding a cigarette in his mouth, inhaled smoke and again disappeared into the conning tower to control the dying ship.
In the left middle casemate, shrapnel hit the cart with cartridges. The explosion here shredded all the artillery servants, and the six-inch cannon was completely unusable. Only two six-inch guns remained on this side, but even those were later paralyzed by the large list of the ship. Thus, the artillery of the battleship "Oslyabya" had to operate very little, and the shells were thrown into the wind rather than at the target, since no one transmitted the distance at that time.
The entire bow of the ship was already flooded with water. Access to two bow dynamos was cut off. The people who were with them had to escape from death, get out of there through the bow tower. The same water, serving as a good conductor and connecting the electrical main to the ship's hull, was the reason that the anchors of the two aft dynamos burned out. As a result, the turbines that were used to pump out water stopped working, the winches that raised the shells stopped working, and all the mechanisms set in motion by electric current refused to serve. On the battleship, below, under the protection of armor, there were two non-binding operational points: one permanent, and the other improvised, made for a while from a bath. In the first, the senior doctor Vasiliev worked, and in the second, the junior, Bunting. Blood was visible everywhere, pale faces clouded over the feverishly alert gazes of the wounded. Around the operating table lay amputated human body parts. The dead also lay with living people. The intoxicating smell of fresh blood made me sick. Moans and complaints were heard. Someone asked:
- Give me a drink as soon as possible ... All my insides are burning ...
The combat non-commissioned officer raved:
- Do not spare the bell ... Fight off the bell! You see what a fog ...
The gunman with a bandage over his broken eyes, sitting in the corner, kept asking:
- Where are my eyes? Who needs me blind?
A sailor was lying on the operating table and yelling. The senior doctor in his coat, thickly caked with blood, was rummaging with a large probe in the shoulder wound, picking out fragments from it. The number of the crippled increased.
- Guys, do not push. I am not allowed to work, - the senior doctor begged.
They did not listen to him well.
Each shell, hitting the battleship, made an unimaginable roar. The entire hull of the ship shuddered, as if a hundred rails were being thrown onto the deck from a great height at once. The wounded at such moments twitched and looked questioningly at the exit: is it the end or not? They brought another one on a stretcher. The meat on his side had been ripped off, his ribs were exposed, one of which stuck out to the side, like a broken branch on a tree. The wounded man yelled:
- Your honor, help quickly!
- I have a lot. Bring it to a junior doctor.
- There are also many. He sent to you. The battleship swung violently.
The blind gunman jumped up and, stretching out his arms, shouted:
- Drowning, brothers!
The wounded stirred, groans and death rales were heard. But the alarm turned out to be false. The gunman was seated again in a corner with abuse. However, the list of the ship to the left side all increased, and in horror the pupils of everyone who were in the operation center dilated. The senior doctor, despite the fact that his minutes were numbered, continued to work at his post.
And above, shells fell incessantly. At least six Japanese cruisers fired on the battleship. The sea boiled around. When hitting the waterline on the waist armor, ruffling, huge columns of water rose flush with the pipes and then fell on board, flooding the upper deck and casemates. The groans, death screams, screams of people crippled and distraught with horror were mixed with the roar of explosions, the howl of fire and the clang of breaking iron. Here the artillery, disabled, completely fell silent. The commander of one of the plutongs, Lieutenant Nedermiller, dismissed the gun servant, and he himself, considering the situation hopeless, shot himself. All the upper superstructures of the ship were engulfed in fire. A fire was raging under the aft bridge. Thick smoke poured onto the spardeck from under the upper deck, and swirling tongues of flame erupted through hatches and holes. The officers' and admiral's premises were on fire. The people of the fire division were rushing about in clouds of smoke like ghosts, but all their efforts were in vain (the ship was burning so badly that at 14.20 Sikishima lost its target due to the smoke). "Oslyabya", burying its nose into the sea up to the hawks, could no longer fight back and, broken, disfigured, still moving somehow, helplessly awaited its final death. She was not slow to come along with a new, decisive hole. A shell of twenty poods hit the side in the middle of the vessel, along the waterline, between the left mine apparatus and the bathhouse. The bolts holding the armor plate were so weak that the next blow fell off like plaster from an old building. Another shell hit this place and made a whole gate in the side, through which the carriage could pass. Water poured into the ship, spilling over the bevel of the armored deck and falling into the bomb cellars. A hold division with engineer Zmachinsky was called in to seal the hole. In vain did people try to close the hole with wooden shields, propping them up with stops: the wave knocked out the bars, and they had to work waist-deep in water. The spare coal pit was flooded. The list began to increase rapidly.
At 14.30, the battleship rolled out of order to the right, and almost at the same time was hit in the waterline by two large shells, one of which made a second huge hole next to the first dangerous hole.
Desperate shouts echoed across all the decks, across all the numerous squads:
- The battleship capsizes!
- We are perishing!
- Save yourself!
At this time, Lieutenant Sablin, senior artillery officer Genke and Warrant Officer Boldyrev were on the bridge. Commander Baer came out of the wheelhouse to them, without a cap, with a bloody wound on his bald head, but with a cigarette in his teeth. Grasping the awning post and spreading his legs wide, he said to his officers:
- Yes, we're drowning, goodbye.
Then he inhaled the smoke for the last time and commanded loudly:
- Save yourself! Overboard! Hurry overboard!
But the time had already been lost. The ship began to quickly fall to the port side. All already and without the order of the commander realized that the moment of disaster had come. From cellars, stokers, compartments of mines, people climbed through the shafts and brackets, clambering, grabbing at anything, breaking down and clinging again. Each tried to get out to the battery deck as soon as possible, where all the exits led, and from there he hoped to jump out, overboard.
The wounded rushed from the dressing stations and screamed. Those who could not move on their own begged for help to get out on the ladder, but each thought only of himself. There was not a single second to waste. Water rushed in streams along the lower deck, filling the corridors and flooding the operations center. Clinging to each other, bloody people climbed up the surviving gangway to the battery deck. Only those who suffered less from wounds managed to escape from here.
But worse happened to the people in the engine rooms. The exits from them for the duration of the battle, so that the shells did not fall down, were battened down with armor plates, which could only be opened from above. The sailors appointed for this purpose fled from fear, leaving those who remained below to fend for themselves. Some then returned and, trying to rescue their comrades, tried to lift the heavy armor covers with hoists, but the ship had already tilted so much that it was impossible to work. The machinists, along with the mechanics, uselessly throwing wild calls for help, remained there, below, all without exception remained, buried under the armored deck, as if under a heavy gravestone.
There was a terrible commotion on the upper deck as well. Some jumped into the sea, not having time to take life-saving equipment with them, others rushed after lifebuoys and cork bibs. People collided with each other, fell. Several daredevils got to bed nets and began to throw out beds from there to drowning people, with which they could stay on the water.
On the starboard side was a priest, one of the monks. He was a middle-aged man, well-fed, ponderous. With fluttering tufts of hair on his head, with rolling eyes, he looked like a man who had just escaped from a madhouse. Seeing the death of the battleship, he shouted angrily:
- Brothers! Sailors! I can not swim. Help me!
But he immediately fell off the side, stupidly slapped his hands on the water and disappeared under the waves.
Around the Oslyabi, sailing away from it, people were floundering in the water. But many of the crew, as if not daring to part with the ship, were still on its deck. This continued until the steel giant finally fell to the port side. The deck plane became vertical. Slipping along it, people fell down to the port side, and with them pieces of wood, pieces of iron, boxes, benches and other loose objects rolled. Arms and legs were broken, heads were smashed. The disaster was aggravated by the fact that the enemy did not cease fire on the battleship. All around the shells were falling all the time, crippling and killing those who were already floating on the water. Moreover, from three colossal chimneys, lying horizontally on the surface of the sea, thick smoke never ceased to come out, spreading in clubs from the bottom and poisoning the last minutes of the drowning. From the boats, broken at the beginning of the battle, debris now floated up, for which people grabbed. The air was filled with calls for help. And among this porridge of living human heads, swaying by waves, in one place, then in another, columns of water rose from the explosion of shells.
Commander Baer, ​​despite the fire flaring up around him, did not leave his bridge. It became clear to everyone that he decided to die along with the ship. It seemed that all his worries were now directed only to ensure that his subordinates were saved correctly. Holding his hands to the awning rack, almost hanging on it, he commanded, trying to shout down the cries of others:
- Further from the boards! Damn it, you will be sucked into a whirlpool! Sail further!
At this moment, in the face of death, he was magnificent.
The battleship turned upside down with its keel and, lifting up the stern, began to plunge into the sea. The propeller of the right machine, while still working, at first quickly rotated in the air, and then, as the ship sank, the water boiled. These were the last convulsions of the dying ship.
Not a single driver or mechanic jumped overboard. All of them, including two hundred people, remained battened down in their offices.

For the flagship of the 2nd armored detachment, the destroyer "Buyny" was "assigned" under the command of Captain 2nd Rank N.N. Kolomeitsev. In his report on the battle on May 14-15, the Commander of the Buynoye reported: “About 3 o'clock a roll to the left side of the Oslyabi was noticed, and I watched it all the time, expecting that it would fail. Indeed, the battleship was put on the left side and was out of order, and its roll was increasing. I went to him at full speed and, approaching almost close, backed up, because at that moment the Oslyabya lay down on the left side, showed the right propeller and deadwood, and went to the bottom with its nose down. On the water, among the floating debris, there were about 300 people. Some of them swam on their own, others grabbing the surfaced whaleboat and steam boat and various debris. Everyone was screaming for help and the picture was amazing. I lowered the whaleboat and sent midshipman Khrabro-Vasilevsky on it to pick up the far sailors, and myself, keeping in the wind, saved everyone who approached the distance of the throwing end. " The flagship navigator, lieutenant colonel of the corps of naval navigators A.I. Osipov, were rescued on "Buyny" from the "Oslyabi"; Lieven, warrant officers Prince S.V. Gorchakov, B.P. Kazmichev, A.A. Bartenev, three conductors and 196 lower ranks (204 people in total). All this time the Japanese continued to fire at the place where the Oslyabi was killed, and soon the shells began to burst near the destroyer. According to N.N. Kolomeitsev, several people were killed in the water at the very side, and one of the "donkeys" died, already being rescued, on the deck of the destroyer.
Almost simultaneously with "Buyny", the destroyer "Bravy" under the command of Lieutenant P.P.Durnovo approached the dying battleship at full speed. Subsequently, P.P. Durnovo reported: “The violent one, approaching the place where the battleship was killed, lowered the whaleboat and rescued people on it; board, throwing ends at them ... The picture was terrible: in the heap of wreckage, bunks and the remains of broken boats swarmed with a mass of people who frantically shouted and interrupted each other's ends fed from the board. Hostile shells lay down thickly in this place and finished off the floating people ... Between the wreckage the mine boat from the Oslyaby was kept on the water, but so many people climbed onto it that it soon drowned. "
Lieutenant MP Sablin, warrant officer BP Ivanov and 163 lower ranks from the Oslyabi command were taken aboard the Bravoy right from the water. A little later, a whaleboat was launched from Bravoy, which also took part in rescuing people. But, as PP Durnovo recalled: “I very soon had to return the whaleboat to the side, and even had to approach it myself, because it was so covered that it could not row itself, and due to the fresh weather and the big wave I was afraid that he would be drowned. It took 16 people from the team and Lieutenant Pavel Kolokoltsev and Warrant Officer Pyotr Bochmanov, both slightly wounded. "
The destroyer "Shiny" under the command of Captain 2nd Rank SA Shamov, who had received heavy damage a few minutes earlier as a result of a direct hit from a large-caliber projectile, and the destroyer "Bystry" also took part in the rescue of the Oslyabi crew. The first managed to save 8 people, after which the destroyer found itself under the covers of Japanese cruisers, trying to get out from under the cover, and maneuvering among the mines floating on the surface, "Shiny" received another direct hit on the starboard side at the waterline in the area of ​​the 2nd boiler ... This shell on the right waist killed the commander, who was heading to the navigating bridge to watch the floating mines from there and control the torpedo boat's maneuvering, 10 people were raised on the second, 4 of them were wounded.
Thus, thanks to the courageous and decisive actions of the commanders and crews of the destroyers, out of almost 900 people who were in battle on board the battleship Oslyabya, 405 people were rescued from the water, including two staff officers and seven officers of the ship.
Between 13.50 and 14.30 Mikasa was hit by 6 12 ″ and 19 6 ″ shells, but was practically not injured. Of these shells, 5 12 ″ and 14 6 ″ hits were received between 13.50 and 14.05. The other three battleships received several minor hits, and Kasuga received one 12 ″ round at 2:13 pm. At 14.20 the barrel of the right gun in the Nissin bow turret was killed by a 12 ″ shell. All the armored cruisers of the Kamimura squad received hits, and at 14.30 the right 8 ″ gun in the aft turret of the Azuma was knocked out by a 12 ″ shell, but only Asama was seriously damaged. At 14.08 12 ″ the shell hit the stern on the starboard side and the steering temporarily failed from the concussion. At this time, "Asama" turned to the left and therefore left the line. The damage was repaired in 6 minutes, but by that time the rest of the Japanese ships disappeared into the fog, and the Asama went to join them at full speed. For some time she was subjected to heavy shelling from Russian ships, but until 14.40 did not receive serious hits.
At 14:00, the Russian hospital ships behind the 2nd squadron were captured: "Eagle" by the Japanese auxiliary cruiser "Manju-Maru" and "Kostroma" by the auxiliary cruiser "Sado-Maru" battle of ships.

Campaign of the Second Pacific Squadron

2 (15) October 1904 The second Pacific squadron left Libau. She had to make an unprecedented passage in history across three oceans. The length of the path was about 18 thousand miles.

It was especially important to provide the squadron with everything necessary on the way, for Russia did not have a single base during the crossing. First of all, the ships needed coal, they needed special equipment for the repair of machines and mechanisms. Since the British government, taking a hostile position, managed to put pressure on neutral states, Russia could not use foreign ports. Even France, which was in an alliance with Russia, under pressure from England did not allow Russian ships to enter its ports. Therefore, the Russian command allocated a large number of transports loaded with coal, food, fresh water to the squadron, as well as a floating workshop, without which a large fleet would not be able to move to such a distant theater of military operations.

Second Pacific Squadron on the march Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase! Increase!

October 7/20 the ships left for the North Sea. Rozhestvensky's headquarters, having received information that the Japanese destroyers intend to attack the squadron in the near future, created a nervous situation with their instructions. As a result, Doggerbank on the night of October 9/22 Russian battleships fired at British fishing vessels, mistaking them for enemy destroyers. One bot was sunk, 5 were damaged, 2 were killed and 6 were wounded. The cruiser "Aurora", on which there were wounded, also suffered from its shells. This incident further strained relations with England and detained the Russian squadron in the Spanish port of Vigo for a week.

October 21 / November 3 the squadron arrived in Tangier. Here the division of the detachments took place. The main forces, which had a large draft, could not pass through the Suez Canal, so, accompanied by cruisers and transports, they headed to the Indian Ocean around Africa. The detachment under the command of the junior flagship of Rear Admiral D. G. Felkerzam left for Suez on the same day.

The navigation of the main forces took place in difficult conditions. British cruisers accompanied them to the Canary Islands. The situation was so tense that the commander of the Russian squadron ordered to load the guns and be ready to repel the attack. During rare stops, and most often in the open ocean, the ships of the squadron were replenished with coal. Coal loading in the tropics exhausted people. Rozhestvensky, striving for maximum load, ordered to load coal into batteries, various utility rooms, even into some of the officers' cabins. When these possibilities were exhausted, some ships took coal directly to the deck. As a result, the fuel supply on the new squadron battleships was more than 2 times higher than the norm. During a storm, such overloaded ships could easily lose their already slight stability and capsize. Therefore, when crossing in fresh weather, they had to be sent to the wave in order to save the ships.

Squadron route map

December 27 (January 9, 1905) the main forces of the squadron arrived at Nossi-Be Bay on the island of Madagascar, where they soon joined up with Felkerzam's detachment, which had arrived in the area 12 days earlier. Although Felkersam's ships made a shorter and easier voyage around Africa, they also needed repairs. So, on the battleship "Navarin" refrigerators went out of order, the cruisers "Pearl" and "Izumrud" were with destroyed drives and auxiliary mechanisms. The situation was much worse on the destroyers. Only 2 of them could move independently.

Sventorzhetsky's letter from Nossi-be Addressed to Pavel Mikhailovich Vavilov, staff captain for the Admiralty, junior clerk of the Main Naval Staff, colleague E.V. Sventorzhetskiy in the scientific department Nossi-be. Dear Pavel Mikhailovich, Yesterday mail from Europe through Djibouti delivered your letter to me, for which I am sincerely grateful. The same letter reminded me of one of the best periods of my service, namely service in the scientific department, where kind and kind colleagues have always been the best consolation in moments of official disappointment. Thank you sincerely for your constant attention to my requests and very much apologize that my correspondence probably brings you a lot of trouble. Our voyage, in which you are interested, is described in some detail in the reports of the admiral; These reports are received, probably, very regularly and read with interest ...

Even before the connection of the ships, the commander received news of the death of the First Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur. Such news could not have a positive effect on the already low morale of the personnel. In this regard, Rozhestvensky asked St. Petersburg for new instructions. He himself believed that his squadron was too weak to fight the Japanese fleet for supremacy at sea. He saw his task in a breakthrough to Vladivostok, if not all, then at least part of the ships. As a reinforcement, he offered to send help to the Pacific Ocean from the Black Sea. However, in St. Petersburg, not paying attention to the commander's requests, they decided to send the Third Pacific Squadron to the Far East, again from the Baltic. Its first detachment, consisting of ships of obsolete types, left Libava 3 (16) February 1905 Not representing combat value, these ships, at best, could only count on the fact that they would divert part of the Japanese forces to themselves. They were commanded by N.I. Nebogatov.

March 3 (16), 1905, after a protracted stay at Madagascar, the Second Pacific Squadron, without waiting for the detachment of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, went out into the ocean. Her path lay to the shores of Indochina. The transition from Africa to the Far East, apart from minor breakdowns, went well. To save the destroyer vehicles, these ships were towed. March 26 / April 8 passed Singapore. The squadron command hoped to put the ships in order in Kamrang, but under pressure from the French authorities, they were forced to transfer their ships to Van Fong Bay.

Panoramic photography

From left to right: auxiliary cruiser Dnepr, cruiser Svetlana, auxiliary cruisers Ural, Kuban, hospital ship Eagle, squadron battleships Prince Suvorov, Oslyabya, Emperor Alexander III, Borodino, Sisoy Veliky "," Eagle ", the steamer" Svir ", the battleship Navarin, the floating workshop" Kamchatka ", the cruiser" Almaz ", the armored cruiser" Admiral Nakhimov ", etc.

April 26 / May 9 the squadron was connected with the ships of Rear Admiral Nebogatov. Nebogatov was able to catch up with Rozhdestvensky's squadron in 2.5 months. Experts recognized such a long journey of his unseaworthy, old ships exemplary. Thus, 3 more coastal defense battleships, a cruiser and several transports appeared in the Russian squadron.

May 1 / May 14 the Russian squadron left Van Fong. Although the meeting with the enemy was expected from day to day, they went without reconnaissance, and in order to avoid collisions at night, the ships carried wake and distinctive lights. The squadron commander considered his main task to be a breakthrough to Vladivostok. This could be done through one of the straits - Korean, Sangar or La Perouse. The Japanese, possessing an advantage in speed, could deploy their forces in any of these directions. Fearing a shortage of fuel, the commander of the Russian squadron decided to break through the shortest route - through the Korea Strait. Rozhestvensky believed that there would be losses in the breakthrough, but most of the ships would be able to reach Vladivostok.

May 8-12 (21-25) for the demonstration in the Yellow Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the commander sent auxiliary cruisers Dnepr, Rion, Kuban and Terek. By this measure, he hoped to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet. But the demonstration was unsuccessful. The forces allocated to her were too insignificant. They could not mislead the Japanese command. Despite the unfavorable circumstances, the passage of the squadron with a length of 18 thousand miles, unparalleled in difficulty, was successfully completed.

Formation of the II Squadron of the Pacific Ocean at 6 o'clock on May 14, 1905
(reconstruction by V.Ya. Krestyaninov)

May 10 / May 23 on Russian ships last time they accepted coal. On the night May 14 / May 27 the squadron entered the Korea Strait.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Captain 1st rank (ret.) P.D. BYKOV

Preparation and campaign of the 2nd Pacific squadron

The first months of the Russo-Japanese war clearly showed that the tsarist government was unprepared for war.

The underestimation of the enemy's forces and his military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained predominance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take measures to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.

Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was the commander of the fleet. But all his submissions and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was revised with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue and sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, which was named the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

The squadron was supposed to include ships that were ending with construction, as well as part of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite fit for sailing. In addition, it was supposed to buy 7 cruisers abroad.

Due to the fact that in terms of its composition, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to solve independent tasks, its sending was mainly aimed at strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships Rear Admirals Felkerzam and Enquist.

Z.P. Christmas

Ship composition of the squadron

The main core of the squadron sent to the theater of operations consisted of four new battleships: "Alexander III", "Prince Suvorov", "Borodino" and "Eagle", of which only the first was tested in 1903, the construction of the rest was completed after the start of the war , and they have not yet passed all the required tests. In particular, the battleship "Eagle" did not have time to test the large-caliber artillery. These new modern battleships, which developed a speed of 18 knots, were heavily overloaded before entering the Far East, as they had to take on board increased stocks of ammunition and food. In addition, during the completion of the battleships, various auxiliary devices were installed on them, which were not provided for in the original project. As a result, the draft exceeded the projected by 0.9 m, which increased the displacement of the battleships by 2000 tons. The consequence of this was a large decrease in their stability, as well as the survivability of ships. Of the rest of the battleships, only Oslyabya belonged to the modern ships already sailing. But it was a ship with a weak armor, which also had a 256-mm cannon instead of a 305-mm one.

Battleship "AlexanderIII“

battleship "Borodino"

battleship "Oslyabya"

The battleships "Sisoy the Great" and "Navarin" were old ships, and the second one had old short-range 305-mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", armed with 203-mm cannons, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had a wide variety of weapons, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were lowered due to defects in construction, and the rest of the ships were outdated.

An even greater variety in their tactical and technical elements was presented by the cruisers that were part of the squadron. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearl” and “Emerald” were modern. The first and the last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it on the way. Of the rest of the cruisers "Svetlana" and "Dmitry Donskoy" were old ships, and "Almaz" was an armed yacht.

CruiserIrank "Dmitry Donskoy"

Of the cruisers, two - "Pearl" and "Emerald" were of the same type, fast (24 knots), but unprotected ships. “Oleg” and “Aurora” had deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. “Svetlana” had a speed of 20 knots, and “Almaz” - 18. The oldest of the cruisers “Dmitry Donskoy” had only 16 knots. The weakness and inadequacy of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to give the squadron as high-speed reconnaissance five armed high-speed steamers - Ural, Kuban, Terek, Rion and Dnepr, which joined at different times: to the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very small. The squadron consisted of nine destroyers - "Bravy", "Bodry", "Bystry", "Bedovy", "Stormy", "Brilliant", "Impeccable", "Loud" and "Grozny", which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and developed a speed of no more than 26 knots.

destroyer

Despite the fact that the decision to send the squadron was made in April, its formation and equipping took a very long time.

The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, the work on the squadron was completed so that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.

Personnel

Ship commanders

The majority of the personnel of the squadron arrived on the ships in the summer of 1904, and only the commanders and some of the specialists were appointed earlier and were on them during construction. Therefore, neither the officers nor the crew had enough time to study their ships well. In addition, the ships of the squadron had many young officers, early released from the naval cadet corps on the occasion of the war, as well as called up from the reserve and transferred from the merchant fleet, the so-called “reserve warrant officers”. The former did not have sufficient knowledge and experience, the latter needed to update their knowledge; still others, although they had experience and knowledge of naval affairs, did not have any military training. Such a manning of the ships of the squadron with officers was caused by the fact that the staff was enough only to fill the most responsible positions on the ships.

Preparation and organization of the squadron

Before leaving the Baltic Sea, the full squadron never sailed, and only separate detachments of ships made several joint campaigns. Therefore, practice in joint navigation and maneuvering was insufficient. During a short stay in Reval, the ships of the squadron were able to fire a very limited number of fires, especially since the amount of practical ammunition received for this was less than expected. Torpedo firing from destroyers was also insufficient. The material part of the torpedoes was not prepared, therefore, during the first firing, many torpedoes sank.

The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the shores of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the conditions of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationship and influence of the chiefs of the detachments on their subordinates and on the training of ship commands. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the headquarters of the squadron commander had to deal with the resolution of various minor issues that could be resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander itself did not have the correct organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag-captain was only the executor of the commander's orders. There was no consistency in the work of the flagship specialists, and everyone worked on their own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.

Thus, the squadron, when entering the theater of military operations, did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.

Organization and conditions of the transition

Ensuring the transition of the squadron from the Baltic Sea to the theater of operations, provided that along the entire route (about 18,000 miles) Russia did not have a single base of its own, was a very difficult and difficult task.

First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repairs and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible attempts by the enemy to make an attack on the way.

The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhdestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.

Due to the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that would not allow passage of the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the squadron commander decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on about. Madagascar. For greater safety of the passage, Rozhestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments regarding the arrival of the squadron at any specific ports, as this would have made known his route in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements were concluded on this issue. There were only negotiations with the French government on some private issues, such as the duration of the stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for anchorage of the squadron, and the possibility of communication with the squadron on the way, etc. Some private issues, such as, for example, about the protection of ships while sailing through the Suez Canal, were resolved with other foreign governments. But on the whole, no diplomatic preparations were made for the transition.

Due to this, the transition of the squadron was extremely complicated due to the protests of foreign states when the squadron entered a particular port, the reduction of the parking time, the impossibility of performing routine repairs and rest of the personnel.

The timely supply of coal, water and provisions was a matter of particular importance, for the timing of the arrival of the squadron in the Far East entirely depended on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal should have been made abroad, it was decided to involve foreign firms in this.

Thus, the possibility of the movement of the squadron to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their performance of contracts. As expected, such a supply organization could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on about. Madagascar.

The squadron commander was so concerned about supplying the squadron with coal that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships took in increased food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be carried out on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign firms. For the repair of ships on the way, the squadron was assigned a specially equipped ship-workshop "Kamchatka". This steamer and several other transports with cargo for various purposes made up the squadron's floating base.

The news of the dispatch by the Russian government to the Far East of such a large reinforcement as the 2nd Pacific Squadron could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed on the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was highly probable that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire route of the squadron's movement, up to a direct attack on the squadron and sabotage actions.

The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian naval ministry, and it was looking for ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where the squadron could expect various surprises. The Danish Straits and the Suez Canal to the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.

After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to the foreign political agency of the security department of the police department, which willingly took upon itself the organization of guarding the route of the squadron in the Danish straits. To organize protection in other places, special people were sent to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.

All of the above measures did not guarantee an uninterrupted supply of ships of the squadron, or provision of parking, repair and rest, or. finally, securing the squadron against the possibility of a surprise attack. To what extent the created organization of the squadron's security on the way did not meet its purpose, was shown by the case when the squadron crossed the North (German) Sea, known as the "Hull incident".

Squadron exit and Hull incident

Completion of new ships, supply issues, etc. - all this delayed the exit of the squadron. On August 29, the squadron arrived at Revel and, after standing there for about a month, moved to Libau to receive materials and replenish coal reserves; On October 2, the squadron left for the Far East. However, not all ships left on October 2. Two cruisers, some of the destroyers and transports were not yet ready and had to catch up with the squadron on the way.

The first passage the squadron made to Cape Skagen (the northern end of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here, Admiral Rozhestvensky received information about the suspicious ships seen and about the allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the anchorage at Cape Skagen in these conditions dangerous, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to proceed further. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were to be removed from the anchor in succession and go one after another at a distance of 20-30 miles. In the first two detachments were destroyers, in the next two - cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last to leave the anchor was a detachment of new battleships. Such a dismemberment of the squadron: Admiral Rozhestvensky considered the most expedient from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - battleships.

However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of their collision at night, in the event of any unforeseen delays along the way. The lead detachments were not given the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would give the main forces, which, moreover, were marching without security, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not in any way meet the requirements for organizing the transition of the squadron in wartime.

A detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky was holding the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22 o'clock. About 0 o'clock. 55 minutes On October 9, the detachment approached the Dogger Banks area. Not long before this, the Kamchatka transport workshop reported on the radio that it had been attacked by destroyers.

During the passage of the Dogger Bapka, in front of the battleship detachment, silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which went to the intersection of the detachment's course and approached it. The squadron decided that the battleships were threatened with an attack, and opened fire. But when the searchlights were turned on, it turned out that the fishing boats were shot. The fire was stopped. However, within 10 minutes, during which the shooting continued, several fishing vessels were damaged. Suddenly, on the left abeam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were seen, on which fire was also opened. But after the very first shots, it turned out that these were Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. On the "Aurora" two people were wounded and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.

Having passed the Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel. Came to Vigo (Spain) on October 13. Here the squadron stayed until the resolution of the conflict between England and Russia caused by the so-called "Hull incident".

There is reason to believe that England, which took a hostile position towards Russia and was in an alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could have been to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which worsened Russia's position in the Far East.

After the "Hull incident" the British government threatened to sever diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to liquidate the conflict that had arisen, agreeing to compensate for the losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.

The transition of the squadron to about. Madagascar

On October 19, a detachment of new battleships left Vigo and on October 21 came to Tangier (North Africa), where by this time the entire squadron was concentrated. After loading coal, provisions and taking water, the squadron, according to the previously developed plan, was divided into two groups. The battleships Sisoy Veliky and Navarin together with the cruisers Svetlana, Zhemchug, Almaz and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Felkerzam sailed through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to Madagascar, where they were supposed to rejoin the squadron.

The sailing of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way proceeded without any particular complications. By December 15, all ships arrived at their destination.

The rest of the ships are the battleships "Prince Suvorov", "Alexander III", "Borodino", "Orel", "Oslyabya", the cruisers "Admiral Nakhimov", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Aurora" with transports "Kamchatka", "Anadyr". "Korea", "Malaya" and "Meteor" headed by Admiral Rozhdestvensky - went around Africa.

The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable anchorage on the way, and coal was loaded on the open sea. In addition, wishing to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhestvensky decided to make large transitions. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves far exceeding normal ones. So, for example, the new battleships took double the amount of coal - instead of a thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To receive such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in residential decks, cockpits, anti-mine artillery batteries and other places, which utterly hampered the life of the personnel. In addition, loading in extreme heat on the ocean swell and roughness was very difficult and time-consuming. On average, battleships took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and thus the parking time was spent on loading and urgent repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, remained without rest. In addition, in conditions when all the premises on the ships were littered with coal, it was impossible to carry out any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment came to Madagascar.

Here Admiral Rozhestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.

On December 27, both squadrons of the squadron united in the Nosy-be bay (western coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to park. The squadron stayed here from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.

1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron and the need to strengthen it.

2. The need to repair some ships in the roadstead.

3. Complications in the further supply of the squadron with fuel.

The situation at the time of the arrival of the squadron in Madagascar and the change in the objectives of the squadron's campaign

The defeat of the Russian Manchurian Army and the 1st Pacific Squadron, which ended with the surrender of Port Arthur, caused serious concern in the ruling spheres of Russia. By getting involved in this adventure, the government hoped for an easy and quick victory. However, these calculations did not come true. The defeats at Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur - this is what the war brought Russia instead of the desired victory.

The moment the 2nd Pacific Squadron arrived in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron, the 2nd Pacific squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the expediency of the further movement of the squadron, since after the loss of Port Arthur by Russia, the squadron was forced to go. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,

Rozhestvensky believed that in connection with the changed strategic situation, the immediate task of the squadron was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. He telegraphed this to Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, regarded the squadron as a force with which it was possible to change the situation in the theater of war, and set before Rozhdestvensky the task of not breaking through to Vladivostok, but conquering the Sea of ​​Japan. However, it was recognized that to achieve this goal, the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky was not strong enough, and it was decided to strengthen it with the ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had finally failed. In this regard, Rozhdestvensky was ordered to wait in Madagascar for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov.

The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers "Oleg" and "Izumrud" and the destroyers "Loud" and "Grozny", was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was named the 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after the departure of Rozhdestvensky. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.

This squadron included the old battleship Nikolai I, the coastal defense battleships Admiral Apraksin, Admiral Senyavin, Admiral Ushakov and the old armored cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. "Nicholas I" was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305-mm guns. The coastal defense battleships were armed with 256-mm guns, although long-range, but not entirely successful in design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. There was not a single modern ship in this squadron.

EBR "Emperor Nicholas I"

battleship "Vladimir Monomakh “

Passage from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina

When Rozhestvensky received news of the fall of Port Arthur and learned about the government's point of view on the further goals and objectives of the 2nd squadron, he decided to go to the East alone, without waiting for the 3rd Pacific squadron, which he regarded only as a burden. Believing that the Japanese fleet would not be able to repair all the damage received during the blockade of Port Arthur and in the battles so soon, Rozhestvensky hoped that he would still be able to break through to Vladivostok, and decided to leave as soon as possible. The government allowed him to do this, but unexpected complications with coal supplies delayed the squadron's departure for almost two months.

The unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy repair work, the nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with the forced inaction due to the lack of coal and shells for practical shooting - all this had an extremely negative effect on the personnel and did not at all contribute to an increase in the combat readiness of the squadron.

Discipline, which had dropped noticeably by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insult to the commanding staff and disobedience have become more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violations of discipline by officers.

The lack of a stock of shells made it impossible to make up for the most important shortcoming — to teach the squadron to shoot. Transport "Irtysh", which was loaded with additional ammunition for firing practice, was delayed when the squadron left Libava. It had an accident and was left for repairs. At the same time, the ammunition was unloaded from it, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by rail. But Rozhestvensky was not notified of this. At the end of the repair, the Irtysh went out to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of the much needed ammunition for firing practice on the way. During their stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firing from distances not exceeding 30 cables. The results of these shooting were completely unsatisfactory. The joint maneuvering of the squadron showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.

Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and parking on the island. Madagascar did not improve at all and it remained unprepared for the task at hand.

When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhestvensky did not report his further route in order to achieve the secrecy of the passage. And at this time on the way was the 3rd Pacific Squadron, which was going to join him, and left Libava in February. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, marching to the East with the same goal, did not know where and when they would meet, for the place of their meeting was not stipulated.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. On the way, coal was received on the open sea six times. On March 26, the squadron sailed past Singapore and in April, after a 28-day crossing, dropped anchor in Kamran Bay, where the ships were to make repairs, load coal and receive materials for further travel. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Wangfong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, the 3rd Pacific Squadron joined it.

The anchorages in Kamran Bay, and then in Wangfong Bay, were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, on the other hand, an attack by the Japanese could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg, in which, referring to his poor health, he asked to replace him with another commander upon arrival in Vladivostok.

Passage from Indochina to the Korea Strait

After the addition of the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov, the 2nd Pacific Squadron on May 1 moved on. The immediate task of the squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, considered a breakthrough to Vladivostok, based on which the squadron was supposed to develop actions against the Japanese fleet.

In the Sea of ​​Japan, the squadron could pass through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or La Peruzov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to take the shortest route through the Korea Strait, the widest and deepest of all. However, this route lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before coming to Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great difficulties in navigation, moreover, the strait could be mined (this was allowed by the depths). Passage through the La Perouse Strait in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhestvensky because of the fogs prevailing here, because of navigational difficulties and a lack of coal for this longer passage.

The decision to go through the Korea Strait created the most favorable conditions for the Japanese fleet for the battle, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron in other straits, however, did not guarantee it against meeting the Japanese, but the latter would still be in less favorable conditions, farther from their bases, and could concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The route through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific Squadron at the most disadvantageous position.

Having made the decision to go through the Korea Strait, Admiral Rozhestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and to partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific shores of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus distract part of the Japanese fleet. With the same purpose, auxiliary cruisers Rion and Dnepr were sent to the Yellow Sea, which separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports when the squadron approached the Sedelny Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were to go to Shanghai, the busiest commercial port, connected by telegraph cables with all major port cities, including Japanese.

The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned of their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freeing itself from transports, would follow the shortest route, i.e. across the Korea Strait.

After the separation of the auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: in the right column were battleships - 1st armored detachment - "Prince Suvorov" (Rozhdestvensky flag), "Alexander III", "Borodino", "Eagle"; 2nd armored detachment - “Oslyabya” (flag of Felkersam), “Sisoy Veliky”, “Navarin” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”; on the left - the 3rd armored detachment - "Nikolai I" (Nebogatov's flag), the coastal defense battleships "Apraksin", "Senyavin", "Ushakov", the cruiser "Oleg" (the flag of Enquist), "Aurora", "Dmitry Donskoy" , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, consisting of the cruisers "Svetlana" (braid pennant of the 1st rank captain Shein), "Almaz" and "Ural", walked ahead in a wedge formation - at a distance of 3-4 cab. from the squadron. The cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud were kept on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left with the squadron went in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the lead "Anadyr", followed by the "Irtysh", "Kamchatka", "Korea", tugs "Rus" and "Svir". The torpedo boats went on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" went in the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The movement of the squadron was determined by the movement of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward of the formation; on the hospital ships, not only all the navigation lights were on, but also additional ones to illuminate the signs of the Red Cross.

Russian squadron

Command personnel and tactical organization

Command staff

Squadron Commander - V.-Adm. ZP Rozhestvensky (flag on "Suvorov")

Chief of Staff - Cap. 1 p. C.C. Clapier-de-Colong

Senior Flag Officers - Leith. E.V. Sventorzhetsky, S.D. Sverbeev 1st, N.L. Kryzhanovsky

Junior Flag Officers - Leith. A.N. Novosiltsov, warrant officers of the pr. G.R. Tsereteli, V.N. Demchinsky,

V.P. Kazakevich

Flagship navigators - regiment. V.I. Filippovsky, cap. 2 rubles. V.I.Semenov

The flagship artilleryman is a regiment. F.A. Bersenev

Flagship miners - cap. 2 p. P.P. Makedonsky, leith. E.A. Leontiev

Flagship engineering mechanics - sub. V.A. Obnorsky, sub. L.N.Sratanovich

Flagship Corresponding Engineer - Chief of Staff of the Court. E.S. Politkovsky

Flagm. quartermasters - cap. 2 rubles. A. G. von Witte, A. K. Polis

Ober-auditor - regiment. V.E. Dobrovolsky

Junior flagship - Candidate of Sciences D.G.Felkerzam (flag on "Oslyabya")

Flag officers are leith. Baron F.M. Kosinsky 1st, mn kn. K.P.Liven

Flagship navigator - sub. A.I. Osipov

Junior flagship - Candidate of Sciences O.A.Enquist (flag on "Oleg")

Flag officers - leit.y D.V. von Den 1 -i, A.S. Zarin

Flagship navigator - cap. 2 rubles. S.R. de Livre

Commander of a separate detachment of ships of the 3rd Pacific Squadron - Cand. N.I. Nebogatov (flag on "Nicholas I")

Chief of Staff - Cap. 1 p. V.A. Cross

Senior Flag Officer - Leith. I.M.Sergeev 5th

Junior flag officers - leit.y F.V. Severin, N.N. Glazov

Flagship artilleryman - cap. 2 rubles. N.P. Kurosh

The flagship miner is Leith. I.I.Stepanov 7th

The flagship navigator is a lieutenant regiment. D.N. Fedot'ev

The flagship mechanic is a lieutenant regiment. N.A. Orekhov

Chief auditor - lieutenant regiment. V.A.Maevsky

1st Armored Detachment

Squadron battleship "Suvorov" - cap. 1 p. V.V. Ignatius

Squadron battleship "Emperor Aleksander III" - cap. 1 p. N.M.Bukhvostov

Squadron battleship "Borodino" - cap. 1 p. P.I.Serebrennikov

Squadron battleship "Eagle" - cap. 1 p. N.V. Jung

With a detachment, a cruiser of the 2nd rank "Pearls" - cap. 2 rubles. P.P. Levitsky

2nd armored detachment

Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" - cap. 1 p. V. I. Baer

Squadron battleship "Navarin" - cap. 1 p. B.A. Fitingoff

Squadron battleship "Sisoy the Great" - cap. 1 p. M. V. Ozerov

Armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" -cap.1 p. A.A. Rodionov

With a detachment, a cruiser of the 2nd rank "Emerald" - cap. 2 p. V.N. Ferzen

3rd Armored Detachment

Squadron battleship "Imp.Nicholas I" -cap. 1 p. V.V.Smirnov

Battleship ber.defense "General-Adm. Apraksin" -cap. 1 p. N.G. Lishin

Battleship ber.defense "Admiral Senyavin" -cap.1 p. S.I. Grigoriev

Battleship ber.defense "Admiral Ushakov" -Cap. 1 p. V. N. Miklukho-Maclay

Squad of cruisers

Cruiser 1st rank "Oleg" - cap. 1 R. L. F. Dobrotvorsky

The cruiser of the 1st rank "Aurora" - cap. 1 p. E.R. Egoriev

Cruiser of the 1st rank "Dmitry Donskoy" -cap.1 r. I. N. Lebedev

The 1st rank cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" -cap. 1 p. V. A. Popov

Reconnaissance detachment

The cruiser of the 1st rank "Svetlana" - cap. 1 r. S.P. Shein

Rank 2 cruiser "Almaz" - cap. 2 rubles. I. I. Chagin

The cruiser of the 2nd rank "Ural" - cap. 2 rubles. M.K. Istomin

Destroyers (fighters)

... "Troubled" - cap. 2 rubles. N.V. Baranov

... "Bouncy" - cap. 2 rubles. P.V. Ivanov

... "Exuberant" - cap. 2 rubles. N.N. Kolomeitsev

... "Fast" - leith. OO Richter

... "Shiny" - cap. 2 rubles. S. A. Shamov

... "Bravy" - leith. P.P. Durnovo

... "Flawless" -cap. 2 rubles. I.A. Matusevich 2nd

... "Loud" - cap. 2 rubles. G.F. Kern

... "Grozny" - cap. 2 rubles. K.K. Andrzhievsky

Squadron ships

Transport workshop "Kamchatka" - cap. 2 rubles. A.I.Stepanov

Transport "Irtysh" (formerly "Belgium") - cap. 2 rubles. K. L. Ergomyshev

Transport "Anadyr" - cap. 2 rubles. V.F. Ponomarev

Transport "Korea" - Doc. Medical. I.O.Zubov

Tugboat "Rus" (formerly "Roland") - cap. 1 bit V.Pernitz

Tugboat "Svir" - Warrant Officer G.A. Rosenfeld

Hospital ship "Eagle" - from.k.2 r. Ya.K. Lokhmatov

Hospital ship "Kostroma" - Colonel N. Smelsky

In this order, the squadron approached the Korea Strait. The squadron was in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming ships, only one was detained, the rest were not even examined. The squadron's location was unmasked by hospital ships, which had full coverage. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any secrecy of the squadron's movement. Admiral Rozhestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korea Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet in it. In addition, he believed that the advancement of scouts would only help the enemy find the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that with the superiority of the Japanese in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by intelligence to perform any maneuver.

Rejecting intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhestvensky's reference to the desire to maintain secrecy of the squadron's movement does not stand up to criticism at all, since the squadron could easily be detected by the enemy from the hospital ships that were with it, which in fact happened.

The abandonment of six transports with the squadron had no compelling justification, since they did not have any vital cargoes. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruiser for their protection. In addition, the presence of the Irtysh slow-moving transport reduced the squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Admiral Rozhestvensky did not take any measures to conceal the movement, did not organize reconnaissance behind the enemy, and did not accelerate the movement of the squadron itself.

On the night of May 13-14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to the large number of ships that were part of the squadron, its marching order was very complicated. The squadron was in the ranks of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one was made up of transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex structure, ships inevitably had to carry fire at night in order to prevent the possibility of collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides, facing inward of the formation, and wake lights; the masthead lights were extinguished. On the hospital ships sailing in the tail of the squadron, all the lights were open, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and course.

Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, which it knew about the proximity of the intercepted radio messages.

On the night of May 14, the ships went ready for battle. The artillery crew rested in the places provided for by the combat schedule.

At that time, the 2nd Pacific Squadron included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd rank, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. Admiral Rozhestvensky's flag was on the battleship "Prince Suvorov". The junior flagships, Rear Admirals Nebogatov and Enquist, were stationed: the first on the battleship Nikolai I, and the second on the cruiser Oleg.

Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship "Oslyabya" was not lowered.

The tactical data of the ships that became part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were 4 new battleships of the Borodino class. These ships were intended for sailing in limited areas, and a strong overload of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long transitions, sharply reduced their combat qualities, since the armor belt was submerged in the water, and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship "Oslyabya" was very different from them - a seaworthy ship, but weak in armor and artillery ("Oslyabya" was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - "Sisoy the Great", "Navarin" and "Nicholas I" had nothing in common either with each other or with the previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, the three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov class were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.

The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers, and two Nissin-class battleships. With the exception of the last two, all ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the peculiarities of the Far Eastern theater.

According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were significantly stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.

Fleet	Reservation (in%) with armor thickness		Unarmored area
	More than 152 mm	Less than 152 mm
Russian battleships
Japanese battleships

Fleet	Artillery		Ship speed, knots
	Weight of thrown metal in min. (lbs)	The weight of the discarded adult. substances per min. (lbs)	The greatest	Smallest
Russian battleships	19366
Japanese battleships	53520	7493

A comparison of these figures shows that the Japanese ships were better armored and had a higher speed. The artillery on the Japanese ships was twice as fast as the Russian, which allowed the Japanese to throw out a much larger number of shells in one minute.

Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosives, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, the Japanese shells were superior to the Russians in high-explosive action. In addition, the force of the explosive (shimosa) in the Japanese shells was approximately twice that of the pyroxylin used in the Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that the Japanese ships were significantly superior to the Russians in artillery preparation, and also that the Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than that of the Japanese (60 versus 39 percent) ...

In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. Against 9 Russians, the Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number of all sorts of obsolete and auxiliary ships.

See the continuation on the website: For advanced - Naval commanders - The Tragedy of Tsushima

As already noted, the beginning of the war found a detachment of Russian ships under the command of Rear Admiral Virenius on the way to Port Arthur, but it was decided to return it to the Baltic. From the very first days of the war at sea, the preponderance of forces was on the side of Japan, and the Russian ships did not take active action. Russia's naval forces in the Far East needed to be strengthened. For this, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was formed in the Baltic.

After the death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" and Admiral S.O. Makarov, the preparation of the 2nd squadron for the campaign, which was led by Vice-Admiral A. A. Birilev and counter-admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, accelerated. Rozhestvensky became the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. It was based on the latest ships - the battleships "Prince Suvorov", "Borodino", "Emperor Alexander III", "Eagle", the cruisers "Oleg", "Izumrud", "Pearls", the destroyers "Grozny", "Loud", "Frisky "," Piercing "and" discerning ". The squadron was supplemented by the battleship Oslyabya, the cruiser Aurora and the destroyers that were part of Virenius's detachment. These were new ships, their brothers were already at war with the enemy as part of the 1st Pacific Squadron. In addition, obsolete ships - the battleships Navarin, Si-soi Veliky, the cruisers Admiral Nakhimov, Dmitry Donskoy - were repaired in the Baltic and were also included in the 2nd squadron. Several foreign steamers were bought and converted into auxiliary cruisers: "Terek", "Kuban", "Ural", "Rion", "Don" and "Dnepr". These ships were supposed to operate on enemy lines of communication. The squadron included the steamer "Rus", which housed an aeronautical fleet of balloons. The dubious combat value of the cruisers "Svetlana" and "Almaz", converted from yachts, did not prevent their inclusion in the squadron.

On August 1, Rozhdestvensky raised his flag on the battleship "Prince Suvorov", which was in Kronstadt. In August, the ships of the squadron made a practical voyage in the Baltic Sea, and on August 29 they moved to Revel, where they were actively engaged in firing, repelling mine attacks and preparing for the campaign. On September 26, an imperial review of the squadron took place on the Revel roadstead. On October 2, the squadron set off on a campaign from Libava. The squadron was accompanied by a large number of transports with spare parts for ships, various military cargo and coal. She had to cover 18,000 miles, overcome three oceans, reach Port Arthur and, having united with the 1st Pacific Squadron, achieve supremacy at sea, interrupt the delivery of supplies and reinforcements for the Japanese army from Japan to help the Russian ground forces to unblock Port Arthur. Along the entire route of the 2nd squadron, Russia did not have a single port and naval base of its own. Replenishment of supplies, loading coal and receiving water, repairing ships - all this had to be done either on the high seas or on poorly equipped roadsteads of neutral countries. Coal for the squadron was delivered by German coal miners of the Hamburg-America Line company.

When the squadron passed the Danish straits, increased combat readiness remained, and attacks by Japanese destroyers were expected, which could operate from the shores of their allied England. On the night of October 9, the Hull incident occurred in the North Sea - the ships of the squadron fired at British fishermen, mistaking them for Japanese fighters. At 0.55 the battleship "Suvorov" opened fire, it was supported by other ships of the squadron. Only at 01.05 am the shooting stopped. As a result, one fishing boat was sunk, five bots were damaged, two fishermen were killed, six were injured. Five shells hit the cruiser Aurora, wounding two people. The incident was examined by an international commission of admirals in The Hague. The Russian government paid 65,000 pounds to the injured fishermen. Art.

It should be noted that almost every week the ships of the squadron loaded coal, with the expectation to always have a full supply of it. Rozhestvensky even issued a special order No. 138 of October 27 about this. Residential decks, wardrooms of ships, rooms for torpedo tubes, passages, baths, dryers were covered with coal. Whole heaps of coal were placed on the decks of ships, in bags and so on. The loading was carried out by the crew and very exhausting the sailors. A participant in the campaign wrote about this: "No report, no brightest description is able to depict the whole gravity of the situation of the transitions of the second squadron. For the first time in the history of fleets of the whole world, everyone saw a large squadron, which, having no naval bases or coal stations, ships of all types, ages and requirements, dared to move on such a long journey ... The entire transition from Tangier to Madagascar was a continuous coal operation. Loading coal turned into a sport, loaded onto prizes. After finishing loading coal, the detachment immediately went out to sea and followed on. "

It was decided to split the squadron - ships with a shallow draft and transports to be sent through the Mediterranean and Red Seas under the command of Rear Admiral D. G. Felkerzam. On November 12, the ships passed the Suez Canal. On December 6, the detachment went into the Indian Ocean, leading the destroyers in tow. On December 15, the ships arrived at Nosy Be, Madagascar.

Five battleships (Suvorov, Alexander III, Borodino, Oryol and Oslyabya) with a large draft and three cruisers (Aurora, Admiral Nakhimov and Dmitry Donskoy) made the transition around Africa for 55 days. They stopped for refueling with coal, water and supplies in Dakar, Gabun, Great Fish Bay, Angrra Pekven. We crossed the equator on November 19. The Cape of Good Hope was successfully passed, and when entering the Indian Ocean, the ships were caught in a strong storm, the wave height reached 12 meters (with a length of 105 meters). Having overcome all these difficulties, on December 16 the ships dropped anchor off Madagascar, next to the small island of St. Mary.

On December 19, the Maritime Ministry announced that Nebogatov's detachment would be sent to reinforce the 2nd squadron, and Rozhestvensky needed to change the route of movement. On December 25, an order was issued to wait in Madagascar for the detachment of captain "1st rank L. F. Dobrotvorsky. Having corrected the damage, received instructions from the command and loaded coal, the Russian ships moved to Nosy-be, where Felkerzam's detachment was already located and the rest of the ships began to wait. The squadron was joined by the auxiliary cruiser "Ural." The squadron's mooring in Madagascar lasted until March 3, 1905. The crews loaded coal, water and food, repaired the mechanisms and hulls of the ships. During the stay in Madagascar, the news of the fall of Port Arthur and the complete destruction of the 1st Pacific Squadron was received.This news and the prolonged (two and a half months) inactivity negatively affected the morale of the officers and sailors of the squadron.

On February 1, the ships of the catching detachment of Captain 1st Rank Dobrotvorsky joined the squadron. Since not all the ships included in the squadron had time to enter the ranks before it went to sea, they were included in this squadron. It includes the cruisers Oleg, Izumrud, auxiliary cruisers Rion, Dnepr, and destroyers Grozny, Gromkiy, Frisky, Piercing and Prosory. On November 3, the pursuing detachment went to sea. On the passage to Tangier, the ships were accompanied by the training ship "Ocean", which later returned to the Baltic. Further, the ships of the detachment were divided into three groups, which went independently. The first group - "poo" included "Oleg" and "Izumrud", the second - "Dnepr", "Gromkiy" and "Grozny." These ships reached Nosi-be safely. The situation was different with the third group, which included "Rion "," Frisky "," Discerning "and" Piercing ". The destroyers constantly suffered breakdowns, and the ships made long stops in ports. On December 15, all groups met in the Court, where they stood until December 26. On December 29, the ships passed the Suez Canal. C On January 6-19, the parking lot in Djibouti, where the Rezvy was left for repairs, on January 20, the detachment, having lost three destroyers, left for Nosi-be.

In St. Petersburg, it was decided to continue the campaign, and on March 3, the 2nd Pacific Squadron left Nosi-be and headed for the shores of Indochina, where they were to meet with Nebogatov's detachment. Now the squadron had to independently break through to Vladivostok, and not to Port Arthur, and, having met alone with the Japanese fleet, in a general battle, decide the fate of the war at sea. Rozhestvensky wrote: “The first squadron, which had before the war 30 warships of different ranks and 28 destroyers, was not enough to master the sea. will also not be sufficient for mastering the sea. Adding 4 bad warships, Nebogatov will add 8 transports, the protection of which will bind the movement of the squadron. "

The crossing from Madagascar to Kamrang took 28 days. The torpedo boats covered almost the entire route in tugs. On April 1, the ships entered Cam Ranh Bay. However, the French government demanded to leave the bay. On April 9, after finishing the loading of coal, water and supplies, all the warships left the bay and maneuvered at sea for four days. Only transports remained in the bay, guarded by the II rank cruiser Almaz. On April 13, the squadron moved to Van Fong Bay, 40 miles north of Cam Ranh, where Nebogatov's detachment began to await. On April 26, the squadron set out to sea and at 15.00, 20 miles from Van Fong Bay, it connected with Nebogatov's detachment.

The decision to create the 3rd Pacific Squadron was made in November 1904, when most of the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron were destroyed, and there were less and less hopes for its help in the fight against the Japanese. In these conditions, it became necessary to urgently strengthen the 2nd Pacific Squadron. It was supposed to send to the Far East battleships "Slava", "Emperor Nikolai 1", "Emperor Alexander II", coastal defense battleships "Admiral Ushakov", "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin", cruisers "Vladimir Monomakh", "Memory Azov "," Admiral Kornilov "and more than a dozen destroyers. But some of the ships did not have time to finish building, some ships turned out to be too old and they decided to leave them in the Baltic. As a result, only a detachment of Rear Admiral Nebogatov was sent for reinforcement. It consisted of the battleship "Emperor Nicholas I", the coastal defense battleships "Admiral Ushakov", "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin" and the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh". The ships hastily prepared for the upcoming voyage: they installed new weapons, rangefinders and searchlights, improved protection from fragments. By February 1905, the preparation of the ships of the detachment was completed. On February 3, the detachment left Libava, on February 12, the ships passed the English Channel. March 12 passed the Suez Canal. After anchorage in Djibouti (March 20-24), they successfully passed the Indian Ocean, entered the Strait of Malacca on April 19, and on April 24 met with Rozhdestvensky's squadron. The detachment traveled 12,000 miles in 83 days.

Now the 2nd Pacific Squadron was assembled. There were 34 warships under the flag of Rozhdestvensky - 8 battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 9 cruisers, 5 auxiliary cruisers, 9 destroyers, a large number of auxiliary ships and transports. At a meeting between Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov, it was announced about the further route of the squadron - to Vladivostok, it will break through the shortest route through the Korean Strait. Taking coal, water and supplies, painting the ships and repairing the damage, the squadron moved on on May 1. On the evening of May 5, the cruisers Oleg and Aurora examined the British steamship Oldgamia, on which military contraband was discovered. In addition to kerosene, he was carrying 2xZ05-mm and 47x120-mm guns to Japan. The steamer was taken as a prize and on May 8 was sent to sail with the auxiliary cruiser "Kuban". On May 9, the auxiliary cruiser "Terek" left for cruising. On May 10, the last coal loading for the squadron took place. On this day, Rozhestvensky issued his last order, which said that "it is necessary to be ready for battle every hour," as well as about the management of the squadron, about the actions of the commanders of ships and flagships. On May 12, the transports Yaroslavl, Voronezh, Vladimir, Meteor, Livonia and Kuronia left for Shanghai, accompanied by the auxiliary cruisers Rion and Dnepr, which later went on to cruise. only the Kamchatka floating workshop, the Anadyr, Irtysh, and Korea military transports, the Svir and Rus tugboats and the Kostroma and Orel floating hospitals remained. On May 13, the squadron spent the whole day maneuvering in full strength. The difficult ocean crossing was completed. During the cruise, 5 officers and 32 lower ranks were killed and died on the ships of the squadron, 54 people were sent back to Russia due to illness.

On May 11, Rear Admiral Felkerzam died, but they did not inform the squadron of this, Nebogatov, who was now the first deputy commander of the squadron, did not recognize this either. The ships were preparing for the upcoming meeting with the enemy fleet.

Thirty warships of the 2nd Squadron faced a confrontation with the Japanese United Fleet, which included 4 battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 12 cruisers, 13 auxiliary cruisers, 21 fighters, 43 destroyers and coastal defense ships. Togo concentrated its main forces in the Korea Strait. Here the Russian squadron was awaited by three squadrons - six combat detachments, five detachments of fighters and eight detachments of destroyers. The Japanese had many advantages - the Russian squadron was numerically weaker than the Japanese fleet, less homogeneous, significantly less staffed, the crews of Russian ships were less trained. Do not forget about the overloading of Russian ships with coal reserves, which withstood a seven-month voyage. While the Russians were making their difficult transition, the Japanese completely repaired their ships, increased their armament, ammunition and protection, taking into account the experience of recent battles. For the rest of the time, the crews of the United Fleet ships were actively engaged in combat training. It should be noted that the Russian squadron was opposed by a fleet that had rich combat experience in a difficult confrontation with the 1st Pacific Squadron. When the Russian squadron passed the Indian Ocean, Togo gathered his ships at the base and waited for the enemy's approach.

On the night of May 14, on the 224th day of an unprecedented campaign, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait.

Formation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

As mentioned earlier, Russia had significant reinforcements, for not all of its naval forces by January 1904 were concentrated in the Far East. It would seem that the first concern of the main command, as soon as the war began, was to accelerate the readiness of the ships under construction and reserve ships and organize a new squadron, especially since Port Arthur was immediately significantly weakened.

But the Russian government and the main command did not admit the idea that the latter could be defeated. The underestimation of the enemy, the lack of a clear understanding of the real danger to which our Far Eastern fleet was exposed, being weaker than the Japanese, and at the same time in a disadvantageous strategic position, and the expectation of an imminent end of the war - created an atmosphere of fatal delusions. Neither the commander-in-chief, Admiral Alekseev, nor the commander of the army, gene. Kuropatkin, or even Admiral Makarov, did not raise this issue in the first months of the war.

It was only in the second half of March 1904 that talk began about strengthening our naval forces; discussion of real measures was put on the queue only after the death of Admiral Makarov. The catastrophe with Petropavlovsk made everyone startle. It was decided to create the 2nd Pacific Squadron from the remaining in the Baltic and unfinished combat ships, the formation of which was entrusted to Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky.

However, the preparation of the squadron proceeded slowly. There was a hope that the Port Arthur squadron, after correcting the Tsarevich and Retvizan, would be able to break through to Vladivostok. It took brutal blows to knock out unfounded optimism and make things really look.

Such a blow was the unsuccessful battle on July 28 in the Yellow Sea. Now it became clear that the ability to turn events in the naval theater of war entirely depended on whether the Arthur squadron could be in time to provide assistance to the Arthurian squadron earlier than it, together with the fortress, would be taken by the enemy or destroyed. It was necessary to hurry with the 2nd squadron.

On August 10, 1904, under the chairmanship of the tsar, a meeting was held in Tsarskoe Selo, at which the situation that had arisen was discussed. Some ministers felt that it was impossible to rush the dispatch of the squadron until the equipment and testing of new ships were completely completed; time must be given for practice and training, leaving the squadron in the Baltic until spring; in addition, not counting on the Port Arthur squadron, to reinforce its composition with 7 cruisers, which were supposed to be bought from Chile and Argentina. Only Rozhdestvensky protested against this, insisting that otherwise it would be necessary to disband with great difficulties the organized apparatus for supplying the squadron on the way, for which foreign (mainly German) shipping campaigns were involved. According to Rozhestvensky, it was better to leave immediately and wait for reinforcements in Madagascar. Rozhdestvensky's insistence had a decisive influence on the meeting and it was decided in the fall of 1904 to send a squadron in the composition that could be assembled by that time, having attached Chilean and Argentine cruisers to it in Madagascar.

Note... In spite of the purchase of Chilean and Argentine cruisers, he apparently had a great influence on the decision to send a squadron. Indeed, if this purchase took place, it would be possible to equip and prepare them well, they would significantly strengthen the 2nd squadron. But the purchase failed. This was prevented by England, which was not in whose interests it was to assist the Russians. Such an outcome could have been foreseen before. A characteristic phenomenon for the lightweight strategy of Russia under the old regime.

A few days later, the need to speed up the exit of the squadron was confirmed by the commander-in-chief in the Far East.

• 1st battleship squad... Lin, cor. Prince Suvorov (flag of adm. Rozhdestvensky). Borodino, Alexander III, Oryol.
• 2nd battleship squad... Battleship. Oslyabya (flag of Adm. Felkerzam), Sisoy the Great, Navarin and the cruiser Admiral Nakhimov.
• Squad of cruisers... cruisers Almaz (flag of adm. Enquist), Aurora, Svetlana, Zhemchug, Dmitry Donskoy.

The squadron had 8 destroyers and a detachment of transports. A little later, a detachment under the command of the cap was supposed to go out and join her. 1 rank Dobrotvorskiy in the cruisers Oleg, Izumrud and auxiliary cruisers Dnepr and Rion (formerly steamers of the Volunteer Fleet).

The squadron faced a huge transition in conditions of exceptional difficulty, since it did not have a single base along the entire route from Libau to the Pacific Ocean. She was allowed to use the anchorage to the extent that neutral countries would not interfere. The supply of coal to the squadron was completely dependent on the conscientiousness of foreign suppliers. The squadron could not receive a dock or serious repairs in case of accidents.

The personnel of the squadron was hastily recruited and had almost no combat training.

In general, the combat readiness of the 2nd squadron left a lot to be desired. This was not a fully prepared and organized formation that could withstand the Japanese fleet, which had passed a large military school, which had an exemplary organization, practice and combat experience. The relatively large number of ships assembled together satisfied only the external impression of people who looked superficially at combat strength, unable or unwilling to see the shortcomings with which the squadron was so rich; but these shortcomings inevitably had to be reflected in the battle.

Upon reaching Tangier, the squadron split up. Some of the ships, the draft of which made it possible to pass through the Suez Canal, went under the command of Admiral Felkerzam this way. Rozhdestvensky with the main forces went around Africa. Both squads merged in Madagascar on December 25, 1904.

The swimming, as you would expect, was extremely difficult. The haste in supplying the squadron made itself felt with a large number of minor accidents. The coal issue was equally difficult: neutral states put all sorts of obstacles (especially England), not allowing, quite often, to load on the roadstead, and the squadron usually had to do this operation at sea.

Soon after coming to Madagascar, Rozhdestvensky received information about the fall of Port Arthur; it turned out that the purchase of the Argentine and Chilean cruisers, whose support was due to the very plan of sending the 2nd squadron, did not take place; finally, the German coal miners, who had fed the squadron so far, refused to supply coal beyond Madagascar ... many ship commanders.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky reported to Petersburg that he considered it impossible to linger in Madagascar, that, having settled the issue with the coal miners, he had to hurry to go now in order to arrive earlier than the Japanese had time to put their forces in order, without giving them time to equip and train resistance, and obstacles in the way. He indicated that now his intention was to break through to Vladivostok, at least with losses, and from there to act on the routes of the Japanese communications.

In response, Rozhestvensky received a directive to wait for the Dobrotvorsky detachment to join him at all costs, which left with a significant delay. In addition, he was informed that a new detachment was hastily prepared in Russia to reinforce the squadron under the command of Admiral Nebogatov, which was to leave at the beginning of February (it included: the outdated battleship Nikolai I, coastal defense battleships Ushakov, Senyavin, Apraksin and the old cruiser Vladimir Monomakh).

However, considering that the sent reinforcements would not add much strength to him, but would delay him very significantly, Rozhdestvensky demanded the right to leave. This was followed by an order to certainly wait for Dobrotvorsky; as far as Nebogatov is concerned, one need not wait for him.

Petersburg, differently than Rozhdestvensky, looked at the appointment of the 2nd squadron. She was now entrusted with a task that far exceeded the modest help she could expect to show. Twice in the telegram of the tsar addressed to Rozhdestvensky, it is indicated that the squadron is not aiming to break through to Vladivostok, but to seize the Sea of ​​Japan, i.e. battle with the main forces of the Japanese fleet and defeat them.

Rozhestvensky clearly understood that an impossible task was being set for him. But he did not find the resolve to declare this openly and categorically. He was nervous, annoyed in private letters at the hopelessness of the squadron's further march, but he was officially silent.

The parking lot in Madagascar dragged on. Misunderstandings with coal miners, waiting for Dobrotvorsky and correspondence with St. Petersburg delayed the squadron. Despite the fact that she had the opportunity to perform some exercises here, due to the general decline in morale and mood of the personnel and the difficult conditions of anchorage, the combat readiness of the squadron improved very little. The hopes that had been pinned on the possibility of preparation along the way did not materialize.

The situation was complicated by the fact that Rozhdestvensky himself, in whose freedom and nerves all the burdens of emotions were discharged, began to noticeably give up. His health was failing. In a private letter, he wrote that he did not feel the data necessary to cope with his task, and asked to appoint another admiral in advance, so as not to leave the squadron in anarchy...

On February 1, the Dobrotvorsky detachment joined on March 3, the squadron went to sea, laying a course for the Malak Strait.

After a very difficult transition, coupled with several loading of coal in the ocean, the squadron, crossing the Indian Ocean on April 1, arrived in Kamran Bay (on the Indo-China Peninsula, near Saigon). There she stayed awaiting Nebogatov's detachment, which arrived on April 24. The meeting took place in b. Van Fong, where the squadron was forced to move from Kamran at the request of the French authorities. Thus, all the forces were united. They were to make the last transition to the theater of operations.

Now Rozhestvensky had to decide: whether to continue the movement of the squadron to Vladivostok or abandon it, confine himself to demonstrative actions south of Japan, or, finally, return back. If you go to Vladivostok, which way? The solution of these issues directed the further course of events.

The squadron, exhausted by the campaign, which took place in incredibly difficult conditions, depressed morally and physically, poorly equipped and poorly trained, inferior in strength to the enemy could not count on victory. Almost everyone was aware of this, but Rozhestvensky himself was more aware of this than others. He was completely suppressed by these shortcomings of the squadron and did not believe at all in the favorable outcome of the inevitable battle.

There are indirect indications that Admiral Rozhdestvensky still hoped that prudence would take over from the main command, that the squadron's campaign would be canceled. He and his closest subordinates apparently hoped that Petersburg would be satisfied with the fact that the squadron was coming to the East, giving. favorable starting position for concluding peace with Japan.

Note... In his book Reckoning Cap. 2nd rank Semenov, who was at the headquarters of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, talks about the meeting that took place during the transition to Kamran on Suvorov. According to him, at this meeting, the flag officer of Rozhdestvensky said: What is to be done? I will answer sharply - to take advantage of the effect that is undoubtedly caused by our appearance in the South China Sea in full force without losses, and to hasten with the conclusion of an honorable peace. To hope for the success of further maritime operations is to dream of a miracle ... Unfortunately, it is not up to us to make such a decision ... It's a pity ... Semyonov goes on to say. the admiral not only did not express his personal opinion, but did not even submit any replies. It seemed to me, however (maybe I'm wrong) that he was sympathetic to this proposal.

Admiral Rozhestvensky himself did not find the moral strength to categorically put before the government the question of abandoning the offensive, being bound by the obligations given to them earlier (it was not who else, exactly how he insisted on the immediate dispatch of the squadron from Russia, hurrying it along the way; finally slogan thrown by Rozhdestvensky wash away the bitter shame of the motherland, to give revenge to the Japanese for the previous failures of the fleet, were obliged to remain silent). As for the government, it looked at the events under the hypnosis of hope for an opportunity, for a miracle, hoping that maybe Rozhestvensky would be able to defeat the Japanese, completely wrongly assessing the really difficult situation that did not give any chance of victory, which was developing around the 2nd squadrons. A number of assurances given to public opinion that the prestige of power that had fallen after the first setbacks of the war prompted them to rush to adventures.

Thus, a situation arose that it was impossible to retreat for those persons in whose hands the fate of the squadron was.

Projects outside the Sea of ​​Japan, based on ocean islands and hence threatening the messages that were spoken about after Tsushima - all these are theories that are practically inapplicable due to the deeper reasons we mentioned above. The squadron had to go. Thus, one of the possible solutions disappeared.

But how to go? Three roads to Vladivostok were opened before Rozhdestvensky, and all three were fraught with difficulties, risk and danger: the Korean, Sangar or La Peruz straits?

In his testimony to the commission of inquiry, Rozhestvensky explained his decision as follows: ... A breakthrough to Vladivostok was necessary and urgent. I expected that the squadron would meet in the Korea Strait, or near it, the concentrated forces of the Japanese armored fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that a general battle would take place during the day, and at night the ships of the squadron would be attacked by the entire presence of the Japanese mine fleet. Nevertheless, I could not admit the thought of the complete extermination of the squadron, and, by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships. I decided to break through the Korean Strait, and not the Sangar Strait, because a breakthrough by the latter would present more navigational difficulties, would be fraught with great dangers, in view of the fact that the Japanese publications would secure themselves the right to resort to the use of floating mines and obstacles in suitable places, and because the relatively slow movement of the squadron to the Sangar Strait would certainly have been accurately tracked down by the Japanese and their allies, and the breakthrough would have been blocked by the same concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet that were opposed to our squadron in the Korea Strait. As for the passage in May from Annam to Vladivostok through the La Perouse Strait, it seemed to me absolutely impossible - having lost some of the ships in the fogs and having suffered from accidents and wrecks, the squadron could be paralyzed by a lack of coal and become an easy prey for the Japanese fleet..

Note... However, Rear Admiral Nebogatov held a different opinion on this issue:In case, for some reason, I could not connect with Admiral Rozhestvensky, and thus, I would have to go to Vladivostok on my own, I ... worked out a plan to go to Vladivostok, going out to the Pacific Ocean, south of Formosa, bypassing the eastern side of Japan, keeping at least 200 miles away from it, enter the Sea of ​​Okhotsk by one of the straits between the Kuril Islands, and then, under the cover of the prevailing very thick fogs at this time of the year, reach Vladivostok through the La Peruz Strait. The detachment had very large reserves of coal on transports, favorable weather at that time in the Pacific Ocean, the already established experience of loading coal from transports in the ocean, the possibility of towing small battleships with transports - all these circumstances allowed me to consider this plan to reach Vladivostok very likely to be executed.

Thus, Rozhestvensky went in the most dangerous direction, deciding to cut the knot here. The Japanese fleet was concentrated in the Korea Strait in full force. The 2nd Squadron was heading straight for him.

To ensure a breakthrough and divert Japanese forces, Rozhestvensky resorted to a demonstration, ordering the auxiliary cruisers (former steamers of the Volunteer Fleet) stationed in the squadron to cruise the Dnieper and Rion in the Yellow Sea, and the Kuban and Terek in the ocean on the southern side of Japan. But this demonstration was too weak to induce the Japanese to split their forces and mislead about the intentions of the Russian fleet.